colonel@sunybcs.UUCP (Col. G. L. Sicherman) (11/18/85)
> There are only three arguments that can feasibly disprove that the mind > cannot be simulated by a computer: > > A. Semantic: If there were a computer which simulated the > mind, we would not call it a computer (quite literally this > is possible, consider for example that we needed to add > biological components to accomplish the job, such as enzyme > switches, this would no doubt cause semantic controversy.) We'll be generous and replace "computer" with "artifact." > B. Religious: This rests on attributing capabilities of the > mind to non-physical components of a magical nature that, > by their very definition, can not be simulated by physical > systems. We'll also forswear argument by definition. > C. Existential: We could not prove that any given computer > is simulating the mind, although a few clever arguments have > been put forth for tests (Turing: if an observer cannot distinguish > the machine from the human then it must be equivalent) these > have generally been shown to be unsatisfactory primarily due > to their lack of rigor (eg. who is to be chosen as the observer?) > The problem of proving that a computer is simulating the mind > I will claim is likely equivalent to simulating a mind. If we > cannot prove something exists, then it does not exist. You can be the observer. But many other arguments than lack of rigor have been made against the Turing Test. What does it mean to "observe" something in the context of impersonating a man? Turing's essay con- centrates on dialogue, which is hardly the only function of a mind. (Then again, I know some people who ... !) By the way, what do you mean by simulating "the mind?" Your mind? Anybody's mind? The mind of a catatonic? (I'll bet I can simulate that one!) > The 'proof' of this claim by me is that the mind is a finite object > contained within the head of a human. It is a physical object composed > of physical materials. If something is physical and finite then it > should be possible to simulate its behavior -at least in theory- (eg. > the entire universe may well be physical and finite, but is not very > simulatable in practice.) One suspects that any counter-argument > resting solely on the magnitude of the problem is only defining the > problem, not refuting it's solvability. Two other arguments are possible: 1. From the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. The smaller the scale of operations, the harder it is to determine what's happening. The extreme case is subatomic particles, which cannot be pinned down at all. 2. The mind is an _interactive_ system. Deprived of sensory input, it goes crazy. Are you prepared to give your artifact the full range of sensory input? Will sensory-deprivation experiments work on a program? A lot of this has been covered very thoroughly in Gunderson's _Mentality and Machines_ (Anchor Books, 1971). -- Col. G. L. Sicherman UU: ...{rocksvax|decvax}!sunybcs!colonel CS: colonel@buffalo-cs BI: csdsicher@sunyabva