arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (04/09/85)
From: Moderator <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA> Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 22 Today's Topics: SDI "Foolishness" SDI economic drain (6 msgs) Gorbachev Star Wars Welfare too-complacent estimate of SDI effectiveness Understanding liberals ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 4 Apr 85 19:04:29 EST From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA> Subject: SDI "Foolishness" To: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@UCB-VAX.ARPA cc: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA > Does Murphy's Law count as a law of physics? Probably nt, but I > think it is a law nevertheless. Larger things are more complex, and > have more ways to go wrong. More effort has to be expended to keep > things going right. In the long run, which one wins? I think the > former. ICBMs are large, complex objects, much more so than many of the proposed defensive systems. Incidentally, the reliability of ICBMs is unproven, and the official estimates are almost certainly much too high. I agree with the latter, and it raises an interesting point. Would we be happy with an SDI that was as reliable as our ICBM's? I would not be. Yet we propose to REPLACE our offensive forces with SDI (deliberately provocative comment, but true nevertheless). > > ...But I see nothing in the laws of physics which > > firmly states that defence against ballistic missiles is a contradiction > > in terms, or that it is intrinsically very expensive. > > How about the notion that SDI should provide a comprehensive > population defense that is 100% effective? Nothing in physics says > that is impossible, yet I don't believe it can ever happen. Do you? Random failures probably prevent absolutely 100% effectiveness, no matter how good the system is. So what? The notion that SDI is worthless unless it is 100.000000% effective is utter garbage, another ridiculous argument advanced by people who don't care whether they lie so long as they win. Look at the original statement above. Your statement above says that nothing in physics prevents a missile defense. My question asks you does not being forbidden by the laws of physics make something possible. Your answer is that "random failures" do so. There is nothing about physics that insures random failures, and yet you believe random failures are possible. I was trying to illustrate that even if there is no law of physics that prohibits something, other things (like Murphy's law) do. You apparently agree. HOWEVER, as long as YOU brought it up, suppose you tell us what effectiveness level is the threshold for buying a BMD. You wouldn't buy it at zero, most (thought not I) would buy it at 100%. What is your minimum effectiveness level? Furthermore, I should point out that if you're not talking about 100% defense (i.e., successful defense of EVERYTHING), you're not talking about what the President proposed. Of course, you need not talk about what he proposed, but then you have to admit that what you're proposing to buy is what NOT what he is trying to sell the public. *That* doesn't bode well for the functioning of the democratic process. Three defence layers, each 90% effective, reduce a 100,000-warhead attack (this is about the level that has been proposed as what the Soviets might build up to as an SDI countermeasure) to 100 warheads. Name just one weapon system that has had an operational effectiveness of 90% against real targets. It is easy to POSTULATE 90% effectiveness in each layer, but mighty hard to deliver. The promises have always been large, the results small. The burden of proof is on you and the SDI advocates to illustrate why this time will be any different than last time and the time before that and the time before that and so on, especially since the last time *seemed* just as promising as this time. I should note that the same contractors that will build SDI are the ones that overstate weapons system reliability by factors of 2-6 typically, and much more not uncommonly. This is not my conjecture - this is an *AIR FORCE* study of state of the art technology in the early 1970's. Note that these are 100 *randomly* *chosen* warheads. Maybe half of them will hit isolated military targets like ICBM silos. The remaining 50 will hit randomly- chosen military targets (that's what the Soviets aim their missiles at) near or in populated areas. Your assumptions of Soviet targeting leave something to be desired. In particular, you assume that they don't change their targeting to preserve assured destruction capabilities. In defense of cities, you don't have the luxury of preferential defense; ergo, you must assume that any city might absorb a much larger attack as compared to warheads divided by cities would give you. Venus and Mars lase at 10 um, from CO2. Earth may too, from O2 rather than CO2, but nobody is really sure of that yet. Put 1-meter mirrors 1000 km apart, with 1-us pulses at 8 kHz. There is lots of gain, a one-way trip may suffice. Power is 5 GW instantaneous, 40 MW average. There is no exhaustion problem, since orbital motion of the mirrors is constantly bringing new gas into the beam path. You might be able to get a global ring laser going, for continuous power output up in the gigawatts. Interesting. What about beam widths? ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 4 Apr 85 22:25:06 EST From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA> Subject: SDI economic drain To: JoSH@RUTGERS.ARPA cc: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA, DBOOTH@USC-ISIF.ARPA Nobody pays money to a missile. Every single dollar spent on SDI goes to a *person*, just as much as a welfare dollar does. False. Money buys hardware as well as paying people. It is as much of a "waste" to buy a missile as a water project, but to say that SDI will go only to people is just silly. What difference does it make whether he is paid the dollar for doing "useless" space research (SDI), or for doing nothing (welfare)? None; I agree here. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 5 Apr 85 10:33:58 PST From: Richard Foy <foy@AEROSPACE.ARPA> To: arms-d@mit-mc.ARPA Subject: Gorbachev I like Knutsen have been wondering about the changes in the Soviet politburo. Another factor bysides his agricultural background is his age. He may not have been as steeped in the Stalinist ideology as prior leadership. Perhaps he sees what the arms race is really doing to his country. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 5 Apr 85 10:41:40 PST From: Richard Foy <foy@AEROSPACE.ARPA> To: arms-d@mit-mc.ARPA Subject: Star Wars Welfare Mixing arguments for jobs with arguments for operational effectiveness leads to very confused thinking and almost certainly to suboptimized solutions. If we want income redistribution we should justify it on its own merits; ie we are a moral society or whatever. If we want space exploration we should justify it on its own merits. Confusing our thinking about Star Wars with extraneous arguments about beneficial fallout at best will lead to a vast waste of money and at worst a nuclear disaster. ------------------------------ Date: 5 Apr 85 14:28:59 PST Subject: Re: SDI economic drain From: David Booth <DBOOTH@USC-ISIF.ARPA> To: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA> cc: arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA, JoSH@RUTGERS.ARPA [Lin@mit-mc:] It is as much of a "waste" to buy a missile as a water project, . . . . No, a water project improves our standard of living; a missile does not. [JoSH@rutgers:] What difference does it make whether he is paid the dollar for doing "useless" space research (SDI), or for doing nothing (welfare)? [Lin@mit-mc:] None; I agree here. Oh come on, there certainly *are* differences between "useless" space research and welfare. Welfare is intended to insure that children -- our future human resources -- grow up physically and mentally fit; and to be charitable, by helping those most in need. "Useless" space research represents welfare for those who are the *least* needy and the *most* needed for productive work: our highly educated researchers. The difference is in who gets the dollar. ------- ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 6 Apr 85 15:30:26 EST From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA> Subject: SDI economic drain To: DBOOTH@USC-ISIF.ARPA cc: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA, LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA, JoSH@RUTGERS.ARPA [Lin@mit-mc:] It is as much of a "waste" to buy a missile as a water project, . . . . No, a water project improves our standard of living; a missile does not. Maybe, maybe not. Depends on the "real" need for it. A missile may or may not improve our standard of living - if it turns out that it kept the Soviets from attacking, then I would argue that it improves our standard of living. Whether or not this is knowable in any fundamental sense is a different question. [JoSH@rutgers:] What difference does it make whether he is paid the dollar for doing "useless" space research (SDI), or for doing nothing (welfare)? [Lin@mit-mc:] None; I agree here. Oh come on, there certainly *are* differences between "useless" space research and welfare. Welfare is intended to insure that children -- our future human resources -- grow up physically and mentally fit; and to be charitable, by helping those most in need. "Useless" space research represents welfare for those who are the *least* needy and the *most* needed for productive work: our highly educated researchers. The difference is in who gets the dollar. It makes no difference for the *economic* goal you are trying to achieve. It does make a difference for the *social* goal you are trying to achieve. ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 6 Apr 85 17:12:49 EST From: "Steven A. Swernofsky" <SASW@MIT-MC.ARPA> Subject: [hamscher: Annals of Computer Science Seminar TODAY!] To: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA MSG: *MSG 3890 Date: Fri, 5 Apr 85 09:15:32 est From: Walter Hamscher <hamscher at mit-htvax> To: *ht at ht, *mc, *oz at oz, *xx at xx Re: Annals of Computer Science Seminar TODAY! REFRESHMENTS: Noon PLACE: 8th Floor Playroom HOSTS: Sundar Narasimhan, Harry Voorhees, Dave Siegel 1941-1985: FORTY-FOUR YEARS OF AN MIT TRADITION :-) (-: Today's annals of computer science seminar will focus on recently discovered documents concerning two anonymous US Navy cryptographers (both MIT '40) stationed at Pearl Harbor in December of 1941. On the evening of December 6th, 1941 an encoded Imperial Japanese Navy transmission was intercepted. The decrypted text began: "The attack on Pearl Harbor of December 8th..." The attack being two days away, the MIT cryptographers decided to call it a night and decrypt the remainder of the message in the morning. The rest, of course, is history. REFRESHMENTS WILL BE SERVED ------------------------------ Date: 6 Apr 85 16:05:25 PST Subject: Re: SDI economic drain From: David Booth <DBOOTH@USC-ISIF.ARPA> To: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA> cc: arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA, JoSH@RUTGERS.ARPA [Lin:] . . . If it turns out that [a missile] kept the Soviets from attacking, then I would argue that [the missile] improves our standard of living. . . . Not quite. The expense of the missile drains the economy. This decreases (or at least, fails to increase) our standard of living. However, If the missile really does keep the Soviets from attacking, then it is *preventing a greater decrease* in our standard of living. The real issues are (1) whether it *will* increase our security; and (2) if so, whether the increase is worth the inherent economic drain. (A bad economy, by the way, also tends to decrease security and stability.) ------- ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 7 Apr 85 10:41:30 EST From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA> Subject: SDI economic drain To: DBOOTH@USC-ISIF.ARPA cc: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA, LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA, JoSH@RUTGERS.ARPA From: David Booth <DBOOTH at USC-ISIF.ARPA> [Lin:] . . . If it turns out that [a missile] kept the Soviets from attacking, then I would argue that [the missile] improves our standard of living. . . . Not quite. The expense of the missile drains the economy. This decreases (or at least, fails to increase) our standard of living. However, If the missile really does keep the Soviets from attacking, then it is *preventing a greater decrease* in our standard of living. I agree that there is a distinction between preventing decreases and generating increases, but in my view, it is not of significance. I want to do both; moreover, the former is a pre-requisite to the latter. In addition, recall the original discussion comparing water projects to missiles. The following paragraph makes appropriate lexical substitutions for "missile" and "Soviet attack": .. The expense of the water project drains the economy. This decreases (or at least, fails to increase) our standard of living. However, If the water project really does keep the floods from destroying valuable farmland, then it is *preventing a greater decrease* in our standard of living. How is your argument different? The real issues are (1) whether it *will* increase our security; and (2) if so, whether the increase is worth the inherent economic drain. (A bad economy, by the way, also tends to decrease security and stability.) I agree with (1), and in many cases, I believe that the missile does NOT increase our security. I have a much harder time with (2), because I don't know how to put a price on my security. (2) is based on the standard libertarian argument that everything is reducible to quantitative monetary terms, and I just don't think that is either true or possible. ------------------------------ Date: 8 Apr 85 12:25:14 PST Subject: Re: SDI economic drain From: David Booth <DBOOTH@USC-ISIF.ARPA> To: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA> cc: JoSH@RUTGERS.ARPA, arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA [Lin:] . . . Recall the original discussion comparing water projects to missiles. The following paragraph makes appropriate lexical substitutions for "missile" and "Soviet attack": ... The expense of the water project drains the economy. This decreases (or at least, fails to increase) our standard of living. However, If the water project really does keep the floods from destroying valuable farmland, then it is *preventing a greater decrease* in our standard of living. How is your argument different? No difference; I agree with this comparison. Maybe I misunderstood the original reference to water projects. If the missile really does prevent Soviet attack, and if the water project has no productive use other than to prevent disasterous floods (i.e. it is not intended to provide a more reliable source of water or generate electricity), the two are equivalent in their impact on our standard of living. [DBooth:] The real issues are (1) whether it *will* increase our security; and (2) if so, whether the increase is worth the inherent economic drain. (A bad economy, by the way, also tends to decrease security and stability.) [Lin:] . . . I don't know how to put a price on my security. (2) is based on the standard libertarian argument that everything is reducible to quantitative monetary terms, and I just don't think that is either true or possible. I didn't mean to imply some kind of numerical equation -- just that there is an inherent trade-off. We make choices like this every day, though we can't quantify the options. ------- ------------------------------ Date: 1985 Apr 08 01:09:23 PST (=GMT-8hr) From: Robert Elton Maas <REM@IMSSS.SU.EDU.ARPA> To: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@UCB-VAX.ARPA CC: Arms-D@MIT-MC.ARPA Subject: too-complacent estimate of SDI effectiveness, yuk Reply-to: REM@MIT-MC.ARPA |From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@UCB-VAX.ARPA |Date: 2 Apr 85 14:32:43 CST (Tue) |To: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA | |Three defence layers, each 90% effective, reduce a 100,000-warhead attack |(this is about the level that has been proposed as what the Soviets might |build up to as an SDI countermeasure) to 100 warheads. Where do you get these figures? I assume you are calculating that each of the three phases of interception will be 90% effective, and that CCC will be absolutely flawless so that no consistent loss of effectiveness occurs. Then the overall non-kill rate will be the product of the individual non-kill rages, i.e. (0.1)^3 = 0.001 ? I don't think there is anything resembling a demonstration that even 80% effectiveness at each phase will occur, much less 90%. Furthermore CCC is a truly major problem with all that EMP and chaff and plasma balls all over the place. I'd wouldn't be surprised to see CCC totally break down, and thus the launch-to-destination tracking and inventory that the Strategic Defense Initiative relies on would be absent and most of the coast-phase and destination-phase interception vehicles would be wandering aimlessly not knowing where to look for a missile to intercept. Furthermore, boost-phase interception is inherently destabilizing/offensive. If we have satellites constantly flying over the SU ready to shoot at ICBMs before they finish their initial burn, those same satellites can be used to shoot down high-flying aircraft and other non-offensive vehicles. Our "defensive" SDI satellites thus have strategic offensive capability, with an action time of mere seconds instead of the half-hour our ICBMs have and the eight minutes our tactical missiles have. We could launch a surprise attack so fast their military capability could be eliminated before they could wake the Premier. If we started to install such a capability, the mere installation might be considered an act of war. Would we allow on-site inspection of our satellites to demonstrate they couldn't zap aircraft on the ground and individual people walking around outside the Kremlin? I don't see that we can be allowed to develop such a technology or that they can allow us to do so. But if we don't, those estimates of 99.9% defense are surely wrong. I'm leery of coast-phase interception too, but perhaps I'll permit it fo the sake of argument. I'll also allow 80% effectiveness even though I consider that optimistic at this time (but possible maybe maybe). Then (0.2)^2 = 4% of the 100,000 weapons get through, i.e. 4000 thermonuclear warheads hit target on the USA. Goodbye everybody. |Note that these are 100 *randomly* *chosen* warheads. Maybe half of |them will hit isolated military targets like ICBM silos. The |remaining 50 will hit randomly-chosen military targets (that's what |the Soviets aim their missiles at) near or in populated areas. |... |Remember, you are not allowed to assume that these 50 |warheads will hit the 50 most important places; they will hit random |places, many of them relatively minor. It sounds like you're assuming the USSR won't retarget their warheads from current no-defense targeting? That's absurd. Of course if they know only 4% (or 0.1% by your calculations) of them will get through, they'll have to send many many of them against each important target, at the expense of leaving lesser targets almost completely uncovered. The current rule of thumb is 2 warheads per target. With defense, they'll probably shift that rule to 50 or 100 or 1000 or 2000 warheads against each important target, and only 1 against each lesser target. That way instead of 50% of the 100 (or 4000) warheads hitting the boondocks and 50% hitting cities, we'll have maybe 95% hitting major targets including NYC and WDC and only 5% hitting boonies; they'll probably be forced to strike our cities instead of individual missile silos, since they won't have enough warheads to cover the missile silos anyway. Regardless of how they really do retarget, I doubt they will use current targeting algorithms and thus I distrust your complacent estimates that our population won't be hit bad. |Contrast this with the effect of 10,000 warheads, hitting every significant |target and most of the minor ones. Sounds worthwhile to me. Let's see, 10,000 now, 4,000 (my estimate) after we've gone to all that trouble to "protect" ourselves, I don't see any significant difference in chance of survival of myself or anybody I know. ------------------------------ Date: 1985 Apr 08 01:21:24 PST (=GMT-8hr) From: Robert Elton Maas <REM@IMSSS.SU.EDU.ARPA> To: JoSH@RUTGERS.ARPA CC: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA Subject: So you don't understand us liberals? Here's a lesson. Reply-to: REM@MIT-MC.ARPA > Date: 29 Mar 85 23:34:22 EST > From: JoSH <JoSH@RUTGERS.ARPA> > Subject: liberal reaction to the SDI proposal > I'm at a loss to understand the liberal reaction to the SDI proposal. > ... > If SDI really doesn't work, > then the program consists essentially of a non-means-tested > income redistribution program, like 95% of the DHHS budget > already is, and which liberals seem to love. You misunderstand the essential difference. Welfare consists of a "parachute" or "safety net" for those who would otherwise be unable to survive without begging or stealing from the rest of us. It diverts their effort from begging or stealing to filling out forms and looking for a job or at least making a show that they are looking. The Military-Industrial complex diverts the effort of those who are able to do technical work, away from useful technical work and towards working on means of death or fake means of death that don't really work. I would rather see welfare than begging&stealing, but I would rather see work on space travel/industry/habitat or medicine or computer networks or rapid transit or deep-sea mining/habitat or general scientific research or even fast-food rather than weapons. I think my preference for welfare over begging&stealing qualifies me as a "liberal", and dosn't imply that I also prefer weapons-welfare over useful work. |Date: 3 Apr 85 17:30:04 EST |From: JoSH <JoSH@RUTGERS.ARPA> |Subject: Re: SDI economic drain | |Nobody pays money to a missile. Every single dollar spent on SDI goes |to a *person*, just as much as a welfare dollar does. What difference |does it make whether he is paid the dollar for doing "useless" space |research (SDI), or for doing nothing (welfare)? In either case the |government is paying him not to take part in the productive economy. The difference is what the person is diverted away from, destitute begging or stealing to survive, or developing lots of wonderful things like industrial robots or cures for types of cancer. See reply to message above. ------------------------------ [End of ARMS-D Digest]