C70:arms-d (06/01/82)
>From HGA@MIT-MC Tue Jun 1 14:41:38 1982
Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 0 : Issue 117
Today's Topics:
Dropping A-bomb to get our boys home
Reliability of spy satellites....
Selling subs to the Soviets...
Soviet participation in ARMS-D...
A possible blockade of Japan
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Date: 29 May 1982 04:09-EDT
From: Robert Elton Maas <REM at MIT-MC>
Subject: dropping A-bomb to get our boys home
WW II was a long hard war, for a while we were losing, and only later
did we make progress, taking Okinawa at last so we could reach Japan
via air for bombing. The war in Europe was over and we wanted to get
this damn Pacific war over so everybody could go home. This impatience
to get the war over may have been partly responsible for using the
BOMB (it sure did work! Wasn't surrender just a week or so after
Nagasaki?)
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Date: 29 May 1982 1337-PDT
From: Herb Lin <LIN at WASHINGTON>
Subject: reliability of spy satellites....
[From: Gene Salamin <ES at MIT-MC>]
Pacifist contributers [claim] that our spy satellite system is of
such unimpeachable reliability (for example, we can read license
plates in Moscow) that we may unilaterally disarm with risk <
epsilon of sudden unanticipated Soviet nuclear blackmail. Surely
then, that very same satellite system can, with equal or better
reliability, provide warning of attack. Therefore, we can adopt a
policy of launch on warning with risk < epsilon (same as above) of
a false retaliatory attack.
To my knowledge, NO ONE on this list has equated (tactical) warning of
attack with ability to gather strategic information. The difference
is that tactical warning requires very short response times, whereas
strategic warning requires much longer response times. It really
doesn't matter if our discovery of the existence of a new missile
system is 30 minutes later, or that they are producing a larger number
of warheads than they are entitled to, or whatever. By contrast,
those 30 minutes are criticial to the actual military (i.e., tactical
and low-level) response.
I am amazed how anyone can... advise the abandonment of our
nuclear retaliatory force.
Just for my own information, has anyone on this list stated that he is
in favor of our unilateral \\abandonment// of our nuclear retaliatory
forces? Remember that reduction or freeze is \\NOT// the same thing
as abandonment, and it is a disservice to those of us who support the
freeze or reductions to accuse us of advocating the "abandonment" of
nuclear forces.
Forbidden to possess long range artillery like Big Bertha, [the
Germans under the Versailles Treaty] managed to evade it by
disguising the barrels as smokestacks. Do our pacificists care to
comment on the extent to which we can entrust our lives and our
freedom to this one particular technology, taking into
consideration the potential for camouflage qtaylored specifically
toward satellite reconnaissance?
The primary difference between the deceptions of WWI/WWII and the
present is that satellites allow for essentially continuous monitoring
of large areas. It is of course true that if there were an area that
was not previously monitored, and satellites then looked at it, they
might not be able to notice anything different. But under present
circumstances, the Soviets (or the US) would need the ability to keep
massive construction undercover for long periods of time, and that
they (or we) cannot do.
[Enter Flame Mode]
By the way, I have seen essentially \\NO// "pacifists" on this list.
Being opposed to mindless and unnecessary and even militarily useless
"defense" expenditures is not the same as being a pacifist. I believe
that EVERYONE on this list believes in the use of military force under
SOME circumstances; hence, there are none on this list.
[Leave Flame Mode]
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Date: 29 May 1982 1356-PDT
From: Herb Lin <LIN at WASHINGTON>
Subject: selling subs to the Soviets...
I find it interesting that the positions of some ARMS-D discussants
seem to be reversed on the issue of technology transfer to the Soviets
in the form of selling them nuclear subs. People who usually take
"hawk" positions (Earl Weaver <earl@BRL>, Jim McGrath <CSD.MCGRATH at
SU-SCORE>) are arguing that the Soviets can't build/copy American
subs, even if we give them the technology, and they cite this as an
argument against our selling the Soviets submarines; since the Soviets
wouldn't want to make themselves dependent on the US, they wouldn't do
it. By contrast, I (one who leans usually to the "dove" position) am
arguing that the Soviets are in fact pretty competent at producing
military hardware at the current state of the (American) art.
To everyone who suggests that "the Soviets wouldn't do it":
Remember that the original proposal was to exchange Poseidon subs for
the dismantling of most of their land-based ICBMs, thereby giving both
sides a secure deterrent.
Three arguments have been proposed against this suggestion:
1. They won't do it, because they won't want to be dependent on the
US.
Response: then sell them the technology to make their deterrent
independent of the US. Certainly the Soviets are as smart as we are,
and given appropriate instruction, they can learn.
2. They won't do it, because we might booby-trap the subs we sell the
Soviets.
Response: Then invite them to inspect the building of the subs in
progress, and give them circuit diagrams and source code listings of
the appropriate computer programs....
3. It's politically impossible.
Response: Sigh! This is true. But if people don't start *thinking*
about the *merits* of ideas (rather than the emotional aspects), we've
all had it.
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Date: 29 May 1982 1401-PDT
From: Herb Lin <LIN at WASHINGTON>
Subject: Soviet participation in ARMS-D...
If it is indeed true that the Soviets read ARMS-D, I for one would
like to hear from them.
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Date: 29 May 1982 1844-PDT
From: Jim McGrath <CSD.MCGRATH at SU-SCORE>
Subject: Re: A possible blockade of Japan
Jim,
The technical possibility of a blockade is a more complex issue than
it appears at first. While it is true that our navy was superior to
that of Japans, we had no close forward bases to mount a blockade
either in the regions west or north of the home islands. That is,
unless we could secure a staging area on the Asian mainland. Remember
that blockade actions have only worked in the era of steam and oil
powered ships when such staging bases were available (such as northern
blockades of the south in the later stages of the civil war; British
and German blockades during WWI and WWII; etc...). Our staging areas
were all hundreds of miles to the south and east of the home islands,
leading me to believe that ONLY sub warfare could have had a chance in
the vital western and northern areas. And even here it appears
unlikely that subs could effectively opperate a thousand miles from
support in hostile enemy waters. Although the Sea of Japan is rather
wide, it is NOT the open Pacific!
Jim
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End of Arms-D Digest
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