[fa.arms-d] Arms-Discussion Digest V0 #118

C70:arms-d (06/04/82)

>From HGA@MIT-MC Thu Jun  3 22:42:01 1982

Arms-Discussion Digest                            Volume 0 : Issue 118

Today's Topics:
             New Administration Nuclear Strategy Document
                         Blockade of Japan...
                    Selling subs to the Soviets...
                             Selling subs
                                START
      Facts are simple and facts are straight, so let's nuke 'em
                     Subs and technology transfer
                        Unilateral Disarmament
            Recent commentary on Soviets buying US subs...
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: 31 May 1982 2146-PDT
From: CAULKINS at USC-ECL
Subject: New Administration Nuclear Strategy Document

>From the San Francisco Chronicle, 31 May 82, P1:

"...In what Pentagon officials term the 'first complete defense
guidance of this administration' ... the armed forces are ordered to
prepare for nuclear counterattacks against the Soviet Union 'over a
protracted period.'

The document, called 'Fiscal Year 1984-1988 Defense Guidance'... also
was a basic source for a recent strategic study done by the National
Security Council ... That study is the foundation of the
administration's overall strategic position

The nature of nuclear war has been a subject of intense debate among
political leaders, defense specialists and military officers.  Some
assert that there would be only one all-out mutually destructive
exchange.  Others argue that a nuclear war with many exchanges could
be fought over days and weeks.

...The civilian and military planners, having decided that protracted
[anything beyond a single exchange] war is possible, say that American
nuclear forces 'must prevail and be able to force the Soviet Union to
seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the
United States.'

...The document makes explicit a strategy under which the military
forces would be prepared to strike the Soviet Union and Soviet allies
such as Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea in case of a long conventional
war with the Russians.

The document makes these other main points:

Nuclear war strategy would be based on what is known as decapitation,
meaning strikes at Soviet political and military leadership and
communications lines. ..."

I HOPE this is neither true nor accurate, but fear that it is.  If I
read it correctly, the following points are made:

1) US planners disagree as to whether a nuclear war will consist of
one all-out exchange, or many exchanges.

2) US nuclear forces must prevail.

[Just what is meant by this ?  Nothing is said about preserving any
vestige of US society or citizens.]

3) In case of a long conventional war with the Soviets, we will mount
a first strike against them and also against their non-nuclear allies.

[A first strike against the Soviets is bad enough, but why the utterly
immoral nuclear attacks on countries strike against the Soviets is bad enough, but why the utterly
immoral nuclear attacks on countries which can do us no harm ?]

4) We plan to explicitly target Soviet leadership and Soviet
communications.

[I can think of no strategy better designed to result in the Soviets
firing every last warhead against us, regardless of what's happening
on a global scale.  Panic stricken junior officers in missile command
posts or submarines, out of contact with their superiors, suspecting
or knowing that their loved ones and society have been incinerated by
US weapons - these men are the least likely to exercise any moderation
in launching the weapons under their control.  And if the Soviets
adopt a similar targeting strategy - a very reasonable response - the
world is left with the virtual certainty of The Full Nuclear Exchange
carried out by men whose leaders were all snuffed out in a bizarre
mutual suicide pact invented by the clever Americans.]

------------------------------

Date:  1 Jun 1982 0030-PDT
From: Herb Lin <LIN at WASHINGTON>
Subject: blockade of Japan...

    [From: Jim McGrath <CSD.MCGRATH at SU-SCORE>]
     ... While it is true that our navy was superior to that of Japan,
    we had no close forward bases to mount a blockade either in the
    regions west or north of the home islands....  Remember that
    blockade actions have only worked in the era of steam and oil
    powered ships when such staging bases were available...  Our
    staging areas were all hundreds of miles to the south and east of
    the home islands... and even subs [would find it hard to]
    effectively opperate a thousand miles from support in hostile
    enemy waters.

Unless I really misremember my WWII history, US Navy subs did patrol
the Sea of Japan quite regularly in the later days of WWII.  In
addition, US surface ships would have found it quite trivial to
enforce a reasonable blockade with supply tankers in the fleet.  At
that time, Japan had essentially no navy left AT ALL.

------------------------------

Date: 1 June 1982 07:35-EDT
From: Oded Anoaf Feingold <OAF at MIT-MC>
Subject:  selling subs to the Soviets...

Aww c'mon folks, the original suggestion was in fun, not in earnest.
It's a lovely fantasy, and if anyone thought it would work it would be
great to try it, but the reasons given for the Russians to reject
buying Poseidons are sufficient without including any of our own, such
as that we don't want them to develop effective ASW on the subs WE
use, and no administration could stay in office if this were known to
be happening.

Selling subs to the Soviets in exchange for anything at all is a
parlor game.  Let's remember that, and save the flames for other
issues.

Oded

------------------------------

Date:  1 Jun 1982 0013-PDT
From: Jim McGrath <CSD.MCGRATH at SU-SCORE>
Subject: Selling subs

Actually, the Soviets would be hard pressed to do such a think even if
there were no technical problems.  Remember that the Strategic Rocket
corps (which runs the land based missiles) is an extremely powerful
block in the military establishment.  If you think we have power plays
in the US military services, you ain't seen NOTHING until you've seen
the Soviet system at work.  A lot of their strategic choices can be
traced back to "organizational" imperatives, not "rational" decisions.

That is, selling subs so as to kill ICBMs would meet with great
hostility in large sectors of the military establishment in the USSR.
I doubt they would ever do it.

Jim

PS  Side note - you can see the same effects (although scaled down) in
    the army's insistence that OUR ICBMs must be a viable force, and
    the navy's insistence that surface ships be considered part of
    the strategic nuclear force.

------------------------------

Date:  1 Jun 1982 0015-PDT
From: Jim McGrath <CSD.MCGRATH at SU-SCORE>
Subject: START

Does anyone know any details of the proposals from our leader, and
have any comments?  The concept looks OK, but getting something that
would please the Soviets, West Europeans, US doves, and US hawks would
be quite a feat.  Carter never even came close (he was ultimately
defeated by the hawks - something Reagan has little to fear about).

Jim

------------------------------

Date: 1 June 1982 08:37-EDT
From: Oded Anoaf Feingold <OAF at MIT-MC>
Subject:  Facts are simple and facts are straight, so let's nuke 'em

... a-and wasn't it Mark Twain who said "If you don't like the
	facts, go out and get some of your own?"
... and didn't he also say "Get your facts straight first, then
	you can distort them as much as you want?"

Good show - sticking in Twain is ALWAYS a good idea.

BTW, do you have a copy of "Brighter than a Thousand Suns" by Robert
Jungk?  He seems to have strong opinions that Leslie Groves pressured
Truman into authorizing the A-bomb drops, by the means already
mentioned in this digest.  Otherwise Groves would have wasted his
years in the war, won no victories, lost out badly in the promotion
sweepstakes.  (Someone borrowed my copy 6 years ago, sigh....)

But a good deal of this guff has been hashed out already.  My major
interest was in getting more Twain into the inferno.

Oded

------------------------------

Date:     1 Jun 82 12:31:59-EDT (Tue)
From:     Earl Weaver (VLD/VMB) <earl@BRL>
Subject:  subs and technology transfer

For the record, I did not argue, explicitly, for or against selling
subs to the Soviets.  I merely made a statement about the difficulty
of reproducing a manufactured item from information based solely from
having it in one's possession.  I will admit to still being upset,
somewhat, at giving the Soviets the technology to produce those tiny
ball bearings that are used in missile guidance components.  (which, I
guess puts me in the 'against' category of selling subs/tech to the
Soviets)

------------------------------

Date:  1 Jun 1982 0948-PDT
From: Herb Lin <LIN at WASHINGTON>
Subject: recent commentary on Soviets buying US subs...

I think the last few pieces of commentary on the idea have brought out
two interesting points.  Many argue that "the Soviets would never do
it..." for some pretty good reasons.

Point 1: What is the harm in letting the Soviets decide what is or is
not an acceptable offer to them, on this issue or any other?  For
example, why do US arms negotiators (in actual negotiations) always
worry about what the Soviets will accept?  Conversely (?), why do
people criticize folks like Reagan for proposing deep cuts which
affect the Soviets asymmetrically?  For the latter, I can see only one
reaon for criticism; if he proposes things he knows are unacceptable
to the Soviets, he's not really proposing to do anything.  Any other
reasons for this criticism?

Point 2: CSD.McGRATH@SU-SCORE puts his finger on a very important
point, one which hasn't been addressed very much on ARMS-D, in
particular, the role of the bureaucracy.  He makes the following
point:

    The Soviets would be hard pressed to [buy US subs] even if there
    were no technical problems.  Remember that the Strategic Rocket
    corps (which runs the land based missiles) is an extremely
    powerful block in the military establishment....  A lot of their
    strategic choices can be traced back to "organizational"
    imperatives, not "rational" decisions.

    ...you can see the same effects (although scaled down) in the
    army's insistence that OUR ICBMs must be a viable force, and the
    navy's insistence that surface ships be considered part of the
    strategic nuclear force.

I think this point is absolutely crucial to doves in understanding the
relative failure of arms control (arms control assumes bilateral
positions (the "US" position and the "Soviet" position), whereas the
negotiators actually play to a variety of constitutiencies on their
OWN sides), and to hawks in understanding why we buy weapons which
don't function all that well and why we are so tremendously
out-numbered against the Soviets (people flourish in the bureaucracy
for producing fancy (and hence expensive) weapons which look good on
paper; since cost is simply an inverse index of quantity, fewer can be
made).

Comments?

------------------------------

Date:  1 Jun 1982 12:52:52 EDT (Tuesday)
From: Roger Frye <frye at BBN-UNIX>
Subject: Unilateral Disarmament

        I am amazed how anyone can... advise the abandonment of our
        nuclear retaliatory force.

    Just for my own information, has anyone on this list stated that
    he is in favor of our unilateral \\abandonment// of our nuclear
    retaliatory forces?  Remember that reduction or freeze is \\NOT//
    the same thing as abandonment, and it is a disservice to those of
    us who support the freeze or reductions to accuse us of advocating
    the "abandonment" of nuclear forces. [From: Herb Lin <LIN at
    WASHINGTON>]

No, I have not previously stated a favoring for unilateral
disarmament.  And no, I am not doing so in this message.  And no, I do
not favor unilateral disarmament myself at this time.  But I have
friends who do, and I understand and respect their arguments.
(Incidentally, one argues that there would be no survivors, and that
retaliation is either the unstable game of bluff poker or ungainful
revenge; while another argues that killing is wrong, and that nothing
can justify the killing of another human being.)

No, I don't know enough about human nature or karma to decide just yet
in favor of unilateral disarmament.  And I miss the chance of hearing
the arguments of armament advocates when I express my indecision on
unilaterality.  And it weakens the positions of my disarmament friends
to associate with such a stereotype.  So, for now, I argue against
unilateral disarmament even when I am with those who favor it, and
there is plenty to say and to learn at this level, but I can't say
that I am unshakingly and totally convinced of my position.

    By the way, I have seen essentially \\NO// "pacifists" on this list.
    [From: Herb Lin <LIN at WASHINGTON>]
    
    If it is indeed true that the Soviets read ARMS-D, I for one would
    like to hear from them. [Herb Lin <LIN at WASHINGTON>]

Both pacifists and Soviets might be reluctant to identify themselves.

 - Roger Frye

------------------------------

Date:  1 Jun 1982 1847-PDT
From: Herb Lin <LIN at WASHINGTON>
Subject: Re: Unilateral Disarmament

    [From: Roger Frye <frye at BBN-UNIX>]
    one [of my friends] argues that there would be no survivors, and
    that retaliation is either the unstable game of bluff poker or
    ungainful revenge; while another argues that killing is wrong, and
    that nothing can justify the killing of another human being.

You have identified the central issue in deterrence by retaliation;
you are promising to do something that is not only painful to the
other guy, but painful to you as well.  Let's say the other guy does
something anyway.  What do you do?  The point of promising to
retaliate was to deter him from attacking; what do you do now?  By
retaliating, you boost the cost.  However, if he believes you won't do
anything, he might attack you.  In some sense, the solution is to
promise to retailate (and make him believe it), but not actually do it
if he turns out to not be deterred.  On the other hand, this means you
have to behave AS THOUGH you would retaliate.  In that case, why not
prepare to actually attack...

------------------------------

Date:  1 Jun 1982 2336-PDT
From: Jim McGrath <CSD.MCGRATH at SU-SCORE>
Subject: Re: recent commentary on Soviets buying US subs...

The problem with being turned down is really a simple one.  Leaders
(actually, everyone) have limited time and attention to devote to
problems.  They usually allocate their time and attention based upon
criteria which, although not perhaps globally rational, is relatively
easy to compute and measure the consequences of choice (afterall, the
scarce commodity here is, simply stated, TIME - thus a fully rational
choice, which usually entails a lot of research and thinking, simply
cannot be made due to diminishing returns).  Thus they handle the last
problem brought to their attention (LIFO), or the first one (FIFO), or
assign weights to the problems (with perhaps a weighing factor for
length of time in the queue) and handle the highest ones first, or
they pay most attention to problems in which they have particular
expertese or concern, or...  you get the idea.

Now couple this idea with the concept of "signalling."  In the real
world most information is hidden from you, or obtainable only at a
high cost.  Thus making rational decisions (or any type of decision
depending upon information) is very difficult.  Thus the dependence on
signalling, or symbolism, for conveying information.  Although an
imperfect channel, it is often the only effective one available for
many items of information, especially those relating more to
"intentions" rather than "capabilities."

Case study: Carter's proposal to the Soviets to reduce nuclear weapons
shortly after he took office.  This was quickly rejected by the
Soviets as being a rather biased and silly proposal (which it was from
their perspective).  Moreover, the manner in which this issue was
treated by both parties conveyed to the Soviets an impression that the
US was not serious about arms control (serious in the sense that we
understood what issues were at stake).  This seriously set back the
arms control effort by sending an incorrect(?) signal about our
intentions towards arms control.  Furthermore, such an initial bad
impression probably altered Soviet priorities (their time and
attention factors) towards arms control, both by shifting away
resources from this area and by reallocating them within this area to
more appropiately match the situation as they understood it (partially
from our signals).

Thus, as both recent and distant history show, wasting time,
attention, political capital, and your reputation on proposals that
are unproductive does adversely impact on your other proposals, no
matter how reasonable they individually may be.

Jim

PS  Another instance of this, outside the military realm, is the
    upcoming Economic Summit in France.  The US was suppose to go into
    these talks with a series of proposals on trading off various
    economic advantages of the seven (such as altering trade barriers
    (Japan), investment credits (Western Europe), high technology (US
    and Japan), etc...).  But the nuclear arms debate, the Falklands,
    the US budget battle, and a couple of other issues drew off so
    much time and energy that these proposals were simply never
    drafted.  And thus, out of sheer lack of time and attention to
    adequately prepare, nothing of real substance will be discussed a