arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (03/07/85)
From: Moderator <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA> Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 12 Today's Topics: Wicker article Stealth Bomber (2 msgs) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 3 Mar 85 15:21:49 pst From: Caulkins@USC-ECL.ARPA Subject: Wicker article To: Arms-D@MIT-MC No Need for the MX - Tom Wicker, P25, 1 March 85 NY Times On what line of reasoning, if any, should Congress now vote $1.4 billion to provide President Reagan with 21 additional MX missiles, each bearing 10 independently targetable nuclear warheads, in addition to the 21 missiles already approved ? Is this a vital addition to the massive United States nuclear arsenal already available for use on land, undersea and in the air - essential because, as Mr. Reagan claims, it is "the first modernized weapon we have come up with after at least five such new systems by the Soviet Union " ? Or is the MX a needed "bargaining chip" that, as Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger argues, is "vitally important to acieve the deep reductions that we seek" in forthcoming arms control talks with the Soviet Union ? The MX certainly can't be both. If it's as essential to United States forces as Mr. Reagan says, it would be unthinkable to forgo building it; but if it's as necessary as Mr. Weinberger claims to persuade the Russians to cut back their forces, then it should be traded for that desirable purpose, rather than deployed. In fact, the MX is of little use for either purpose. Considered only as an additional weapons system, the MX deployed in Minuteman silos - the last-resort basing mode adapted after all others were found wanting - is highly vulnerable, tempting to Soviet attack and thus destabilizing. Not only are the silos insufficiently hardened to protect even the smaller Minutemen they now house, much less the MX's; but also, by launching two warheads against each silo, the Russians could hope to destroy 10 warheads on each MX - a solid military profit. The Minutemen are far less inviting, since the two Soviet warheads could take out only one warhead on most Minutemen, and only three on the most modern [Minteman III]. So why, Soviet strategists certainly will ask themselves, would the US deploy a missile so easily destroyed at so great a loss ? Obviously, they might well conclude, to launch a surprise attack. Thus, the incentive for the Russians to attack first would be all the greater precisely because the MX's in Minuteman silos are so vulnerable. With that in mind, if unspoken, and with the arms talks opening in Geneva on March 12, followed immediately by the necessary voting on the MX, Mr. Reagan and his men are shrewdly emphasizing the "bargaining chip" line. To refuse further spending for the new missile just as talks are begnning, they say, would undercut American negotiators. But going ahead with 21 new MX's would give Moscow cause to worry about its heavy land-based missiles - 2/3 of its strategic forces. Indeed it might - particularly since President Reagan already is asking for 48 more MX's to be approved in fiscal 1986, for a total of 90 with 900 warheads; and most particulary since the US also is moving ahead with the Trident D-5 submarine-launched missile, another accurate, multi-warheaded giant that can hit and destroy those Soviet silos, and with far less warning time. The MX, if continued, and the Trident will make all the land-based two-thirds of the Soviet strategic force vulnerable within the decade. Soviet leaders MIGHT react as the bargaining-chippers predict, by cutting back their present missile force and moving to single-warhead missiles, thus conforming their forces to US desires and pressures. More likely, they'd put their land-based heavies on hair-trigger alert, ready to launch on warning, before either the MX or the Trident could reach them. Instead of scrapping these heavy ICBM's, they might even build MORE, with which to launch more warheads and more penetration devices to overwhelm the missile defense Mr. Reagan says he's determined to build. Moscow, in short, is altogether likely to see the MX and the Trident, accompnaied by the projected missile defense, as an American first-strike effort. And even if not, what kind of logic expects the Russians to make deep cuts in their strategic weaponry because the United States is building more, bigger, and more accurate weapons ? When first President Carter and then Ronald Reagan were confronted with the possibility that Soviet ICBM's could destroy American land-based missiles, they had just the opposite reaction - they asked for the MX. ------------------------------ Date: 4 Mar 85 17:20 EST From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA> Subject: Stealth Bomber To: gd@SRI-SPAM.ARPA cc: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA, LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA From: gd at SRI-SPAM.ARPA From the February 25, 1985 issue of Aerospace Daily: "While not quoting a price tag, [Air Force Secretary Verne] Orr told a Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee hearing last week that he had no reason to be discouraged by the price of the stealth-based Northrop Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB). He said on a per pound basis, the ATB costs are reasonable.". Hmmm. From what I have heard, the ATB is supposed to be lighter than the B-1. This suggests it will be heavier. Indeed, some quotes for ATB I have heard run to $600 M. ------------------------------ Date: 05 Mar 85 11:26:59 PST (Tue) To: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA> Cc: gd@SRI-SPAM.ARPA, ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA Subject: Re: Stealth Bomber From: gd@SRI-SPAM.ARPA Indeed, this does suggest that the ATB will be rather heavy. Isn't this bomber being made with alot of carbon fiber materials and other new laminates? In any case, I'm glad to see that the Air Force has finally found a simpler way to determine the fair price of an aircraft! ------------------------------ [End of ARMS-D Digest]