[fa.arms-d] Arms-Discussion Digest V2 #43

daemon@ucbvax.UUCP (06/27/84)

From @MIT-MC:JLarson.PA@Xerox.ARPA  Wed Jun 27 01:38:38 1984
Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 2 : Issue 43

Today's Topics:

	Protecting Ourselves Against Libya (3 msgs)
	Russian Explosion
	softwar, a new weapon to deal with the Soviets? (2 msgs)
	Defense of Lowell Wood

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Date: 24 June 1984 23:53-EDT
From: Robert Elton Maas <REM @ MIT-MC>
Subject: Protecting Ourselves Against Libya
To: "JONG@HIS-PHOENIX-MULTICS.ARPA" @ MIT-MC
cc: ARMS-DISCUSSION @ MIT-MC

    Date:  Mon, 11 Jun 84 05:18 MST
    From:  Jong@HIS-PHOENIX-MULTICS.ARPA
      Before I considered rebuilding our cities linearly, as a defense
    against a madman running a Third-World dictatorship, I think it would be
    incumbent upon me, in the interest of arms control and security, to have
    the little pipsqueak killed.
(1) The mere use of the term "pipsqueak" is insulting to a peaceful
world. You imply that because you are bigger and stronger you have the
right to kill anybody smaller and weaker whom you dislike. But I'll
pretend you didn't use that term and get on with the main rebuttal to
your suggestion above.
(2) If it's acceptable to your moral theory that we in the USA have
the right to kill the leader of any little Third-World nation if that
leader threatens our life with even one thermonuclear weapon (or five
or ten), then why isn't it acceptable for other nations to kill the
leader of our big nation with 26,000 thermonuclear weapons? It seems
they have as much or more right than we do. Or is it back to point
number 1, because we're bigger we can do any damn thing we want? The
attitude that one nation can go over to another nation and kill
anybody there who in any way threatens the first nation, is horribly
destabilizing. Such an attitude is a major cause of wars and
hinderance to real peace (except the dead peace after an exterminating
thermonuclear war). I say we must adopt the policy that it's ok
to modify ourselves but not to attempt to forcibly modify others. That
would be stabilizing. <Opinion of REM>

So anyway, do you have any grounds for "we should go over and kill
them" other than "we're bigger and stronger" (or "God is on our side"
or "we're white" or ...)?

------------------------------

Date: 25 Jun 1984 02:54:08 PDT
Subject: :Russian Explosion...
From: Jeff Rolinc <Rolinc@USC-ISIB.ARPA>
To: Arms-D@MIT-MC.ARPA


     Has anything more been learned as to what actually occurred in the
Russian Military blast?  It is being kept a very close secret... by both
the US and USSR.  I don't think it had much effect overall on the "big"
picture, as far as amount of missiles destroyed.  If there is anymore info
as to what exactly happened I would like to hear about it.

ROLINC@USC-ISIB.ARPA

------------------------------

Date: 25 June 1984 11:15-EDT
From: Herb Lin <LIN @ MIT-MC>
Subject:  This was on the AIList: softwar, a new weapon to deal with the
Soviets?
To: ARMS-D @ MIT-MC

Date: Wed 20 Jun 84 18:37:45-PDT
From: Jean-Luc Bonnetain <BONNETAIN at SU-SCORE.ARPA>
To:   AIList [also submitted to Arms-D]
Re:   softwar, a new weapon to deal with the Soviets ?

         [Forwarded from the Stanford bboard by Laws@SRI-AI.]

This is my translation of an article published in a French news magazine,
"Le Point"; i have done my best to translate it, but i am sure there are
some inadequacies. I just hope they don't occur in important places.

I am just wondering if any one has heard about that, and if this is real,
pure computer fiction or so well known that it's not worth flaming about.


"Between the atomic bomb and conventional weapons, there was nothing in the
American warfare equipment against the USSR. Now the time has come for
"soft bombs", to launch a destructive war without any bloodshed. This is the
topic of "Softwar", a forthcoming book written by a French computer scientist
working in New York. The idea: as simple as it is machiavelic. In the programs
that Soviet people get from Western countries are placed what amounts to "time
bombs": devices that can be triggered from afar to hamper the functioning of
Russian computers and paralyze the economy. With "Softwar", nuclear blackmail
becomes obsolete. Le Point asked the author, Thierry Breton, how his relations
with highly skilled American engineers has convinced him of the existence of
the new type of weapon.

LePoint:
is "Softwar" just an computer thriller, or do "soft bombs" really exist ?

ThierryBreton:
I never used any, but they have been used for a few years already in our
trade. Some countries from Africa or South America, who are customers of
big American software companies, have booby-trapped programs running in their
administrations. The aim of the providers of the software is to be protected
against customers who won't pay. These soft bombs are set in vital areas,
like payroll routines, which are then paralyzed. The customer has to call the
company, and won't get any help until debts are cleared. In this case people
talk about technical problems in the computer, but obviously never say that
the program contained a bomb.
Since now, these techniques had never been used for aggressive purposes. But
there is absolutely no technical difficulty in doing that, so we are led to
believe that this new weapon could be used through non strategic networks
giving access to databases. For example, the Stockex network, which gives
information on stock exchange values, or the WMO network, about worldwide
meteorological information.

LePoint:
Has softwar begun yet ?

ThierryBreton:
For me, there is no doubt about that. The Soviets use 80% of the American
databases. It is this dependency on communication between computer which is
new, and which allows to enter a territory. Until now, the "bombs" had to be
triggered on the spot by someone inside the place. The bombs were there, but
could not be triggered remotely. Today, thanks to data transfer, they can be
reached from thousands of kilometers. In the book, I imagine that one bomb is
controlled, through Stockex, by the rate of exchange for a particular company
determined in the software, and the Pentagon, as long as it does not want to
detonate the "bomb", avoid the critical value by buying or selling actions.

LePoint:
You give some names of American organisms working for the Pentagon whose work
is to set bombs in the programs, and to activate them. Is this real ?

ThierryBreton:
The names quoted have been slightly modified from the real ones. I took my data
from a group founded in 1982 by the American Army, called NSI (National
Software Institute). This institute works on all programs which have military
applications. In 1983, the Army has spent 500 million dollars to debug its
programs. Written in different languages, they have now been unified by the ADA
language. This is the official objective of NSI. But for these military
computer scientists, there is not much difference between finding unvoluntary
errors and adding voluntary ones...

LePoint:
What is the Trojan horse used to send those soft bombs to the USSR ?

ThierryBreton:
The USSR has a lag of about 10 to 15 years in computer science, which is the
equivalent of 2 or 3 new generations of computers. This lag in hardware
causes an even more important lag, in artificial intelligence, which is the
type of software running on the machines Soviet people have to buy from Western
countries. They are very eager to get those programs, and some estimate that
60% of the software running there comes from the USA. The most important source
is India, which has very good computer scientists. Overnight, IBM has been
kicked out, to be replaced by Soviet Elorg computers ES10-20 and ES 10-60,
which are copied from IBM. The Indians buy software from Western countries,
port it to Elorgs, and then this software goes to the USSR.

LePoint:
Can a trap be invisible, like a buried mole ?

ThierryBreton:
Today, people know how to make bombs completely invisible. The first generation
was fixed bombs, lines of code never activated unless a special signal was
sent. Then the Polaris-type traps: like for the rockets, the programs contain
baits to fool the enemy, multiple traps, only one of which is active. Then the
stochastic bomb, the most dangerous one, which moves in the program each time
it is loaded. These bombs are all the more discreet that they can be stopped
from a distance, failures then disappearing in an unexplicable way.

LePoint:
Have there been cases in USSR of problems that could be explained by a soft
bomb ?

ThierryBreton:
Some unexplained cases, yes. In November 1982, the unit for international
phone calls has been down for 48 hours. Officially, the Soviets said it was
a failure of the main computer. We still have to know what caused it. Every
day in the Soviet papers one can read that such and such factory had to stop
its production because of a shortage of some items. When the Gosplan computers
break down, there are direct consequences on the production and functioning of
factories.

LePoint:
By talking about softwar, aren't you helping the Soviets ?

ThierryBreton:
No. For 30 years, we have seen obvious attempts from the Soviets to destabilize
Western countries by infiltrating trade unions, pacifist movements. The Eastern
block can remotely cause strikes. But since now, there was now way to retaliate
by doing precise desorganizing actions. In the context of the ideological war,
softwar gives another way to strike back.
The book also shows that the Soviets have no choice. They know that by buying
or getting by other means this software, they are taking a big risk. But if
they stop getting this software, the time it will take them to develop it by
themselves will increase the gap. This is a fact. So soft bombs, like atomic
bombs, can be a means of deterrence. For political people who are just
dicovering this new strategy, the book is that of a new generation showing to
the old one that what was a tool has become a weapon."

[ this article has been published in the international edition of the French
magazine Le Point, #612, dated April 17, pages 60-61 ]

jlb
-------

[This reminds me of an anecdote I heard Captain (now Cmdr) Grace Hopper tell.
It seems some company began to pass off a Navy-developed COBOL compiler
verifier as their own, removing the print statement that gave credit to
the Navy.  When the Navy came out with an improved version, the company
had the gall to ask for a copy.  Her development group complied, but
embedded concealed checks in the code so that it would fail to work if
the credit printout were ever altered.  -- KIL]

------------------------------

Date: 25 June 1984 11:16-EDT
From: Herb Lin <LIN @ MIT-MC>
Subject:  also of possible iterest...c
To: ARMS-D @ MIT-MC

Date: Wed 20 Jun 84 20:07:35-PDT
From: Richard Treitel <TREITEL at SUMEX-AIM.ARPA>
To:   AIList
Re:   softwar  @=

         [Forwarded from the Stanford bboard by Laws@SRI-AI.]

The article Jean-Luc (or whoever) translates sounds like a typical piece of
National Enquirer-style "reporting", namely it describes something that is
*just* feasible theoretically but against which countermeasures exist, and
which has wider ramifications than are mentioned.   I'm sure the Russians are
too paranoid to allow network access to important computers in such a way as to
trigger these "bombs".

But:  it is widely rumoured that IBM puts time-delayed self-destruct operations
into some of its programs so as to force you to buy the new release when it
comes out (and heaven help you if it's late?).   And in John Brunner's book
"The Shockwave Rider", one of America's defence systems is a program that would
bring down the entire national network, thus making it impossible for an
invader to control the country.

I love science fiction discussions, but I love them even more when they're not
on BBoard.
                                - Richard

[Another SF analogy: there is a story about the consequences of developing
some type of "ray" or nondirectional energy field capable of igniting
all unstable compounds within a large radius, notably ammunition, propellants,
and fuels.  This didn't stop the outbreak of global war, but did reduce it
to the stone age.

All that has nothing to do with AI, of course, except that computers may
yet be the only intelligent beings on the planet. -- KIL]

------------------------------

Date: Mon 25 Jun 84 15:45:18-EDT
From: Keshav K. Pingali <KESHAV@MIT-XX.ARPA>
Subject: Of pips and squeaks and sealing-wax ...
To: arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA


     From:  Jong@HIS-PHOENIX-MULTICS.ARPA
     Subject:  Protecting Ourselves Against Libya
     To:  ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA

     Before I considered rebuilding our cities linearly, as a defense
     against a madman running a Third-World dictatorship, I think it would be
     incumbent upon me, in the interest of arms control and security, to have
     the little pipsqueak killed.

Unlike some contributors to PROG-D, I have no particular insight into
the mental stability of the colonel. Just out of curiosity - what evidence 
do we have of the pip-squeak's insanity ? 

-------

------------------------------

Date:  Tue, 26 Jun 84 11:25 EDT
From:  Jong@HIS-BILLERICA-MULTICS.ARPA
Subject:  Re: Protecting Ourselves Against Libya
To:  arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA

    [Jong:] Before I considered rebuilding our cities linearly, as
    a defense against a madman running a Third-World dictatorship, I
    think it would be incumbent upon me, in the interest of arms
    control and security, to have the little pipsqueak killed.

  [REM:] ...The term "pipsqueak" is insulting to a peaceful world...
  The attitude that one nation can go over to another nation and
  kill anybody there who in any way threatens the first nation, is
  horribly destabilizing...  Do you have any grounds for "we should
  go over and kill them" other than "we're bigger and stronger"...?

I confess I spoke from the heart here.  Upon reflection, I think
the word "killed" does lead into a moral thicket I'd rather
avoid.  We have no disagreement on the ideal conduct of nations.
However, in Libya we have an international renegade, with a
proven record of terrorism and murder.  I like to see the game
played by agreed-upon rules, and it distresses me if someone
cheats.  In chess, say, I can appeal to a higher authority (the
tournament director).  Who is the tournament director of
international politics?  When the rules are broken, we're on our
own.  Let's talk aggression: All nations, great and small,
reserve the right to defend themselves.

  In the case of Libya, many of its actions have been intolerable
(machine-gunning protesters outside the Libyan embassy in London;
executing exiles in France).  Qaddaffi has earned his reputation
as an international madman.  What if he posed a legitimate threat
to the U.S.?

  It is preposterous for a large industrial country to consider
rebuilding its entire infrastructure because of the threats of
one political leader, who would be gone long before the change
took place.  Self-defense makes more sense.  When one nation
threatens another, a preemptive strike seems justified (Ref:
Israel vs.  Egypt, 1967; Israel vs.  Iraq's nuclear reactor, date
unrecalled).  I will amend my suggestion: Qaddaffi is indeed a
pipsqueak (no offense intended to Libya), and thus not worth
killing.  But if he acquired an atomic weapon (and hasn't he
tried?), he would become much more dangerous.  If he acquired an
atomic weapon and threatened the U.S., I think we would be
perfectly justified in taking it away from him, by any
appropriate means.

  Even though I've repudiated my original statement, let me
defend it, just for fun (and because many agree with its original
wording).  Mentioning Libya and "a peaceful world" on the same
line is a contradiction in terms.  Remember those alleged Libyan
"hit squads" stalking President Reagan?  If true, they were, I
agree, "horribly destabilizing." But what is Reagan to do?  Well,
once Qaddaffi breaks the rules, he's on his own.  Maybe we should
just *have the little pipsqueak killed.*  My grounds?  He started
it; he no longer has the right to feel safe.
 ---(4)---


------------------------------

Date:  Tue, 26 Jun 84 11:26 EDT
From:  Jong@HIS-BILLERICA-MULTICS.ARPA
Subject:  In Defense of Lowell Wood
To:  arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA

                        IN DEFENSE OF WOOD
                                or
                    The Way Things REALLY Work

    In order to preserve anonymity, this message is being sent
through the kind auspices of Steve Jong.

    It seems the problems many members of the forum are having
with Lowell Wood are due to three things: refusal to accept his
secrecy agreement with Government agencies, ignorance of
technical advances made under secret contracts, and ignorance of
the way world-power governments think.

    I was involved in the high-tech defense business for almost
10 years.  I intend to honor the agreements I signed in the
remarks that follow.  In defense of Lowell Wood, I am sure he is
under many such agreements, and the consequences of breaking them
are serious.  I will say this: the "Star Wars" technology is
really no big deal compared to some of the other devices and
systems we've developed over the years.  Also, it was doing
pretty good fifteen (15) years ago, and it was on a back burner
then.

    A simple look at the national budget and at the annual
reports of certain companies leads one to the conclusion that
there are hundreds of thousands of American technical people
spending billions of dollars a year working on secret projects
(for many agencies).  These people "know" a great deal that they
cannot tell anyone about.  It is unrealistic (and unfair) to ask
Wood or anyone else to (1) break the law and (2) lose a clearance
(and thus possibly a career) to prove something is true.

    The fact is that many of these projects plod along, making
slight improvements to existing technology, but some achieve
amazing breakthroughs which the government feels cannot be
disclosed.  (I am sure that there are respected university
professors teaching theories, etc. that are no longer true, or
have been outdated by someone in a defense industry.)  One reason
for the secrecy is that some of these breakthroughs are so
"different" that perhaps no one (Russia, etc.) would ever think
of them on their own (unclassified examples: over-the-horizon
radar, the Stealth bomber).  It's true that keeping discoveries
secret costs millions, and can easily be overcome by one spy (or
one politician).  But, for every nn secrets lost or disclosed,
some are kept.

    Another reason the government keeps things secret is that
there is a particular mindset required to play international
games.  This involves lying.  A good example is OTH radar.  If
the Russians had said that we were tracking their planes with OTH
radar, we would have denied it, saying it was not technically
possible.  Or, the Russians might say overflights by our
reconnaissance planes are no longer possible because they can now
shoot them down.  We would agree.

    Once you have gained the proper mind-set, it's easier to see
how the government handles a project like Star Wars.  The
opponents to Star Wars are, in my opinion, unaware of the
state-of-the-art technology.  ( A *really* suspicious person
might say Sagan et al are doing this as a ploy.)  But even if
they carried public opinion and the project was not funded by
Congress, what makes you think the project would not still go
on?  There are lots of agencies with classified budgets.  From
the government's point of view, it probably would have been
better if this had happened.

    Let's turn to the flight of KAL 007, now that it's back in
the news, and as an example of how some government officials
might *think* about it.  Here is a possible scenario: every so
often, the US sends a civilian airliner over the USSR, China,
etc. to gather some photo, communications, radar, etc.
intelligence.  Why would we do this when we have satellites?  The
closer to the source, the better.  Also, an airliner makes a
nice, stable platform.  Why a civilian airliner?  We gamble that
they would *never* shoot it down.  (I have heard from a
much-travelled person that he has often been on airliners that
overflew other countries and were escorted out by interceptors.)
So we do this for a couple (many?) times.  They say the next
time, they'll shoot it down.  We call their bluff.

    I'll close with some questions for thought:

1. Do you think we ever tested nuclear weapons against
satellites, C3 systems, etc., in space (before the ban)?

2. Do you think we were told about every space flight carrying
U.S. "astronauts"?

3. What do you think the Skylab was really about?

4. Who do you think picks up more pieces of Russian missile
fragments after a missile test?  Us or them?

    There have been and are lots of scary, interesting things
going on out there.  Again I say, Star wars is not that big a
deal.

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[End of ARMS-D Digest]