arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (12/21/84)
From: Moderator <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 2 : Issue 81
Today's Topics:
nuclear threats
Cuba (3 msgs)
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Date: Thu, 20 Dec 84 00:09:50 PST
From: David Jacobson <DMJ@WASHINGTON.ARPA>
Subject: nuclear threats
To: arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA
cc: dmj@WASHINGTON.ARPA, lin@MIT-MC.ARPA
Here is the list to which Herb Lin referred:
Place year President type of reference
Threatened threat
Iran 1946 Truman secret threat Time Magazine,
January 28, 1980
Quotes Henry Jackson
Korea 1950 Truman public threat Press Conference
November 30, 1950
Korea 1953 Eisenhower secret threat George and Smoke,
Deterrence in
American Foreign
Policy, 1974
pp. 237-241
Berlin 1961 Kennedy public threat Blechman and Kaplan
Force Without War
1978 pp. 343-439
Cuba 1962 Kennedy public threat Robert Kennedy,
Thirteen Days, 1971
Vietnam 69-72 Nixon repeated H.R. Haldeman, The
secret threat Ends of Power, 1978
pp. 81-85, pp. 97-98
Richard Nixon's
Memoirs, pp. 393-414
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About the same time James Cox submitted the following quotation from
the book Living with Nuclear Weapons by the Harvard Nuclear Study
Group. From pages 150-151:
One study has noted that there were 19 international incidents
between 1945 and 1973 in which military forces with a "role in U.S.
plans for strategic nuclear war" were utilized in such a way "that a
nuclear signal of some type could be inferred." Of these cases of
nuclear "signaling," 17 took place in 1945-65 and only 2 since then.
There have been none since 1973, by which time the Soviet Union had
achieved strategic parity with the United States (from Blechman and
Kaplan, Force Without War). During its years of nuclear superiority,
the U.S. did not attempt to exploit its unique destructive capability
to roll back Soviet power. When it felt major interests to be at
stake, however, it did wage nuclear diplomacy, and on most of these
occasions the U.S. secured all or most of the goals it sought. Why
this is true is debatable, but with the emergence of nuclear parity,
the U.S. has been much more reluctant to use nuclear threats in support
of its diplomacy.
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Date: Thu, 20 Dec 84 12:54:27 mst
From: jlg@LANL.ARPA (Jim Giles)
To: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA, LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Cuba
> What we should have done is accept NO conditions for the removal of the
> missiles. The missiles should have been removed and the conditions
> revertedto the status BEFORE the missile's deployment.The US may even
> had a strong enough position to force the Soviets to make concessions
> themselves. By what right would we have done so when we had nuclear
> missiles ringing the S.U.?
We had missiles 'ringing' the S.U. because the NATO countries requested
that we do so. The S.U. also had missiles 'ringing' the NATO countries
(or, at least in range - these days being surrounded is not a disadvantage,
the disadvantage in being in range; which an enemy can do to you whether
you are surrounded or not). Moving missiles to Cuba endangered a whole new
theatre which had not been under the nuclear missile threat before.
Had the NATO countries been allowed direct control over the nuclear forces
they maintained, the missiles 'ringing' the S.U. would not have been U.S.,
but German, English, French, etc.. France now has its own nuclear
capability. If the Soviets retaliated against the U.S. for a French
buildup, it would obviously be unprovoked. So how can Missiles in Cuba be
regarded a a response to the NATO buildup?
----
The greatest derangement of the mind is to believe in something
because one wishes it to be so - Louis Pasteur
James Giles
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Date: 20 Dec 84 17:23 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: Cuba
To: jlg@LANL.ARPA
cc: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA, LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
We had missiles 'ringing' the S.U. because the NATO countries requested
that we do so.
So what? You think the Cubans and Castro have the missiles there
because the Soviets forced them to take them? If so, how would you
prove it?
The S.U. also had missiles 'ringing' the NATO countries
(or, at least in range - these days being surrounded is not a disadvantage,
the disadvantage in being in range; which an enemy can do to you whether
you are surrounded or not). Moving missiles to Cuba endangered a whole new
theatre which had not been under the nuclear missile threat before.
Why? Were Soviet missiles aimed at Mexico? Panama? No. They were
aimed at the U.S. So it wasn't a new theater threat, just a threat to
the U.S.
Had the NATO countries been allowed direct control over the nuclear forces
they maintained, the missiles 'ringing' the S.U. would not have been U.S.,
but German, English, French, etc.. France now has its own nuclear
capability. If the Soviets retaliated against the U.S. for a French
buildup, it would obviously be unprovoked.
I cannot reply until you tell me what you mean by retaliating for a
French buildup.
So how can Missiles in Cuba be
regarded a a response to the NATO buildup?
The U.S. decided to tell the Soviets that it (US) knew that the Soviet
ICBM force was essentially non-existent. Shortly thereafter, the
Soviets put missiles in Cuba. Correlation, or causality? I don't
know; you can make your own inference.
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Date: Thu, 20 Dec 84 16:29:02 mst
From: jlg@LANL.ARPA (Jim Giles)
To: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA, LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Cuba
> So what? You think the Cubans and Castro have the missiles there
> because the Soviets forced them to take them? If so, how would you
> prove it?
MODERN TIMES, by Paul Johnson [again]: "According to Castro's account,
given to two French journalists, the 'initial idea originated with the
Russians and with them alone.... It was not in order to ensure our own
defence but primarily to strengthen socialism on the international plane.'"
Johnson writes later: " ... Castro had no alternative bu to provide his
island as a missile base in return [for Russian economic assistance]."
> Why? Were Soviet missiles aimed at Mexico? Panama? No. They were
> aimed at the U.S. So it wasn't a new theater threat, just a threat to
> the U.S.
A direct missile threat to the US WAS new. And how do you know that some
weren't aimed at other countries in the area. Their presence in Cuba
certainly caused some discomfort to these neighboring countries.
> I cannot reply until you tell me what you mean by retaliating for a
> French buildup.
If the French decide to beef-up their nuclear capability, would it be
appropriate for the Soviets to respond by building up anti-American
weapons? I think not. If the Germans decide to beef-up their nuclear
defences (since they are in NATO, these would be US weapons), is the
situation significantly different than in the case of the French? Tough
to say, but I still think not. Your connection of missiles in Cuba
with NATO forces still doesn't hold much validity.
--
The greatest derangement of the mind is to believe in something
because one wishes it to be so - Louis Pasteur
James Giles
P.S. By quoting the book, I violated an agreement with myself that I
would only encourage others to read things for themselves and
not supply it for them. I don't like having to copy passages
but in this case it seemed appropriate.
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[End of ARMS-D Digest]