[fa.arms-d] Arms-Discussion Digest V2 #74

arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (11/26/84)

From: Moderator <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA>

Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 2 : Issue 74
Today's Topics:

		Tom Wicker on Reagan + arms control
		WWII gas weapons (3 msgs)
		Russians (4 msgs)
		
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Date: 18 Nov 1984 0745-PST
From: CAULKINS@USC-ECL.ARPA
Subject: Tom Wicker on Reagan + arms control
To:   arms-d@MIT-MC

Some quotes from a column titled "Jawboning Arms Control" by
Tom Wicker in the 16 Nov NYT:

"... In an election day interview ... Mr. Reagan stressed his hopes
for peace - but inadvertently disclosed how little his first term had
taught him.  He repeated, for example, his old theme that the Russians
would soon abandon the arms race for negotiations because "they know
there are difficulties in matching us industrially in such a buildup."
Nothing in four years, apparently, has suggested to him what virtually
every authority on Soviet affairs has concluded - that the arms race
pinches the Soviet economy [as it does that of the US], but that the
Kremlin will do what it has to to maintain military parity. ...

The President also expressed ... 'an unrelenting commitment' to his
Startegic Defense Initiative ... Star Wars, Mr. Reagan blithely 
declared, would provide an incentive to the Russians to reduce or
eliminate their missile forces because it woould make the U.S.
'invulnerable' to attack by these forces.  

This view confirms how little Mr. Reagan knows about even his own
proposals.  Actually, Adminstration experts have testified to Congress
that Star Wars may not work; it will take $26 billion or more just to
find out.  At best, these experts say, it will be 90% effective; but
10% of a 5,000-warhead attack, which Moscow could make, is 500 warheads
and curtains for most of Reagan Country.

Besides, against an only partial defense, the real incentive for Moscow
would be to build not fewer but more  missiles and warheads in order to
overwhelm that defense. ...

That he continues to see missile defense as the road to arms control
and 'deterrence at a lower level' - let alone to 'peace , disarmament'
- suggests that Mr. Reagan has not really thought through these
subjects ..."

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Date: 19 Nov 1984 08:58:53-EST
From: sde@Mitre-Bedford
To: arms-d@mit-mc
Subject: Russian culture

The following two paragraphs were in the same note:

>I completely agree with this.  It is important for the people of the world
>to know what the big picture is, not only with respect to the arms race, but
>also economics and culture.  For example, if we understood more about Russian
>history and culture, we would have a higher regard for them as a people--
>and would not be so easily swayed by rhetoric and hyperbole.

... <intervening lines deleted> ...

>Also, communism does not have a monopoly on ruthlessness and despotism.
>I think the ruthlessness of the Soviet government may be due more to
>the history and culture of the Russian people than to the type of
>economic system they are professing at this time.

On one hand, "if we understood more about Russian ... culture, we
would have a higher regard...," and on the other hand, "the ruthlessness
... may be due more to ... culture ... than to ... economic system ..."

So should one therefore have a higher regard for a people and culture
characterized by ruthlessness?
Forgive my naivete, but I do not understand why the above is an
argument in favor of doing anything but girding oneself against,
not merely communist Russia, but Russia for all time (unless and
until the culture itself changes).

   David   sde@mitre-bedford

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Date: Monday, 19 Nov 1984 11:55:23-PST
From: hughes%mother.DEC@decwrl.ARPA  (Gary  walk this way  Hughes - CSSE uVAX
Systems)
To: arms-d@mit-mc.ARPA
Subject: WWII gas weapons

A number of recent articles have mentioned German WWII developments in nerve
gasses and why they weren't used in WWII.

Most of the references that I have read claim that German intelligence believed
that the Allies also had nerve gas weapons (which was, apparently, not the
case) and feared that the Allies would respond to a nerve gas attack in kind.

If their intelligence had been correct the outcome MAY have been different

Gary Hughes
UUCP:   ...{ decvax | allegra | ucbvax }!decwrl!dec-rhea!dec-mother!hughes
                                                     ...!dec-godzla!hughes
ARPA:      hughes%mother.DEC @decwrl.ARPA
           hughes%godzla.DEC @decwrl.ARPA
reality?:  DEC, ZKO1-2/C07, 110 Spit Brook Rd, Nashua NH 03062

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Date: 20 Nov 84 07:31:47 EST
From: DIETZ@RUTGERS.ARPA
Subject: British WW II Nerve Gas
To: aurora!eugene@RIACS.ARPA, arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA

The British were indeed developing nerve gases during WW II.  Their
gas was called DFP, and was perhaps 10 times less toxic than Tabun, but
easier to make in large quantities.
-------

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From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@Berkeley
Date: 20 Nov 84 03:40:51 CST (Tue)
To: arms-d@mit-mc.ARPA
Subject: more on poison gas

> Actually, this is only part of the picture.  The Germans had just developed
> nerve gases for which the Allies had no defense at the time.  The Allies
> did have a new gas ... but it was no where near as effective at Tabun [GA].

Actually, *this* is only part of the picture.  Yes, the Germans had
developed the first nerve gases and the Allies had nothing to match them,
but... neither side appreciated this!  The Allies didn't know about the
German developments.  And the Germans had noticed that Allied scientists
weren't publishing anything about organic phosphorus compounds, and
concluded that the Allies also had discovered the nerve gases.  In fact,
the Germans were mistaken:  organic phosphorus compounds WERE on the list
of sensitive topics that Allied scientists were asked not to publish about,
but for lesser reasons.

				Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
				{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry

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Date: Tue, 20 Nov 84 19:52:56 mst
From: jlg@LANL (Jim Giles)
To: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: KHRUSHCHEV

>   Refering to 'positive forces' in the Soviet Union
>   is like talking about cold spots on the sun.  To be sure, there are
>   some Soviet leaders who are less 'hawkish' than others, but ALL Soviet
>   leaders are 'dangerous hawks' on any scale americans would be familiar
>   with.
>
>This is just false.  Khruschev (sp?) was rather atypical, and from all
>the available evidence was, by my assessment, a positive force for
>change in the SU.

I can't pretend to have read 'all the available evidence' about Khrushchev
(at least I can spell the name), but from what I have read, I can't conclude
that he was really a 'positive force for change'.

A single example ought to clarify the issue.  To have become the Soviet
leader in the mid-fifties, Khrushchev must have been a fairly high-level
official even under the Stalin regime.  This means that he must have
survived one or more of the purges that took place.  You remember the
purges, don't you?  That was when millions of Russian citizens were killed
and tens of millions sent to slave labor camps for real or imagined crimes
against the Stalin regime (a million here and a million there, pretty soon
you're talking real carnage!).  I wonder how Khrushchev survived it?
A quick trip to the local library sets me straight: 'WHO'S WHO in the
USSR', 1961 issue (they only come out every 5 years, and Khrushchev was
out of power by 66).  Well here's part of the entry:

	Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, ...
		career: ...
		1934-37 helped organize Party purge in Moscow
		and Moscow Oblast; 1937 member of "commission
		of three" (with Molotov and Yezhov) for carrying
		out purge in Ukr.; 1938-41 and again 1944 till
		1949 as First Secr., CC, CP(b) Ukr., in charge
		of further purges in Ukr.; ...

Well, that's how he survived - he was in charge!  That's not the only
example from Khrushchev's past, but it's sufficient to make my original
point again.  ALL SOVIET LEADERS ARE "DANGEROUS HAWKS" BY ANY NORMAL
AMERICAN STANDARDS.  Soviet leaders only get to positions of power after
they have proven themselves, time and again, to be TOTALLY committed
to the communist party and the stated goals thereof (they also have to
be cunning, resourceful, tenacious, ...).

Very incomplete bibliography:

 'Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Eighties', Paul
	Johnson; pub. Harper and Row, 1983  [not so much on Khrushchev,
	but a good overall history of the Twentieth Century]

 'Khrushchev Remembers' and 'Khrushchev Remembers: the Last Testament',
	N.S.Khrushchev; trans. Strobe Talbott; pub. Little, Brown and
	Co.,1974  [Khrushchev's memoirs, understandably biased but
	still of interest.  Both rather large volumes, not for the
	casual reader]

 'Thirteen Days: a Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis', Robert Kennedy,
	1969  [sorry don't have the book handy for the publisher.]

 'Who's Who in the USSR' [any edition is fine for some 'bare bones'
	biographies of leading personalities.]


There are also some books on soviet history and politics of interest.
Go to your library and look!

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 20 Nov 84 20:09:33 mst
From: jlg@LANL (Jim Giles)
To: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: SATIRE

>> The issue of arms control can't be solved by spreading false hope,
>> or by debating philosophical or ethical considerations.  The only
>> solution is cold, rational inquiry into the potential causes and
>> effects of present policies and how they might be improved.  If
>> you go into this discussion with preconcieved ideas about solutions,
>> you should be willing to change your mind - there is no room for
>> sentiment or dogma.  And because we have to live with the situation
>> indefinitely, we will almost certainly have to change policies and
>> resort, on occasion, to policies which are expensive or unpleasant.
>> Among the sentimental ideas we will have to discard are some of the
>> statements in the note I quoted above, the issues just aren't that
>> straightforward.
>
>Perhaps, I had it all wrong.  Maybe what the US should do is expand it's
>empire.  We had better start taking over territory as quickly as we can!
>And, maybe if we could hit the Soviets fast enough and hard enough, our
>casualties could be kept to a minimum.  We had better step up the insurgent
>operations throughout the world.  This way we can rid the world of the Soviet
>threat [their people don't like their government, right?] and become
>the true leader of the world.  After all, our 'thinking' is better than
>their thinking. [Pardon the paragraph of satire.]

Ah yes, Satire!  No one has yet created a less rational way to argue a
point.  Unfortunately, this kind of argument often sways public opinion.
It is one of the kinds of things I was warning about in the first paragraph
above.  The satirical paragraph above adds no new information or ideas
to this discussion and is therefore totally irrelevant.

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 20 Nov 84 21:24:33 mst
From: jlg@LANL (Jim Giles)
To: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY RESPONSE (LONG)

>> The leaders of the Soviet Union have the stated
>> objective of world communist revolution - and they have never made
>> a secret of this objective.
>
>What type of communism will the world be under after this revolution--
>Russian, Chinese, or Vietnamese?  There is no longer any monolithic
>communist movement, just as there is not any monolithic capitalistic
>movement.  The main goal of the Soviet Union is the social and economical
>survival of the Russian people in the face of threats from mainly China
>and the United States.

I am willing to accept that the communist movement is now somewhat
fragmented, perhaps more than you pointed out (remember Poland).  But
you should not confuse lack of success with lack of intent.  If the
only Soviet interest is its own social and economic survival then why
does it spend over $12 million per DAY supporting Cuba ($4.5 billion
per year divided by 365 days - 1976 figures).  And what POSSIBLE
interests are the Soviets protecting in Nicaragua (don't tell me that
they are protecting a formative socialist country, because without
Soviet intervention the country would never have had a socialist
revolution).

>> 3. The American people see that the democratic system only holds the
>>   POTENTIAL
>>    for the salvation of the world from nuclear holocaust.  It is up to the
>>    people to lead and demand that the officials in whatever administration
>>    produce results.  The confusion between results and reasons for no
results
>>    is ended.

>> In order for this to work, the people of the free world need to be
>> much better educated and informed - so that they can recognize a
>> path to peace if they see it.

>I completely agree with this.  It is important for the people of the world
>to know what the big picture is, not only with respect to the arms race, but
>also economics and culture.  For example, if we understood more about Russian
>history and culture, we would have a higher regard for them as a people--
>and would not be so easily swayed by rhetoric and hyperbole.

I think it's much more important to understand more about Russian politics
and government.  Unlike the US, Soviet PEOPLE don't make policy.  In
addition, Soviet leaders are willing to do many things that aren't in the
interest of Soviet people in order to pursue policies of interest to
themselves.  This is perhaps not different from politicians anywhere - but
Soviet leaders aren't elected.

>> 4. The US becomes the true leader in the evolution beyond war by affecting
>>    Soviet policy; by playing to the positive forces in the Soviet Union and
>>    thus giving them power.  The power residing in the dangerous hawks
>>    naturally dies out and they (as well as our own fear-ridden crazies)
>>    gradually become a harmless fringe group.
>>
>> It is a particularly dangerous idea to regard Soviet leadership as
>> similar to our own.  Refering to 'positive forces' in the Soviet Union
>> is like talking about cold spots on the sun.  To be sure, there are
>> some Soviet leaders who are less 'hawkish' than others, but ALL Soviet
>> leaders are 'dangerous hawks' on any scale americans would be familiar
>> with.  This is no surprise - Soviet leaders are chosen as leaders only
>> after the have proven themselves time and again as being TOTALLY
>> commited to the communist party and to the stated goals thereof.

>Is the Soviet leadership that dogmatic?  I think they are pragmatic,
>and becoming more so each day.  Again, I think economic survival is
>their primary goal.  The Chinese communists have changed the party
>line quite often since Mao, and most recently have begun an experiment
>in capitalism just outside of Hong Kong which is having great success.

>Also, communism does not have a monopoly on ruthlessness and despotism.
>I think the ruthlessness of the Soviet government may be due more to
>the history and culture of the Russian people than to the type of
>economic system they are professing at this time.

Yes Soviet leadership is dogmatic!  That doesn't prevent them from being
pragmatic, tenacious, cunning, ruthless, etc..  Pragmatic means that
goals are pursued in a logical manner, it doesn't mean that the goals
are CHOSEN in a logical manner.  The Soviets have 'changed the party
line' a number of times as well, but the changes would seem subtile
to anyone not familiar with their governmental structure (for example:
Stalin was a Leninist while Khrushchev was a Marxist - there are quite
a number of philosophical differences which can lead to policy changes).
On thing that ALL Soviet leaders have retained is a committment to
world revolution.

As for Soviet ruthlessness being a consequence of their history, I can't
think of any Russian history of quite the caliber of the purges.  The
only thing that comes close is German history under the NAZIs, and that
was more recent than the original purges.

>> The issue of arms control can't be solved by spreading false hope,
>> or by debating philosophical or ethical considerations.  The only
>> solution is cold, rational inquiry into the potential causes and
>> effects of present policies and how they might be improved.  If
>> you go into this discussion with preconcieved ideas about solutions,
>> you should be willing to change your mind - there is no room for
>> sentiment or dogma.  And because we have to live with the situation
>> indefinitely, we will almost certainly have to change policies and
>> resort, on occasion, to policies which are expensive or unpleasant.
>> Among the sentimental ideas we will have to discard are some of the
>> statements in the note I quoted above, the issues just aren't that
>> straightforward.

>You can have detailed discussions and negotiations about the size and
>number of warheads, etc., and this may have some short term benefits,
>but you are not really striking at the root of the problem.  We may be
>able to buy time with negotiations and defensive weapons, and this is
>very important, but I think they will not provide a permanent solution.
>
>The most destabling influence now is the economic and social inequalities
>that exist between peoples.  As I understand it, there are sufficient
>resources to feed the population of the earth, and yet people are
>starving.  People in comparatively affluent nations, such as the USA,
>need to share expertise and resources with the less well off.
>We also need to understand and appreciate their social system and
>culture.  Without an acceptance of their right to existence there
>can be no progress.
>

Very nice liberal rhetoric, and not without some merit.  We certainly should
help those who are really less well of than we.  As part of our program
of assistance we should try to learn about the people in these countries.
But we should not let our justified concern for the underprivilaged color
our view of other important political issues.

As for Russia's supposed economic problems - Russia is self-sufficient in
essentially everything but food (which it can buy, with cash (gold),
whenever it feels the need).  Russia is the largest world producer of crude
oil (as well as natural gas, I think), which kind of makes you wonder what
legitimate interest it has in the moddle east.  The Russian people are
hungry and poor because Soviet leadership CHOSES to be an expansionist
military power rather than a strong economic one.  They could even be self-
sufficient in food if they chose to be.  They have more agricultural land
than we do and, although the growing season is shorter, they could probably
match our output with sufficient investment in the technology.

>Basically, selfishness, ethnocentricism, and insensitivity will lead
>to further destabilization, while benevolence, acceptance, and compassion
>will reduce tensions.  The quality and temperment of the people will
>determine their survival.

While I agree that understanding the other cultures of the world is
important in order for anyone to survive in it (my motto - the license
plate on my car - is 'to seek'), I don't agree that compassion is
universally appropriate.  I feel compassion for the several million kulaks
killed in the early Soviet purges but not for the leaders and the
descendants of the leaders which committed that crime.

In fact, it seems rather ethnocentric to project our value system into
our models of the political, economic, and cultural behaviour of other
countries.  That is one reason that I pointed out the fallacy of thinking
about Soviet leadership in the same terms as US leadership, it just doesn't
work.  Rhetoric (liberal or otherwise), beliefs, or wishfull thinking are
all no substitute for knowledge and rational inquiry.

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[End of ARMS-D Digest]