arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (03/03/85)
From: Moderator <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 11
Today's Topics:
Another book on "the threat"
SDI reference request
Comments on "THE THREAT" (2 msgs)
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Date: 26 Feb 85 13:18 EST
From: Samuel McCracken <oth104%BOSTONU.bitnet@WISCVM.ARPA>
Subject: another book on "the threat"
To: arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA
Cc: gzt.sam%mit-oz@MIT-MC.ARPA
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The discussion of Andrew Cockburn's The Threat reminds me of "Viktor
Suvorov"'s cognate work, Inside the Red Army . The author is a former
Soviet tank captain who emigrated after the 1968 invasion of
Czechoslovakia. He agrees with Cockburn on much, e.g., drunkneness and
brutal treatment of recruits, but argues that because of its superior
tactics, total integration into the economy, and semi-war footing even in
peacetime, the Soviet army is indeed a Threat. He quotes a scenario often
raised in staff college: A man comes after you with a knife. You are
holding a knife and an axe. Q. Which of your weapons do you use? A. The
axe. "Suvorov"'s Moral: if the Soviets do come across the North German
plain, they will not use tactical nuclear weapons to save themselves from
defeat; they will use them at the outset to destroy NATO supply dumps,
artillery parks, barracks, &c. "Suvorov" has a new book out on the GRU.
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From: dcdwest!benson@SDCSVAX.ARPA (Peter Benson)
Date: Tue, 26 Feb 85 13:14:47 pst
To: arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: SDI
I write to this address because it is listed in the headers of fa.arms-d.
I am hoping to find some references to the strategic defense initiative
in the open literature. I would hope this would be current and non-technical.
If you have such references, could you mail me the citations.
Thanks in advance
_
Peter Benson | ITT Defense Communications Division
(619)578-3080 | 10060 Carroll Canyon Road
decvax!ittvax!dcdwest!benson | San Diego, CA 92131
ucbvax!sdcsvax!dcdwest!benson |
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Date: 26 Feb 85 17:53:48 PST (Tue)
To: arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA
Cc: gd@SRI-SPAM.ARPA
Subject: Stealth Bomber
From: gd@SRI-SPAM.ARPA
From the February 25, 1985 issue of Aerospace Daily:
"While not quoting a price tag, [Air Force Secretary Verne] Orr told a
Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee hearing last week that he had
no reason to be discouraged by the price of the stealth-based Northrop
Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB). He said on a per pound basis, the ATB
costs are reasonable.".
Greg DesBrisay
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Date: 28 Feb 85 10:58:42 EST (Thursday)
From: Robert Bloom AMSTE-TOI 3775 <rbloom@APG-1.ARPA>
Subject: Miller's last comment on "THE THREAT"
To: arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA
Cc: lin@MIT-MC.ARPA, rbloom@APG-1.ARPA
(At least Jeff said this was going to be the end - but I think all he's
doing is dropping this and going on to 'The Death of the State Secret'.
On that latter subject, having only a plain secret clearance, if I submitted
that article I would probably lose my clearance; whether it was factual
or not. It is curious that the restrictions on me in government are
much greater than if I wasn't, even given the exact same access.
Anywhat, onward and outward ...)
LATEST RESPONSE
It is tempting to sally forth with another response to Lin with regard to
military intelligence, trying to remember all the while that it all started
with the review of a book whose memory is obscured by the fog of rhetoric. It
appears Lin is more interested in keeping a good argument going than the
subject at hand. ( I've been perusing the archives.) He is still off the mark
with his comment on the CIA viz military intelligence. Sure they collect data
of a military nature. They do a lot of weird stuff not in line with their
primary mission. That doesn't change the fact that it is the mission of DIA
to provide the intelligence upon which defense policy is based. There are a
number of published works one could consult to learn a little bit about the
National Security Act of 1947, perhaps clearing up the notion that the various
agencies, who admittedly overlap in selected areas, muck about in each other's
jurisdictions as Lin seems to suggest. His response to comments on combat
potential have my head spinning- I suspect he refers by mistake to something
he read elsewhere. After demonstrating conclusively that he understands the
meaning of the concept by citing one phrase,( mobilization rates ) he states
that he is sure the WP forces could mop up NATO if we didn't resist! I'm sure
of that too! I wonder where he read anything like that. I went back and
studied my original statement; "....it ( the USSR ) does have the combat
potential to defeat NATO- and the U.S., in conventional or nuclear warfare."
I even asked the man who replaces light bulbs in our building if my statement
implied possible Soviet victory predicated on Allied inaction. He said that
wasn't how he read it either. At the risk of being repetitious, I'll repeat
something. Specifically, my example: The Arab confrontation states have had
the combat potential to defeat Israel since 1948. For those with difficulty
comprehending, that means the Arabs have had the military means to mop up the
Israelis regardless of how much they resisted. Fortunately for the Israelis,
factors such as lack of political cohesion ( a non-combat factor ) offset raw
combat potential. The tone of REBUTTAL~4 is improved. Now intelligence
analysis is merely as prone to error as any other field of endeavor such as,
say, Mr. Lin's profession. I've already indicated a less than warm regard for
some things the CIA does, so I don't feel I ever claimed infallibility in the
community.( I'll even admit that military intel isn't perfect.) I agree
wholeheartedly that the U.S. depends too heavily on signals- and photo-
intelligence at the expense of human-intelligence. The cult of technology is
responsible for our capabilities in humint to be far inferior to those of the
threat. Since I seem to be waxing long-winded, I'll make a point, hopefully
reconnecting all of this with "The Threat." When Casper Weinberger tells a
Senate committee that 50 of their divisions can beat 5 of ours, his source of
information is an amalgam of a large amount of intel assessments, all with a
margin for error. If it were a 10% margin,( which I'll go out on a limb by
declaring too high ) 45 of theirs still has the combat potential to beat 5 of
ours....or do we have to go all over combat potential again?
J. Miller (c/o rbloom@apg-1 till I get my own address)
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Date: 2 Mar 85 01:46 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: Lin's last comment on "THE THREAT"
To: rbloom@APG-1.ARPA
cc: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA, LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
From Miller:
That doesn't change the fact that it is the mission of DIA
to provide the intelligence upon which defense policy is based.
It is true that this is the *stated* mission of DIA, though you must
be kidding if you believe that threat analysis is the ONLY thing on
which defense policy is based.
.... clearing up the notion that the various
agencies, who admittedly overlap in selected areas, muck about in each
other's
jurisdictions as Lin seems to suggest.
The analysts that I have spoken to (no longer in government) tell me
that the original rationale (apparently long since lost in the breach)
for the creation of the post of Director of Central Intelligence (the
other hat that the CIA director wears) was to make some "objective"
sense out of the intelligence data that was coming out of the
services, primarily *because* it was so unreliable and self-serving.
One would *expect* army intelligence to overestimate performance of
enemy tanks, air force intelligence to overestimate perofmrnace of
enemy planes, and so on, in response to
lack of hard evidence.
His response to comments on combat potential have my head
spinning- I suspect he refers by mistake to something he read
elsewhere. After demonstrating conclusively that he understands the
meaning of the concept by citing one phrase,( mobilization rates ) he
states that he is sure the WP forces could mop up NATO if we didn't
resist! I'm sure of that too! I wonder where he read anything like
that. I went back and studied my original statement; "....it ( the
USSR ) does have the combat potential to defeat NATO- and the U.S., in
conventional or nuclear warfare."
The reason I said WP could mop up NATO assuming NATO inaction was that
it is only in that situation that I can imagine such a bald and
categorical statement on Miller's part that the USSR does have the
"combat potential".. etc. I can't seriously believe that Miller
believes that, but given the analyses I have seen, the outcome of any
real WP/NATO battle really is in doubt, based on reasonable
assumptions about what NATO does in fact do. Of course, if NATO does
unreasonable things (like not resisting), then it is screwed.
The Arab confrontation states have had the combat potential to defeat
Israel since 1948. For those with difficulty comprehending, that
means the Arabs have had the military means to mop up the Israelis
regardless of how much they resisted. Fortunately for the Israelis,
factors such as lack of political cohesion ( a non-combat factor )
offset raw combat potential.
Lack of political cohesion is likely the *ultimate* cause of
battlefield disadvantage of the Arabs over the Israelis. Still, this
indicates a real confusion between strategic and tactical factors. What
do you count as military means?
Moreover, "military means" are meaningless without a doctrine for
their use; would you agree that the U.S. should receive credit for
support assets such as C^3I in assessing "combat potential"? If you
would, you are rare among analysts, most of whom ignore doctrine and
tactics in making assessments.
I've already
indicated a less than warm regard for some things the CIA does, so I
don't feel I ever claimed infallibility in the community.( I'll even
admit that military intel isn't perfect.)
Then why are you opposed to people like Cockburn who are skeptical of
DoD analyses?
... When Casper Weinberger
tells a Senate committee that 50 of their divisions can beat 5 of
ours, his source of information is an amalgam of a large amount of
intel assessments, all with a margin for error. If it were a 10%
margin,( which I'll go out on a limb by declaring too high ) 45 of
theirs still has the combat potential to beat 5 of ours....or do we
have to go all over combat potential again?
But if the "5 divisions" that he speaks of omit other available forces
and assets that would be reasonably available in a wartime scenario,
then that statement is simply misleading at best and an outright
deception at worst. If you can show me a Weinberger statement that
makes such a claim, and backs it up with an *analysis*, I'll consider
retracting my skepticism, but I've never seen a claim that is so
supported.
To clarify the matter, maybe you could tell us what *you* believe to
be the "combat potential" that you believe would so overwhelm NATO
forces. If we get that out in the open and stated explicitly, we
could assess the merits of that claim.
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[End of ARMS-D Digest]