arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (04/26/85)
From: Moderator <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 25
Today's Topics:
Whither Arms-D ?
***** Submissions must cease until further notice. *****
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Date: 26-Apr-85 0:33:08
From: JLarson.pa@Xerox
Subject: Whither Arms-D ?
To: ARMS-D@MIT-MC
cc: CSTACY@MIT-MC
Reply-To: Arms-D-Request@MIT-MC
Arms-D has apparently become too popular for it's own good.
We have been told that MIT-MC can no longer suppport the mailer load
that distribution of this digest causes. Delivery of a digest to the
175 odd addresses on this list ties up the MC mailer completely for
at least one hour. (Unfortunately batch mail is not supported on MC!)
So.. this may be the last you see of Arms-D unless someone offers a
site to distribute this digest... or fixes MC's crufty mailer!
Please send recommendations/suggestions to Arms-D-Request@MIT-MC.
**** All submissions must cease until this issue is resolved. ****
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Date: Thu,18 Apr 85 23:19:05 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC>
Subject: first strike...
To: umich!drogers@MIT-EDDIE
cc: ARMS-D@MIT-MC
Luttwak's definition of first strike does correspond to common usage;
no one really thinks that a first strike would be aimed deliberately
at both weapons and cities, although since major strategic facilities
are often in cities, one might wonder about whether cities are in
practice sanctuaries.
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Date: Thu,18 Apr 85 23:27:49 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC>
Subject: SDI and welfare
To: COWAN@MIT-XX
cc: ARMS-D@MIT-MC
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN at MIT-XX.ARPA>
>From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
>To: JoSH@RUTGERS.ARPA
> It is as much
>of a "waste" to buy a missile as a water project, but to say that SDI
>will go only to people is just silly.
>
> What difference
> does it make whether he is paid the dollar for doing "useless" space
> research (SDI), or for doing nothing (welfare)?
>
>None; I agree here.
How can you agree with such a statement? I agree completely that
SDI is useless, and therefore a waste of money. But you can't say
that welfare does nothing unless you measure progress exclusively
by GNP, productivity, or per capita income.
Even then, there's a major difference between welfare and
SDI: welfare doesn't leave behind a residue of influence.
.... When we have a nation full of MITs -- few of which
study the damage caused by military bias -- supporting a largely
military economy, there is no countervailing influence to sustained
military buildup.
I suspect that we will always be arming, and that military research
will always be necessary. That doesn't change my belief that we have
to find political accomodations, but that's a fact of the world.
Sustained military buildup -- depending on its definition -- is not
necessarily a pure evil.
Congress cannot act if there are no experts to testify for
corrective legislation.
You forget that Congress has its own experts, that often take quite
adversarial roles.
Ralph Nader recently said that if there are
no published articles in a journal about a topic, then its dead.
Fields without funding have few researchers, produce few papers, and
have no respected journals.
I haven't seen a shortage of anti-buildup articles recently. Have you?
Thus, even if SDI is never deployed, the consequences of just doing
resarch are extremely grave.
But there's an upside to research too, and I for one am not willing to
give up the upside that SDI research would provide at the level of
1-2B $ per year.
Received: from apg-1 by MIT-MC.ARPA; 19 APR 85 11:33:33 EST
Date: 19 Apr 1985 11:22:24 EST (Friday)
From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1>
Subject: Laymen's perceptions of intelligence
To: arms-d@mit-mc.arpa
Cc: rbloom@apg-1, jmiller@apg-1
Reference comments made by Mr. Jong in his 10 April message.
Jong misses my point, much the same as the prolific Herb Lin. I don't claim
that U.S. intelligence is infallible, nor do I claim that policymakers always
use intelligence wisely. I am only saying that its superior to those
extrapolations made by private individuals.
Like scientists, intel analysts are more comfortable with their
conclusions if the quantity of useable raw information from which those
conclusions are drawn is such that it allows the subject to be studied from a
maximum number of angles. A commercial publicist looking into a particular
matter will not have the luxury.
An example; ( hypothetical, Mr. Lin, don't get excited and try to dispute
it! ) The fabled Kharkov tank plant. Cockburn's source is ostensibly a
former intelligence official. We won't even raise the question whether or not
this chap worked the Kharkov data or just knew something about it. ( Remember,
work of this sort at the all-source level is strictly compartmentalized. When
a " former intelligence official " begins commenting on diverse areas in the
intel world, he is either smokescreening or was a very high ranking officer
with inputs in all areas and disciplines, in which case he will be
smokescreening anyway, if he claims to have any detailed knowledge or technical
understanding of methods.) Thus, Cockburn's sources = 1. The intelligence
community has those wonderful satellites Cockburn mentioned and Jong quotes.
Like many wrong-thinking intelligence officials, they are drawn to the "high-
tech spying" like children to a shiny toy. I submit that final reports on the
Kharkov plant would be submitted only after careful examination of wireless
and land-line traffic intercept in and out, overhead imagery * collected over
time in all weathers and at varying angles *, de-briefs of emigres from the
geographic region and the ground automotive industry at large, imagery
collected from humint assets of the little old lady with a camera hidden in
her beets-basket type, and information from Defense attache collectors.
Thus, the intel community's sources = many
Be aware, this is only to name a few sources.
Sure some info is bum info. Thats why the quantity is collected. Jong
said " I believe." Meaning that he believes in one civilian journalist who
believes in one former defense official. I believe in God, everything else I
hold suspect. But I * trust * the guy who has done the homework, and has the
most data to work with. I trust the guy who is a professional over the guy
who decides to do a little research in an area in which he has no experience.
As I tried to explain to Mr. Lin, open sources are used in intel analysis. So
nobody is going to dig up a more informative source than those available to
the community. As for the sophomoric notion that "the sources are okay, but
the analysis must be suspect because the analysts are all under the thumb of
the regime in power and are forced to interpret intelligence along the party
line," the best answer is the hardest, observe the species at work. Analysts
are Democrats, Republicans, apathetics, Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Druids,
atheists, male, female, black, white, intelligent, charming, boorish, dense,
and every other thing imaginable, like other professions. They are forbidden
by law to falsify documents, and are encouraged to, and protected when they
blow the whistle on any superiors who tamper with their products.
What policymakers do with finished intelligence products is another matter.
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Date: Fri, 19 Apr 85 08:51:23 PST
From: Richard Foy <foy@AEROSPACE.ARPA>
To: arms-d@mit-mc
Subject: Star War Costs
I find Dani's cost estimates of Star Wars interesting. If I read his figures
correctly he is saying a total of something like $220 billion. Every program
that I am familiar with has grown in cost by anywhere from a factor of 5 to 10
from the time at which it was was only research to the time that there was
operational hardware. The lastest program that I am famiuliar with is the
Inertial Upper Stage which at a much stage approaching full scale development
was planned at $100 million. Its growth since then fits the the historical
pattern.
The book Augistine's Laws by Norman Augustine vice president or lhigher at
Martin is enlightening on the growth of system costs.
I find it fascinating that the people who are willing to spend hundreds of
billions evan trillions on speculative technological hardware and research
are not willing to spend on dime on sociological, psychological, or other
human sciences approaches to solving the problems of international relations.
richard
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From: Laurinda Rohn <rohn@rand-unix>
Date: 19 Apr 85 09:22:19 PST (Fri)
To: ARMS-D@mit-mc.ARPA
Cc: rohn@rand-unix
Subject: Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V3 #23
> from David Rogers (DRogers@MIT-OZ)
> Can anyone verify the strategic points here? I had always assumed that
>the famed First Strike would be against both missles and cities, but it is
>suggested here that the real objective of a first strike would be to disable
>the enemy's nuclear capacity while leaving cities relatively untouched, and
>having enough nuclear weapons in reserve to then use "blackmail" against the
>relatively unprotected cities.
>
> The quote about the decreasing power of warheads would seem to support
>this reading. (I left out Luttwak's gratuitous digs against a freeze that
>followed the second paragraph in the original.) If this really is the
>top level strategy of nuclear war, then aren't we really trying to use
>accuracy to remove the MAD from nuclear war? (If this is true, it is
>interesting
>that I have never read any media explanations of nuclear first strike that
>suggest anything other than a total attack on all targets.)
Which kind of attack you believe will happen depends entirely on who
you talk to. There are many different objectives from which an enemy
might choose. Some of the major types of strategic attacks are:
1. Counterforce - The basic intention is to destroy the enemy's
strategic forces (i.e. ICBMs, bombers, major bomber airfields,
that sort of stuff). This sort of attack would cause
casualties, but not as many as other sorts of attacks.
2. Countermilitary - This includes counterforce as well as other
military targets like army bases, smaller military airfields,
conventional forces (tanks and the like), and possibly military
industries. This sort of attack would create many more
casualties than counterforce.
3. Countervalue - Ugly. This is the sort of attack where they go
after the cities. Undoubtedly the most casualties. The
industrial base in general is usually included in this attack.
The basic idea is to destroy the entire society.
4. Leadership attack - Just what it says. Get the White House, the
Pentagon and Congress perhaps. The idea is to leave the other
side with no leadership so they don't have anyone who can
approve launching a strategic attack.
5. C3 attack - Attack the enemy's command, control and communications.
This attack, sometimes combined with 4., is often called a
decapitation attack. The idea is to leave the enemy without the
ability to launch an attack because they can't talk to each
other.
Those are the basic sorts of attacks, although there are many other
kinds depending on whether you take subsets of each kind and combine
them with others. Estimates of casualties range from down in the
thousands for attacks like #4 to a million or so for #1 to upwards of
10 million for #3. The reason the media doesn't talk about things
like #1 or #4 is that those attacks aren't nearly so gruesome or
sensational as the country being blown to bits. I realize this sounds
more than a bit perverse, but then I think the media is generally
quite perverse. Why talk about a thousand casualties when you can talk
about 10 million and scare people out of their wits? :-(
The above are strictly my own opinions and do not necessarily have
anything to do with the opinions of the Rand Corporation, its sponsors,
or any other reasonable entity.
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Date: 19 Apr 1985 1447-PST
From: Rem@IMSSS
Subject: You cut, I choose
To: ARMS-D%MIT-MC@SCORE
I invented that idea when I was a teenager, because my younger sister always
got more of the cake or whatever than I did. When I suggested she cut an
I choose, she logically figured out that since she couldn't cut very carefully
the pieces would be uneven and I'd get to pick the larger piece. But when I
suggested that I cut and she choose, she refused that too, saying that I
would trick her in some way and she'd still end up with the smaller piece.
She thus refused any logical resolution, continuing to both cut and choose
herself which retained the advantage she always had. (If I tried to resolve
that by force, she always cryed to mother who always resolved in her favor
because she was smaller and needed defense. In effect she&mother always ganged
up on me.) I'm not sure how this relates to arms control, but just because
the solution seems logical and fair doesn't mean the great leaders will
accept the plan. After all, when has Reagan or any Soviet leader accepted
fairness in the past? (rhetorical question, answer is "never")
-------
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From: Jeff Mogul <mogul@SU-SHASTA.ARPA>
Date: 19 Apr 85 18:33 PST (Friday)
To: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V3 #23
Dani Eder writes of a kinetic energy SDI:
Then 27 pods in the same orbit will go all the way around the
earth. If you use polar type orbits, 27 orbits side by side will
cover the entire earth, with lots of overlap over the poles.
Now, if each pod carries 100 interceptors, we have 72900 interceptors,
Your math looks correct, but:
(1) Presumably these "pods" will be equally spaced in their polar orbits
(or else there would be holes in the coverage. This means that
half of them will be in the southern hemisphere at any time;
conservatively, at least half of the remaining pods (probably more)
won't be within 1000 Km of the ICBM flight paths. This leaves us
with < 19K interceptors that have any chance of being useful.
(2) How many ICBMs will they be shooting at? Especially N years
from now, when the USSR (in response to observed parameters of
this ABM system) builds lots of cheap, decoy boosters. How many
interceptors do you aim at each booster to get a good kill rate?
How many pods have been taken out by an ASAT?
(3) If the boost phase of the Soviet ICBMs is shortened to 60
seconds (from your figure of 200), this means that means that
your interceptors have only 333 km range, so you need 9 times
as many pods.
(4) This still assumes a fairly sophisticated, and fast,
sensor system to detect launches. If it takes, say, 30 seconds
to detect and aim, then the number of pods quadruples again, no?
(5) If the sneaky Russkies launch a bunch of decoys (they
know how many interceptors are in nearby orbital position)
what would stop your system from shooting its wad, only
to watch the real missiles fly past 2 minutes later?
(6) What about cruise missiles?
Just asking,
-Jeff
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Date: Fri, 19 Apr 85 19:19:52 pst
From: rimey@UCB-VAX.ARPA (Ken Rimey)
To: arms-d@mit-mc.ARPA, ihnp4!uw-beaver!ssc-vax!eder@UCB-VAX.ARPA
Subject: Re: Dani Eder in 3:23
Dani Eder's assessment of the potential of kill vehicles for BMD is overly
optimistic.
Space Based Lasers and particle beam weapons, as interesting as they
are, are not the practical method of shooting down missiles.....
At a closing velocity of 7000 meters per second, 1 kilogram of
ANYTHING equals the energy in 6 kilograms of TNT.....
The original missile masses perhaps 100 kg. Let us assume that
the job must be done within 200 seconds.....
First, I interject that 200 seconds is an optimistic assumption. The
following table and succeeding footnote were taken from page 62 of "The
Fallacy of Star Wars" by the Union of Concerned Scientists. Sorry for
not going to original sources.
Burnout of Booster MIRVing Finished
ICBM time height time height
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
SS-18 two-stage 300s 400km N.A. N.A.
liquid highly MIRVed
MX three-stage 180s 200km 650s 1100km
solid 10 MIRV's
MX-fast burn 50s 90km 60s 110km
microbuses and decoys and RV's
MIDGETMAN-fast burn 50s 80km N.A. N.A.
+ decoys 1 RV
*Ashton Carter. "Directed Energy: Missile Defense in Space." Washington,
D.C.: Office of Technology Assessment, April 1984. The first two entries
refer to the most modern components of the Soviet and U.S. strategic
forces; the SS-18 is deployed, the MX is tested but not deployed. The
last two are designs of ICBMs prepared by the Martin-Marietta Corporation
for the Fletcher Panel, under the supposition that a Soviet boost-phase
BMD system would require missiles that finish boosting and warhead dispersal
as quickly as possible.
Ignoring the time required for sensing and decision-making, 200 seconds
of travel time might be available for kill vehicles intercepting TODAY's
Soviet ICBMs. But clearly we should be considering the Soviet ICBMs that
will be deployed when this BMD system is deployed.
Dani Eder's calculation continues as follows.
With 7 km/sec of available velocity,
the interceptor could cover perhaps 1000 km range, allowing for
some acceleration time. Place 'pods' in orbit some humdreds of
kilometers high. Each pod covers a 1000 km radius sphere. Space
the pods 1500 km apart, allowing for some overlap of coverage.
Then 27 pods in the same orbit will go all the way around the
earth. If you use polar type orbits, 27 orbits side by side will
cover the entire earth, with lots of overlap over the poles.
Now, if each pod carries 100 interceptors, we have 72900 interceptors,
with a total weight of 7.29 million kg. Allow overhead for the
pods and we get perhaps 10 million kg. This is perhaps 200 launches
of a Shuttle-derived cargo launcher. Not trivial, but in the
10-20 billion$ range. Using historical space hardware costs
the production cost for all these platforms would be $50 billion.
Polar orbits may not be optimal here, and so 27^2 pods is somewhat
pessimistic. However, 100 interceptors per pod is again very
optimistic. I have no way to check whether this suffices for the
current geographical arrangement of the Soviet ICBMs. However, the SDI
creates a strong incentive for the Soviet Union to place its ICBMs in
large groups. If they moved 1000 of their 1400 ICBMs together into one
big missile field, ten times as many interceptors would be needed. The
cost estimate above of $50 billion would rise to half a trillion. I
will quote here a relevant paragraph from page 121 of the UCS book.
"What, then, is the cheapest, surest, and most threatening Soviet response
to an American BMD? The answer is obvious: a massive buildup of offensive
weapons and decoys. SALT II and the ABM Treaty would have long been dead
letters if a BMD system were being deployed. The United States could not test
or deploy such a system without abrogating the ABM Treaty, and the Soviets
would not tolerate the limits on their missile force imposed by SALT II if
they were about to be faced by a missile shield. As a result, there would
be no numerical limits on silos or on ICBMs. Nor would there be the rule in
Article XII of the ABM Treaty forbidding "deliberate concealment measures
which impede verification by national technical means," so silos would be
built under cover to prevent satellite observation during construction. In
these conditions, it would be possible to construct many cheap silos and a
new generation of fake ICBMs consisting of boosters without costly guidance
packages and warheads. A still cheaper, though more precarious, Soviet
response would be to place a large number of true and fake ICBMs above
ground, and to announce a launch-on-warning posture, so that we could not
threaten their unprotected missiles. Such additional ICBMs could be
deployed in tight clusters, which would greatly aggravate the absentee problem
that afflicts all low-orbit interception schemes. A Soviet attack could
then begin with a large proportion of fakes that have precisely the same
booster flares as real ICBMs....."
Kill vehicles suffer from a critical technical problem. They can function
only at high altitudes. Deployment of the fast-burn booster technology
mentioned above would be a fatal countermeasure. From page 102:
"..... a high-speed object moving through the atmosphere will heat the layer
of air next to it, which results in the emission of infrared radiation. But
because the kill vehicles utilize infrared signals to home in on ICBM
boosters, the infrared signal that it causes by its motion through the air
masks its own homing telescope. The phenomena that determine this
self-produced infrared background have been studied in connection with the
design of reentry vehicles and are quite complex. A rough estimate indicates
that a kill vehicle having a shape similar to a reentry vehicle cannot home
successfully below an altitude of about 100km. Boosters that burn out at an
altitude of 80km, therefore, could not be intercepted by kill vehicles.
Such vehicles could still attack a MIRV bus, but, as explained earlier, one
can design ICBMs that have no bus and release warheads and decoys immediately
after boosting is over, or that disperse their warheads and decoys very
rapidly at altitudes below 100km."
In summary, there is a quite valid method of shooting down missiles.
I WILL grant you that this scheme could almost certainly be used to
shoot down small numbers of certain kinds of ICBMs in boost phase. But
it looks like it will not succeed in stopping a real Soviet attack a
decade hence.
The technique works (with different types of sensors) in boost
phase, mid-course, and teminal phase, making for a layered
defense. The difference between the last phase and the other
two is the terminal defense missiles start from the ground
rather than orbit.
The counting above of interceptors was for boost phase only.
Mid-course is much worse. Large modern missiles can carry about ten
warheads. They can easily disperse 100 objects that are not reliably
distinguishable from warheads. This number might be raised to 1000.
If the boost-phase interception layer was 90% effective, there would
still be 10 or 100 times as many targets in mid-course as in
boost-phase.
Please, readers, don't neglect to consider the strategic and political
issues implicit in a technical discussion such as this. A boost phase
interception system based on kill vehicles would
1. be ideally suited to quickly destroying a similar system
deployed by the opponent.
2. be vulnerable to many types of ground based antisatellite
weapons.
3. bring the death of most existing arms control treaties.
4. be much more effective against a weak second strike, than
against a first strike, diminishing the ability of that second
strike to deter war.
Ken Rimey
Berkeley!rimey
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[End of ARMS-D Digest]