arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (05/06/85)
From: Moderator <ARMS-D@MIT-MC> Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 27 Today's Topics: We're Back on the Air Laymen's perceptions of intelligence Making it easy for the Soviets Star Wars studies and conflict of interest Silliness ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: The (new and old) Moderator Subject: The Return of Arms-D With the aid of many people, Arms-D distribution has been improved, and I hope to get about one issue out a day. I thank the group of moderators that have maintained the list for the last few years, and thanks you all for waiting patiently for the last week. - Harold ------------------------------ Date: 26 Apr 85 11:00:24 PST (Friday) From: Hoffman.es@Xerox.ARPA Subject: Laymen's perceptions of intelligence Jeff Miller makes the point that more sources are better than fewer, and U.S. intelligence analysts have the most sources, public as well as private. I tend to believe him on both points. But I'll tell you this layman's perceptions of intelligence: Intelligence, AS REVEALED TO THE U.S. PUBLIC, is just the same as a single source like Cockburn and his 'former intelligence official'. I believe the public is only told what the Administration wants to make public, and that is quite predictable, and, to me, usually unbelievable. The Administration gets to choose what they reveal; they don't have to tell sources, they don't have to mention even the existence of any opposing intelligence or interpretation. THAT's why I don't trust what they tell me. If I had access to the professional intelligence analysts' reports BEFORE the Administration edited them, THAT I would believe over, say, Cockburn. --Rodney Hoffman ------------------------------ Date: 29 Apr 1985 12:15:44 EDT (Monday) From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1> Subject: Laymen's Perceptions of Intelligence - Response to Hoffman Mr. Hoffman has championed my point, although I suspect nothing was furter from his intentions. I've never contended that the information released by government leaders be used as a yardstick of the quality of intelligence used to formulate defense policy. My point has been that one can find much more fertile grounds for criticizing defense policies than a source like Cockburn, because the intelligence upon which he bases his conclusions is often at great variance with current all-source intelligence. I am aware of a number of inconsistencies in his work. I must confess that I have been thunderstruck that reasonably intelligent people cannot assume that, when they read an open source work, a lot of the information inside is not the last word in intel methods or products. Nowhere in the functions of intelligence is there a function or a responsibility to inform the public. That is the job of the national leadership, which will always be influenced by political motives. I can tell you that very little of what is released is unaltered. This often occurs because senior intelligence officials tend to fight doggedly against release, usually compromising only after information is altered. This is not done, as some would believe, because these men are liars, but because they are justifiably ferocious in protecting sources. I often wonder at information that is deliberately not released - especially when such release would work to the advantage of the administration. For instance, ( war story ) I was the second senior officer in the technical intelligence operations during Urgent Fury. I ran the collection, identification, inventory and evacuation of all captured equipment. I know by heart what quantities of which types of weapons were captured. I can only say that the figures publicly released by the government are extremely low, in the neighborhood of less than a tenth of the real numbers. And as for the stories about "antique" weapons, yes, there were a few thousand WWII vintage and older weapons, and these made up perhaps as high as 10% of the weapons found. The rest were the same kinds of modern weapons that are in use every day in Beirut, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Namibia etc. Why does the story persist that there weren't many weapons captured, and that those that were turned out to be museum pieces? Journalists, living in hotels in, St George as opposed to living in the Frequente warehouses, who spent perhaps a total of two hours milling around the warehouses ( which we had half emptied by the time they were permitted on the island ) saw half-empty warehouses and some stacks of Lee Enfield rifles. Military spokesmen for some reason had nothing to say, so the story came out based entirely on that evidence available to the newsmen. It was wrong. I've often wondered why the administration did not capitalize on the amount of materiel captured, but I'm not concerned, because , again, it is not the responsibility of intelligence to inform the public. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 26 Apr 85 18:28:57 EST From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC> Subject: Making it easy for the Soviets From: Lin Please provide an analysis that says that ERWs are the good way to kill tanks. (paraphrase) From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller at apg-1> In depth analysis not necessary. This says it all. I wish that people *would* do serious analysis, because mostly their judgments are based on unsupported opinion. Simple concept. ERWs kill tank crews and open infantry by use of "fast" neutrons produced in fusion. Unlike currently deployed (and apparently more acceptable to pacifists) fission weapons, ERWs would not emit as tremendous heat, blast and fallout, since they use only a minimum of fissile material as a trigger. True that ERWs are less dangerous to surrounding people/villages than ordinary fission weapons. Why wouldn't an equal investment in precision-guided antitank weapons be (a) more effective and (b) more politically acceptable? No peacenik dupe that I know of (e.g., Robert McNamara) would arge that better anti-tank weapons would be a good thing. I await a serious analysis. ------------------------------ Received: from apg-1 by MIT-MC.ARPA; 29 APR 85 13:36:21 EDT Date: 29 Apr 1985 13:28:28 EDT (Monday) From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1> Subject: More dupe-to-dupe explanation. To: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC> Cc: arms-d@mit-mc, jmiller@apg-1 When it comes to providing our ground and air forces with advanced anti-tank weapons, I will gladly carry you on my back through the halls of Congress to push it through, if that would do it. It would of course mean overall increases in force levels, which would help balance the threat in Europe. Nuclear weapons of any kind are merely bargaining chips, valuable in their sinister way,only by deterrance and trade-off. I harbor an ex-soldier's unshakable instinct that tactical nuclear weapons of any type, rather than offseting numerical superiority, will lead to intra-, and intercontinental escalation. I welcome any motion to expand our conventional forces. My sarcastically expressed concern is not over the ERW as "the ultimate anti-tank weapon", rather, over the fact that this highly useful bargaining chip, which was greatly feared by the Soviets ( FACT; if you want to hear more, I suggest we get together in a public place), was effectively cancelled by a large-scale intelligence campaign. This is not to say there is anything wrong in being anti- nuke. This is not to say the Soviets use only liberal cause groups as their "dupes", as you like to say.( They use anybody, to include the KKK. So the argument that goes: "so what if the KGB is influencing my cause as long as its right?" is empty because it fails to recognize that the KGB isn't helping fund and organize because it is concerned with peace or morality, but because it is a handy means to harm the US.) Final point; I've been going back through the ARMS-D archives. Herb Lin complaining about somebody not providing substantive analysis! What a hoot!! J.MILLER ------------------------------ Date: 1 May 85 02:17 EDT From: Andy.Hisgen@CMU-CS-A.ARPA Subject: Star Wars studies and conflict of interest This comes from the N.Y.Times, Tuesday, April 30, 1985: 'STAR WARS' CONTRACTS CRITICIZED By Wayne Biddle Washington, April 29 -- Military contractors that stand to profit the most from developing a space-based antimissile system have been assigned the task of deciding its feasibility, a private study has charged. The Council on Economic Priorities said the program was "rife with potential for conflict of interest." ... ------------------------------ Date: 26 Apr 85 12:02:20 PST (Fri) From: Laurinda Rohn <rohn@rand-unix> From: alice!wolit@UCB-VAX.ARPA >> From: Laurinda Rohn <rohn@rand-unix> >> >> Estimates of casualties range from down in the thousands for attacks >> like #4 [Leadership attack] to a million or so for >> #1 [Counterforce] to upwards of 10 million for #3 [Countervalue]. >> [#2 = Countermilitary, #5 = C3 attack.] >> The reason the media doesn't talk about things >> like #1 or #4 is that those attacks aren't nearly so gruesome or >> sensational as the country being blown to bits. >Gimme a break, Laurinda! Casualties "down in the thousands" for an >attack that takes out "the White House, the Pentagon, and Congress"!!! >We're talking about several million people who live in D.C., unless >you envision an attack by a human wave of Iranian teenagers, or something... >Similarly, the estimates I've read of the results of a counterforce >attack run from more like several tens of millions just from fallout alone >up to the whole shebang if you believe -- as does the Pentagon -- in >nuclear winter. It would make discussions much more interesting for all concerned if you would read the postings *before* you start, ah, commenting on them. Nowhere did I say or even imply that these were MY estimates. What I *did* say was that I was simply describing the basic sorts of strategic attacks and jargon used by analysts in the nuclear strategy field as someone had questioned in a previous digest why estimates of casualties were so different. There are very wide ranges for casualty estimates for any type of attack. > As for 10 million dead in a countervalue [nice euphemism >for city-busting] attack, you could easily generate that with, say, 5 >bombs each on NY and Chicago, which is more like what RAND strategists >consider to be "communication of intentions" rather than serious >war-making. You apparently didn't notice that I said "upwards of 10 million". Again, there are many estimates. Just out of curiosity, how many RAND strategists have you talked to who say 10 million dead would not be "serious war- making"? > Besides, it is already widely acknowledged that AUTHORITY >exists well below the level of the residents of the White House, the >Pentagon, and Congress for launching nuclear attacks in their absence, >and the ABILITY exists right down to the level of the individual sub >captain, bomber pilot, or missile crew, so it's all but 100% assured >that a #4 or #5 will degrade to a #2 and #3 in a matter of hours, >making the casualty figures for such attacks mere fantasies. I'd like to know your sources, especially for your first statement. I doubt seriously that it's "widely acknowledged." And nothing is 100% assured except death and taxes.... >I'm glad that you don't consider your opinions to be those of "any >resonable entity," since they're clearly not! After the last world war, >we hanged those who expounded the theories that inspired the >prosecution of aggressive war (which included political assasination >-- your "#4 attack"). What size necktie do YOU wear? > >Jan Wolitzky, AT&T Bell Labs, Murray Hill, NJ; 201 582-2998; alice!wolit >(Affiliation given for identification purposes only) Again, it would improve your arguments if you would read what you're arguing against first. I don't think I was "expounding" theories; my intent was to clarify some terminology and to provide some information for someone who asked. I most certainly did *not* say anything to inspire anyone to war. As for the personal attack(s), if you wish to continue that sort of thing, please do so by private mail. I really don't think it's appropriate for the digest. Laurinda rohn@rand-unix ------------------------------ [End of ARMS-D Digest]