[fa.arms-d] Arms-Discussion Digest V3 #10

arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (02/24/85)

From: Moderator <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA>

Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 10
Today's Topics:

	More on "THE THREAT" (2 msgs)
	
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: 21 Feb 85 13:17:34 EST (Thursday)
From: Robert Bloom AMSTE-TOI 3775 <rbloom@APG-1.ARPA>
Subject: More on "THE THREAT"
To: lin@MIT-MC.ARPA
Cc: arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA, rbloom@APG-1.ARPA

(Gee this is fun standing back and reading the arguments you guys 
come up with - sorta like 'lets you and he fight'.  Miller will 
be getting him own mailbox as soon as we can get the bureaucracy 
to move ...) - Bob Bloom

'Rebuttal-Cubed' (original from J. Miller, c/o rbloom @APG-1)

    From Lin@MIT-MC, 15 Feb 85:

    The problem that the DoD has in "analyzing" data is that so 
    many conclusions are assumption-dependent.  The story of how 
    vulnerable U.S. intelligence is to Soviet deception and even 
    to its own misinterpretations is well documented with issues 
    such as the missile gap and the bomber gap and more recent 
    claims in the middle 1970s that the Soviets would have 
    operational beam weapons by the early 1980's. DoD has its own 
    budget shares to protect, and since intelligence data can be 
    massaged to yield conclusions withing fairly wide bounds, it 
    is not clear that DoD analysis is at an advantage or a 
    disadvantage.

The argument that any information from government sources is 
untrustworthy is oversimplistic and lacks reason.  There has 
never existed any intelligence work that WASN'T "assumption-
dependent."  Nice sounding phrase, though.

    Probably true; but the question is not how much data you had, 
    but rather how much meaningful data you had.  Some years ago, 
    the CIA was quite proud of the fact that it acquired a sample 
    of Brezhnev's stool. So what? 

I was speaking of military intelligence, not political 
intelligence ( CIA ) Military intelligence is only interested in 
Soviet leaders' bodily by-products if they go bang or can 
frequency-hop.

    On the contrary, anecdotes from emigres and former defense 
    officials should often do better than "analysis", simply 
    *because* the impressions of people are often *less* subject 
    to missing the forest for the trees.  Staying in a cubicle 
    all day with reams of data does not ensure that an analyst 
    will get a more accurate picture, as any mid-level executive 
    in a large company will tell you;  talking to those on the 
    shop floor often pays off handsomely.

Regarding emigres and former defense officials; believe it or 
not, somebody in the intel community was smart enough to think 
about talking to emigres, too.  Even before it was fashionable 
for freelance authors and PEOPLE magazine.  I'll stack the info 
I've heard from the thirty or so defectors I've interviewed in 
debrief programs to that of the handful Mr. Lin has read about. 
As for former officials, Mr. Lin, who apparently wishes us to see 
him as a hard-bitten champion against the greedy and the self-
serving, displays some genuine wide-eyed naivete here. We all 
know former government officials never act out of self-serving 
motives, dont't we?

    It is indeed not a paper tiger, at least as much as the U.S. 
    is not a paper tiger.  I also regard it as a severe threat.  
    It is NOT a fact that it can defeat NATO and the U.S. in 
    either conventional or nuclear warfare; rather this is a 
    *judgment* that Miller makes.  Indeed, any *analysis* I have 
    seen points in the other direction; that they cannot.  This 
    is not to say that the U.S. could defeat the S.U., but rather 
    to say that the balance is reaonably robust, and that the 
    outcome would be uncertain.

Mr. Lin should polish up his reading on military matters, and 
learn the meaning of the term, combat potential.  Given his 
obviously well-researched comment on Soviet combat potential viz 
the U.S. and NATO, one must wonder whether he is really concerned 
with accuracy before putting fingers to keyboard.  By the way, 
Mr. Lin, the Arab confrontation states have had the combat 
potential to defeat Israel since 1948.  But they haven't, because 
the Israelis have always recognized the threat and maintained 
strong defenses.

I was touched by Mr. Lin's concern that my outlook is unduly 
influenced by "....staying in a cubicle all day with reams of 
data.."  That line caused me to think back; it would have been 
nice to have had such a work environment when I was being shot at 
while doing my intel job in a combat zone.  Or when I was up to 
my neck in Brezhnev-offal trying to coordinate operations in; 
East Africa, (there are people there who shoot, too) North Africa 
and Central Asia.  His comment about "...talking to those on the 
shop floor..." also brought a chuckle as I once ran a shop whose 
mission was to tear apart, analyze and reconstruct Soviet tanks 
and military vehicles.

My overall conclusion is that given evidence of his ignorance of 
military matters in general, and intelligence in particular, Mr. 
Lin displays remarkable testicular fortitude when it comes to 
lecturing the judges about the law.  I have no idea what his 
profession is, and for that reason would never pretend great 
knowledge of it, or disseminate erroneous assumptions about it in 
writing.  Obviously, Mr. Lin is not similarly deterred.

My only basic point was and is that his and Mr. Cockburn's 
sources of intelligence may not be of the same quality as those 
of the intelligence community.  I really didn't think that was 
such an unreasonable point, but Mr. Lin seems to be dismayed by 
such a ludicrous assumption on my part.  One almost gets the 
impression that he believes he has information sources the intel 
folks do not.  Should we tell him that the spooks read NEWSWEEK, 
too?  I cannot close without complimenting Mr. Lin's debating 
approach.  He refutes an opponent not by presentation of logic, 
but by using a spurious a priori declaration that any position 
espoused by the opponent has to be false because the opponent is 
an unwitting tool of a corrupt system; thus we learn that any 
information from any DoD source is tainted because all defense 
people use the taxpayers money to threaten world peace and 
national interest in pursuit of the budget dollar.  I'm 
impressed, Mr. Lin.  PRAVDA would be proud of you. 

------------------------------

Date: 22 Feb 85 18:25 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject:  More on "THE THREAT" (rebuttal^4)
To: rbloom@APG-1.ARPA
cc: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA, LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
In-reply-to: Msg of 21 Feb 1985 13:17:34 EST () from Robert Bloom AMSTE-TOI
3775 <rbloom at apg-1>

    'Rebuttal-Cubed' (original from J. Miller, c/o rbloom @APG-1)

        From Lin@MIT-MC, 15 Feb 85:

        The problem that the DoD has in "analyzing" data is that so 
        many conclusions are assumption-dependent.  The story of how 
        vulnerable U.S. intelligence is to Soviet deception and even 
        to its own misinterpretations is well documented with issues 
        such as the missile gap and the bomber gap and more recent 
        claims in the middle 1970s that the Soviets would have 
        operational beam weapons by the early 1980's. DoD has its own 
        budget shares to protect, and since intelligence data can be 
        massaged to yield conclusions withing fairly wide bounds, it 
        is not clear that DoD analysis is at an advantage or a 
        disadvantage.

    The argument that any information from government sources is 
    untrustworthy is oversimplistic and lacks reason.

You will note that *I* did NOT say that *any* government information is
untrustworthy.  I simpy noted that U.S. intelligence is vulnerable.  I
stand by that claim.  Do you disagree?  I also imply by my statement
that DoD analysis of potential threats can be suspect, and I provide
cases in which, in retrospect, suspicion would have been justified.
Again, do you disagree?  My bottom line is that simply DoD's 
saying it does not make it true, and it is possible to challenge
their assessments on reasonable grounds.  Do you disagree?

    There has 
    never existed any intelligence work that WASN'T "assumption-
    dependent."  

We agree on this point, at least.  My complaint is that the
presentation of DoD intelligence work does not spell out these
assumptions; the conclusions are presented, the qualifications rarely
if ever articulated, and the ranges of possible conclusions are not
made available.  The overall desire is to have the public accept the
conclusions without question; intelligence analysts then say "but if
only you knew what I knew, then you too would come to the same
conclusion."  Bull.

        Probably true; but the question is not how much data you had, 
        but rather how much meaningful data you had.  Some years ago, 
        the CIA was quite proud of the fact that it acquired a sample 
        of Brezhnev's stool. So what? 

    I was speaking of military intelligence, not political 
    intelligence ( CIA ) Military intelligence is only interested in 
    Soviet leaders' bodily by-products if they go bang or can 
    frequency-hop.

Are you asserting that CIA has no military intelligence gathering
function?  I hope not.  The point remains: the question is how much
meaningful data you had, not how much data you had.

        On the contrary, anecdotes from emigres and former defense 
        officials should often do better than "analysis", simply 
        *because* the impressions of people are often *less* subject 
        to missing the forest for the trees.  Staying in a cubicle 
        all day with reams of data does not ensure that an analyst 
        will get a more accurate picture, as any mid-level executive 
        in a large company will tell you;  talking to those on the 
        shop floor often pays off handsomely.

    Regarding emigres and former defense officials; believe it or 
    not, somebody in the intel community was smart enough to think 
    about talking to emigres, too...  I'll stack the info 
    I've heard from the thirty or so defectors I've interviewed in 
    debrief programs to that of the handful Mr. Lin has read about. 

I am quite certain that the intelligence community has heard stories
from emigres.  The important issues are (1) what did they ask them,
(2) how much weight did they give to their testimony, and (3) what did
they do when human testimony contradicted photographs and the like.
Many analysts (perhaps not you) favor the latter, sometimes with good
reason, and sometimes without.  However, photographs etc are NOT
always right, as I believe you would agree.

    As for former officials, Mr. Lin, who apparently wishes us to see 
    him as a hard-bitten champion against the greedy and the self-
    serving, displays some genuine wide-eyed naivete here. We all 
    know former government officials never act out of self-serving 
    motives, dont't we?

In general, the person who is on watch has more of a vested interest
in the status quo than someone who no longer on the firing line.
Certainly former gov't officials are self-serving.  I regard them as
less self-serving than current officials, because they don't have to
toe a line as closely; the result is more candid testimony.

        It is indeed not a paper tiger, at least as much as the U.S. 
        is not a paper tiger.  I also regard it as a severe threat.  
        It is NOT a fact that it can defeat NATO and the U.S. in 
        either conventional or nuclear warfare; rather this is a 
        *judgment* that Miller makes.  Indeed, any *analysis* I have 
        seen points in the other direction; that they cannot.  This 
        is not to say that the U.S. could defeat the S.U., but rather 
        to say that the balance is reaonably robust, and that the 
        outcome would be uncertain.

    Mr. Lin should polish up his reading on military matters, and 
    learn the meaning of the term, combat potential.

You want to enlighten us?  I used the term in the usual sense of the
phrase: the ability to engage in combat given a certain set of
surrounding circumstances (e.g., mobilization rates and the like).
There is no question that the SU could mop up Western Europe if the
NATO countries did nothing, for example.  I don't make that
assumption, though some people do.  If that is what you mean by combat
potential, then your statement that the SU has the "potential" to
defeat NATO/US forces is simply meaningless.  Maybe the DoD uses the
phrase as you do, but I don't think so.

    Given his 
    obviously well-researched comment on Soviet combat potential viz 
    the U.S. and NATO, one must wonder whether he is really concerned 
    with accuracy before putting fingers to keyboard.

Some remarks aren't really worth responding to, but since I am being
attacked, I will respond anyway.  I have in fact done some ball-park
calculations that say that the balance is not that bad.  I have read a
variety of studies that also arrive at the same conclusion.  In fact,
the farther one gets away from simple bean-counting, the better it
looks for the West; this should not be surprising, since the West
spends lots more on things that don't show up in simple bean-counts,

    My only basic point was and is that his and Mr. Cockburn's 
    sources of intelligence may not be of the same quality as those 
    of the intelligence community.  I really didn't think that was 
    such an unreasonable point, but Mr. Lin seems to be dismayed by 
    such a ludicrous assumption on my part.  One almost gets the 
    impression that he believes he has information sources the intel 
    folks do not.  

Please re-read my original message.  I agree that Cockburn's sources
of intelligence may not be of the same quality as those of the
intelligence community.  I simply question the assumption that those
of the intelligence community are *necessarily* better than his.  I
certainly do not have sources that the intelligence folks do not, but
when it comes to analysis, the intelligence community does not
necessarily have better analytical tools at its disposal.  Moreover,
it has no way of distinguishing between good and bad analyses.  Thus,
its conclusions are most likely correct in some cases, and incorrect
in others.  It should not be the judge of the correctness of its own
output, and therefore people like Cockburn provide a valuable
skeptical outlook.

    I cannot close without complimenting Mr. Lin's debating 
    approach.  He refutes an opponent not by presentation of logic, 
    but by using a spurious a priori declaration that any position 
    espoused by the opponent has to be false because the opponent is 
    an unwitting tool of a corrupt system; thus we learn that any 
    information from any DoD source is tainted because all defense 
    people use the taxpayers money to threaten world peace and 
    national interest in pursuit of the budget dollar.  

Please include a quote from my original message that says "any
opsition espoused by the opponent has to be false" or that DoD is by
definition is a threat to world peace.  I never said that, and I don't
even believe it.  I just want what DoD says to be taken skeptically.
What's wrong with that?

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[End of ARMS-D Digest]