C70:arms-d (07/29/82)
>From HGA@MIT-MC Thu Jul 29 00:11:21 1982
Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 0 : Issue 150
Today's Topics:
Historical Query about US-USSR Ship Exchange
Comments on Nuclear Destruction Rebuttal
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Date: 28 Jul 1982 08:50:40-PDT
From: CSVAX.rrh at Berkeley
Subject: Historical Query about US-USSR Ship Exchange
I recently acquired a copy of a small newspaper that had a transcript
of a rather rambling talk by Capt. Jude Lahr, Commander, Naval Weapons
Center, China Lake, CA. The newspaper, the "Valley Enquirer",
Ridgecrest(China Lake), CA, July 21, 1982 said that "the talk to the
Exchange Club [a local club] on July 14 (1982) is presented in its
entirety...".
One of the several points in the talk dealt with a US-USSR ship
exchange. I quote from part of the article in the paper (which is a
transcript from Lahr's talk):
``...Back when I worked in the Pentagon there was another example that
I might give you that was interesting. I worked in Op 60, which is
Plans and Policies, and the joke was that "I don't know what the plan
is, and we don't have any policy", but that really wasn't true. We
really did have plans and we really did have polices and we had very
good sound rules that we operated under. The United States and the
Soviet Union had decided to exchange ship business. You may remember
that the Soviets sent some ships to Boston and we sent some to a
Latavian port.
I got a call from an underling in the State Department, who
said they would like to have a gesture of goodwill, they would like to
make an announcement that there are no nuclear weapons aboard those
three ships that are going into Latavia.
I said "well, we really can't talk about this on the
telephone, why don't you come on over." So he did.
I said, "First of all, you understand that the national policy
is, we neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons
anywhere."
He said, "well, I know, but this is a special deal. A gesture
of good will, we'd like to make that announcement."
I said, well, the second thing is, do you want to lie? The
guy's face turned white and he said, "You don't mean to tell me?"
I said, "Hey, look, our deployment policy is to put them on
capable vessels, aircraft and what not, and if you want to know, the
answer is yes."
He said, the next question was will they be able to find out?
The answer was "yes" to that, too, because you can confirm
their presence and you can't confirm their absence. You can confirm
the presence through the use of some very simple equipment. You
shouldn't be concerned about it because we don't want to confuse the
Russians, do we? They think we deploy nuclear weapons on our ships,
even though you don't. Why confuse them?
Well, he didn't take that, he ran out of there and said "I'm
going to the top with this one".
I said, "In twenty minutes, the phone is going to ring, and
I'm going to be on my to see the Chief of Naval Operations."
Well, it took a little longer than 20 minutes and the first
one was a Rear Admiral, but I got to see the CNO who said, "I'm
getting these calls from the State Department. Aren't we in
compliance with National?" and the answer's "Yes". He said, "It seems
to me that it would be confusing to the Russians if we went in there
with ships that didn't have em."
I answered, "Yes, sir, that's what it looks like to me too."
He said "well, then, this guy's really off base."
I answered that , "I think he's going to find out too if he
gets high enough in the State Department."
He finally worked his way up to Kissinger, whose rules we were
following. He had written the rules on deterrents. A friend of mine
who worked at the State Department said the blistering they guy got
when that day was over was legend around the State Department.
What surprised many of us was that the Russian ships came to
Boston without them (nuclear weapons) and that surprised us.
It's okay for the Russians to confuse us and I'll tell you
why. Because we're not going to start a war! That is not in our
national interest and it's not our national character. We're not
going to start a war except on clear provocation. It's not okay for
us to confuse the Russians because as soon as they feel they have an
advantage they re going to go for full domination. So, we have to be
credible in our deterrents...''
1) Precisely when was this ship exchange?
2) Which ships were involved?
3) What was the intention of the ship exchange?
4) What "very simple equipment" is used to confirm the presence of
nuclear weapons aboard a ship?
5) Comments on Lahr's talk?
Robert Henry
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Date: 28 Jul 1982 0843-CDT
From: BREITLING at GUNTER-ADAM
Subject: One readers opinion of Maas' lettters in V0/I149
I am realy amazed that a person could come up with a extrapolation of
the effects of nuclear weapons on a society. In my mind there are
several serious problems with Robert Elton Maas' theory on the effect
of a nuclear weapon.
1. to say a bomb is capable of killing .01% (or any set percent)
of a population is not very accurate. It would seem to me that the
"state" of the target would be a big determining fact of the effect of
the weapon. By state, I mean how prepared the target is to receive a
nuclear attack. Since the world had never seen a nuclear weapon
before, Hiroshima is not a very good base to make a generalized
extrapolation on. I am sure i have read somewhere the Russians feel
they could survive a nuclear attack from an enemy because they
prepared (bomb shelters etc) for the attack. In the case of
Hiroshima, there was no preparation. If you want to survive, then
prepare yourself to survive.
2. the scenerio of only attacking counter-value targets is poor
at best. The Russians have stated continuously that counter-force
targets are much more appropriate for nuclear weapons. that is not to
say they would not attack counter-value target either.
3. one could be sceptical of the Russians ability to launch
approximately 1700 missle and have them hit all their targets
simultaneously. Caldicott's scenerio could be valid.
These are my opinion of the Maas letters in volume 0 issue 149. I
would like to here other people's opinions of the extrapolation
theory.
Excuse the typos please. Thanks.
R. J. Breitling
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Date: 26 Jul 1982 11:15:31-EDT
From: csin!cjh at CCA-UNIX
Subject: [[nuclear destruction] rebuttal] rebuttal
I haven't the background (or the research time) to pick holes in
the physics or math, although I have seen people with much stronger
backgrounds than Caldicott who agree with her.
However, comparing past [disasters] to the probable effects of a
single nuclear bomb is a red herring of monstrous proportions. Most of
the disasters cited (e.g., the black death) were gradual, giving
people time to adjust; that 25% of the population was over years, if
not decades. More important is that in all of the examples cited,
communications and travel were so difficult that each city-area was
virtually self-sufficient. This is true no longer; even if you share
my contempt for many of the financial manipulations practiced in New
York City you can guess at the chaos that would result if it were
wiped out.
Today's world is acknowledged even by most chauvinists to be
interdependent on an intra-national scale; the EEC is perhaps the
first trembling step toward acknowledging and supporting
inter-national interdependency.
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End of Arms-D Digest
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