arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (03/20/85)
From: Moderator <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 15
Today's Topics:
missile accuracy (3 msgs)
Star Wars Thoughts
6th Annual Defense Intelligence Technical Forum
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Date: 17 Mar 85 15:57 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: US, USSR nuclear arsenal strengths
To: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@UCB-VAX.ARPA
cc: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA
(How many ICBMs would fly more-or-less
North-South trajectories near the North Magnetic Pole in a real war?
Almost all of them. How many have been tested for accuracy under
such conditions? None. No ICBM has ever been tested on a North-
South trajectory at all, never mind the North Magnetic Pole. All
the test ranges, both American and Soviet, run East-West.)
I used to believe this too, but did you know that SLBM's are tested
from all azimuths? Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that ICBM's
will be at least as accurate as SLBMs in the N-S ICBM mode.
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From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@UCB-VAX.ARPA
Date: 19 Mar 85 12:16:54 CST (Tue)
To: LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: missile accuracy
Cc: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA
>
> I used to believe this too, but did you know that SLBM's are tested
> from all azimuths? Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that ICBM's
> will be at least as accurate as SLBMs in the N-S ICBM mode.
I wasn't aware of this, and in fact would like to see a reference for
it. As far as I know, the U.S. doesn't have any all-azimuths test ranges.
My recollection is that most SLBM testing is done at Canaveral, either
from the launch pads on the Cape or from submarines submerged offshore.
Also, note that current SLBMs have nowhere near the accuracy claimed for
current ICBMs, so the question of ICBM accuracy remains largely open.
(Note to anyone thinking of commenting on this: test results from the
Kwajalein range verify precision [reproducibility] not accuracy [ability
to hit something you've never hit before]. The difference accounts for
much of the difficulty of long-range gunnery.)
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
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Date: 19 Mar 85 19:43 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: missile accuracy
To: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@UCB-VAX.ARPA
cc: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA, LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
From Henry:
I wasn't aware of this, and in fact would like to see a reference for
it. As far as I know, the U.S. doesn't have any all-azimuths test ranges.
reference is a personal communication from Richard Garwin.
Also, note that current SLBMs have nowhere near the accuracy claimed for
current ICBMs, so the question of ICBM accuracy remains largely open.
Agreed. that's the implication of my last sentence.
(...test results from the Kwajalein range verify precision
[reproducibility]
not accuracy [ability to hit something you've never hit before]... )
Quite correct.
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Date: 19 Mar 85 07:08 PST
From: CAULKINS@USC-ECL.ARPA
Subject: Star Wars Thoughts
To: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA
Some thoughts on Star Wars after reading the Fletcher Report (FR)*
the March 11 issue of Time with cover story on Star Wars, attending a
CPSR lecture by Dave Redell + Greg Nelson on the subject, etc.
1) The computer hardware required to implement Star Wars seems within
the state of the art today; it will certainly be so in 5 - 10 years.
Star Wars software is quite a different story; design and development
techniques for reliable (bet-your-society-on-it) software have not
progressed much (compared to hardware) in the last decade. Star Wars
software will be much larger and more complex than anything built thus
far, civilian or military. The Fletcher Report estimates that 6 to 10
million lines of code will be required. The difficulties are so great
that the FR recommends that automated tools be used to specify,
develop, and maintain the software. These tools don't exist yet, and
it is not clear they will be less error-prone than existing methods.
2) The FR states "...The problem of realistically testing an entire
system, end-to-end, has no complete technical solution. ..."
3) For a Star Wars defense (SWD) to be effective, the FR states: "...
Time scales are too short for human decision makers to select among a
complex array of alternatives. ... *some degree of automation in the
decision to commit weapons is inevitable if a ballistic missile
defense system is to be at all credible.* ..." (text delimited by *
underlined in the FR).
Given the serious problems in generating and testing the software, it
seems less than prudent to entrust it with the weapons commitment
decisions which could start WWIII.
4) Advocates and opponents of SWD agree that for defensive systems to
reduce the threat of nuclear war both sides must have about the same
SWD capability during all phases of system deployment. If this
symmetry is not carefully maintained the side with inferior defenses
may fear that its offensive deterrent capability is being rapidly
eroded, and may feel required to mount an attack on the other side's
SWD, or even to launch a preemptive nuclear strike. The Soviets are
particularly vulnerable to this kind of asymmetry, since 75% of their
deterrent forces are in the form of land-based ICBMs, the weapons
present SWD designs are specifically designed to attack.
Present US secrecy about technical details of SWD discourages the USSR
from seriously considering a shift from offense-based to defense-based
systems, as well as limiting informed discussion of SWD in the West.
Soviet paranoia about SWD being a second-strike-blunting part of a US
first-strike strategy is reinforced by the fact that the US continues
to press forward with the 'prompt, hard target kill' MX, and to fund
technology for penetrating defensive systems.
5) The cost-effectiveness of SWD is crucial - if the cost tradeoff
between penetration and saturation methods and SWD doesn't indicate
SWD a clear win, the Soviets will move in the less expensive and less
risky direction. There are strong indications that SWD loses in any
such comparison. Several SWD countermeasures have been discussed:
Decoys - metallized balloons, some enclosing the real
warheads.
Chaff
IR emitting aerosols, and other things to screw up optical
sensors
Jamming and spoofing against sensors and communications links
6) There are hostile military systems against which current SWD
designs will work better than against ballistic missiles; orbiting
objects like parts of the opponent's SWD system, and surveillance
satellites. This kind of attack is clearly destabilizing, since its
first effects are to reduce the quantity and accuracy of information
available to the country under attack. Also accidental weapon firing
induced by software error is likely to escalate into a full-scale
battle between the 2 opposing SWD systems.
The result of deployment of SWD systems by the US and USSR is more
likely to lead to a new and unstable arms race in space than to some
kind of defense-based peace.
7) SWD is going to cost a lot. Informed estimates suggest a total
cost of at least $1 trillion. Here are some back-of-the-envelope
calculations which may serve to show how big this number is:
Assume the Soviets decide to increase their present arsenal of
approximately 9,000 strategic nuclear warheads to 90,000; and that
each warhead costs the same as an MX warhead (21 MXs for $1.5 billion,
10 warheads each - $7.1 million per warhead, full cost of the missile
allocated to the warheads): 81,000 x $7.1 million = $575 billion.
Also assume they decide to provide each warhead with $2 million worth
of assorted penetration aids and SWD countermeasures: 90,000 x $2
million = $180 billion. This would result in a threat cloud of at
least 900,000 objects containing 90,000 real warheads, all for about
75% of the trillion-dollar cost of Star Wars.
* - The Fletcher Report: "Battle Management, Communications, and Data
Processing (U)"; Feb 1984; B. M. McMillan, Panel Chairman; Contract
MDA 903 84 C 0031, Task T-3-191; SRI International; Volume V of
"Report of the Study On Eliminating The Threat Posed By Nuclear
Ballistic Missiles (U)"; James C. Fletcher, Study Chairman
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Telephone: (405) 360-5172
Organization: EM
From: Kurt F. Sauer <mtxinu!ea!uokvax!emks@UCB-VAX.ARPA>
Date: 19 Mar 85 00:37 CST (Tuesday)
To: Arms Discussion Digest <ea!mtxinu!ucbvax!arms-d@UCB-VAX.ARPA>, ARPAnet
BBoard <ea!mtxinu!ucbvax!arpa-bboard@UCB-VAX.ARPA>
Subject: Civil Air Patrol Members
Do any members of the Civil Air Patrol receive this digest? If so, kindly
send your net address and real name to me. I'm trying to round up names
for a possible e-mailing-list.
Kurt F. Sauer
emks@uokvax.UUCP
{ ctvax , ucbvax!mtxinu!ea , ihnp4!cuuxb }!uokvax!emks
Norman, OK
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Telephone: (405) 360-5172
Organization: EM
From: Kurt F. Sauer <mtxinu!ea!uokvax!emks@UCB-VAX.ARPA>
Date: 19 Mar 85 01:06 CST (Tuesday)
To: Arms Discussion Digest <ea!mtxinu!ucbvax!arms-d@UCB-VAX.ARPA>
Cc: Mike O'Dell <cuuxb!cbosgd!seismo!mo@UCB-VAX.ARPA>
Subject: Announcing 6th Annual Defense Intelligence Technical Forum (DITFOR)
I think that some of the arms-d subscribers will be particularly interested
in this.
kurt
emks@uokvax.UUCP
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AN INVITATION
You are cordially invited to attend the Sixth Annual
Defense Intelligence Technical Forum (DITFOR VI) to be held
at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Bolling AFB,
Washington DC, on 17 and 18 April 1985. DITFOR is sponsored
by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) and is open to
all properly cleared personnel who have specific responsi-
bilities or business interests in C3I.
AGENDA
This year DITFOR will examine the many aspects of
imagery support for both national requirements and tactical
operations. Subject areas will include sensors, dissemina-
tion, processing, exploitation and user requirements. The
program will begin with a brief history of imagery develop-
ments. Following this, the many facets of the Department of
Defense current program will be presented along with the
impact that these capabilities will have on both tactical
and national operations. An overview of new technologies
and research development trends will include, but not be
limited to, new display and man/machine interface technol-
ogy, artificial intelligence, pattern recognition and VHSIC
applications.
INDUSTRY PRESENTATIONS
Recognizing the wide ranging aspects of imagery techni-
logical developments, we believe that an opportunity should
be made available to industry to make presentations at the
TOP SECRET/SCI level. Therefore, in a departure from previ-
ous policy, papers are being solicited from industry for
presentation at DITFOR VI. Specific details are included in
the invitation packet that is currently being distributed.
FOR MORE INFORMATION
DITFOR VI attendees must hold a TOP SECRET/SCI clear-
ance. For reservations or other administrative information,
write RADC/IRDE (DITFOR VI), Griffis Air Force Base, New
York 13441, or call Warren Emlen or Lt. William Mitchell at
AC 315 330-7791 (AUTOVON 587-7791). Seating is limited so
make your reservation soon. Please limit attendees to one
primary and five or fewer alternates from your organization
or firm.
NOTE: AFCEA will sponsor an intelligence conference
this fall in Washington DC, to follow-up and further develop
ideas discussed at DITFOR VI. The conference will provide a
general forum at the SECRET level for industry to respond to
DITFOR and other intelligence related issues.
SEE YOU AT DITFOR VI!
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[End of ARMS-D Digest]