snell@utzoo.uucp (snell) (03/05/88)
In article <308@bacchus.DEC.COM>, larrabee@decwrl.UUCP (Tracy Larrabee) writes: >In article <495@picuxa.UUCP> gp@picuxa.UUCP (Greg Pasquariello X1190) writes: >>Is this for real? Can it be that parrots can not only speak like humans >>but ALSO _UNDERSTAND_ WHAT THEY ARE SAYING!!! Maybe we can send a parrot >>to the moon, not as a test animal, but as an astronaut! Hell, maybe he can >>run for President!! > >Would you like to send Koko the Gorilla to the moon? How about the >African Gray at Purdue who has a 100 word vocabulary--that is, he says and >understands at least 100 different words. I have to wonder what the operational definition of "communicate" is here. I would accept that some response can be elicited from the parrot by exposing it to each of 100 or more words. Perhaps the same response is elicited in each case. I can also accept, since parrots are excellent mimics, that a bird might develop an extremely large repertoire of "words." Certainly, there are other birds with immense song repertoires, though this in no way implies that they exchange immense quantities of information. Nor does it imply that they have any special ability to think. I certainly have seen no evidence to support the contention that any parrot can understand the information content of anything even remotely approaching 100 different words. Whether the parrot can utter them or not is beside the point. >He can communicate using the >concepts of the names of 4 different colors, the first 5 integers, and >negation. Now, I do not scan the contents of the Journal of Irreproducible Results, but I must admit that I have missed this one. Please give us a reference to a study which provides evidence supporting these claims. I would be happy to read it with a critical (not the same as skeptical) frame of mind. Now I have no doubt that a parrot exposed to sufficient repetitions of an audible sequence "one-two-three-four-five" might come to mimic that sequence, and not miss a beat. This in no way indicates any cognitive awareness of what an integer is. Similarly, a parrot might come to mimic a sequence "red-blue-yellow-green," and perhaps even spontaneously emit parts of the sequence at various times. No cognitive awareness need be invoked. >He can ask that things be done to him or for him or that they >not be done. His researchers were espescially surprised when he "learned" >the concept of negation by himself. Prior to that they had believed that >they could not teach him negation because it was thought to be too >sophisticated a lingustic concept. Please give us an operational definition of "the concept of negation" as it would be applied to parrots. Exactly what has this bird done, or not done, which makes you believe this? The Purdue Parrot is not the first example of a supposedly intelligent animal. One of the parrot's most famous predecesors was a horse named Clever Hans. Some 80 years ago, this horse amazed the scientific world and also the popular press with his apparent abilities to count, spell, and apparently manifest intelligence. Clever Hans would perform, not just for his owner who evidently was a sincere man who truly believed in the abilities of his horse, but for many others as well. There can be no doubt that it was a remarkable phenomenon. I suspect is it rather naive to dismiss Clever Hans as a historical curiosity, which could not happen in our more "enlightened" age. Clever Hans would tap out numbers with his hoof, stopping when he reached the right answer. It was discovered that people were subconsciously cueing the horse, by a small jerk of the head or some other movement. The horse was able to detect such movement when it was as small as even 0.2 mm. As has been pointed out in many analyses since then, not just of Clever Hans, but of the whole field of self-deception and gullibility, this desire to communicate with animals is a recurrent fashion. In the 1950's the fad became dolpins. After that, the fad progressed to sign language with apes (which Ms. Larrabee alludes to when she mentions Koko, who reportedly described a zebra as a "white tiger.") The superstar of ape signing was Nim Chimpsky, named after Noam Chomsky. Nim's longest recorded utterance was a 16 word statement, "Give orange me give eat orange me eat orange give me eat orange give me you." For a detailed and enlightening analysis of this, read Umiker-Sebeok and Sebeok (Clever Hans and Smart Simians, _Anthropos_ 76:89-166, 1981). Another discussion is in Wade (Does Man alone have language? Apes Reply in Riddles, and a Horse says Neigh. _Science_ 208:1349-1351, 1980). The bottom line is this: the apes have been busy making monkeys out of their proponents. In short, I no more think the Purdue Parrot is engaged in intelligent conversation than I think Clever Hans was. >The bird has been on TV and written up in magazines and newspapers. This is not exactly an endorsement--there are many foolish things on television. >He has also plucked all the feathers off his body that he can reach. It is common for caged animals who are deprived of adequate stimulus to exhibit such aberrant, abnormal behaviour. To be anthropocentric for a moment, I could say that parrot is bored out of his little mind. >As an addendum, perhaps you don't think that linguistic ability alone >signifies intelligence. John Lilly and company seem to believe that if >they could prove that dolphins could communicate using language they would >have proven that dolphins are sapient beings. The fad for dolphin intelligence will continue, likely indefinitely. I was as amused as anyone to watch Mr. Spock mind-melt with a whale in Star Trek IV, but surely the pleasure of the fantasy does not imply any reality. >Yes, intelligence is a >multi-faceted thing, but parrots, gorillas, and dolphins are demonstrably >more advanced with respect to this multi-faceted thing than the other >animals that most of us have dealings with. Though clearly not a cut and dried issue, there is much evidence that many animals engage in elaborate social interactions. It is easy, for those who are so inclined, to anthropomorphise and imagine that these animals are "demonstrably more advanced." >Not to mention their laudable lack of sarcastic comments. You mistake sarcasm for skepticism. The blind-faith believers in animal intelligence could use a hearty dose of the latter. -- Name: Richard Snell Mail: Dept. Zoology, Univ. Toronto Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 1A1 UUCP: {allegra,decvax,ihnp4,linus,pyramid,yetti,utai}!utzoo!snell
jth@cuuxb.ATT.COM (6414~) (03/07/88)
In article <1988Mar4.162334.18184@utzoo.uucp> snell@utzoo.uucp (snell) writes: > >In article <308@bacchus.DEC.COM>, larrabee@decwrl.UUCP (Tracy Larrabee) writes: > >>As an addendum, perhaps you don't think that linguistic ability alone >>signifies intelligence. John Lilly and company seem to believe that if >>they could prove that dolphins could communicate using language they would >>have proven that dolphins are sapient beings. > >The fad for dolphin intelligence will continue, likely indefinitely. I was >as amused as anyone to watch Mr. Spock mind-melt with a whale in Star Trek IV, >but surely the pleasure of the fantasy does not imply any reality. To begin with, no one has been able to develop an absolute criteria for intelligence within the human race or otherwise. I would not have the audacity to be skeptical about animal intelligence when such a criteria is non-existant. Star Trek IV, although fictional, makes a perfect case in point of where man's unfortunate disreguard for his environment and his brethren creatures, could eventually lead to his demise. We persist in this day and age thinking that we can do anything and are capable of knowing anything, but until we do, a little humility will go a long way. So, lighten up. Enjoy animals, whether they are in a zoo or in a home. We're here on this planet together and we can learn from each other. It seems that the intent of this newsgroup is for discussion about birds of any kind and related topics. Joe Heneghan
govett@avsd.UUCP (David Govett) (03/08/88)
> I can also accept, since parrots are > excellent mimics, that a bird might develop an extremely large repertoire > of "words." Reminds me of a (possibly apocryphal) story I read about a linguist that visited a tribe in the Amazon basin. Seems they had a parrot that was the last "speaker" of the language of a vanished tribe, so no one in the village could understand what the historic bird said. Squawk squaaaaawk.
pell@boulder.Colorado.EDU (Anthony Pelletier) (03/08/88)
In article <1988Mar4.162334.18184@utzoo.uucp> snell@utzoo.uucp (snell) writes: > >In article <308@bacchus.DEC.COM>, larrabee@decwrl.UUCP (Tracy Larrabee) writes: >>Would you like to send Koko the Gorilla to the moon? How about the >>African Gray at Purdue who has a 100 word vocabulary--that is, he says and >>understands at least 100 different words. A small point, Irene Pepperburg, the owner/trainer of "Alex" has, I believe, left Purdue. I think she is at Minn. or Wisc. I don't recall which. This news came as a relief to us Purdue Alums. Publications of her's are hard to find, unless you count the cover story the "National Examiner" once did on Alex. When I was at ol' PU (pre '82) most people seemed to think that she was a nut. But, that does not make her wrong. In a typical demonstration, she, or one of her assistants will hold up a few different objects that are all the same color and ask "what same?" to which alex will respond "color" and, if asked, tell what the color is. Or, several geometric shapes of the same color might be held up and Alex asked "what different?" to which he would respond "shape." I think the "clever hans" model, mentioned by R. Snell, has not yet been ruled out. Remarkably subtle cues can be noticed by animals. In the "Hans" case, it was discovered when the researchers realised that the horse would not perform when his master was not in the room. Presumably, Hans watched his master and stamped his foot until the trainer reacted in some consistant way which hans had learned meant "stop stamping." He would do this no matter who asked the questions. But, with the master out of the room, there were no cues given. Does anyone know if Alex the parrot will respond the same way for other people even if Pepperburg (or other trainers) is not present? To my knowledge, that test has not been done, or at least, not reported. -tony
heather@blia.BLI.COM (Heather Mackinnon) (03/08/88)
<lots of refutations of the abilities of animals to communicate and act intelligently have been deleted> One of the key points that has returned to me over and over in the study of biology is that all living things are more similar to all other living things than they are different. We are more similar, genetically and at the cell level, than we are different from garbanzo beans. Parrots, dolphins and gorillas are all warm blooded animals, much more similar to us than they are different. Gorillas resemble us very closely, and dolphins even have a brain structure which is very similar to ours. Why, when it comes to cerebral activity, do we assume that other animals can't communicate and aren't intelligent? Why do we assume that humans are the only animals who can think and communicate meaningful concepts? When a person shows evidence that other animals can communicate intelligently either to humans or among themselves, that person is often attacked by the scientific community as being "unscientific" or a "crackpot". Why? I remember when pheromone research began that scientists were saying that only the lower animals were subject to pheromones; that there was no evidence that humans would be subject to the effects of pheromones. When I heard that, I snorted with disbelief that scientists would say such a thing with a total lack of evidence. Now, there IS evidence that humans have pheromones in much the same way other animals do. Should this surprise us? Should we be surprised to discover that we are very similar to all of the other animals who have evolved along with us; that we share their "bestial" traits and that they share our "human" ones? Heather Mackinnon
craig@unicus.UUCP (Craig D. Hubley) (03/10/88)
In article <4299@blia.BLI.COM> heather@blia.BLI.COM (Heather Mackinnon) writes: >One of the key points that has returned to me over and over in the study >of biology is that all living things are more similar to all other living >things than they are different. We are more similar, genetically and >at the cell level, than we are different from garbanzo beans. > >... > >Should we be surprised to discover that we are very similar to all of the >other animals who have evolved along with us; that we share their "bestial" >traits and that they share our "human" ones? No, we shouldn't be surprised. However, *which* of the myriad similarities between organisms is responsible for a particular behaviour is a matter for sustained and rigorous research. To say that Clever Hans can add or Koko can talk is easy. Adding and talking are easy things for humans to appreciate. To say that they are responding to subtle cues is difficult: Which subtle cues ? Why can't the researchers control their cueing ? Do you mean to say that *humans*, with their free will, respond that way too? It moves the assumptions from inside the animal's head, where they are hidden, to the relationship between the animal and researcher, which is more easily scrutinized and less easily characterized. In short, it opens a can of worms that were neatly hidden, though still there, before. That is, ascribing Koko's `eye hat' to a sense of humour or Nim's long nonsentence to a desire to communicate urgency is cheating, in the scientific sense. There is no proof of that. The fact that human children, at any age, do not utter such sentences as "me give me me orange eat give me orange", but rather quite different constructions, suggests strongly that the fundamental processes involved may be quite different. I will give apes more `credit' (if being like humans is credit!) than that: I think that Koko knew what an eye was, and what a hat was. I think that Nim knew what `me', `give' and `orange' meant. But my dog knows `Heili', which is her name, `walk', and `cookie'. If I say "Heili cookie walk", then she will most definitely understand me fully, though in fact I have said nothing in English. I suspect that a similar fault underlies animal language constructions. There may simply not be enough analytical/synthetic `firepower' to create abstract linkages, though there is strong evidence that linkages to concrete objects and even events are made and understood just as in humans. I furthermore don't doubt that animals can deliberately lie. Playing dumb, however, is a phenomenon that many of us have observed in our pets. For an animal to have some rudimentary sense of responsibility and blame does not to me seem necessarily indicative of a great deal of mental firepower. If it did, then I doubt it would be ingrained as deeply in human culture as other rudimentary behaviour such as sex. To give an animal the ability to finger-point and *directionally* shift the blame indicates more, but `Kate break sink' suggested that there was little if any understanding of the plausibility of the lie. To stack up boxes to reach a hanging banana seems to be slightly more intelligent behaviour than a rather dumb lie, and we already knew that apes could do that. I think what many anthropologists and some biologists tend to miss is that, for a given phenomenon, there are dozens of possible explanations, not all of which anthropologists or biologists are qualified to enumerate. The statistical significance of the utterance, that is, was `eye hat' the only one of a dozen two-word utterances that made any sense, is also often not closely enough considered. Some such statistical mistakes are deeply ingrained in human thought, even in the `estimates' of trained statisticians. Suffice it to say that complete charts of all of the ape utterances over an extended period of time, complete with a ratio of the total to the number that make sense, are usually not included with such a study. Furthermore, many of the researchers are *not* trained to avoid cueing: quite the opposite, many have worked with young children, where positive cueing is usually desirable. No doubt it encourages a secure atmosphere in which to learn; but is it learning ? Marvin (Martin?) Gardner, the Scientific American columnist, has written a book on ``Science: Good, Bad and Bogus'' with a chapter where he outlines the objections to this research in some detail. Suffice it to say that all of the points I've seen on this issue in this group are covered there, along with guides to the primary and review literature. I would love to see some real proof. But the key word is `proof' not `love'. Craig Hubley, Unicus Corporation, Toronto, Ont. craig@Unicus.COM (Internet) {uunet!mnetor, utzoo!utcsri}!unicus!craig (dumb uucp) mnetor!unicus!craig@uunet.uu.net (dumb arpa)
msellers@mntgfx.mentor.com (Mike Sellers) (03/10/88)
In article <4299@blia.BLI.COM>, heather@blia.BLI.COM (Heather Mackinnon) writes: > <lots of refutations of the abilities of animals to communicate and > act intelligently have been deleted> As a disclaimer, I don't believe the controversy here is over whether animals can communicate or act intelligently. Certainly they can. Bees, dogs, whales, birds, bats, apes, etc., have all been shown to be able to communicate in the wild and in some cases in captivity, and all are able to react to their perceived environment and react accordingly. The question seems to be more one of abstraction: do animals *think about* what they are doing, do they reflect on it, do they think about thinking? Except in a very limited sense, the answer, from all available and reliable evidence, seems to be "no". Birds and whales create beautiful music, but not in the methodical, considered way that Mozart or Springsteen do. Bees can do solar navigation better than me, but only for a very narrow and unchanging range of purposes, none of which are to get to Bimini. In short, humans seem to be alone in their consideration of the world, in the way we constantly examine, re-examine, abstract, associate, and formulate our perceptions of the world. The primary reason for this springs from the biological nature of intelligence, which is being understood (by humans) better all the time. I'll talk about this a little below. As a final disclaimer, let me note that discussions like this often seem to have at their unspoken root a concern for the value of animals. The fear seems to be that if Science (note the "S") shows us that these creatures do not think as we think that somehow their intrinsic value has diminished. I do not believe this to be the case. > One of the key points that has returned to me over and over in the study > of biology is that all living things are more similar to all other living > things than they are different. We are more similar, genetically and > at the cell level, than we are different from garbanzo beans. This is quite true, and is a sobering thought. However, it has little if anything to do with intelligence. > Parrots, dolphins and gorillas are all warm blooded animals, much more similar > to us than they are different. Gorillas resemble us very closely, and > dolphins even have a brain structure which is very similar to ours. It is true that any random vertebrate is more similar to us than different, "warm blooded" or not, but this too has little if anything to do with their being intelligent or not. It is NOT true that porpoises (dolphins is easier to type :-) ) have a brain structure similar to ours, or at least, not in some critical ways. This is where the "more similar than different" argument falls apart. Intelligence is not expressed on the cellular or genetic level; it is an epiphenomena arising from the interactions of *many* cells. Thus the similarities between me and a garbanzo bean that are striking on the cellular level do not reveal anything about similarities or differences on the systemic or organismic level. However, when we look at those factors that *do* affect intelligence, namely large scale neural mass, neural structures, and CNS to body mass ratios, we see that there are significant differences between humans and any other species (though the great apes resemble us more closely than the others, followed by dolphins). Humans begin life with a large cerebral cortex, a large portion of which is not dedicated to some specific function (e.g. sensation, motor response, etc.). These undedicated sections of the brain, residing primarily in the prefrontal, superior temporal, and parietal lobes, later become associated with much of what we refer to as hallmarks of uniquely human experience: broad association, abstract abstraction (that is, thinking about the principles behind already abstracted things, rather than just thinking about instances of those things), mathematics, complex language, etc.. Gorillas, chimpanzees, and to a lesser extent dolphins and other cetaceans also have a certain amount of undedicated cortical mass that is doubtless used in life for complex and intelligent types of behavior. In proportion to the human brain, however, these creatures do not have nearly the amount of their brain that is not used for strictly biological functions. It should be noted too that dogs have some brain mass not assigned to a specific function, cats slightly less, and birds and other animals little if any at all. This does not mean that these animals are unintelligent or unable to communicate, but it does mean that they simply do not have the brain mass available to be able to learn mathematics (even counting and negation), non-mimicry language, or other complex, abstracted tasks that most humans take for granted. Koko, Washoe, and other apes have been able to learn a certain amount of language and communicate effectively with it. This does not mean that they have minds or intelligence as it occurs in humans, but does serve to show that intelligence is more of a continuum than a binary yes-no phenomenon. > Why, when it comes to cerebral activity, do we assume that other animals > can't communicate and aren't intelligent? Why do we assume that humans > are the only animals who can think and communicate meaningful concepts? Assuming you mean communication above the level of the mechanistic, predictable, non-abstract modes (e.g. the sun-dance of the bee), the simple answer is that we have no evidence for it. Science tends to be minimalist; if there is no reliable evidence for the existance of something, it is assumed not to exist. There are some things that we still don't know what to think about, for example whale-songs. We don't know if these are mating calls, depth soundings, lures, or conversation. Until we know otherwise, however, it is imprudent to assume the whales are discussing Beauty, or algebra, or God, when all they are *most probably* doing is something much more prosaic. > When a person shows evidence that other animals can communicate intelligently > either to humans or among themselves, that person is often attacked by the > scientific community as being "unscientific" or a "crackpot". Why? If such a person cannot provide testable, refutable evidence that can be used in their absence, then the rest of the scientific community is essentially believing on their word. This is not a robust way of building a stable view of the world. It is rare that someone with a really outrageous claim ("my parrot does negation") is either willing or able to stand up to an unbiased investigation of their claim. Of course, the "unbiased" here is key; someone with a need to prove the first person wrong is no better than they are in making the wild claim. > I remember when pheromone research began that scientists were saying that > only the lower animals were subject to pheromones; that there was no evidence > that humans would be subject to the effects of pheromones. When I heard > that, I snorted with disbelief that scientists would say such a thing with > a total lack of evidence. Now, there IS evidence that humans have pheromones > in much the same way other animals do. Should this surprise us? There is (to my knowledge) little evidence that human behavior is affected by pheromones (can you provide sources, please?). Thus, a neuropharmacologist might say "we have no evidence that humans are affected by pheromones" or even "I don't see any reason to believe that humans are affected by pheromones." It is something of a mis-translation for someone else to then say "there you have it: humans are not affected by pheromones." New evidence could always come in and change things. On the other hand, in terms of your "snorting with disbelief", why should scientists say anything ELSE if there was no evidence for it (note that "no evidence for x" DOES NOT equate to "a total lack of evidence")? > Should we be surprised to discover that we are very similar to all of the > other animals who have evolved along with us; that we share their "bestial" > traits and that they share our "human" ones? > > Heather Mackinnon We are similar to apes, and lions, and lizards. Great. This is not a surprise. We share some "bestial" traits -- eating, defecating, and reproducing, as well as hormonal changes that produce changes in behavior. The *behavior* is not the commonality however; the biochemical base for it is. This is a very significant difference. There is little evidence, beyond that provided by Koko, Washoe, et al, that they share what we consider to be "human" traits. If you or anyone else can, without gross anthropomorphism, show evidence that some animals do show unexpectedly human traits, please do so. Otherwise, there is no *reason* to believe that such behavior exists. -- Mike Sellers ...!tektronix!sequent!mntgfx!msellers Mentor Graphics Corp., EPAD msellers@mntgfx.MENTOR.COM "Passion breeds hyperbole" -- The AI Business
cej@ll1a.UUCP (Jones) (03/10/88)
In article <4687@sigi.Colorado.EDU>, (Anthony Pelletier) writes: > In a typical demonstration, she, or one of her assistants will > hold up a few different objects that are all the same color and > ask "what same?" to which alex will respond "color" and, if asked, > tell what the color is. Or, several geometric shapes of the same > color might be held up and Alex asked "what different?" to which > he would respond "shape." From this description it seems that the animal may just be expressing a classical conditioned response to external stimuli. All this really indicates is that a parrot (or, more properly, a macaw) can distinguish between shapes. (I don't believe that macaws have color vision. It may be that a certain "answer" is associated with a certain combination of items.) As far as the questions the trainer asks go, macaws can differentiate between different "human sounds", without understanding their meaning. A friend's macaw can be prompted to "speak" any number of phrases that it knows by hearing that phrase. > I think the "clever hans" model, mentioned by R. Snell, has not > yet been ruled out. No "Clever Hans like cuing" is required in this case. The objects and the question are cuing enough. > In the "Hans" case, it was discovered when the researchers > realised that the horse would not perform when his master was not > in the room. Presumably, Hans watched his master and stamped his > foot until the trainer reacted in some consistant way which hans > had learned meant "stop stamping." He would do this no matter who > asked the questions. But, with the master out of the room, there > were no cues given. Not exactly accurate. Hans didn't perform as well with his master out of the room, and his performance varied depending on who was present. It seems Hans could read the "unconscious cuing" that many people seem to exhibit. If you were watching Hans, might your eyebrows go up when he got to the right number? Might you cross your arms? Shift your weight? Blink? > Does anyone know if Alex the parrot will respond the same way for > other people even if Pepperburg (or other trainers) is not > present? > > -tony With classical conditioning, it wouldn't matter. The real trick with Hans was that anyone could ask any questions that could be answered a number of stamps, not just a fixed set of questions dealing with a fixed set of objects. But it would be interesting to see just what shapes the bird can tell apart. What kind of depth perception does it have? Does shadowing or contrast play the biggest part in its perception of shape? ...ll1a!cej [Just me, not AT&T] Llewellyn Jones "Can't act, can't sing, can dance a little" - results of Fred Astaire's screen test
gcf@actnyc.UUCP (Gordon Fitch) (03/12/88)
In article <1988Mar9.132722.3364@mntgfx.mentor.com> msellers@mntgfx.mentor.com (Mike Sellers) writes: }In article <4299@blia.BLI.COM>,heather@blia.BLI.COM (Heather Mackinnon) writes: }} <lots of refutations of the abilities of animals to communicate and }} act intelligently have been deleted} } } [lots of stuff deleted] } }} Why, when it comes to cerebral activity, do we assume that other animals }} can't communicate and aren't intelligent? Why do we assume that humans }} are the only animals who can think and communicate meaningful concepts? } }Assuming you mean communication above the level of the mechanistic, }predictable, non-abstract modes (e.g. the sun-dance of the bee), the simple }answer is that we have no evidence for it. Science tends to be minimalist; }if there is no reliable evidence for the existance of something, it is }assumed not to exist. There are some things that we still don't know what }to think about, for example whale-songs. We don't know if these are mating }calls, depth soundings, lures, or conversation. Until we know otherwise, }however, it is imprudent to assume the whales are discussing Beauty, or }algebra, or God, when all they are *most probably* doing is something much }more prosaic. } If Science were really minimalist, "it" would assume that "it" didn't know whether what the whales were doing when they sang was prosaic or not. It is imprudent to assume they are discussing Beauty, algebra, or God, because these are, as far as we know, concepts of the human mind, but they might be doing something else equally abstract or complex. Recent (20th-century) scientific work has validated Eddington's famous & perhaps mythical remark about the universe being queerer than we can imagine. I wonder if the information content of the whale songs has been measured. Must have been.
kludge@pyr.gatech.EDU (Scott Dorsey) (03/14/88)
In article <727@actnyc.UUCP> gcf@actnyc.UUCP (Gordon Fitch) writes: >If Science were really minimalist, "it" would assume that "it" didn't >know whether what the whales were doing when they sang was prosaic or >not. It is imprudent to assume they are discussing Beauty, algebra, >or God, because these are, as far as we know, concepts of the human >mind, but they might be doing something else equally abstract or >complex. This is indeed true. However, there is a certain amount of mundane communication, and in every channel I can think about offhand (ie. human speech, the few bird songs which have been deciphered, the Ethernet protocol, etc.), natural or man-made, a fair percentage of the information presented is housekeeping stuff. Therefore, one can assume that a fair amount of whales' songs are data of a similar character. This assumption might be wrong (assumptions often are), and room exists in my mind for it being so. But I'll place fair odds and five dollars on the existance of information about where the good kelp is, mothers calling their children and telling them to hurry along, mating and so on. Once you can decipher this information, then you can worry about the rest of it. I learned the French word for "chair" long before I learned the words for "soul" or "integration." Scott Dorsey Kaptain_Kludge SnailMail: ICS Programming Lab, Georgia Tech, Box 36681, Atlanta, Georgia 30332 "To converse at the distance of the Indes by means of sympathetic contrivances may be as natural to future times as to us is a literary correspondence." -- Joseph Glanvill, 1661 Internet: kludge@pyr.gatech.edu uucp: ...!{decvax,hplabs,ihnp4,linus,rutgers,seismo}!gatech!gitpyr!kludge
larrabee@decwrl.dec.com (Tracy Larrabee) (03/18/88)
Just two corrections of errors made by a previous poster: 1) Alex, the bird that used to be at Purdue and has since moved west is an african gray parrot--and not a macaw. 2) Macaws, parrots, conures, and all other hookbills have color vision. I think the poster isn't very familiar with psitticines: nothing wrong with that. What I find unfortunate is that he seems to have a strong set of preconceptions.
pell@boulder.Colorado.EDU (Anthony Pelletier) (03/19/88)
In article <2037@ll1a.UUCP> cej@ll1a.UUCP (Jones) writes: >In article <4687@sigi.Colorado.EDU>, (Anthony Pelletier) writes: >> In a typical demonstration, she, or one of her assistants will >> hold up a few different objects that are all the same color and >> ask "what same?" to which alex will respond "color" and, if asked, >> tell what the color is. Or, several geometric shapes of the same >> color might be held up and Alex asked "what different?" to which >> he would respond "shape." > > From this description it seems that the animal may just be >expressing a classical conditioned response to external stimuli. > > All this really indicates is that a parrot (or, more >properly, a macaw) can distinguish between shapes. (I don't believe >that macaws have color vision. It may be that a certain "answer" is >associated with a certain combination of items.) It seems a bit strange that a bird that depends so much upon colour in mating identification etc. should be color blind; but what do I know? I'm not a real biologist. Get me with anything larger than a single cell and I'm hopelessly lost. > > No "Clever Hans like cuing" is required in this case. The >objects and the question are cuing enough. > > With classical conditioning, it wouldn't matter. The real >trick with Hans was that anyone could ask any questions that could >be answered a number of stamps, not just a fixed set of questions >dealing with a fixed set of objects. > >...ll1a!cej [Just me, not AT&T] Llewellyn Jones > Sorry, I did not mean to imply that there was only a fixed set of shapes and objects (actually, I did not think I did). Irene can use lots of stuff. I've only seen keys, small blocks, and fruit used; but one gets the feeling she can use most anything you find hanging around. There are also other types of demonsatrations. So, I still think the posibility of unconscious cues is the thing that needs to be ruled out. Once again, does anyone know if that experiment has been done? If Clever Hans did all the things you mentioned, i.e., learned what cues meant "stop counting" for several people and generalised that out to all people (a sigh of relief from one person, a raised eybrow of disbelief from another, and axious biting of a lip from a third) then he was indeed very clever. It strikes me that this form of learning is a good deal more than stimulus-response-type conditioning. -tony
erict@flatline.UUCP (eric townsend) (03/19/88)
In article <4299@blia.BLI.COM>, heather@blia.BLI.COM (Heather Mackinnon) writes: ...some stuff... > Why, when it comes to cerebral activity, do we assume that other animals > can't communicate and aren't intelligent? Why do we assume that humans > are the only animals who can think and communicate meaningful concepts? I recently finished _Programming_and_Metaprogramming_in_the_Human Biocomputer_, by Dr. John Lilly. This is a great book about the mind and how it works, etc. (I always thought my brain should work like a computer -- as in reprogramming to do different functions -- but it's nice to have somebody else agree.) Anyway, Lilly wrote a book titled something like _Communication_Between Man_and_Dolphin_, or something like that... Anybody read it? I understand it's really great... > Heather Mackinnon -- Just say NO to skate harassment. | Just another journalist with too much If I wish really hard, will IBM go away forever? | computing power.. Girls play with toys. Real women skate. -- Powell Peralta ad J. Eric Townsend ->uunet!nuchat!flatline!erict smail:511Parker#2,Hstn,Tx,77007
jnp@calmasd.GE.COM (John Pantone) (03/22/88)
Someone said: > > All this really indicates is that a parrot (or, more > >properly, a macaw) can distinguish between shapes. (I don't believe > >that macaws have color vision. ... I was under the impression that all (most?) birds were color-seeing, anyone got the answer? -- These opinions are solely mine and in no way reflect those of my employer. John M. Pantone @ GE/Calma R&D, 9805 Scranton Rd., San Diego, CA 92121 ...{ucbvax|decvax}!sdcsvax!calmasd!jnp jnp@calmasd.GE.COM GEnie: J.PANTONE
sigrid@geac.UUCP (Sigrid Grimm) (03/25/88)
In a previous article Mike Sellers wrote: > If you or anyone else can, without gross anthropomorphism, show evidence > that some animals do show unexpectedly human traits, please do so. Otherwise, > there is no *reason* to believe that such behavior exists. Seems to me that this is an interesting challenge ... For a trait to be considered *human* (as compared to say, "mammalian"), it must be a trait which is somehow unique or characteristic of humans. And the more isolated to humans a trait is, the more *human* it becomes ... So, how would one ever go about showing that a *non-human* animal shows these human traits *without* anthropomorphism, or if the trait is *really* "human", without *gross* anthropomorphism?? If we say that for a behaviour to be intelligent it must be somehow human, BUT that to compare the possibly intelligent behaviour of a non-human to humans is anthropormorphistic (sp?), thereby discounting the intelligent potential, then we are in effect, sealing up our Only-Humans-Are-Intelligent argument very nicely aren't we? I think an animal is just trying to be the best animal it can... A dolphin is striving to be a better dolphin ... not a human. This doesn't mean that an animal cannot exhibit and use intelligence!!! I'll agree that no non-human animal can exhibit *human* intelligence, but that's like saying that no non-human animal is a human ... no revelation there. As for the question as to whether animals *think* about things, how would a pride of lions or a pack of wolves ever successfully cooperate to hunt down prey without some kind of intentionally-oriented thinking? For all we know intelligence is *instinctive* in which case our own version of it is no more a big deal than any of the fabulous behaviour of other animals which we attribute to instinct (as in "oh, that's not *intelligent behaviour* [god forbid!!], it's just instinct"). Why do we have such a difficult time envisioning intelligence in non-humans??? Especially when you start to consider animals like the primates and the dolphins, it seems that we do not have a monopoly on intelligence, although we seem to develop it in unique (i.e., human) ways. The whole Conditioning-Only argument as "proof" that an animal has not exhibited intelligence behaviour is also becoming a tired one (in my humble opinion). Sure, there are cases when this argument is valid, however, in the case of a bird who recognizes similarities and differences in shape and colour (dolphins do this too, by the way), I think the hurried application of this argument is a little suspect. I mean every single one of us only understands and does what we do because of the example set by some other human(s) at some time in our life. Does this mean that we ourselves are also outside the realm of intelligence? Sigrid p.s., I have a friend who has been doing work in Dolphin Communication for the University of Hawaii. He has some interesting anecdotes and thoughts about intelligence in animals ... I'm sending him all these articles hoping maybe he will be interested in commenting ... --------------------------------------------------------------------------- "The principal discovery in biology over the last hundred years is that we are profoundly ignorant about nature" ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
kevin@chromo.ucsc.edu (Kevin McLoughlin) (03/29/88)
In article <2495@geac.UUCP> sigrid@geac.UUCP (Sigrid Grimm) writes: >For all we know intelligence is *instinctive* in which case our own version of >it is no more a big deal than any of the fabulous behaviour of other animals >which we attribute to instinct (as in "oh, that's not *intelligent behaviour* >[god forbid!!], it's just instinct"). The term "instinct" is totally meaningless. It's usually used to describe a behavior whose origin is not understood. It is a black box. It doesn't belong in discussions of behavior or, perhaps, much else. ----------- Susan Nordmark Internet: kevin@chromo.UCSC.edu UUCP: ...ucbvax!ucscc!chromo.kevin Santa Cruz, CA
heather@blia.BLI.COM (Heather Mackinnon) (03/29/88)
In article <2495@geac.UUCP>, sigrid@geac.UUCP (Sigrid Grimm) writes: (excellent article on human and animal intelligence deleted for the sake of brevity.) > The whole Conditioning-Only argument as "proof" that an animal has not > exhibited intelligence behaviour is also becoming a tired one (in my humble > opinion). Sure, there are cases when this argument is valid, however, in the > case of a bird who recognizes similarities and differences in shape and colour > (dolphins do this too, by the way), I think the hurried application of this > argument is a little suspect. It is certainly true that human children learn to manipulate symbols via an intensive conditioning process that begins in early infancy. Children are taught via repetition, positive and negative reinforcement. If we call this "learning" in human children, why shouldn't we call it "learning" in other animals? If human children exhibit "intelligence" when they master the manipulation of certain symbols, then shouldn't other animals exhibit the same "intelligence" when they master the same task? I think that there are several different interpretations of the word "intelligence". One interpretation is that it has something to do with manipulation of very human symbols like letters and numbers. Hence, an animal wouldn't be considered "intelligent" unless it could perform calculus and comprehend Goethe. My working definition of intelligence is that it is the ability to learn an appropriate response to some environmental stimulus and to apply that response to future situations. The key here is the word "learn" which has both the sense of acquiring a skill that one didn't have before and of retaining that skill over some reasonable period of time. (How many of you remember the date of Shakespeare's death?) I still wonder what it is about humans that makes us want to be different and better than other animals? We are certainly more similar to other animals than we are different from them. Why do we keep pretending that other animals can't communicate or act intelligently? We are animals; we are mammals. We're made out of the same stuff as other animals and constructed very similarly. What makes us so different? Heather Mackinnon
arti@vax1.acs.udel.EDU (Arti Nigam) (03/30/88)
In article <4400@blia.BLI.COM> heather@blia.BLI.COM (Heather Mackinnon) writes: > >> The whole Conditioning-Only argument as "proof" that an animal has not >> exhibited intelligence behaviour is also becoming a tired one (in my humble > >It is certainly true that human children learn to manipulate symbols via >an intensive conditioning process that begins in early infancy. Children >are taught via repetition, positive and negative reinforcement. If we call >this "learning" in human children, why shouldn't we call it "learning" in >other animals? If human children exhibit "intelligence" when they master Is it really true? I assume you are speaking of language acquisition. The development of the ability to speak grammatically and in novel sentences, and the ability to differentiate between grammatical and nongrammatical, seems NOT to develop as a result of specific reinforcement. Most parents do not follow their toddlers around correcting the grammar of the utterances; they may correct their child if the child mislabels an object, they may pronounce a word completely that was half-pronounced by the child, but more often than not the parent will ignore syntax, or even reinforce faulty syntax by speaking 'baby-talk'. Simple reinforcement does not explain language acquisition.
heather@blia.BLI.COM (Heather Mackinnon) (03/31/88)
In article <910@udccvax1.acs.udel.EDU>, arti@vax1.acs.udel.EDU (Arti Nigam) writes: > In article <4400@blia.BLI.COM> heather@blia.BLI.COM (Heather Mackinnon) writes: > > > >> The whole Conditioning-Only argument as "proof" that an animal has not > >> exhibited intelligence behaviour is also becoming a tired one (in my humble > > > >It is certainly true that human children learn to manipulate symbols via > >an intensive conditioning process that begins in early infancy. Children > >are taught via repetition, positive and negative reinforcement. If we call > >this "learning" in human children, why shouldn't we call it "learning" in > >other animals? If human children exhibit "intelligence" when they master > > Is it really true? I assume you are speaking of language acquisition. Actually, I was talking about the ability to do the task the parrot performed. From what I understood, the parrot would indicate whether two objects were the same or different shape and color. Children learn to do this exercise by repetition and reinforcement. Language acquisition and learning to read are not well enough understood in humans for me to feel comfortable with comparisons between language acquisition in humans and other sorts of learning in human or non-human animals. But I personally suspect that repetition and reinforcement are important in learning to speak. Heather Mackinnon
hollombe@ttidca.TTI.COM (The Polymath) (03/31/88)
In article <4400@blia.BLI.COM> heather@blia.BLI.COM (Heather Mackinnon) writes:
.I still wonder what it is about humans that makes us want to be
.different and better than other animals? We are certainly more similar
.to other animals than we are different from them. Why do we keep
.pretending that other animals can't communicate or act intelligently?
.We are animals; we are mammals. We're made out of the same stuff as
.other animals and constructed very similarly. What makes us so
.different?
Your (our) cultural prejudices are showing. This is very much a
European-American attitude. The North American Native American tribes have
a very different philosophy wherein humans and animals are co-equal
tenants of the universe. It's more appropriate to ask what's different
about our culture that we don't share these attitudes.
--
The Polymath (aka: Jerry Hollombe, hollombe@TTI.COM) Illegitimati Nil
Citicorp(+)TTI Carborundum
3100 Ocean Park Blvd. (213) 452-9191, x2483
Santa Monica, CA 90405 {csun|philabs|psivax|trwrb}!ttidca!hollombegp@picuxa.UUCP (Greg Pasquariello X1190) (03/31/88)
In article <2535@saturn.ucsc.edu> kevin@chromo.UUCP (Kevin McLoughlin) writes: >In article <2495@geac.UUCP> sigrid@geac.UUCP (Sigrid Grimm) writes: > >The term "instinct" is totally meaningless. It's usually used to >describe a behavior whose origin is not understood. It is a black >box. It doesn't belong in discussions of behavior or, perhaps, >much else. > >----------- >Susan Nordmark I don't beleive that "instinct" is a meaningless term at all! I do agree that _sometimes_ it is used to describer behavior that is misunderstood, but this is not normally the case. For example, it is instinctive for a baby calf to immediately try to walk when it is born. The sucking reflex is instinctive in human babies. I believe bird migration is also instinctive (although this point may be arguable :-)). Greg Pasquariello ihnp4!picuxa!gp
gcf@actnyc.UUCP (Gordon Fitch) (04/01/88)
In article <2535@saturn.ucsc.edu> kevin@chromo.UUCP (Kevin McLoughlin) writes: }In article <2495@geac.UUCP> sigrid@geac.UUCP (Sigrid Grimm) writes: } }>For all we know intelligence is *instinctive* in which case our own version of }>it is no more a big deal than any of the fabulous behaviour of other animals }>which we attribute to instinct (as in "oh, that's not *intelligent behaviour* }>[god forbid!!], it's just instinct"). } }The term "instinct" is totally meaningless. It's usually used to }describe a behavior whose origin is not understood. It is a black }box. It doesn't belong in discussions of behavior or, perhaps, }much else. I tried to email this non-rhetorical question, but no go; I have to post. What do we call behavior which is apparently programmed into the behaving organism? It used to be called instinct.
hollombe@ttidca.TTI.COM (The Polymath) (04/06/88)
In article <762@actnyc.UUCP> gcf@actnyc.UUCP (Gordon Fitch) writes: >... What do we call behavior which is apparently programmed >into the behaving organism? It used to be called instinct. There's some question whether _any_ behavior is hard-wired in any creature above the level of insect. The following example is from one of my psych. courses: New-born chicks will begin to scratch for food almost as soon as they are able to stand. This looks to be a classic example of instinct -- a behavior hard-wired into the organism. However, if you take a chick and fit it with a harness that prevents it from pecking at the ground for food, then spoon feed it, the chick will _never_ scratch for food. It will starve to death while standing on a pile of grain if not spoon fed. So much for _that_ hard-wired behavior. (Sorry, I can't give a specific reference on the experiment. It was discussed in class by our professor, Dr. Keith-Spiegle(sp?), about 10 years ago, and that's all I remember). -- The Polymath (aka: Jerry Hollombe, hollombe@TTI.COM) Illegitimati Nil Citicorp(+)TTI Carborundum 3100 Ocean Park Blvd. (213) 452-9191, x2483 Santa Monica, CA 90405 {csun|philabs|psivax|trwrb}!ttidca!hollombe
jwm@stdc.jhuapl.edu (James W. Meritt) (04/07/88)
In article <2231@ttidca.TTI.COM> hollombe@ttidcb.tti.com (The Polymath) writes: }In article <762@actnyc.UUCP> gcf@actnyc.UUCP (Gordon Fitch) writes: }>... What do we call behavior which is apparently programmed }>into the behaving organism? It used to be called instinct. } }There's some question whether _any_ behavior is hard-wired in any creature }above the level of insect. The following example is from one of my psych. }courses: } }New-born chicks will begin to scratch for food almost as soon as they are }able to stand. This looks to be a classic example of instinct -- a }behavior hard-wired into the organism. However, if you take a chick and }fit it with a harness that prevents it from pecking at the ground for }food, then spoon feed it, the chick will _never_ scratch for food. It }will starve to death while standing on a pile of grain if not spoon fed. } }So much for _that_ hard-wired behavior. I saw some interesting relevant film footage: A pike (fish) eats minnows. Sucks 'em right up. I saw a large bell jar put into a tank with a pike (filled with water) and a bunch ("a large number") of minnows placed into it. The pike ran into the jar for a long time, trying to get the minnows. It eventually quit. At that stage they removed the jar and just dumped the minnows into the tank. The pike still would not eat them. The person in the movie said that it starved...... in spite of being surrounded by "food". Disclaimer: Individuals have opinions, organizations have policy. Therefore, these opinions are mine and not any organizations! Q.E.D. jwm@aplvax.jhuapl.edu 128.244.65.5
gcf@actnyc.UUCP (Gordon Fitch) (04/07/88)
In article <2231@ttidca.TTI.COM> hollombe@ttidcb.tti.com (The Polymath) writes: >In article <762@actnyc.UUCP> gcf@actnyc.UUCP (Gordon Fitch) writes: >>... What do we call behavior which is apparently programmed >>into the behaving organism? It used to be called instinct. > >There's some question whether _any_ behavior is hard-wired in any creature >above the level of insect...[example of chick scratching for food, >but not when restrained by harness, etc.].. I've read about this and similar experiments. I would say, going from simpler to more complex organisms, that the hardwiring is first for explicit behaviors, and gradually shifts over toward learning mechanisms. So with birds it seems that something is programmed in which has to be filled out by experience -- learning. Often, it's by imitating an parent. I take it you're saying that the chick sort of behaves at random and finds some behaviors rewarded, and its "programming" is no more complex than to remember which behaviors were rewarded. It's hard for me to see how a behavior as complex as human language can be learned by a randomly-behaving infant in two or three years.
sigrid@geac.UUCP (Sigrid Grimm) (04/08/88)
In article <2231@ttidca.TTI.COM> hollombe@ttidcb.tti.com (The Polymath) writes: >In article <762@actnyc.UUCP> gcf@actnyc.UUCP (Gordon Fitch) writes: >>... What do we call behavior which is apparently programmed >>into the behaving organism? It used to be called instinct. > >There's some question whether _any_ behavior is hard-wired in any creature >above the level of insect. The following example ... I don't know if we must question if _any_ behaviour is hardwired. A good example is the behaviour caused by any reflex action. This is clearly "behaviour" because the organism does something in response to something else. It is also hardwired. So is blinking an eye in response to having a bug fly into it ... This is not very *interesting* behaviour however. I also recall a couple of years ago seeing something on TVO regarding hardwired behaviour in cats. The deal was that they figured *walking* is hardwired into a cat because they can stimulate a part of the cat's brain and the cat will walk. I clearly recall the segment: they had a kitty on a treadmill and the kitty's brain had been opened and electrodes attached to parts of it's brain. When they stimulated that part of the brain, *presto*, the cat's legs started walking. The cat didn't appear to be too involved, I might add. My recall about the details however, is fuzzy at best ... anyone else see this? Intuitively, hardwired behaviour makes sense: think of what we do with computer technology ... Alot of machine "behaviour" that was previously software-driven is now hardwired. This is because this behaviour is required again and again and again. With time, if the software aspect is considered relatively stable and necessary, the software is removed and replaced with firmware or even hardware - to speed up processing. This is how our computer systems have *evolved*. The body is much the same I think, except it can take much longer and is *evolved* through natural selection. The more profound the change is, the longer it takes. The more a given behaviour is required and standardized (e.g., walking), the more the body doesn't want to have to "think" about it. It wants it to become automatic, so it becomes hardwired. We notice this tendency on a smaller scale with behaviour that becomes automatic with practise (e.g., driving). This may be like the "firmware" stage ... and indeed there are *physical* changes (in the brain) which reflect this adaptation. Perhaps then, once a behaviour has been firmwired long enough, the body evolves and the behaviour becomes hardwired. Walking on our hind legs is a good example of this. We have been walking upright for tons of years. At first, when we were learning to walk upright at all (as a species, that is), we maybe had to be quite conscious of it all until it became second nature (firmwired). Next, once we had been walking for ages and ages and since walking upright was good (free hands and all that), those with the hardwired tendency did better and eventually the hardwired walking was just part of the human default configuration. The converse may also be true for firmwired stuff. If the firmwired potential is not realized when the body is modified by actual use, then perhaps the potential is lost in favour of whatever else may become necessary. This would explain why the chicks couldn't scratch and peck after awhile since their firmwired potential for this was *inhibited* when the body's *startup* routine was working. This is sort of like a computer freeing up firmware that isn't used during the first few months of system use so that this firmware can be used to better ends (e.g.,put the X routine here since I've been using it so often and I have to get it from disk every time, while I've never used the stuff which is programmed into the firmware now). Well, that's my humble two cents worth wrt hardwired behaviour. It's Friday afternoon, eh, and from many many weeks of this, my brain is becoming firmwired to shut down around now, so I'm finding ... it ... harder ... and ....... h..a..r..d..e..r .... to ... k...e...e...p ...... o...n..... ... t...h...i...n...k...i...n...g... ... ...
malc@tahoe.unr.edu (Malcolm L. Carlock) (04/09/88)
In article <2231@ttidca.TTI.COM> hollombe@ttidcb.tti.com (The Polymath) writes: > >There's some question whether _any_ behavior is hard-wired in any creature >above the level of insect. The following example is from one of my psych. >courses: > >New-born chicks will begin to scratch for food almost as soon as they are >able to stand. This looks to be a classic example of instinct -- a >behavior hard-wired into the organism. However, if you take a chick and >fit it with a harness that prevents it from pecking at the ground for >food, then spoon feed it, the chick will _never_ scratch for food. It >will starve to death while standing on a pile of grain if not spoon fed. > >So much for _that_ hard-wired behavior. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ I don't think that Polymath's example rules out hardwired scratching behavior in the chick. Why couldn't it be that the scratching instinct (if it exists) is suppressed by learned behavior, stemming from the influence of the harness? Seems to me that the chick's "scratching instinct" might be overruled by after the chick learned that trying to peck the ground resulted in unpleasant sensations (choking or whatever). This would be a case of instinct overruled by learned behavior. To support this, I offer a counter-example to The PolyMath's, which I encountered in a science text during high school (or thereabouts): Some captured sharks (lemon or sand or somesuch) were being studied by some behavioralists. One of the tests involved giving a shark an electric shock when it tried to eat. I don't remember how many sharks were involved, but a notable result of the shock test was that the shocked shark would refuse to eat ever again (after just ONE shock), and eventually starve. Given the fact that many species of sharks are known to cannibalize their siblings after they hatch in their mother's "womb", I would say that there is a pretty strong likelihood that shark eating behavior is basically instinctual and NOT learned (how could they learn the behavior from Mom if they haven't been born yet, and thus can't watch her in order to learn it?), and that the above example (if I remembered it correctly) shows an instance of instinct (eating, in this case) being overruled by learned behavior. --- BTW, I would also say that the existance of pre-birth predatory behavior among sharks shows pretty clearly that there IS such a thing as instinct in creatures higher than insects. --- Malcolm L. Carlock ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Das Motto des Zeitteilers: "Batschen?! Wir brauchen keine stinkenden Batschen!!" ------------------------------------------------------------------------- malc@tahoe.unr.edu.UUCP University of Nevada, Reno
pell@boulder.Colorado.EDU (Anthony Pelletier) (04/11/88)
In article <202@aplcomm.UUCP> jwm@stdc.jhuapl.edu.UUCP (James W. Meritt) writes: >In article <2231@ttidca.TTI.COM> hollombe@ttidcb.tti.com (The Polymath) writes: >}In article <762@actnyc.UUCP> gcf@actnyc.UUCP (Gordon Fitch) writes: >} One of the above writes: >}New-born chicks will begin to scratch for food almost as soon as they are >}able to stand. This looks to be a classic example of instinct -- a >}behavior hard-wired into the organism. However, if you take a chick and >}fit it with a harness that prevents it from pecking at the ground for >}food, then spoon feed it, the chick will _never_ scratch for food. >} one of the others writes: >I saw a large bell jar put into a tank with a pike (filled with water) >and a bunch ("a large number") of minnows placed into it. The pike >ran into the jar for a long time, trying to get the minnows. It eventually >quit. At that stage they removed the jar and just dumped the minnows >into the tank. The pike still would not eat them. The person in the >movie said that it starved...... in spite of being surrounded by "food". This sounds more to me like the pike learned *not* to bother with minnows. (and the chick, not to bother with scratching to eat) I don't think it addresses whether the minoow-eating behaviour was "hard wired" or not. Along similar lines, there is a fellow named Chip Quinn, formally of Princeton, now at MIT (I think), who works on learning mutations in flies. This presupposes that you can teach a fly something in the first place. If you ever have the opportunity to hear him speak, do so. His science is sometimes only mediocre, but he is one of the funniest men in science. His delivery is rather like the comedian Richard Write's. But I digress, one type of learned beharviour has to do with mating. Male flies will jump on anything that smells female female, but females mate only once and dole out the sperm as needed. If you put a bunch of normal males in a bottle with a non-vrgin female, they will jump all over her for a bit, then, as Quinn puts it, eventually get depessed and sulk in the corner ("it happens...to me, sometimes"). Even if one then adds a few virgins, who are trying to interrest the males, the continue to sulk. His learning mutants (dunce, rutabega, cabbage etc ("we had to resist the temptation of naming them after people we don't like...'Gipper-1'")) will never learn not to bother with the non-virgins and jump on the virgins as soon as they are added. (you might imagine this is an easy selection to do) Again, this says nothing about whether the initial mating behaviour is "hard wired", only that they can learn to ignore it, if it is instict. The learning mutants cannot learn to over-ride this apparent instinct (some humans seem to be have similar mutations to Quinn's flies). -tony
hollombe@ttidca.TTI.COM (The Polymath) (04/12/88)
In article <777@actnyc.UUCP> gcf@actnyc.UUCP (Gordon Fitch) writes: .In article <2231@ttidca.TTI.COM> hollombe@ttidcb.tti.com (The Polymath) writes: ..There's some question whether _any_ behavior is hard-wired in any creature ..above the level of insect...[example of chick scratching for food, ..but not when restrained by harness, etc.].. . . ... I take it you're saying that the chick sort of behaves at random and .finds some behaviors rewarded, and its "programming" is no more complex .than to remember which behaviors were rewarded. ... For the record, I neither said nor intended any such thing. In fact, I didn't propose any mechanism or explanation, merely reported the facts, as I know them, as a counter-example to the concept of instinct. I'm not a Skinnerian, nor even much of a behaviorist, though I find some of their techniques useful over a limited domain. (N.B.: Discussions of behaviorism vs. other schools of psychology tend to take on overtones of religion fairly quickly. I prefer to avoid debating the subject. Believe what you want, but leave me out of it). I think it's reasonable to assume humans are more complex than birds, or most other animals. I doubt there's anything in human makeup that could be identified as a hard-wired instinct. -- The Polymath (aka: Jerry Hollombe, hollombe@TTI.COM) Illegitimati Nil Citicorp(+)TTI Carborundum 3100 Ocean Park Blvd. (213) 452-9191, x2483 Santa Monica, CA 90405 {csun|philabs|psivax|trwrb}!ttidca!hollombe
hollombe@ttidca.TTI.COM (The Polymath) (04/12/88)
In article <2550@geac.UUCP> sigrid@geac.UUCP (Sigrid Grimm) writes: >In article <2231@ttidca.TTI.COM> hollombe@ttidcb.tti.com (The Polymath) writes: >>above the level of insect. The following example ... > >I also recall a couple of years ago seeing something on TVO regarding hardwired >behaviour in cats. The deal was that they figured *walking* is hardwired >into a cat because they can stimulate a part of the cat's brain and the cat >will walk. ... I'm beginning to see that "hard-wired" is a poor choice of metaphor when dealing with the brain. In a sense, the brain programs itself by changing its "wiring", so anything it does can be called hard-wired. I think the original intent was to define instinct as behaviors hard-wired at birth, requiring no further training. The nature of the brain is such that proper stimulus may elicit a learned behavior. -- The Polymath (aka: Jerry Hollombe, hollombe@TTI.COM) Illegitimati Nil Citicorp(+)TTI Carborundum 3100 Ocean Park Blvd. (213) 452-9191, x2483 Santa Monica, CA 90405 {csun|philabs|psivax|trwrb}!ttidca!hollombe
heather@blia.BLI.COM (Heather Mackinnon) (04/12/88)
About hardwired versus non-hardwired behavior: Stimulating sections of the human brain can cause hallucinations of sight, sound and smell and can also cause behaviors like walking in human beings. So, if we say that walking in cats is instinctual, would we also say that it's instinctual in humans? Would we say that the scent of roses or the sound of someone playing Mozart on a piano is hardwired into the brain? I don't know; I just think that the human behavior and our neuro-endocrine system is not well enough understood to separate instinctual behavior from learned behavior. I remember reading in a psychobiology text some years ago that learned physical skills are stored as programs in the cerebellum. Thus, skills such as throwing a ball, tying a shoelace or riding a bicycle are stored as ballistic programs in the cerebellum. These are all learned skills, but, once learned, they are mediated by the cerebellum. This improves response time, since less processing is required before one acts. Remember! There are 10^10 neurons in the human brain, 10^11 of which are in the cerebellum. (10^10 is a low scientific estimate of the number of cells in the human brain and 10^11 is a high estimate for the number of neurons in the cerebellum.). Heather Mackinnon
braun@drivax.UUCP (Kral) (04/15/88)
In article <2282@ttidca.TTI.COM> hollombe@ttidcb.tti.com (The Polymath) writes: >I'm beginning to see that "hard-wired" is a poor choice of metaphor when >dealing with the brain. In a sense, the brain programs itself by changing >its "wiring", so anything it does can be called hard-wired. I think the >original intent was to define instinct as behaviors hard-wired at birth, >requiring no further training. The nature of the brain is such that >proper stimulus may elicit a learned behavior. I agree somewhat. Did anyone see the PBS special on the brain broadcast a couple of weeks ago? There was a great experiment where (gee, I wish I could remember details, like *names*) brain tissue was excited to generate a current between neurons. As the current was produced, the path between the neurons (help me out with names here) became more efficient at carrying the current, and the neurons changed to, all to facilitate 'message carrying' on that 'path'. The implications relative to this topic are (in my opinion) this: Some paths are already established at birth. Others are not. Some beings are more capable of making these paths more effecient (learning), others not. So it seems to me we are just talking about a matter of degrees, and 'hardwired' now seems to mean the inability to change, rather than just an inate or apriori-learned action. (Another neat experiment was performed on an epileptic which had had the two halves of his brain disconnected. If he saw a picture with two objects, his left hand could only draw the picture on one side, his right hand could only cope with the other image -- other details about how he represented the image reflect on the analytic vs artistic functions of the two halves.) etc. -- kral 408/647-6112 ...{ism780|amdahl}!drivax!braun Think Globally ... Act Locally DISCLAIMER: If DRI knew I was saying this stuff, they would shut me d~-~oxx
hg@clinet.FI (Janne H{gglund) (04/21/88)
In article <2279@ttidca.TTI.COM> hollombe@ttidcb.tti.com (The Polymath) writes: >I doubt there's anything in human makeup that could be identified as a >hard-wired instinct. I have to disagree with you. We humans merely have so much free brain capacity to use for learning we sometimes forget we also have instincts. For example: - Sexuality. The sight of a sexy human female exites me. So does her smell. It didn't when I was seven years old, only after the hormonal activity started. If we LEARNED our sexual behaviour we could be horny at age six. - In a very stressful situation, my adrenaline glands start working, my heart starts pounding and so on. This happens even when the stress situation has nothing to do with physical extertion, a computer crash, for example. Why does my metabolic system respond to stress even when it doesn't have to? Hard-wiring, I suppose. - Hunger, thirst etc. are universally unpleasant. They are hard-wired to be so. - Why does the sight of a baby provoke feelings of tenderness, the need to care, and so on? This includes also near relatives - a dog puppy is much more 'cuddly' than an adult dog. The list could go on almost forever, but I wish not to overload the net. My main point is: humans do have as much instinct as other animals. Humans only have so much more capacity of learning, so we use our instincts less often. However, the instincts are there, and appear in out everyday lives. (Without instincts, for example families would not exist, neither would people marry) GRAMMATICAL DISCLAIMER: My native language is Finnish. [inews refused to send this article since our site does not recieve rec.birds. I had to delete that newsgroup from the distribution list. Anyway, this discussion doesn't belong to that group anymore. ]
mmcg@moncsbruce.oz (Mike Mc Gaughey) (04/22/88)
From article <3339@drivax.UUCP>, by braun@drivax.UUCP (Kral): > I agree somewhat. Did anyone see the PBS special on the brain broadcast a > couple of weeks ago? There was a great experiment where (gee, I wish I could > remember details, like *names*) brain tissue was excited to generate a current > between neurons. As the current was produced, the path between the neurons > (help me out with names here) became more efficient at carrying the current, > and the neurons changed to, all to facilitate 'message carrying' on that > 'path'. The implications relative to this topic are (in my opinion) this: There is a good book, by Valentino Braitenburg, called "Vehicles". Braitenburg is (was?) the director of the Max Plank institute. In the book, he conducts a thought experiment in which vehicles with two independantly driven wheels and a variety of sensors exhibit varying behaviours - e.g. if the vehicle is a rectangle - wheel A +--------------------+ | + sensor X | | | + sensor Y +--------------------+ wheel B we can imagine a variety of interconnections between A, B, X and Y. If, for instance, stimulation of Y induces extra speed in A, and the same for X and B, we have an aggressive vehicle that turns towards and runs at full speed into whatever excited it (a lightbulb destroyer?) That was chapter 1. Succeeding chapters introduce the concept of associative memory (using the mechanism described in the posting I have included), darwinian evolution, causative memory (is this the name?), higher faculties, instincts. By the end of ch. 15, we have a machine which, to all outward appearences, acts of its own volition, thinks, makes decisions, meditates, has instincts, and, in general behaves in a very complex manner comparable to many animals. The other half of the book (yes, there's more!) is a look at real life examples of the types of vehicles he has constructed in the first half. Have you ever wondered why a fly always lands on the dark spot on a wall (or flies out a window from a dark room into the light)? According to Braitenburg (I'm no biologist), the fly is organised just like our little vehicle above (that's why I chose this example). The X and Y sensors detect movement (i.e. the motion of contrasting features in the fly's field of vision). The wheels are, of course, the wings. When a fly enters a room, with a spot on one wall, the spot will be moving more in one of its eyes tham the other (remember, the fly is just a little buzz box - everything is buzzing). Because of some simple brain interconnections, the opposing wing beats just a little harder - so the fly orients towards the spot ... and finally lands on it. Neat, huh? This book is written in a very witty, lighthearted manner, by an acknowledged expert in the field (cybernetics). It was written mainly to demonstrate that things are always simpler than they seem, and is very readable. I don't have a copy of the book now (I read a friends), so I'm sorry I can't give any more details - but if you see it around, read it. Feel free to correct my misconceptions. .... Mike.
hollombe@ttidca.TTI.COM (The Polymath) (04/26/88)
In article <625@clinet.FI> hg@clinet.UUCP (Janne H{gglund) writes: +In article <2279@ttidca.TTI.COM> hollombe@ttidcb.tti.com (The Polymath) writes: +>I doubt there's anything in human makeup that could be identified as a +>hard-wired instinct. + + I have to disagree with you. We humans merely have so much free brain +capacity to use for learning we sometimes forget we also have instincts. + For example: + +- Sexuality. The sight of a sexy human female exites me. So does her + smell. It didn't when I was seven years old, only after the hormonal + activity started. If we LEARNED our sexual behaviour we could be + horny at age six. Touche'. Sexual response is certainly instinctive. +- In a very stressful situation, my adrenaline glands start working, my + heart starts pounding and so on. This happens even when the stress + situation has nothing to do with physical extertion, a computer crash, + for example. Why does my metabolic system respond to stress even when + it doesn't have to? Hard-wiring, I suppose. But you had to be trained to recognize that situation as stressful. The response to stress is automatic, but the recognition of the situation isn't. +- Hunger, thirst etc. are universally unpleasant. They are hard-wired to + be so. Got me again. +- Why does the sight of a baby provoke feelings of tenderness, the need + to care, and so on? This includes also near relatives - a dog puppy is + much more 'cuddly' than an adult dog. Sorry, I'm not at all fond of children and don't care for babies at all. I don't even like dogs and puppies much. + The list could go on almost forever, but I wish not to overload the +net. My main point is: humans do have as much instinct as other animals. +Humans only have so much more capacity of learning, so we use our +instincts less often. However, the instincts are there, and appear in +out everyday lives. (Without instincts, for example families would not +exist, neither would people marry) You've made some good points for human instincts, but I must disagree with your example of families and marriage. Those are purely social constructs. Many people get along quite well without them. In no way can they be considered instinctive. -- The Polymath (aka: Jerry Hollombe, hollombe@TTI.COM) Illegitimati Nil Citicorp(+)TTI Carborundum 3100 Ocean Park Blvd. (213) 452-9191, x2483 Santa Monica, CA 90405 {csun|philabs|psivax|trwrb}!ttidca!hollombe
cjs@moncsbruce.oz (Chris Stuart) (04/26/88)
People interested in the topic of "animal language", and in particular with the mimic behaviour of parrots and other animals, and to what extent it reflects true understanding, would be well advised to find and read the following book: King Solomon's Ring by Konrad Z. Lorenz Translated from the German by Marjorie Kerr Wilson First published 1952 The copy i am reading is a 1968 issue, published as a "University Paperback" by John Dickens & Co, Ltd, Northampton, Great Britain. (SBN 416 67880 7) I don't know how hard it will be to find, but it is truely a gem. The author is a somewhat eccentric but very serious researcher into animal behaviour. The book is non-technical, and the various points made are illustrated by anecdotes about animals with which the author had direct contact in the course of his researches. Chapter 8 (The language of animals) is especially relevant to this discussion. If there is sufficient interest expressed, i may post some extracts. He relates some remarkable incidents concerning communication between animals, or between animals and humans. However, his lucid discussion of such communication makes it clear that we are NOT talking about "language" or "understanding" as is understood in a human context. Christopher Stuart (cjs@moncsbruce.oz)