arms-d (03/11/83)
>From The-Moderator@MIT-MC Thu Mar 10 22:41:08 1983
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Subject: Arms-Discussion Digest V1 #5
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Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 1 : Issue 5
Today's Topics:
Review of Bradley Fighting Vehicle article, Tal APC quote, Russian APC,
March 83 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
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Date: 5 March 1983 22:36-EST (Saturday)
Sender: CARTER @
From: _Bob <Carter @ RUTGERS>
To: CAULKINS @ USC-ECL
Cc: armsd @ MIT-MC
Subject: Review of Bradley Fighting Vehicle article
In-reply-to: Msg of 3 Mar 1983 23:00-EST from CAULKINS@USC-ECL
Date: Thursday, 3 March 1983 23:00-EST
From: CAULKINS@USC-ECL
To: armsd at MIT-MC
Re: Review of Bradley Fighting Vehicle article
In the Feb 83 issue of "California" there is an article on the Bradley
Fighting Vehicle, an Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) intended to
succeed the M-113 used in Viet Nam. The piece is titled "The $13
Billion Dud", and is by William Boly.
When
interviewed in the Swiss military journal "International Military
Review", Israeli General Tal said that "The best APC in the world is
the worst tank, just as the best tank in the world is the worst APC."
How's that again?
[reviewer's comment: If the military can so badly screw up something
as relatively straightforward as an APC, my confidence in their
ability to deal adequately with the greater complexities of nuclear
weapons is close to zero.]
[reader's comment: No comment.]
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Date: 7 Mar 1513 9:42-PST
From: CAULKINS@USC-ECL
Subject: Tal APC quote
To: armsd at MIT-MC
What I think Tal meant was that a rough terrain vehicle designed to
carry a high velocity >75 mm gun plus sufficient crew, ammunition,
armor, and fuel to make the gun effective is no good for moving a
bunch of infantrymen around; conversely a vehicle that is designed for
transporting infantrymen is no good as a gun platform.
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Date: 7 Mar 1983 9:42-PST
From: dietz%usc-cse@USC-ECL
Subject: Russian APC
To: arms-d@mit-mc
Origin: usc-cse
Via: Usc-Cse; 07 Mar 83 10:31:59
I've read somewhere that some Soviet armored personel carriers have
magnesium (!!) alloy armor and very poorly armored *external* fuel
tanks (!!!) in back. I think this was the BMP.
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Date: 10 Mar 83 9:26-PST
From: CAULKINS@USC-ECL
Subject: March 83 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
To: armsd at MIT-MC
Here are some of the things I found interesting in this issue:
No Evidence of Cheating
[Jack] Anderson claimed [in a column of August 10, 1982] that "the
Russians appear to have exceeded the 150-kiloton [Threshold Test Ban
Treaty] limit at least 11 times since 1978." This interpretation of
the information contained in secret documents is apparently in error.
..... UCID-19352, titled "An Analysis Based On Seismic Data of the
Pattern of Soviet High-Yield Nuclear Tests from March 31, 1976 through
December 31, 1981."
The conclusions reached in these papers have, however, recently been
made public. Michael M. May, associate director at large at
Livermore, referring to an earlier question on the subject, said that
the documents "did conclude that there was no evidence that the
Soviets had cheated on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty."
No First Use: A View From Europe
by Field Marshall Lord Michael Carver, Chief of the Defense Staff
of the United Kingdom from 1973 to 1976
..... a policy of nuclear deterrence - at what ever level it is considered -
contains a fundemental paradox: if a nation wishes to deter war
through the fear that nuclear weapons will be used, it has to appear
to be prepared to use them in certain circumstances. But if this is
done, and the enemy answers back in kind, then the nation that has
struck first is very much worse off than if it had not done so.
To pose an unacceptabe risk to the enemy automatically poses the same
risk to oneself. But any attempt to reduce the risk by turning to
some form of limited war, in order to make the threat more credible,
begins to make the unacceptable risk appear more acceptable - and
therefore less of a deterrent.
..... the best strategic brains have been trying to escape from this
dilemma by inventing various concepts of limited nuclear war. Among
these are counterforce strategies; selective and limited use against
strategic targets, counterforce or countervalue; and use of theater or
battlefield systems only, including very limited application of both -
even down to the absurd demonstration shot.
All these concepts of limiting nuclear war, in order to make the
threat of it credible as a deterrent, fail for four reasons:
o There can never be a guarantee that a nuclear exchange will remain
limited to the extent that the initiator hopes. Indeed, it is
inherent in deterrent strategy that, in the last of last resorts, it
should not; that the ultimate threat of escalation to an attack on the
opponent's principal cities should remain credible. ...
o ... there is no guarantee that the side that intiated the exchange
would emerge better off. Indeed, the probability is that, if it were
NATO, it would be worse off. ...
o My third reason for rejecting concepts of limited nuclear use of any
kind is that they undermine the very basis of nuclear deterrence,
which is to pose an unacceptable risk. These concepts are all
designed to make the risk appear unacceptable to the opponent but
acceptable to oneself. However in a situation where the opponent has
the capability to retaliate and is likely to do so, that is neither
rational nor credible. ...
o My fourth reason for opposing concepts of limited nuclear use - and
surely nobody is so mad as to suggest unlimited use - is that if it
came to a crunch, such a policy would not be supported by the nations
likely to be involved, when they realized what it would mean. ...
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[End of Arms-D Digest]