arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (10/03/84)
From: Moderator <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 2 : Issue 61
Today's Topics:
Scientific American SW article (4 msgs)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: 26 September 1984 22:37-EDT
From: Herb Lin <LIN @ MIT-MC>
Subject: Scientific American SW article
To: KING @ KESTREL
cc: ARMS-D @ MIT-MC, ARMS-DISCUSSION @ MIT-MC
From: Richard M. King <KING at KESTREL.ARPA>
A minor but obvious example is the statement that a power plant,
due to be used for five or ten minutes, must cost $300 per kilowatt. I can
march into any auto parts store and do TEN TIMES better than that - retail.
A car battery, even a $39 one, can and DOES put out more than a kilowatt.
It can do so for several minutes if it is charged and kept reasonably warm.
(The reason a cheap car battery only lasts a couple of years is the
charge/discharge cycles. The ones used in SW would only be discharged
during tests; once a month, not twice a day. "We only warrantee these
batteries for 200 nuclear wars. ..."
Are you seriously suggesting the shipping of 10^5 auto batteries into
space? The benchmark does seem reasonable to me when you consider
that a nuclear powerplant costs about $3-4,000 per kilowatt. Nuclear
powerplants have to be reliable, which adds to their cost, but so must
the space battle station power plant. Furthermore, it is far more
difficult to get optimum performance out of a system that is quiescent
most of the time than out of a system that is more or less on most of
the time (as in a power plant).
A more serious omission is that of physical interception. No
countermeasure is reasonable. If the missile masses 100Kg (reasonable)
and it's hit by a Lexan cube massing 100gm (reasonable) with a relative
velocity of 30Km/sec (low) it will be knocked far enough off course to
miss by 10-15Km. Even if you protect it well enough to survive (a VERY
dubious proposition) a lot of lives would be saved if Boston's missile fell
into the Bay. A threat cloud can be met by a net or a "shotgun shell";
a MIRV'ed device can send out ten threat clouds, but each of these is
physically small.
Huh? I agree that a kinetic energy kill device will indeed work when
it hits the target -- the recent HOE test showed that. The issue is
indeed if a shotgun blast can hit another shotgun blast, but I don't
really understand your point above. Are you proposing MIRV'd
interceptors?
There are reasons not to persue this technology. Dissemination of
inaccurate statements of what "can never work" leaves SW opponents
embarassed whenever something that "can never work" is demonstrated.
True. On the other hand, there are good examples of things that were
predicted to work, and never worked well enough to be worth pursuing
(e.g., steam locomotives, nuclear airplanes). An apocryphal sign at
the Pentagon says "They said the job couldn't be done. He rolled up
his sleeves, got to wwork, and couldn't do it."
------------------------------
Date: 27 Sep 1984 1556-PDT
From: Richard M. King <KING@KESTREL.ARPA>
Subject: defense of attack of attack of SW defense
To: lin@MIT-MC.ARPA, arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA
From: Richard M. King <KING at KESTREL.ARPA>
A minor but obvious example is the statement that a power plant,
due to be used for five or ten minutes, must cost $300 per kilowatt.
I can march into any auto parts store and do TEN TIMES better than
that - retail. A car battery, even a $39 one, can and DOES put out
more than a kilowatt. It can do so for several minutes if it is
charged and kept reasonably warm.
(The reason a cheap car battery only lasts a couple of years is the
charge/discharge cycles. The ones used in SW would only be discharged
during tests; once a month, not twice a day. "We only warrantee these
batteries for 200 nuclear wars. ..."
[from LIN@MC]
Are you seriously suggesting the shipping of 10^5 auto batteries into
space? The benchmark does seem reasonable to me when you consider
that a nuclear powerplant costs about $3-4,000 per kilowatt. Nuclear
powerplants have to be reliable, which adds to their cost, but so must
the space battle station power plant. Furthermore, it is far more
difficult to get optimum performance out of a system that is quiescent
most of the time than out of a system that is more or less on most of
the time (as in a power plant).
The context of the claim that the laser unit was impractical because of the
power supply costs was a discussion of the possibility of sending a weak
beam from a geostationary satellite, into and back out of a powerful
GROUND-BASED laser (which is the thing that would need the massive but
momentary power supply), back up to a mirror on the geostationary satellite,
to another mirror orbiting about a thousand KM over Asia, and onto a
missile. The power of the beam is dictated by a path through the
atmosphere. From the article: "A factor of about 10 [in the energy
requirement] is necessary to compensate for atmospheric absorption, ... and
overcast skies."
I would say it's practical to ship 10^5 car batteries to Colerado. We
probably do that every winter.
Powerful space-based lasers would probably be driven by focused sunlight or
mixing of chemicals. The latter is an expensive source of energy but a
cheap source of POWER.
A more serious omission is that of physical interception. No
countermeasure is reasonable. If the missile masses 100Kg (reasonable)
and it's hit by a Lexan cube massing 100gm (reasonable) with a relative
velocity of 30Km/sec (low) it will be knocked far enough off course to
miss by 10-15Km. Even if you protect it well enough to survive (a VERY
dubious proposition) a lot of lives would be saved if Boston's missile
fell into the Bay. A threat cloud can be met by a net or a "shotgun
shell"; a MIRV'ed device can send out ten threat clouds, but each of
these is physically small.
Huh? I agree that a kinetic energy kill device will indeed work when
it hits the target -- the recent HOE test showed that. The issue is
indeed if a shotgun blast can hit another shotgun blast, but I don't
really understand your point above. Are you proposing MIRV'd
interceptors?
Using the term "Threat Cloud" for a cluster of warheads, balloons, chaff and
old tin cans released in a single launching act, each threat cloud's size is
limited. A MIRV can only create a fixed and relatively small number of
threat clouds, although each threat cloud can contain a large amount of
junk. (Has it occurred to anyone, however, that something has to be done to
prevent the junk from hitting the warhead on reentry, and that these
measures might give an opponent a handle to distinguish the two?)
If a kinetic energy weapon sent a net or a few hundred small pellets instead
of a large bullet, it would do a good job of cleaning out the whole threat
cloud.
I propose no MIRVed interceptor. I propose to hit a swarm of targets with a
swarm of rocks.
There are reasons not to persue this technology. Dissemination of
inaccurate statements of what "can never work" leaves SW opponents
embarassed whenever something that "can never work" is demonstrated.
True. On the other hand, there are good examples of things that were
predicted to work, and never worked well enough to be worth pursuing
(e.g., steam locomotives, nuclear airplanes). An apocryphal sign at
the Pentagon says "They said the job couldn't be done. He rolled up
his sleeves, got to wwork, and couldn't do it."
So? There are lots of examples of things that "could never work" working,
using different principles than those that the opponents prove can never
work. The best-known example among the readership of this digest is
probably the assertion of the fourties (or maybe the fifties) that
electronic computation will never be better than a certain level because the
MTBF of a vacuum tube is provably bounded above. Another example is that
the cost of transoceanic flight was once believed to be bounded below by the
maintainence requirements of piston engines. As time goes on, the number of
years it seems to take for impossible things to become commercially
available seems to decrease. It's not always exotic technology; cleverness
plays a role (example: home video tapes, which work entirely differently
from the professional ones of the sixties)
I think you missed my point. The article had at least one important
inaccuracy and omitted an important approach to "star wars". Rather than
explain why a practical technology should perhaps not be used, they give a
thorough-seeming analysis that has a lot of holes.
Don't fight "star wars" on technology. You will find yourself in the
unenviable position of retreating one step at a time until you have to
concede that the damn thing works (or, at least, that it is about as likely
to work as our deterrent is. The latter hasn't been tested under battle
conditions, either!). "Items A, B, C, D and E can never work." "Well, A
works and C might but B and D don't and E is a real stopper." "Well maybe E
works but we haven't scratched the surface of B." Et cetra. Debate it on
the assumption that it works. Show how we shouldn't use it anyway.
-------
------------------------------
Date: 28 September 1984 00:05-EDT
From: Herb Lin <LIN @ MIT-MC>
Subject: defense of attack of attack of SW defense
To: KING @ KESTREL
cc: ARMS-D @ MIT-MC
From: Richard M. King <KING at KESTREL.ARPA>
Are you seriously suggesting the shipping of 10^5 auto batteries into
space? The benchmark does seem reasonable to me when you consider
that a nuclear powerplant costs about $3-4,000 per kilowatt. Nuclear
powerplants have to be reliable, which adds to their cost, but so must
the space battle station power plant. Furthermore, it is far more
difficult to get optimum performance out of a system that is quiescent
most of the time than out of a system that is more or less on most of
the time (as in a power plant).
The context of the claim that the laser unit was impractical because of the
power supply costs was a discussion of the possibility of sending a weak
beam from a geostationary satellite, into and back out of a powerful
GROUND-BASED laser (which is the thing that would need the massive but
momentary power supply),..
You're right. Moral: read before putting mouth into gear.
I would say it's practical to ship 10^5 car batteries to Colerado. We
probably do that every winter.
How do you respond to my assertion that a power plant that is always
on is easier to keep operating at peak performance than a usually
off/suddenly on system?
Powerful space-based lasers would probably be driven by focused sunlight or
mixing of chemicals. The latter is an expensive source of energy but a
cheap source of POWER.
As fuel, yes, though lift costs could become serious, even with
the shuttle.
... A threat cloud can be met by a net or a "shotgun shell";
a MIRV'ed device can send out ten threat clouds, but each of
these is physically small.
Huh? I agree that a kinetic energy kill device will indeed work when
it hits the target -- the recent HOE test showed that. The issue is
indeed if a shotgun blast can hit another shotgun blast, but I don't
really understand your point above. Are you proposing MIRV'd
interceptors?
A MIRV can only create a fixed and
relatively small number of threat clouds, although each threat cloud
can contain a large amount of junk. (Has it occurred to anyone,
however, that something has to be done to prevent the junk from
hitting the warhead on reentry, and that these measures might give an
opponent a handle to distinguish the two?)
Junk will vanish when it hits the atmosphere.
If a kinetic energy weapon sent a net or a few hundred small pellets
instead of a large bullet, it would do a good job of cleaning out the
whole threat cloud.
How big a net? (The HOE in fact used a net, though rather small.)
There are reasons not to persue this technology. Dissemination of
inaccurate statements of what "can never work" leaves SW opponents
embarassed whenever something that "can never work" is demonstrated.
True. On the other hand, there are good examples of things that were
predicted to work, and never worked well enough to be worth pursuing
(e.g., steam locomotives, nuclear airplanes). An apocryphal sign at
the Pentagon says "They said the job couldn't be done. He rolled up
his sleeves, got to wwork, and couldn't do it."
So? There are lots of examples of things that "could never work"
working, using different principles than those that the opponents
prove can never work. The best-known example among the readership of
this digest is probably the assertion of the fourties (or maybe the
fifties) that electronic computation will never be better than a
certain level because the MTBF of a vacuum tube is provably bounded
above...
But the article addressed particular technologies currently in the
running. Not one of the authors of the article would assert the
impossibility of star wars if it could be shown that it were possible
to use psycho-kinesis to destroy missiles -- i.e., if new physical
principles could indeed be illustrated.
Don't fight "star wars" on technology. You will find yourself in the
unenviable position of retreating one step at a time until you have to
concede that the damn thing works (or, at least, that it is about as likely
to work as our deterrent is. The latter hasn't been tested under battle
conditions, either!). "Items A, B, C, D and E can never work." "Well, A
works and C might but B and D don't and E is a real stopper." "Well maybe E
works but we haven't scratched the surface of B." Et cetra. Debate it on
the assumption that it works. Show how we shouldn't use it anyway.
I certainly agree with your last point, and I sadly agree with your
first point about retreating, but for different reasons than you would
have. In particular, the military doesn't exactly have a wonderful
reputation for conducting rigorous testing, and in the absence of
testing, it is obvious to me that things can be shown to work
regardless of any objective standard.
To take up your last point, simply consider the fact that both nations
will simply not use ballistic missiles in the future. We won't be
much safer then, when we get zero warning from smuggled bombs and
bacteriological weapons.
------------------------------
Date: 30 Sep 84 09:27:46 PDT (Sun)
To: "Richard M. King" <KING@kestrel>
cc: arms-d@mit-mc
Subject: Re: your message about Scientific American SW article
From: Martin D. Katz <katz@uci-750a>
I tend to take all Scientific American articles concerning arms
policy with a dose of salt -- enough to salinate a small ocean.
As well you should; these articles are at least in part editorializing by
the authors (as any politically loaded articles tend to be). One must also
realize that S.A. doesn't have a science staff which researches these
articles to insure that they are totally factual (this would not be
reasonable given the breadth of their publication), but rather publishes
articles written by outside "experts." The problem is that there is no such
thing as an unbiased expert in Military Weaponry, let alone such a volatile
field as Space Based Weaponry.
A minor but obvious example is the statement that a power plant,
due to be used for five or ten minutes, must cost $300 per kilowatt. ...
A car battery, even a $39 one, can and DOES put out more than a kilowatt.
Weight to orbit, reliability, etc. argue against current off the shelf
parts, but the general argument about number of times used appears valid for
low energy devices. High energy devices (e.g. X-ray lasers) require high
concentrations of energy and therefore either nuclear-critical (e.g. fission
bombs) devices or some new breakthrough.
A more serious omission is that of physical interception. ...
Even if you protect it well enough to survive (a VERY
dubious proposition) a lot of lives would be saved if Boston's missile fell
into the Bay.
So called guided bullets or even shotgun blasts are a medium-tech. rather
than high-tech approach, and probably have a higher chance of successful
implementation (remember the Omni article on translunar injection of a
retrograde orbit at GEO, I have seen no counter argument other than debris
density).
Please watch your scenaria carefully: Some (admittedly low detail) estimates
have indicated that the number of lives lost by a 1 Megaton explosion at sea
level in the harbor of a major city might cause more deaths than the same
explosion at 1000 meters above the heart of the city. This is because of
the resulting tidal wave, liquid fall-out (water based fall-out may be far
more hazardous than dust borne because it can be injested easier), etc.
------------------------------
[End of ARMS-D Digest]eder@ssc-vax.UUCP (10/07/84)
> inaccurate statements of what "can never work" leaves SW opponents C3,SS8o,CC,CS,G4 > > As well you should; these articles are at least in part editorializing by > the authors (as any politically loaded articles tend to be). One must also > realize that S.A. doesn't have a science staff which researches these > articles to insure that they are totally factual (this would not be > reasonable given the breadth of their publication), but rather publishes > articles written by outside "experts." The problem is that there is no such > thing as an unbiased expert in Military Weaponry, let alone such a volatile > field as Space Based Weaponry. > > A minor but obvious example is the statement that a power plant, > [End of ARMS-D Digest] I beg to differ. Having recently worked on the Space Based Laser System Concept Study at Boeing, I can state that there are UNBIASED experts on space weapons. I have worked with several. Among the tasks of this study was to determine exactly what technologies needed development, and how much development they needed. No we cannot build an effective SBL now. We think, given R&D in progress, that we will probably be able to some number of years in the future. It WILL be expensive. One problem with working in the field, is that much of it is classified. Hence, I cannot give specifics. I cannot even point out the mistakes in the Scientific American article (there are several). Sigh. As long as the Strategic Defense programs are classified, the public (arms digest included) will be using innaccurate data, and there can be no 'review by experts'. Dani Eder / Boeing Aerospace Company / uw-beaver!ssc-vax!eder / (206)773-4545