arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (12/20/84)
From: Moderator <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 2 : Issue 78
Today's Topics:
Lin vs Giles (1)
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Date: 16 December 1984 23:58-EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN @ MIT-MC>
Subject: Khrushchev again (not a real nice guy)
To: jlg @ LANL
From: jlg at LANL (Jim Giles)
> A single example ought to clarify the issue. To have become theSoviet
> leader in the mid-fifties, Khrushchev must have been a fairly high-level
> official even under the Stalin regime. This means that he must have
> survived one or more of the purges that took place. I wonder how
> Khrushchev survived it? ...
> Well, that's how he survived - he was in charge!
> What does this have to do with what he did as top honcho of the Soviet
> Union?
Well, there was the invasion of Hungary in 1956, there was the Berlin
wall, there was the Cuban missile crisis.... After Stalin died there
were four men in the running for the top post in the government, after
just three months one of them (Beria) was murdered - guess who had that
done?
I give up; who had that done? (Serious question; please give
citation), and reason why you believe it.)
Besides, if you are going to cite the causing of international crises
as evidence that someone is ruthless, the U.S. is far from blameless
also. However, in my view, purges (= many many people dead) are
considerably more damning than the fomenting of the incidents of which
you speak.
What is there in Khrushchev's past that allows a director
of purge activities to EVER be regarded as a peaceful man BY AMERICAN
STANDARDS. When you lead people to believe that the Soviet leaders have
familiar characteristics - you are leading them down the garden path.
Please explain what you mean by familiar characteristics. You can't
mean K has totally unfamiliar characteristics; you obviously believe
you recognize some of them.
> As sec'y of the Communist party, he was responsible for
> placing the military under a greater degree of civilian control;
Civilian control was a political move, Khrushchev didn't trust the
military leaders at the time.
How do you know that? Moreover, why does it matter? It was a good
thing, and it led to a better world. Or would you feel safer if
Soviet nuclear weapons were controlled by the Soviet military?
> he tried to push to SU towards a nuclear posture that resembled minimum
> deterrence; he saw that nuclear weapons changed the nature of war in an
> establishment that strongly opposed that observation.
It was Stalin that wanted nuclear weapons treated as 'just big
bombs'. Khrushchev and his associates (not the military) didn't see
any conflict in assigning more importance to nuclear arms.
Conflict with what?
As for'minimum deterrence', he was mainly interested in the quickest to
achieve superiority over the American position. Since the American
nuclear deterrent was already great, Khrushchev saw the that the
quickest scheme was not through direct confrontation, but through
coersion and subversion in the third world - a tactic which the
Soviets still use with great effect today.
Again, so what? The Soviets are coercive and subversive in the third
world. So is the U.S. I'd rather have both countries screwing around
in the third world than in building ever more nuclear weapons.
What Khrushchev did was to hold production
at a minimum until the types of weapons that the Soviets could build would
be clearly superior to the American. For this reason resources, that would
otherwise have gone to production of weapons that were inferior, could be
used to more effect elsewhere.
Please give your citation for this claim, or at least tell us why
you believe it.
I am struck in this interchange by its lack of analytic validity. In
other words, where you stand really does depend on where you sit. If
you start with the premise that the Soviets are bad (choose your own
adjective) and continue to interpret all evidence in such a way as to
support that premise, then the argument is circular. What a priori
criteria can you give us to evaluate a particular piece of evidence
that will not automatically confirm your point of view? For example,
how should we know when to dismiss pieces of evidence as "politically
motivated" or "insincere"? If you cannot provide such criteria, then
we have no reason to believe that any statement you make on the
subject has any validity.
------------------------------
Date: 17 December 1984 00:09-EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN @ MIT-MC>
Subject: first-use
To: jlg @ LANL
From: jlg at LANL (Jim Giles)
It's clear that I'm not too sure what you mean by 'no-first-use', please
specify and we can discuss it at length.
NFU comes in two flavors: one is a pledge that a given side will not
be the first to use nukes under any circumstances; this is simply
declaratory policy, and may or may not have operational significance.
The second meaning is the pledge, AND the restructuring of forces and
exercises and tactical doctrine to reflect this declaratory policy.
> [...] How many people believe in a no-first-use
> policy? about 70%, according to a recent poll done. How many people
> think we have such a policy? about 85%.
> people here make policy.
I don't know anyone that believes in the no-first-use policy.
Very few American military leaders believe in NFU. I myself am
uncertain about it. However, the American public clearly believes
that we have such a policy.
You might as well sell-out NATO right away and have done with it.
Despite my reservations about NFU, I think the NATO/Pact balance is
much more favorable to the West than is commonly believed. We spend
lots of money on things that we believe will enhance combat
effectiveness but which are not counted in the usual force comparisons.
I think a no-first-strike (unprovoked attack on stratigic targets
inside the Soviet Union) policy might be reasonable.
Generous of you. This is in fact current stated U.S. (and Soviet)
policy. We don't believe them, and they don't believe us.
Of course, when you talk of such things, you have to be more specific.
The US has not used nuclear weapons AT ALL since WWII, and the Soviets
have NEVER used them - by this logic it's clear that both countries
have a de facto no-first-use policy already.
But both sides have used nuclear weapons to threaten someone else, the
U.S. far more than the Soviets.
How would you enforce
an explicit no-first-use policy? By the time someone has violated the
policy, it's too late to do anything about it.
The sentiment (I withhold judgment, because I don't know enough about
it) is that you observe force deployments and orders of battle and
doctrinal statements and exercises. From this, you are supposed to be
able to infer if the other side is indeed conforming to a NFU policy,
since this should be reflected in all of these dimensions.
------------------------------
Date: 17 December 1984 00:14-EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN @ MIT-MC>
Subject: Soviet government
To: jlg @ LANL
From: jlg at LANL (Jim Giles)
What office(s) and title(s) must a man hold to be considered
the undisputed head of the Soviet government? What bureaucratic
structures are DIRECTLY beneath said leader in the government
heirarchy? What official mechanisms exist for the change in
leadership should that prove necessary (current leader dies
for example)?
I claim that anyone who cannot answer all three of these questions (at
least) is not in a very good position to assess policy that involves the
Soviets.
Why? Furthermore, your terms are sloppy. *Undisputed*? By whose
measure? "DIRECTLY"? What does that mean?
Moreover, why is the organizational chart more important than what
really happens?
------------------------------
Date: 17 December 1984 00:24-EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN @ MIT-MC>
Subject: Soviet objectives
To: jlg @ LANL
(From JLG)
Soviet support of Cuba and covert actions in Nicaragua [not to
mention the invasion of Afghanistan] contradict the claim that
the ONLY interest of the Soviet Union is its own economic and
social survival.
> Let me retaliate. What possible reason
> could the US have for supporting South Korea? Why do we have a
> security interest in the Phillippines? What possible reason does the
> US have in providing tobacco supports while it also provides money to
> publicize the dangers of smoking?
I don't see what these questions have to do with the subject at hand.
YOU (or someone, I think it was you) made the claim the the Soviet
leaders were ONLY interested in the economic and social survival of
the Soviet Union.
Not me. It is clear that both nations have more at stake than simple
economic and social survival.
> [...] Why do you assume that the Soviet Union has a
> coherent policy when no other government in the world does? Do you
> think the Soviet Union would go to war if we were to invade Cuba? I
> think not. How about Nicaragua? I think not. The Soviets intervene
> when they see that an advantage is to be gained, whether political,
> economic, or whatever. So does the U.S.
Well, at least NOW you're admitting that the Soviets have interests
outside their own country.
I've always admitted it; if you can find a place where I misspoke, pls
tell me where, and I will repent publically.
By the way, we have an official agreement
with the Soviets that we won't invade Cuba.
I know about this. The question stands.
Said
official agreement was made as part of the settlement of the Cuban
missile crisis (which many analysts say was the worst American defeat
in the entire cold war, we backed down on ALL of the Soviet conditions
for the removal of the missiles).
Citation for your analysts please? Besides, I really don't understand
your point. We did get the missiles removed, when the Soviets really
wanted them there. What should we have done?
> Nor do they in the U.S. How many people believe in a no-first-use
> policy? about 70%, according to a recent poll done. How many people
> think we have such a policy? about 85%. Don't tell me that the
> people here make policy. (I am not arguing that they should; I think
> the current system is better than the Russian alternative.)
People may not directly MAKE policy in the US, but if we consistently
disagree with the people who do we can (and often do) remove them from
office.
If policy is made from the top down, then I agree with you. But I
have no evidence that it is, except in broad terms. Indeed, the
biggest difficulty that an Administration has in implementing policy
is in reining in the bureaucracy to do its bidding. That is hard, as
any President will admit. The bureaucracy is *not* accountable.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 17 Dec 84 15:13:42 mst
From: jlg@LANL (Jim Giles)
To: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA, LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: first use
NFU comes in two flavors: one is a pledge that a given side will not
be the first to use nukes under any circumstances; this is simply
declaratory policy, and may or may not have operational significance.
I which case, why bother with it? This is the definition of No First
Use (NFU) which I originally thought you meant.
The second meaning is the pledge, AND the restructuring of forces and
exercises and tactical doctrine to reflect this declaratory policy.
Sounds expensive, and politically difficult (as it sould involve re-arming
German and other countries to a degree which NATO has never contemplated,
not all European countries trust each other yet).
Despite my reservations about NFU, I think the NATO/Pact balance is
much more favorable to the West than is commonly believed. We spend
lots of money on things that we believe will enhance combat
effectiveness but which are not counted in the usual force comparisons.
There has been a recent outcry on this newsgroup for inclusion of references,
please give some here.
But both sides have used nuclear weapons to threaten someone else, the
U.S. far more than the Soviets.
While the US has considered the use of nuclear weapons in every major
conflict since WWII, I can't think of any occasion on which any real threat
was made that we would use them. I assume the same holds true for the
Soviets (I haven't heard of any direct threat from the Soviets of this
nature). Of course, both nations flexed their nuclear muscles a bit during
the Cuban missle crisis, but the real solution to that problem was the
American stratigic superiority in conventional weapons in the area. An
implicit threat is sometimes made by putting forces on alert, but both
sides do this with about equal frequency. Please give references to this
claim too.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 17 Dec 84 15:41:13 mst
From: jlg@LANL (Jim Giles)
To: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA, LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Cuba et. al.
YOU (or someone, I think it was you) made the claim the the Soviet
leaders were ONLY interested in the economic and social survival of
the Soviet Union.
Not me. It is clear that both nations have more at stake than simple
economic and social survival.
Then why are you argueing with me? I posted remarks about Soviet activity
in the world to counter the claim tha the Soviets are interested ONLY in
thei own problems. Has it gotten to the point where ANY anti-Soviet
statement is regarded as dangerous and requires retaliation?
By the way, we have an official agreement
with the Soviets that we won't invade Cuba.
I know about this. The question stands.
Said
official agreement was made as part of the settlement of the Cuban
missile crisis (which many analysts say was the worst American defeat
in the entire cold war, we backed down on ALL of the Soviet conditions
for the removal of the missiles).
Citation for your analysts please? Besides, I really don't understand
your point. We did get the missiles removed, when the Soviets really
wanted them there. What should we have done?
Citations : MODERN TIMES, Paul Johnson - pp.625-8 ; has a very good
bibliography so you can find some other references there.
KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS, N.A.Khrushchev ; I don't remember the page.
That's right, even Khrushchev thought the US could have
taken a tougher stand.
What we should have done is accept NO conditions for the removal of the
missiles. The missiles should have been removed and the conditions reverted
to the status BEFORE the missile's deployment. The US may even had a strong
enough position to force the Soviets to make concessions themselves. But,
Kennedy was under pressure to resolve to crisis QUICKLY, so we accepted
a pretty bad solution, including an armed and unattackable Cuba.
Except for Bobby Kennedy (who would clearly show himself and his brother
in a good light), I'd like to see your references to the supposed fact
the the US got a good settlement in the Cuban missile crisis.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 17 Dec 84 15:55:39 mst
From: jlg@LANL (Jim Giles)
To: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA, LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: by the people
People may not directly MAKE policy in the US, but if we consistently
disagree with the people who do we can (and often do) remove them from
office.
If policy is made from the top down, then I agree with you. But I
have no evidence that it is, except in broad terms. Indeed, the
biggest difficulty that an Administration has in implementing policy
is in reining in the bureaucracy to do its bidding. That is hard, as
any President will admit. The bureaucracy is *not* accountable.
Broad terms seem to be enough. Reagan decided for a stronger defense,
and it can't be denied that we now, at least, spend more on defense.
You seem to saying the the US electorate have NO control whatsoever over
the direction taken by this country. If enough people had disagreed with
Reagan's defense policies, and felt it strongly enough to vote based on
that issue, the Reagan would have lost. Under Mondale, I have no doubt we
would have started spending less (in relative terms at least) on defense.
I don't know what this has to do with my claim the the Soviet people have
no say in their government's policies. Even if we, in the US, had less
control than we do, it still doesn't change the accuracy of my original
statement.
--------
The greatest derangement of the mind is to believe something
because one wishes it to be true - Louis Pastuer
James Giles
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[End of ARMS-D Digest]