throopw@xyzzy.UUCP (Wayne A. Throop) (01/21/89)
> mirk@warwick.UUCP (Mike Taylor) > [...the...] viewpoint of conciousness > that we have is not succeptible to reductionist methods because we cannot > view the phenomenon objectively. It is an intrinsically subjective thing. This seems clear enough and I agree with it. > [...] but to > have a true picture of the phenomenon of bat-consciousness, we must > understand what it is like for the bat to be bat. Clear? No, I > didn't think so :-( :-) To the contrary, I think this is clear enough... I just don't think it is true. Mike seems to be equating "true picture" with "subjective picture" here, and while I agree we can't have a subjective picture of another being's consciousness, I don't agree that this unobtainable subjective experience is necessary to obtain a "true picture" of another being's consciousness. -- Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked? --- Lord Edward Thurlow -- Wayne Throop <the-known-world>!mcnc!rti!xyzzy!throopw
lv08+@andrew.cmu.edu (Lili Velez) (02/03/89)
I recall reading an essay speculating about what it is like to be a bat, in an anthology called _The Mind's I_ , editted by Douglas Hoffstaeder (I may have misspelled that; he is the fellow who wrote _Godel, Escher, Bach_). I'm not sure it id would exactly address your interests, but it is good reading (the whole book is pretty interesting). Lili Velez Department of English lv08@andrew.cmu.edu