[fa.arms-d] Arms-Discussion Digest V2 #46

daemon@ucbvax.UUCP (07/18/84)

From @MIT-MC:JLarson.PA@Xerox.ARPA  Tue Jul 17 17:34:20 1984
Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 2 : Issue 46

Today's Topics:

	Money Market Fund with a Conscience
	Need for secret knowledge in discussion of BMD?
	AWST BMD article
	Sept. Deterrence Conference

Date: 13 July 1984 04:50-EDT
Date: Fri, 13 Jul 84 09:31:25 edt
From: ima!inmet!tower@cca-unix
Subject: Money Market Fund with a Conscience
To: arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA

Thought readers of ARMS-D would find this useful.

I have recently found a "socially conscious " money market fund.

A brief quote from their prospectus:
    "Our goals (that is, those of the fund) are to seek as high a level
of current income as we can, while maintaining liquidity and safety of
capital, and at the same time concerning ourselves with the social and
economic impact of our investments. We seek these goals by investing in
a portfolio that consists of short-term debt securities meeting high
quality standards and also meeting out social and economic tests."

Prospectus and application available from:
	Working Assets Money Fund
	230 California Street
	San Francisco, CA  94111
	(415) 989-3200

They look as respectable as any most of the other funds I have looked
into with similar yields. The societal goals they are pursuing are

-len tower        {ihnp4,harpo}!inmet!tower        Cambridge, MA

This news does not reflect the opinions of my employer.
Please mail me any flames. Don't clutter the net.


Date:           Fri, 13 Jul 84 09:34:56 PDT
From:           Leo Marcus <marcus@AEROSPACE>
To:             arms-d@mit-mc
Subject:        Need for secret knowledge in discussion of BMD?

From the April 1984 Office of Technology Assessment Background Paper on
Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space:

"This Paper is based on full access to classified information and studies
performed for the Executive Branch.  But it turns out that a fully adequate
picture of this subject can be presented in unclassified form. One reason is
that the important features of the directed-energy BMD concepts are based on
well-known physics, and many have in fact been discussed for 20 years.  The
second reason is that at this early stage of conceptualization there is
simply no point in (and little basis for) discussion at the detailed level
where classified particulars make a difference."


Date: 13 Jul 1984 8:26-PDT
From: dietz%USC-CSE@ECLA
To: arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: AWST BMD article

The July 9 issue of Aviation Week had an interesting article on an
endoatmospheric BMD missile being developed by the government.  The
small hypersonic missile uses millimeter wave radar and has no warhead;
instead, it destroys its target by collision.  The missile is intended
for early terminal layer defense, engaging incoming warheads at 40,000

Milestones for the kinetic energy kill weapons part of the Strategic
Defense Initiative are:  (1) Flight demonstration of a non-nuclear
terminal defense interceptor by 1989, (2) Flight test demonstration of
an exoatmospheric non-nuclear interceptor by 1990, (3) Demonstration of
a hypervelocity gun launcher by 1991, (4) Demonstration of a kinetic
energy kill space-based defense system by 1991.


Date: 17 Jul 1984 0729-PDT
Subject: Sept. Deterrence Conference
To:   arms-d@MIT-MC

The University of Maryland is sponsoring a conference on Sept 5 - 7
1984 titled "Nuclear Deterrence - New Risks, New Opportunities".
It will be held at the University College Center of Adult Education
adjacent to the College Park Campus near Washington, D.C.

The list of speakers is impressive:

V.V. Aleksandrov (USSR Academy of Sciences), Hans Bethe, McGeorge Bundy,
Sid Drell, Paul Ehrlich, Richard Garwin, George Keyworth (Presidential
Science Adviser), Lynn Sykes (seismologist), Richard Turco (TTAPS study),
and lots more including people from DoD and Dept. of State.

The conference description is as follows:

"In 1983 teams of American and Soviet scientists announced their
findings about "Nuclear Winter".  Are these findings holding up to
scrutiny ?  Do we need to think about nuclear deterrence in a new way
?  How, if at all, are policy options changed by what scientists now
believe ?  Can we construct new opportunities for good policies from
our current understanding of the new risks ?"

[End of ARMS-D Digest]