arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (04/19/85)
From: Moderator <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 23
Today's Topics:
Star Wars (6 msgs)
Re: Pearl Harbor
Quote on nuclear strategy
----------------------------------------------------------------------
[Sorry about these delayed digests. Your moderator is recovering nicely
after an accident, and just received a home workstation with which to
carry on.. JL]
Date: Mon, 8 Apr 85 13:35:59 pst
From: ihnp4!uw-beaver!ssc-vax!eder@UCB-VAX.ARPA (Dani Eder)
To: arms-d@mit-mc
Subject: Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V3 #21
[8 April 1985]
People who are arguing about whether a space-based laser system
will work or not are, so to speak, barking up the wrong tree. I
have worked on transportation for SBL's, and from my contact with
the laser people at my company, and in the Air Force, I can say that
(1) we know fairly precisely what it will take to make the system
work, such as how many megawatts pointed with so many nanoradians
error, but (2) we do not now have the technology. The technology we
need to improve has been identified, and the development program
laid out, but until the R&D is actually done, we will not know if
we will have a workable system. (3) The cost has been estimated,
assuming the technology works, at about $200 billion.
Now, as for barking up a wrong tree, Space Based Lasers and
particle beam weapons, as interesting as they are, are not the
practical method of shooting down missiles. There was an experiment
performed recently called the "homing overlay experiment", where
an interceptor successfully hit a Minuteman missile. Now, it takes
a very small bullet to destroy a missile. I once joked about
just hitting the missile with the homing sensor. That turns out
to work. At a closing velocity of 7000 meters per second, 1 kilogram
of ANYTHING equals the energy in 6 kilograms of TNT. A two stage
solid fuel missile would mass about 19 kg for each kg of payload.
Since hitting a missile with 1 kg is probably enough to destroy it,
and the homing system is probably more like 5 kg, you do not need
anthing other than hitting the missile with your sensor. The
original missile masses perhaps 100 kg. Let us assume that the job
must be done within 200 seconds. With 7 km/sec of available velocity,
the interceptor could cover perhaps 1000 km range, allowing for
some acceleration time. Place 'pods' in orbit some humdreds of
kilometers high. Each pod covers a 1000 km radius sphere. Space
the pods 1500 km apart, allowing for some overlap of coverage.
Then 27 pods in the same orbit will go all the way around the
earth. If you use polar type orbits, 27 orbits side by side will
cover the entire earth, with lots of overlap over the poles.
Now, if each pod carries 100 interceptors, we have 72900 interceptors,
with a total weight of 7.29 million kg. Allow overhead for the
pods and we get perhaps 10 million kg. This is perhaps 200 launches
of a Shuttle-derived cargo launcher. Not trivial, but in the
10-20 billion$ range. Using historical space hardware costs
the production cost for all these platforms would be $50 billion.
Since historical data is for typically one or two of a kind,
I consider that a vast overestimate for a system with hundreds of
identical units. So we are talking about a project that is
probably comparable to the B-1 bomber or MX missile in program
level costs. The interception technique has already been
demonstrated once. The biggest technology hurdle is probably
'battle management', i.e. deciding which interceptors go after
what missiles. This is a computer type number crunching/real time
problem, but certainly not 'physical law violation' category.
In summary, there is a quite valid method of shooting down
missiles. The technique works (with different types of sensors)
in boost phase, mid-course, and teminal phase, making for
a layered defense. The difference between the last phase and the other
two is the terminal defense missiles start from the ground
rather than orbit. The cost is in the tens of billions, rather
than hundreds or thousands of billions.
Dani Eder / Boeing / ssc-vax!eder
------------------------------
From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@UCB-VAX.ARPA
Date: 8 Apr 85 19:16:52 CST (Mon)
To: arms-d@mit-mc.ARPA
Subject: Re: Numbers
> I find Henrys calculations showing that Star Wars would cut the number of
> warheads hitting targets in the US to 100 very interesting. When I think
> of the damage done to the world during WWII by my friends and my enemies,
> perhaps in a pseudorandom manner I don't find 100 nukes getting through
> very acceptable. Remember there won't be any undamaged equivalentr of the
> U. S. around to have a Marshall plan to rebuild.
I agree that 100 warheads penetrating is not a pleasant thought, even if
half of them go on isolated military targets and the remaining half hit
(mostly) minor targets. My point was, it is a vast improvement on
10,000 warheads getting through and hitting everything, which is the
current situation. I strongly suspect we could survive the former,
admittedly with major hardship and much pain. (I don't believe the
Soviet Union got any Marshall-plan aid, and they recovered -- not easily
or quickly, but eventually -- from quite severe WW2 damage.) I greatly
doubt that a functioning society would survive the latter.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 85 09:04:33 pst
From: aurora!eugene@RIACS.ARPA (Eugene miya)
To: arms-d@mit-mc.ARPA
Subject: Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V3 #22: SDI
With all the talk about bargining chips:
what ever happen to "build down?" I remember that prior to "formal"
SDI announcement there was talk about coupling defense with a reduction
of offensive weapons. I can only assume we are no different from our
counterparts.
Also, in light of all the economic arguments and in light of recent
news reports of seminar being held by third parties on how to bid
for SDI contracts, I would like all major contractors under any investigation
such as GD or GE out of the SDI bidding. I see no indication that SDI
would be immune to the overbidding and shoddy workmanship which has
marked some recent weapons systems.
--eugene miya
The above represents the author's opinion and does not represent that
of my employer on the mail header.
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 85 15:22 EST
From: Jong@HIS-BILLERICA-MULTICS.ARPA
Subject: SDI
To: arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA
The recent discussion of a three-layer, 99.9% effective Star Wars
system helps me understand its attractiveness. Assume such a
system were built. I really think an all-out Soviet attack (and
they do seem to favor all-out attacks, holding back nothing)
would be reduced to a few warheads, falling largely on Minuteman
silos in the Midwest. No nuclear winter, and no great problem
(at least, not here in Boston). If I were the President, I would
then demand--and probably get--a Soviet surrender, since our
retaliatory force would be intact. We wouldn't have to fire a
shot.
Now, while I understand its attractiveness, I also know (from
reading "The Threat," among other sources) how large a gap there
is between theoretical kill ratios and real ones. If I WERE in
charge of things, I wouldn't want to bet the planet on Star Wars.
On another topic: Mr. J. Miller's bristling at my review of
"The Threat" is reminiscent of Lowell Wood's defense of Star
Wars. Ultimately, the Wood-Teller "if you knew what I know"
position is unsatisfying. It certainly excludes most of us from
this discussion, and I don't think that is the intended point.
From pg. 29 of "The Threat:"
"Contemplating [the] impressive array of sophisticated and
expensive information-gathering techniques, one finds it easy to
believe not only that the assessments of U.S. national security
policymakers about the Soviet threat are based on irrefutable
evidence, but that it is impossible for the researcher unendowed
with such facilities to pursue independent inquiries. The most
that can be done is to sift through the information released by
the agencies for facts that may amplify or possibly modify the
conclusions.
"This mystique of high-technology intelligence-gathering needs
to be put in context. Satellites can watch over enemy territory
with an ease that would have been unimaginable before the Space
Age, but they still cannot see through clouds. This is why, for
example, the output from the tank factory at Kharkov in the
Ukraine is regularly listed at 500 tanks a year in unclassified
intelligence publications. Through a meteorological quirk,
Kharkov is covered by clouds most of the time, rendering the
specialists in watching Soviet tank production effectively blind
as to the scale of the plant's operations. 'That is why they
give the figure of 500,' one former intelligence official told
me. 'It's the number they use when they don't know if it is
zero or 1,000.'"
I would like to add simply that for one to dispute this
passage, one must disagree both with the assertion and the
"former intelligence official" quoted. I prefer to believe.
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 85 19:42:52 EST
To: arms-d@mit-mc.ARPA
Subject: re: the liberal reaction to SDI
From: dm@bbn-vax.ARPA
I've always thought that a particularly strong objection to SDI is that it
isn't a defense measure at all--it's an offensive program.
Let's face it: a partially effective defense against a full Soviet force of
10,000 warheads is a much more effective defense against the drastically
reduced number of warheads launched by the Soviets in retaliation to a first
strike by the US.
For that matter, what else are those vulnerable Minute-man silo-based MX
missles (with their silo-killing accuracy that is pretty superfluous for a
retaliatory strike) good for other than a first-strike? If I were a Soviet
planner looking at the current US nuclear weapons plans (silo-based MX plus
Star Wars, plus Pershings in Europe), I would suspect the US of preparing
for a first strike.
Which is:
a) a good reason for us to get upset if the Soviets start to develop
their own Star Wars
b) a good reason for the Soviets not to want us to embark on Star Wars
since they know we'll get there first
c) a good reason for people (who after all have very few interests in
common with governments) to avoid starting a Star-Wars-race
Of course a first strike probably dooms the initiating side to death by
nuclear winter, which might be a deterrent, but nuclear winter isn't
universally accepted, and certainly is too complicated a concept for a man
like Reagan or Chernenko to grasp, so it isn't something to depend on as a
defense against a first strike.
How about finding some other back door into space development?
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 85 09:28:09 est
From: Walter Hamscher <hamscher@mit-htvax.ARPA>
To: rrd@Mitre-Bedford.ARPA
Subject: Re: Pearl Harbor
Cc: arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA
Date: Tuesday, 9 Apr 1985 18:32-EST
From: rrd at Mitre-Bedford
To: SASW at MIT-MC.ARPA
cc: rrd at Mitre-Bedford, hamscher at mit-htvax
Re: Pearl Harbor
Steven,
Noticed your forwarding of Walter's message buried deep in that long
ARMSD Digest (number 22, I think). Being a Pearl Harbor and military
history buff I, of course, became very interested in the notice
of the seminar. It is a little late now to attend, plus the fact that
I'm on on the wrong coast for it - I'm in San Diego, regardless what
the address says. Can you give me some particulars on what was said
and if there is any written material on the incident referred to in the
announcement? I've done a bunch of reading on the subject and this
is the first time I have heard of it.
Would appreciate anything you can do for me.
Thanks.
Bob Darron (rrd at MITRE-BEDFORD)
---
Sigh. I wish people would stop forwarding these things.
There's an instituion here at MIT, called Graduate Student
Lunch, every Friday at noon. I coordinate it, and back
a couple of years ago I got bored with the same old
announcement week after week, so I started making up joke
seminar announcements. Since the day, time, and place was
always the same there was never any confusion.
Then it got out of control -- people started forwarding the
announcements all over the country, and now whenever the
hack announcement mentions anything vaguely military,
people take the damn things seriously! That's why the "(-: :-)"
symbol is in it now. I thought that ":-)" was universally
understood, but apparently not (look at it sideways).
This particular announcement was inspired by the fact that
earlier in the week, two MIT graduate students cracked a
puzzle that should have won them $100K, but they hadn't read
the directions and finished the decryption 16 hours too
late, thus missing out on the prize. The underlying joke is
that waiting until the very last minute possible to finish
anything is highly characteristic of MIT students (which is
OK for me to say 'cause I'm one of them).
Sorry to disappoint anyone who's disappointed.
-Walter Hamscher
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 85 09:12:46 est
From: umich!drogers@mit-eddie.ARPA (David Rogers)
To: arms-d@mit-mc.ARPA
(Quote on nuclear strategy)
At the fifth level of interaction, each side strives to reduce the
nuclear attack strength of the other, by defenses when possible (notably
antiaircraft, against the bombers), but mainly by offensive weapons accurate
enough to destroy the weapons of the other. And it is not enough to be able
to threaten the destruction of weapons: to make the threat effective it is
also necessary to demonstrate the ability to destroy them without at the
same time destroying the nearby population centers. For if that happens,
then all strategy and all rational purposes come to an end, as the victim will
respond by launching his surviving weapons (there will always be some, perhaps
many) against the cities of the attacker. For the United States, the
competition
at this point is driven by the goal of keeping the interaction on the fourth
level [DR: The fourth level is the threat of US intercontinental nuclear force
against Russian tactial nukes in Europe], where the Soviet Army stands
deterred;
for the Soviet Union, the goal is to reach the fifth level, where American
nuclear deterrence is itself deterred. [DR: This is the famed "unlinking" of
Europe from US nuclear defense]
Because of the goals now persued, intercontinental nuclear weapons,
contrary to widespread belief, are steadily becoming @i(less) destructive in
gross explosive power. The goal of each side is to make the forces more
accurate and more controllable so that they can destroy small and
well-protected
targets, and no more. During the 1960's, the United States was still producing
weapons of 6-9 megatons, while the Soviet Union was producing 20-megaton
warheads; nowadays, most new American warheads have a yield of less than
half a megaton, while most Soviet warheads are below 1 megaton. As new weapons
replace old, the total destructive power of the two intercontinental nuclear
arsenals is steadily declining.
- From "The Pentagon and the Art of War", Edward Luttwak
Can anyone verify the strategic points here? I had always assumed that
the famed First Strike would be against both missles and cities, but it is
suggested here that the real objective of a first strike would be to disable
the enemy's nuclear capacity while leaving cities relatively untouched, and
having enough nuclear weapons in reserve to then use "blackmail" against the
relatively unprotected cities.
The quote about the decreasing power of warheads would seem to support
this reading. (I left out Luttwak's gratuitous digs against a freeze that
followed the second paragraph in the original.) If this really is the
top level strategy of nuclear war, then aren't we really trying to use
accuracy to remove the MAD from nuclear war? (If this is true, it is
interesting
that I have never read any media explanations of nuclear first strike that
suggest anything other than a total attack on all targets.)
David Rogers
(DRogers@MIT-OZ)
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 85 23:18:56 EST
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN@MIT-XX.ARPA>
Subject: Re: SDI and welfare
To: arms-d@MIT-MC.ARPA
cc: cowAN@MIT-XX.ARPA
>From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
>To: JoSH@RUTGERS.ARPA
> It is as much
>of a "waste" to buy a missile as a water project, but to say that SDI
>will go only to people is just silly.
>
> What difference
> does it make whether he is paid the dollar for doing "useless" space
> research (SDI), or for doing nothing (welfare)?
>
>None; I agree here.
How can you agree with such a statement? I agree completely that
SDI is useless, and therefore a waste of money. But you can't say
that welfare does nothing unless you measure progress exclusively
by GNP, productivity, or per capita income.
But I'm willing to forget about people and assume that welfare has
no use. Even then, there's a major difference between welfare and
SDI: welfare doesn't leave behind a residue of influence. Surely, too
much welfare may create a class of lazy, non-working parasites. But
what are these people going to do to stave off Stockman's axe?
Organize congressional mass-mailings on fancy letterheads? Go on
trips to Washington? Claim a Soviet edge, a "welfare gap" that needs
to be closed? By comparison, SDI oozes with potential residual
effects.
Water projects share one of these effects, the enlarged residual
power base in the form of the shipping industry. Wasteful water
projects have historically consisted of construction of dams and locks
that subsidize the shipping industry at the expense of the railroad
industry by not requiring the users of the revamped waterways to
support the cost with tolls. The shipping industry lobby is much like
the Defense Lobby, with one major exception: it does not dominate our
entire society by pervading our educational institutions.
Defense has become inextricably linked with state-of-the-art
technology, and has become reliant on universities ever since World
War II. Universities, in turn, have become dependent on military
research funding. MIT especially: in 1983 it absorbed 26% of the $937
millions in military research funding at US universities. The
relative size of MIT's departments and the knowledge those departments
create have been biased to reflect the funding directions of research
sponsors. Reagan's first few years have doubled oncampus military
research to over $40 million and pushed the $90 million of NASA and
DOE research in increasing military directions. SDI research will
continue these trends nationwide, causing increasing numbers of
universities to approach MIT's distribution of departmental size.
Past concern by MIT has created special research programs to focus
awareness on the societal effects of technology and policy. These
programs are endangered today, and would be in greater danger if they
constantly criticized military dominance of the universities of which
they are a part. When we have a nation full of MITs -- few of which
study the damage caused by military bias -- supporting a largely
military economy, there is no countervailing influence to sustained
military buildup.
Congress cannot act if there are no experts to testify for
corrective legislation. Ralph Nader recently said that if there are
no published articles in a journal about a topic, then its dead.
Fields without funding have few researchers, produce few papers, and
have no respected journals.
Presidential wisdom is the only hope. Eisenhower, ironically,
the most perceptive warnings about this
"military-university-industrial complex" just before he left office.
But, like the rest of society, presidential elections are influenced
by military lobbying.
Thus, even if SDI is never deployed, the consequences of just doing
resarch are extremely grave.
Rich Cowan
-------
------------------------------
[End of ARMS-D Digest]arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (04/24/85)
From: Laurinda Rohn <rohn@rand-unix> > from David Rogers (DRogers@MIT-OZ) > Can anyone verify the strategic points here? I had always assumed that >the famed First Strike would be against both missles and cities, but it is >suggested here that the real objective of a first strike would be to disable >the enemy's nuclear capacity while leaving cities relatively untouched, and >having enough nuclear weapons in reserve to then use "blackmail" against the >relatively unprotected cities. > > The quote about the decreasing power of warheads would seem to support >this reading. (I left out Luttwak's gratuitous digs against a freeze that >followed the second paragraph in the original.) If this really is the >top level strategy of nuclear war, then aren't we really trying to use >accuracy to remove the MAD from nuclear war? (If this is true, it is >interesting >that I have never read any media explanations of nuclear first strike that >suggest anything other than a total attack on all targets.) Which kind of attack you believe will happen depends entirely on who you talk to. There are many different objectives from which an enemy might choose. Some of the major types of strategic attacks are: 1. Counterforce - The basic intention is to destroy the enemy's strategic forces (i.e. ICBMs, bombers, major bomber airfields, that sort of stuff). This sort of attack would cause casualties, but not as many as other sorts of attacks. 2. Countermilitary - This includes counterforce as well as other military targets like army bases, smaller military airfields, conventional forces (tanks and the like), and possibly military industries. This sort of attack would create many more casualties than counterforce. 3. Countervalue - Ugly. This is the sort of attack where they go after the cities. Undoubtedly the most casualties. The industrial base in general is usually included in this attack. The basic idea is to destroy the entire society. 4. Leadership attack - Just what it says. Get the White House, the Pentagon and Congress perhaps. The idea is to leave the other side with no leadership so they don't have anyone who can approve launching a strategic attack. 5. C3 attack - Attack the enemy's command, control and communications. This attack, sometimes combined with 4., is often called a decapitation attack. The idea is to leave the enemy without the ability to launch an attack because they can't talk to each other. Those are the basic sorts of attacks, although there are many other kinds depending on whether you take subsets of each kind and combine them with others. Estimates of casualties range from down in the thousands for attacks like #4 to a million or so for #1 to upwards of 10 million for #3. The reason the media doesn't talk about things like #1 or #4 is that those attacks aren't nearly so gruesome or sensational as the country being blown to bits. I realize this sounds more than a bit perverse, but then I think the media is generally quite perverse. Why talk about a thousand casualties when you can talk about 10 million and scare people out of their wits? :-( The above are strictly my own opinions and do not necessarily have anything to do with the opinions of the Rand Corporation, its sponsors, or any other reasonable entity.