[fa.arms-d] Arms-Discussion Digest V3 #12

arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (03/07/85)

From: Moderator <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA>

Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 12
Today's Topics:

		Wicker article
		Stealth Bomber (2 msgs)

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Date: Sun, 3 Mar 85 15:21:49 pst
From: Caulkins@USC-ECL.ARPA
Subject: Wicker article
To: Arms-D@MIT-MC

No Need for the MX
	- Tom Wicker, P25, 1 March 85 NY Times

On what line of reasoning, if any, should Congress now vote $1.4 billion
to provide President Reagan with 21 additional MX missiles, each bearing
10 independently targetable nuclear warheads, in addition to the 21
missiles already approved ?

Is this a vital addition to the massive United States nuclear arsenal
already available for use on land, undersea and in the air - essential
because, as Mr. Reagan claims, it is "the first modernized weapon we
have come up with after at least five such new systems by the Soviet Union " ?

Or is the MX a needed "bargaining chip" that, as Defense Secretary Caspar
Weinberger argues, is "vitally important to acieve the deep reductions that
we seek" in forthcoming arms control talks with the Soviet Union ?

The MX certainly can't be both.  If it's as essential to United States forces
as Mr. Reagan says, it would be unthinkable to forgo building it; but if it's
as necessary as Mr. Weinberger claims to persuade the Russians to cut back
their forces, then it should be traded for that desirable purpose, rather
than deployed.

In fact, the MX is of little use for either purpose.  Considered only as an
additional weapons system, the MX deployed in Minuteman silos - the
last-resort basing mode adapted after all others were found wanting - is
highly vulnerable, tempting to Soviet attack and thus destabilizing.

Not only are the silos insufficiently hardened to protect even the smaller
Minutemen they now house, much less the MX's; but also, by launching two
warheads against each silo, the Russians could hope to destroy 10 warheads
on each MX - a solid military profit.  The Minutemen are far less inviting,
since the two Soviet warheads could take out only one warhead on most
Minutemen, and only three on the most modern [Minteman III].

So why, Soviet strategists certainly will ask themselves, would the
US deploy a missile so easily destroyed at so great a loss ?  Obviously,
they might well conclude, to launch a surprise attack.  Thus, the
incentive for the Russians to attack first would be all the greater 
precisely because the MX's in Minuteman silos are so vulnerable.

With that in mind, if unspoken, and with the arms talks opening in
Geneva on March 12, followed immediately by the necessary voting on the
MX, Mr. Reagan and his men are shrewdly emphasizing the "bargaining
chip" line.  To refuse further spending for the new missile just as
talks are begnning, they say, would undercut American negotiators.
But going ahead with 21 new MX's would give Moscow cause to worry 
about its heavy land-based missiles - 2/3 of its strategic forces.

Indeed it might - particularly since President Reagan already is asking for 
48 more MX's to be approved in fiscal 1986, for a total of 90 with 900
warheads; and most particulary since the US also is moving ahead with
the Trident D-5 submarine-launched missile, another accurate,
multi-warheaded giant that can hit and destroy those Soviet silos, and with
far less warning time.  The MX, if continued, and the Trident will make all
the land-based two-thirds of the Soviet strategic force vulnerable within
the decade.

Soviet leaders MIGHT react as the bargaining-chippers predict, by cutting 
back their present missile force and moving to single-warhead missiles,
thus conforming their forces to US desires and pressures.  More likely,
they'd put their land-based heavies on hair-trigger alert, ready to
launch on warning, before either the MX or the Trident could reach them.
Instead of scrapping these heavy ICBM's, they might even build MORE,
with which to launch more warheads and more penetration devices to
overwhelm the missile defense Mr. Reagan says he's determined to build.

Moscow, in short, is altogether likely to see the MX and the Trident,
accompnaied by the projected missile defense, as an American first-strike
effort.  And even if not, what kind of logic expects the Russians to
make deep cuts in their strategic weaponry because the United States
is building more, bigger, and more accurate weapons ?  When first
President Carter and then Ronald Reagan were confronted with the possibility
that Soviet ICBM's could destroy American land-based missiles, they
had just the opposite reaction - they asked for the MX.


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Date: 4 Mar 85 17:20 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject:  Stealth Bomber
To: gd@SRI-SPAM.ARPA
cc: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA, LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA

    From: gd at SRI-SPAM.ARPA
    From the February 25, 1985 issue of Aerospace Daily:

    "While not quoting a price tag, [Air Force Secretary Verne] Orr told a
    Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee hearing last week that he had
    no reason to be discouraged by the price of the stealth-based Northrop
    Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB).  He said on a per pound basis, the ATB
    costs are reasonable.".

Hmmm.  From what I have heard, the ATB is supposed to be lighter than
the B-1.  This suggests it will be heavier.  Indeed, some quotes for
ATB I have heard run to $600 M.

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Date: 05 Mar 85 11:26:59 PST (Tue)
To: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Cc: gd@SRI-SPAM.ARPA, ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Re: Stealth Bomber
From: gd@SRI-SPAM.ARPA

Indeed, this does suggest that the ATB will be rather heavy.  Isn't this
bomber being made with alot of carbon fiber materials and other new
laminates?  In any case, I'm glad to see that the Air Force has finally
found a simpler way to determine the fair price of an aircraft!

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[End of ARMS-D Digest]