arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (12/21/84)
From: Moderator <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA> Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 2 : Issue 81 Today's Topics: nuclear threats Cuba (3 msgs) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 20 Dec 84 00:09:50 PST From: David Jacobson <DMJ@WASHINGTON.ARPA> Subject: nuclear threats To: arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA cc: dmj@WASHINGTON.ARPA, lin@MIT-MC.ARPA Here is the list to which Herb Lin referred: Place year President type of reference Threatened threat Iran 1946 Truman secret threat Time Magazine, January 28, 1980 Quotes Henry Jackson Korea 1950 Truman public threat Press Conference November 30, 1950 Korea 1953 Eisenhower secret threat George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 1974 pp. 237-241 Berlin 1961 Kennedy public threat Blechman and Kaplan Force Without War 1978 pp. 343-439 Cuba 1962 Kennedy public threat Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 1971 Vietnam 69-72 Nixon repeated H.R. Haldeman, The secret threat Ends of Power, 1978 pp. 81-85, pp. 97-98 Richard Nixon's Memoirs, pp. 393-414 ------------ About the same time James Cox submitted the following quotation from the book Living with Nuclear Weapons by the Harvard Nuclear Study Group. From pages 150-151: One study has noted that there were 19 international incidents between 1945 and 1973 in which military forces with a "role in U.S. plans for strategic nuclear war" were utilized in such a way "that a nuclear signal of some type could be inferred." Of these cases of nuclear "signaling," 17 took place in 1945-65 and only 2 since then. There have been none since 1973, by which time the Soviet Union had achieved strategic parity with the United States (from Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War). During its years of nuclear superiority, the U.S. did not attempt to exploit its unique destructive capability to roll back Soviet power. When it felt major interests to be at stake, however, it did wage nuclear diplomacy, and on most of these occasions the U.S. secured all or most of the goals it sought. Why this is true is debatable, but with the emergence of nuclear parity, the U.S. has been much more reluctant to use nuclear threats in support of its diplomacy. ------- ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 20 Dec 84 12:54:27 mst From: jlg@LANL.ARPA (Jim Giles) To: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA, LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA Subject: Cuba > What we should have done is accept NO conditions for the removal of the > missiles. The missiles should have been removed and the conditions > revertedto the status BEFORE the missile's deployment.The US may even > had a strong enough position to force the Soviets to make concessions > themselves. By what right would we have done so when we had nuclear > missiles ringing the S.U.? We had missiles 'ringing' the S.U. because the NATO countries requested that we do so. The S.U. also had missiles 'ringing' the NATO countries (or, at least in range - these days being surrounded is not a disadvantage, the disadvantage in being in range; which an enemy can do to you whether you are surrounded or not). Moving missiles to Cuba endangered a whole new theatre which had not been under the nuclear missile threat before. Had the NATO countries been allowed direct control over the nuclear forces they maintained, the missiles 'ringing' the S.U. would not have been U.S., but German, English, French, etc.. France now has its own nuclear capability. If the Soviets retaliated against the U.S. for a French buildup, it would obviously be unprovoked. So how can Missiles in Cuba be regarded a a response to the NATO buildup? ---- The greatest derangement of the mind is to believe in something because one wishes it to be so - Louis Pasteur James Giles ------------------------------ Date: 20 Dec 84 17:23 EST From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA> Subject: Cuba To: jlg@LANL.ARPA cc: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA, LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA We had missiles 'ringing' the S.U. because the NATO countries requested that we do so. So what? You think the Cubans and Castro have the missiles there because the Soviets forced them to take them? If so, how would you prove it? The S.U. also had missiles 'ringing' the NATO countries (or, at least in range - these days being surrounded is not a disadvantage, the disadvantage in being in range; which an enemy can do to you whether you are surrounded or not). Moving missiles to Cuba endangered a whole new theatre which had not been under the nuclear missile threat before. Why? Were Soviet missiles aimed at Mexico? Panama? No. They were aimed at the U.S. So it wasn't a new theater threat, just a threat to the U.S. Had the NATO countries been allowed direct control over the nuclear forces they maintained, the missiles 'ringing' the S.U. would not have been U.S., but German, English, French, etc.. France now has its own nuclear capability. If the Soviets retaliated against the U.S. for a French buildup, it would obviously be unprovoked. I cannot reply until you tell me what you mean by retaliating for a French buildup. So how can Missiles in Cuba be regarded a a response to the NATO buildup? The U.S. decided to tell the Soviets that it (US) knew that the Soviet ICBM force was essentially non-existent. Shortly thereafter, the Soviets put missiles in Cuba. Correlation, or causality? I don't know; you can make your own inference. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 20 Dec 84 16:29:02 mst From: jlg@LANL.ARPA (Jim Giles) To: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA, LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA Subject: Cuba > So what? You think the Cubans and Castro have the missiles there > because the Soviets forced them to take them? If so, how would you > prove it? MODERN TIMES, by Paul Johnson [again]: "According to Castro's account, given to two French journalists, the 'initial idea originated with the Russians and with them alone.... It was not in order to ensure our own defence but primarily to strengthen socialism on the international plane.'" Johnson writes later: " ... Castro had no alternative bu to provide his island as a missile base in return [for Russian economic assistance]." > Why? Were Soviet missiles aimed at Mexico? Panama? No. They were > aimed at the U.S. So it wasn't a new theater threat, just a threat to > the U.S. A direct missile threat to the US WAS new. And how do you know that some weren't aimed at other countries in the area. Their presence in Cuba certainly caused some discomfort to these neighboring countries. > I cannot reply until you tell me what you mean by retaliating for a > French buildup. If the French decide to beef-up their nuclear capability, would it be appropriate for the Soviets to respond by building up anti-American weapons? I think not. If the Germans decide to beef-up their nuclear defences (since they are in NATO, these would be US weapons), is the situation significantly different than in the case of the French? Tough to say, but I still think not. Your connection of missiles in Cuba with NATO forces still doesn't hold much validity. -- The greatest derangement of the mind is to believe in something because one wishes it to be so - Louis Pasteur James Giles P.S. By quoting the book, I violated an agreement with myself that I would only encourage others to read things for themselves and not supply it for them. I don't like having to copy passages but in this case it seemed appropriate. ------------------------------ [End of ARMS-D Digest]