C70:arms-d (06/04/82)
>From HGA@MIT-MC Thu Jun 3 22:42:01 1982 Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 0 : Issue 118 Today's Topics: New Administration Nuclear Strategy Document Blockade of Japan... Selling subs to the Soviets... Selling subs START Facts are simple and facts are straight, so let's nuke 'em Subs and technology transfer Unilateral Disarmament Recent commentary on Soviets buying US subs... ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: 31 May 1982 2146-PDT From: CAULKINS at USC-ECL Subject: New Administration Nuclear Strategy Document >From the San Francisco Chronicle, 31 May 82, P1: "...In what Pentagon officials term the 'first complete defense guidance of this administration' ... the armed forces are ordered to prepare for nuclear counterattacks against the Soviet Union 'over a protracted period.' The document, called 'Fiscal Year 1984-1988 Defense Guidance'... also was a basic source for a recent strategic study done by the National Security Council ... That study is the foundation of the administration's overall strategic position The nature of nuclear war has been a subject of intense debate among political leaders, defense specialists and military officers. Some assert that there would be only one all-out mutually destructive exchange. Others argue that a nuclear war with many exchanges could be fought over days and weeks. ...The civilian and military planners, having decided that protracted [anything beyond a single exchange] war is possible, say that American nuclear forces 'must prevail and be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States.' ...The document makes explicit a strategy under which the military forces would be prepared to strike the Soviet Union and Soviet allies such as Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea in case of a long conventional war with the Russians. The document makes these other main points: Nuclear war strategy would be based on what is known as decapitation, meaning strikes at Soviet political and military leadership and communications lines. ..." I HOPE this is neither true nor accurate, but fear that it is. If I read it correctly, the following points are made: 1) US planners disagree as to whether a nuclear war will consist of one all-out exchange, or many exchanges. 2) US nuclear forces must prevail. [Just what is meant by this ? Nothing is said about preserving any vestige of US society or citizens.] 3) In case of a long conventional war with the Soviets, we will mount a first strike against them and also against their non-nuclear allies. [A first strike against the Soviets is bad enough, but why the utterly immoral nuclear attacks on countries strike against the Soviets is bad enough, but why the utterly immoral nuclear attacks on countries which can do us no harm ?] 4) We plan to explicitly target Soviet leadership and Soviet communications. [I can think of no strategy better designed to result in the Soviets firing every last warhead against us, regardless of what's happening on a global scale. Panic stricken junior officers in missile command posts or submarines, out of contact with their superiors, suspecting or knowing that their loved ones and society have been incinerated by US weapons - these men are the least likely to exercise any moderation in launching the weapons under their control. And if the Soviets adopt a similar targeting strategy - a very reasonable response - the world is left with the virtual certainty of The Full Nuclear Exchange carried out by men whose leaders were all snuffed out in a bizarre mutual suicide pact invented by the clever Americans.] ------------------------------ Date: 1 Jun 1982 0030-PDT From: Herb Lin <LIN at WASHINGTON> Subject: blockade of Japan... [From: Jim McGrath <CSD.MCGRATH at SU-SCORE>] ... While it is true that our navy was superior to that of Japan, we had no close forward bases to mount a blockade either in the regions west or north of the home islands.... Remember that blockade actions have only worked in the era of steam and oil powered ships when such staging bases were available... Our staging areas were all hundreds of miles to the south and east of the home islands... and even subs [would find it hard to] effectively opperate a thousand miles from support in hostile enemy waters. Unless I really misremember my WWII history, US Navy subs did patrol the Sea of Japan quite regularly in the later days of WWII. In addition, US surface ships would have found it quite trivial to enforce a reasonable blockade with supply tankers in the fleet. At that time, Japan had essentially no navy left AT ALL. ------------------------------ Date: 1 June 1982 07:35-EDT From: Oded Anoaf Feingold <OAF at MIT-MC> Subject: selling subs to the Soviets... Aww c'mon folks, the original suggestion was in fun, not in earnest. It's a lovely fantasy, and if anyone thought it would work it would be great to try it, but the reasons given for the Russians to reject buying Poseidons are sufficient without including any of our own, such as that we don't want them to develop effective ASW on the subs WE use, and no administration could stay in office if this were known to be happening. Selling subs to the Soviets in exchange for anything at all is a parlor game. Let's remember that, and save the flames for other issues. Oded ------------------------------ Date: 1 Jun 1982 0013-PDT From: Jim McGrath <CSD.MCGRATH at SU-SCORE> Subject: Selling subs Actually, the Soviets would be hard pressed to do such a think even if there were no technical problems. Remember that the Strategic Rocket corps (which runs the land based missiles) is an extremely powerful block in the military establishment. If you think we have power plays in the US military services, you ain't seen NOTHING until you've seen the Soviet system at work. A lot of their strategic choices can be traced back to "organizational" imperatives, not "rational" decisions. That is, selling subs so as to kill ICBMs would meet with great hostility in large sectors of the military establishment in the USSR. I doubt they would ever do it. Jim PS Side note - you can see the same effects (although scaled down) in the army's insistence that OUR ICBMs must be a viable force, and the navy's insistence that surface ships be considered part of the strategic nuclear force. ------------------------------ Date: 1 Jun 1982 0015-PDT From: Jim McGrath <CSD.MCGRATH at SU-SCORE> Subject: START Does anyone know any details of the proposals from our leader, and have any comments? The concept looks OK, but getting something that would please the Soviets, West Europeans, US doves, and US hawks would be quite a feat. Carter never even came close (he was ultimately defeated by the hawks - something Reagan has little to fear about). Jim ------------------------------ Date: 1 June 1982 08:37-EDT From: Oded Anoaf Feingold <OAF at MIT-MC> Subject: Facts are simple and facts are straight, so let's nuke 'em ... a-and wasn't it Mark Twain who said "If you don't like the facts, go out and get some of your own?" ... and didn't he also say "Get your facts straight first, then you can distort them as much as you want?" Good show - sticking in Twain is ALWAYS a good idea. BTW, do you have a copy of "Brighter than a Thousand Suns" by Robert Jungk? He seems to have strong opinions that Leslie Groves pressured Truman into authorizing the A-bomb drops, by the means already mentioned in this digest. Otherwise Groves would have wasted his years in the war, won no victories, lost out badly in the promotion sweepstakes. (Someone borrowed my copy 6 years ago, sigh....) But a good deal of this guff has been hashed out already. My major interest was in getting more Twain into the inferno. Oded ------------------------------ Date: 1 Jun 82 12:31:59-EDT (Tue) From: Earl Weaver (VLD/VMB) <earl@BRL> Subject: subs and technology transfer For the record, I did not argue, explicitly, for or against selling subs to the Soviets. I merely made a statement about the difficulty of reproducing a manufactured item from information based solely from having it in one's possession. I will admit to still being upset, somewhat, at giving the Soviets the technology to produce those tiny ball bearings that are used in missile guidance components. (which, I guess puts me in the 'against' category of selling subs/tech to the Soviets) ------------------------------ Date: 1 Jun 1982 0948-PDT From: Herb Lin <LIN at WASHINGTON> Subject: recent commentary on Soviets buying US subs... I think the last few pieces of commentary on the idea have brought out two interesting points. Many argue that "the Soviets would never do it..." for some pretty good reasons. Point 1: What is the harm in letting the Soviets decide what is or is not an acceptable offer to them, on this issue or any other? For example, why do US arms negotiators (in actual negotiations) always worry about what the Soviets will accept? Conversely (?), why do people criticize folks like Reagan for proposing deep cuts which affect the Soviets asymmetrically? For the latter, I can see only one reaon for criticism; if he proposes things he knows are unacceptable to the Soviets, he's not really proposing to do anything. Any other reasons for this criticism? Point 2: CSD.McGRATH@SU-SCORE puts his finger on a very important point, one which hasn't been addressed very much on ARMS-D, in particular, the role of the bureaucracy. He makes the following point: The Soviets would be hard pressed to [buy US subs] even if there were no technical problems. Remember that the Strategic Rocket corps (which runs the land based missiles) is an extremely powerful block in the military establishment.... A lot of their strategic choices can be traced back to "organizational" imperatives, not "rational" decisions. ...you can see the same effects (although scaled down) in the army's insistence that OUR ICBMs must be a viable force, and the navy's insistence that surface ships be considered part of the strategic nuclear force. I think this point is absolutely crucial to doves in understanding the relative failure of arms control (arms control assumes bilateral positions (the "US" position and the "Soviet" position), whereas the negotiators actually play to a variety of constitutiencies on their OWN sides), and to hawks in understanding why we buy weapons which don't function all that well and why we are so tremendously out-numbered against the Soviets (people flourish in the bureaucracy for producing fancy (and hence expensive) weapons which look good on paper; since cost is simply an inverse index of quantity, fewer can be made). Comments? ------------------------------ Date: 1 Jun 1982 12:52:52 EDT (Tuesday) From: Roger Frye <frye at BBN-UNIX> Subject: Unilateral Disarmament I am amazed how anyone can... advise the abandonment of our nuclear retaliatory force. Just for my own information, has anyone on this list stated that he is in favor of our unilateral \\abandonment// of our nuclear retaliatory forces? Remember that reduction or freeze is \\NOT// the same thing as abandonment, and it is a disservice to those of us who support the freeze or reductions to accuse us of advocating the "abandonment" of nuclear forces. [From: Herb Lin <LIN at WASHINGTON>] No, I have not previously stated a favoring for unilateral disarmament. And no, I am not doing so in this message. And no, I do not favor unilateral disarmament myself at this time. But I have friends who do, and I understand and respect their arguments. (Incidentally, one argues that there would be no survivors, and that retaliation is either the unstable game of bluff poker or ungainful revenge; while another argues that killing is wrong, and that nothing can justify the killing of another human being.) No, I don't know enough about human nature or karma to decide just yet in favor of unilateral disarmament. And I miss the chance of hearing the arguments of armament advocates when I express my indecision on unilaterality. And it weakens the positions of my disarmament friends to associate with such a stereotype. So, for now, I argue against unilateral disarmament even when I am with those who favor it, and there is plenty to say and to learn at this level, but I can't say that I am unshakingly and totally convinced of my position. By the way, I have seen essentially \\NO// "pacifists" on this list. [From: Herb Lin <LIN at WASHINGTON>] If it is indeed true that the Soviets read ARMS-D, I for one would like to hear from them. [Herb Lin <LIN at WASHINGTON>] Both pacifists and Soviets might be reluctant to identify themselves. - Roger Frye ------------------------------ Date: 1 Jun 1982 1847-PDT From: Herb Lin <LIN at WASHINGTON> Subject: Re: Unilateral Disarmament [From: Roger Frye <frye at BBN-UNIX>] one [of my friends] argues that there would be no survivors, and that retaliation is either the unstable game of bluff poker or ungainful revenge; while another argues that killing is wrong, and that nothing can justify the killing of another human being. You have identified the central issue in deterrence by retaliation; you are promising to do something that is not only painful to the other guy, but painful to you as well. Let's say the other guy does something anyway. What do you do? The point of promising to retaliate was to deter him from attacking; what do you do now? By retaliating, you boost the cost. However, if he believes you won't do anything, he might attack you. In some sense, the solution is to promise to retailate (and make him believe it), but not actually do it if he turns out to not be deterred. On the other hand, this means you have to behave AS THOUGH you would retaliate. In that case, why not prepare to actually attack... ------------------------------ Date: 1 Jun 1982 2336-PDT From: Jim McGrath <CSD.MCGRATH at SU-SCORE> Subject: Re: recent commentary on Soviets buying US subs... The problem with being turned down is really a simple one. Leaders (actually, everyone) have limited time and attention to devote to problems. They usually allocate their time and attention based upon criteria which, although not perhaps globally rational, is relatively easy to compute and measure the consequences of choice (afterall, the scarce commodity here is, simply stated, TIME - thus a fully rational choice, which usually entails a lot of research and thinking, simply cannot be made due to diminishing returns). Thus they handle the last problem brought to their attention (LIFO), or the first one (FIFO), or assign weights to the problems (with perhaps a weighing factor for length of time in the queue) and handle the highest ones first, or they pay most attention to problems in which they have particular expertese or concern, or... you get the idea. Now couple this idea with the concept of "signalling." In the real world most information is hidden from you, or obtainable only at a high cost. Thus making rational decisions (or any type of decision depending upon information) is very difficult. Thus the dependence on signalling, or symbolism, for conveying information. Although an imperfect channel, it is often the only effective one available for many items of information, especially those relating more to "intentions" rather than "capabilities." Case study: Carter's proposal to the Soviets to reduce nuclear weapons shortly after he took office. This was quickly rejected by the Soviets as being a rather biased and silly proposal (which it was from their perspective). Moreover, the manner in which this issue was treated by both parties conveyed to the Soviets an impression that the US was not serious about arms control (serious in the sense that we understood what issues were at stake). This seriously set back the arms control effort by sending an incorrect(?) signal about our intentions towards arms control. Furthermore, such an initial bad impression probably altered Soviet priorities (their time and attention factors) towards arms control, both by shifting away resources from this area and by reallocating them within this area to more appropiately match the situation as they understood it (partially from our signals). Thus, as both recent and distant history show, wasting time, attention, political capital, and your reputation on proposals that are unproductive does adversely impact on your other proposals, no matter how reasonable they individually may be. Jim PS Another instance of this, outside the military realm, is the upcoming Economic Summit in France. The US was suppose to go into these talks with a series of proposals on trading off various economic advantages of the seven (such as altering trade barriers (Japan), investment credits (Western Europe), high technology (US and Japan), etc...). But the nuclear arms debate, the Falklands, the US budget battle, and a couple of other issues drew off so much time and energy that these proposals were simply never drafted. And thus, out of sheer lack of time and attention to adequately prepare, nothing of real substance will be discussed a