daemon@ucbvax.UUCP (07/05/84)
From @MIT-MC:JLarson.PA@Xerox.ARPA Wed Jul 4 15:30:11 1984 Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 2 : Issue 44 Today's Topics: International behaviour Defense of L. Wood C^3I ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Wed 27 Jun 84 12:47:05-CDT From: Don Stuart <ICS.STUART@UTEXAS-20.ARPA> Subject: Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V2 #43 To: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA I'm sure we all agree about the ideal behaviour of nations. International law, treaties and so forth provide a reasonable set of rules. We should always seek to abide by those rules, for reasons both moral and practical. However, to commit ourselves irrevocably to the written rules when our opponents (whoever they are) violate them with impunity is unacceptable. There are greater evils. While we are far from perfect and they are not all bad, the two sides are not morally interchangable. It does make a difference who wins, and it would be foolish to pretend otherwise. Moral issues aside, I believe that our nation's greatest strength is a reputation for following the rules, for fair play and general decency. It pains me when we squander that international capital. However, it also pains me to hear people suggest that simple principles will solve any problem. Killing people is always a bad thing, but sometimes failing to kill is worse. This has nothing to do with who is bigger or stronger. It has everything to do with who is right. If it seems clear that Libya has both the ability and intent to kill thousands of innocent civilians by detonating an atomic device in a US city (or for that matter, any city), then our government MUST do all it can to prevent this. If the only way to do so is to kill Qaddaffi, then he must die. We should regret the necessity, but not the act. Jong is concerned about a "moral thicket" which he wishes to avoid. It cannot be done, for the world is far too complex and ugly a place. Sometimes there are no good choices (sometimes there are no bad ones!) and we must make hard decisions. To pretend otherwise is silly, dangerous and far too common. Don ------- ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 2 Jul 84 23:47:50 PDT From: Charlie Crummer <crummer@AEROSPACE> To: arms-d@mit-mc Subject: Defense of L. Wood This is a reply to the anonymous defender of L. Wood. It seems the problems many members of the forum are having with Lowell Wood are due to three things: refusal to accept his secrecy agreement with Government agencies, ignorance of technical advances made under secret contracts, and ignorance of the way world-power governments think. I think problem is the naive belief that sufficiently secret, sufficiently high-tech advances will provide a solution to the problems that nations have with one another. ... many of these projects plod along, making slight improvements to existing technology, but some achieve amazing breakthroughs which the government feels cannot be disclosed. (I am sure that there are respected university professors teaching theories, etc. that are no longer true, or have been outdated by someone in a defense industry.) Do you personally know of such a case? (You can answer without divulging the secret.) One reason for the secrecy is that some of these breakthroughs are so "different" that perhaps no one (Russia, etc.) would ever think of them on their own (unclassified examples: over-the-horizon radar, the Stealth bomber). The principles of over-the-horizon radar have been used for years by ham radio operators for years; it has also been known for a long time that there are materials that don't reflect radar energy. What evidence do you have that there have been any breakthroughs so "different" that "no one would ever think of them on their own"? Breakthroughs are made by individuals, not agencies. I'll close with some questions for thought: 1. Do you think we ever tested nuclear weapons against satellites, C3 systems, etc., in space (before the ban)? 2. Do you think we were told about every space flight carrying U.S. "astronauts"? 3. What do you think the Skylab was really about? 4. Who do you think picks up more pieces of Russian missile fragments after a missile test? Us or them? There have been and are lots of scary, interesting things going on out there. Again I say, Star wars is not that big a deal. On the other hand, whatever happened to: 1) the nuclear airplane, 2) the nuclear rocket, 3) the 50-megaton nuclear submarine mines, and 4) a viable basing concept for the MX? --Charlie ------------------------------ Date: 2 June 1984 2104-PDT From: CAULKINS@USC-ECL Subject: C^3I To: arms-d @ MIT-MC In the 22 June 84 issue of Science (Vol 224, N0. 4655, P1306) there is a piece titled "Strategic Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence" by Charles A. Zraket, executive V.P. of the MITRE Corp. The article illustrates many of the paradoxes associated with real plans for waging a 'controlled' nuclear war. Some quotes: "... The crux of the strategic issue is the relation between deterrence and force employment. The United States can achieve reliable deterrence only if it can ensure that it can retaliate discriminately and end a nuclear war as quickly as possible. Without this, deterrence is at the mercy of provocative rhetoric, threats of mutually assured destruction (MAD), or suicidal attacks. The decision to use nuclear weapons is the ultimate C^3I issue. International security requires capabilities beyond first-strike attack, launch-on-warning, and MAD, or we may not be able to act rationally during a crisis. ... [curiouser and curiouser. We have nuclear weapons to deter their use by others; the main purpose of using the weapons is to stop the use of the weapons (end the war) as quickly as possible. We must go beyond first-strikes, LOW, MAD ... to what ? These capabilties may prevent us from acting rationally (who knows, we might even be tempted into acting humanely), as if these strategies themselves were not the result of a good deal of supposed rationality.] Zraket quotes several paragraphs from The Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter expressing sketicism about the ability to wage 'limited' nuclear war and to maintain a policy of 'discriminate targeting'. He then says: "... before discussing how an enduring C^3I system can ameliorate the situation envisioned [by the Bishops - the probability of loss of control, and consequent millions of civilian casualties]... The United States will have no credible, prompt counterforce to Soviet ICBM's until the MX ... or .. submarine D-5 missiles ... are deployed. Thus the Soviets can continue to depend mostly on strategic warning and can maintain lesser readiness in its nuclear forces ... When and if the United States deploys a credible counterforce to Soviet ICBM's ... we can expect the Soviet Union to pursue more aggressively the same kinds of worldwide crisis C^3, tactical warning and surveillance, and reconnaisance as the United States ... These concerns [about the need to upgrade space surveillance, intelligence, warning, and ASAT] may push [the Soviets] to maintain higher states of readiness in their strategic forces ..." [In other words, if we deploy MX and D-5 and continue to lead the Soviets in deployment of space-based C^3I systems, they may react by putting their ICBMs at a higher state of alert - not exactly a stabilizing development.] "Long-term endurance and reliability [of C^3I] in a large scale exchange are impossible to achieve because of nuclear devastation of the environment due to direct effects and climatic phenomena [Zraket references the TTAPS study here] ... To deter large-scale attacks, including attacks on C^3I, only an assured retaliatory capability is needed, not an enduring, discriminate one ..." [sounds like MAD to me]. It's an interesting article; I recommend reading the whole thing. ------------------------------ [End of ARMS-D Digest]