arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (10/16/84)
From: Moderator <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 2 : Issue 65
Today's Topics:
Scientific American Starwars Critique
Eavesdropping
Paul Warnke talk
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Date: Sun, 14 Oct 84 14:50:38 pdt
From: cgr%ucbpopuli.CC@Berkeley
To: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Scientific American Starwars Critique
I would like to take issue with the style of criticism
recently directed at the article by Bethe, Garwin, Gottfried, and
Kendall, titled "Space-based Ballistic-Missile Defense"
(SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, vol. 251, no. 4., October 1984, pp. 39-49)
by several contributors to this forum.
As a reasonably intelligent citizen without specialist
knowledge, I try to keep abreast of arms issues in order to make
reasonably informed decisions about where my tax dollars should
be spent. I have found a number of publications -- SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN, the NEW YORK TIMES, and the NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
among them -- to be reasonably useful in this regard (certainly
more reliable than, say, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE). While I would not
claim that any of these publications are totally and completely
unbiased in their coverage of events, I can say with some
certainty that over the past decade I have found them a far more
reliable guide to decision-making than, say, various DoD press
releases.
I am not qualified to critique the conclusions presented
in the SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN article under discussion (although
Bethe's credentials certainly seem unassailable to me). I can,
however, say that the criticisms expressed in this newsgroup are
rather unconvincing.
Katz and Lin seem to be saying that SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN
is "biased". I say, so what? The question is not whether
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN is biased, the question is whether the
authors of the article in question know what they're talking
about. Nattering about "bias" seems a shabby way of discrediting
the article without having to confront the hard issues raised by
the authors. If the critics can show that the authors' "bias"
has slanted the authors' conclusions, I would like to see their
(the critics') proofs (preferably with some concrete and
practical alternatives).
I'd also like to see some evidence as to the nature of
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN's "bias".
John Hevelin
ucbvax!cgr@ucbpopuli
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Date: 15 Oct 1984 06:20-PDT
Sender: GEOFF@SRI-CSL
Subject: Eavesdropping.
From: the tty of Geoffrey S. Goodfellow <Geoff@SRI-CSL.ARPA>
To: telecom@ECLC, security-forum@UTEXAS-20, arms-d@MC
n062 1528 14 Oct 84
BC-EAVESDROP
High-Level Group to Combat Soviet Eavesdropping
By DAVID BURNHAM
c.1984 N.Y. Times News Service
WASHINGTON - President Reagan, acting on on intelligence reports
that Soviet eavesdropping is a serious security threat, has ordered
the creation of a cabinet-level group to combat it.
Reagan signed a directive three weeks ago spelling out the extent
of the threat and ordering a government move to reduce the loss of
government and private industry information that might help the
Soviet Union or other nations.
According to the unclassified version of the president's order,
equipment that is used to eavesdrop on telephone conversations and
other kinds of electronic messages is now widely available and ''is
being used extensively by foreign nations.'' The order added that the
technology ''can be employed by terrorist groups and criminal
elements.''
With the widespread use of microwave towers and satellites to
transmit telephone messages and other data, the messages of
government, businesses and individuals have become increasingly
subject to interception. Antennas in Cuba and on Soviet trawlers
cruising offshore reportedly are able to identify and record much of
this traffic.
While the Ford and Carter administrations were concerned about the
problem and ordered some changes in government practices to deal with
it, Reagan's National Security Decision Directive 145 is the first
public assertion by a president that international eavesdropping
constitutes a threat to the United States.
The president's directive was obtained after Walter G. Deeley, the
National Security Agency's deputy director for communications
security, disclosed in an interview that the agency hoped to equip
government and industry with 500,000 special telephones. The
telephones are meant to make it far more difficult for eavesdroppers
to conduct electronic surveillance.
Reagan said that both government and privately owned communication
networks transmit large amounts of classified and unclassified
information that, when put together, can reveal important secrets.
''The compromise of this information, especially to hostile
intelligence services, does serious damage to the United States and
its national security interests,'' Reagan's directive said.
''A comprehensive and coordinated approach must be taken to protect
the government's telecommunications and automated information systems
against current and anticipated threats,'' the document continued.
''This approach must include mechanisms for formulating policy, for
overseeing systems security resources programs, and for coordinating
and executing technical activities.''
The directive, written by the staff of the National Security
Council, established the Systems Security Steering Group, made up of
the secretaries of state, treasury and defense, the attorney general,
the director of the Office of Management and Budget and the director
of central intelligence.
In addition to setting overall policies, the directive said the
steering group was responsible for reviewing all communication
security proposals before they were submitted ''to the Office of
Management and Budget for the normal budget review process.''
The directive's explicit requirement that the budget office review
and approve all electronic security programs appeared to thwart
efforts by the National Security Agency, which suggested this summer
that it should become the ''national focal point for communications
security requirements and funding.''
The National Security Agency is the nation's largest and most secret
intelligence organization. With an estimated annual budget of $4
billion, its twin missions are to collect electronic intelligence all
over the world and protect the sensitive communications of the United
States. It also serves as the principal adviser to the president and
the National Security Council on communication security questions.
Reagan's directive set up the National Telecommunications and
Information Systems Security Committee, subordinate to the
cabinet-level steering group. This committee has 14 members,
including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the director of the top
security agency. The committee was ordered to establish two
subcommittees, one focusing on telephone security and the other on
computer security.
In a third major assignment, Reagan authorized the security agency
to serve as the ''national manager'' for telephone and computer
security. In this role, the agency was authorized to conduct, approve
or endorse all government research on this problem.
The president's directive also orders the agency to examine
government telecommunications and computer systems to determine their
''vulnerability to hostile interception and exploitation.''
The order explicitly authorized the agency to monitor ''official
communications'' but added that such monitoring ''shall be conducted
in strict compliance with the law, Executive Orders and applicable
presidential directives.''
The presidential directive did not say the agency had the right to
monitor the communications of private corporations, but guidelines
under which such monitoring may be conducted were approved by
Attorney General William French Smith earlier this year. nn
nyt-10-14-84 1825edt
***************
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Date: 15 October 1984 21:03-EDT
From: Steven A. Swernofsky <SASW @ MIT-MC>
Subject: [JW: Paul Warnke talk]
To: ARMS-D @ MIT-MC
Date: Mon 15 Oct 84 16:54:31-EDT
From: Joseph Weizenbaum <JW%MIT-OZ@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: Paul Warnke talk
To: Bboard@MIT-MC
Paul Warnke, Chief U.S. negotiator at the SALT II talks will be
interviewed by an MIT faculty panel - among them Vicky Weisskopf
and Joseph Weizenbaum - after giving a talk on "Which Way to Peace".
Place: 9-150
Time: 7:30 pm
Date: Tuesday, October 16
This event is sponsored by:
The Technology and Culture Seminar
The Faculty Disarmament Group and
The Student Disarmement Group.
All invited, of course.
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[End of ARMS-D Digest]