[fa.arms-d] Arms-Discussion Digest V3 #29

arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (05/08/85)

From: Harold G. Ancell <HGA@MIT-MC>


Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 29
Today's Topics:

			    Intelligence
			      More KGB
----------------------------------------------------------------------

From: The Moderator
Subject: Mail system progress and idea on Grenada Weapons mystery

Things seem to be getting ironed out.  I know I can't say "If you
don't get this message send me mail...."; however, everyone should be
receiving their copy.  Please send me mail if there are any problems.

A friend of mine pointed out a possiable reason for the Administration
hiding the existance of the bulk of the weapons captured in Grenada.
Perhaps they (the weapons) made their way to some group (such as the
contras) that the Administration didn't want to openly supply with
Made in U.S. weapons.

					- Harold

------------------------------

Date: Mon 6 May 85 12:29:29-CDT
From: Don Stuart <ICS.STUART@UTEXAS-20.ARPA>
Subject: Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V3 #27

I think Jeff Miller has missed Mr. Hoffman's point.  I will grant that
the reports generated by government analysts contain much better
guesses than anything Cockburn or the rest of us could generate.
Certainly the dribbles of information that reach us have often been
altered to protect sources and so forth.  The difficulty for us, as
Miller seems to confirm, is that they have also been altered to fit
the political needs of various groups within the government.  I would
like to believe that such alterations do not occur before reports
reach policy makers, but I know that is not true.  First, there is
probably some fudging for internal purposes: Casey, the JCS and
everybody else have their own agendas.  Second, ultimately WE ARE the
policy makers.  I have to decide who to vote for, what ideas to
support, in order to do my 1/200000000th share of running this
country.  Therefore I must take what I can get and try to remember
that ALL of my sources of information are badly flawed.

Miller also says:
	So the argument that goes: "so what if the KGB is influencing
	my cause as long as its right?" is empty because it fails to
	recognize that the KGB isn't helping fund and organize because
	it is concerned with peace or morality, but because it is a
	handy means to harm the US.

Say what?  This claim seems to rest on two assumtions:
1) Anything that is bad for the US is wrong.  
2) The KGB is an infallible judge of what is bad for the US.

The first is arguable, although I think not quite true.  The second is
nonsense.  Perhaps we should be suspicious of anything the KGB
approves of, but I am not about to give them a veto over my opinions.

					Don

------------------------------

Date:  3 May 1985  8:44:18 EDT (Friday)
From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1>
Subject: More KGB

I must apologize

I only get to these things as I can, and it dawned on me that I 
had not answered the question you raised about Active Measures in 
relation to groups or movements.
     Groups are penetrated by operatives intent on a. seeking to 
recruit Agents of Influence, and b.using the activities of that 
group to influence public opinion, influence government, disrupt 
normal functions of commerce and government, provoke reaction 
from police and other governmental organs, shape and direct where 
possible the ideology of the group as a whole, manage the public 
relations of the group (propaganda) such that the target 
government is always presented in the worst light, and the 
government of the Soviet Union is presented in only a favorable 
light.   
     Soviet operatives usually become very popular within groups.
By pretending to espouse shared beliefs the operative feeds the 
egos of individuals in the group. By providing guest supporters 
with impressive credentials, the group self-esteem is played upon. 
Very often the "distinguished physicist" or whatever is a KGB 
operative with no factual credentials whatsoever, posing as a
whatever after extremely extensive coaching. When actual 
professionals are used, they are KGB personnel. Most popular of 
all are the funds that can be provided.... the KGB has access to 
funds that would bring tears to the eyes of a CIA spook.
     Penetration of groups is accomplished through myriad 
organizations, in existence already, or created especially for a 
given operation. Thus groups tend not to suspect that they are 
dealing with KGB. The KGB manages a veritable multinational 
conglomerate of peace, labor, social-welfare, and in typically 
ultra-cynical Soviet fashion, religious organizations.  I 
mentioned one very active KGB organization in my sarcastic letter 
of a few days back; the World Peace Council. Established in 1950 
as an anti-nuclear weapons group before the Soviets had developed 
viable nuclear weapons, it was expelled from France in 1951 for 
being an espionage base and from Vienna in 1957 for subversive 
activities.  Later it quietly reopened a satellite in Vienna 
clled the International Institute for Peace. It is headed by 
Indian Communist Romesh Chandra, an operative of the KGB. In its 
32 years, this * World * organization failed to make any comment 
on Soviet suppression of E. German workers in 1953, Hungarians in 
1956, Soviet abrogation of the nuclear test moratorium in 1961, 
the installation of missiles in Cuba in 1962, the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, or Afghanistan in 1979. It has *never* 
criticized a single Soviet armament program. This organization 
has developed a large sympathetic following in the US, to include 
the congressmen I named in the previous letter. It boasts 36 
allied or otherwise sponsored organizations in the US. It has 
provided guest speakers like Dr. Radomir Bogdanov "of the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences", who has spoken at a luncheon in the House 
of Representatives during a WPC sponsored " Dialogue on 
Disarmament and Detente." He is Colonel Bogdanov of the 12th 
Department, with an unearned doctorate, whose name was placed as 
author on several works by real Russian scientists in order to 
construct his "legend". Other names familiar to attendees at 
freeze rallies are Yuri Kapralov and Georgi Arbatov - who may be 

familiar to watchers of ABC's "Nightline" on which he regularly 
appears to present the Soviet viewpoint as director of the 
"Institute for USA and Canada," operated by the International 
Department, KGB. Both are officers of the KGB.


I would recommend reading of;

     Soviet Active Measures: An Update, Special report no.101, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, US State Department, July 1982
     Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations, Soviet Active 
Measures, Special report no. 88, US State Department, October 
1981 
     ( Both above include debrief exerpts of KGB defector Major 
Stanislov Levchenko )
     House Permanent Subcommittee on Intelligence hearings; April 
1978, February 1980, July 1982.

     * Example of Obvious Sign of Disinformation Influence :
Australian physician Helen Caldicott who has no criticism of 
Soviet arms policies - in fact who has nothing but admiration for 
Soviet intentions - claims that the US is THE villain of the arms 
race.


                                           J. Miller

------------------------------

Date: Mon,  6 May 85 18:33:12 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC>
Subject:  KGB and Influence

[From J. Miller  - Moderator]

    It must be understood that during development, the subject is not 
    aware he is dealing with KGB. In most cases the operative either 
    passes himself off as a private Soviet citizen with counterpart 
    views, goals, beliefs, etc., or as a third country national. 

But then what does the subject do to give the KGB person leverage?  A
person with access to classified information shouldn't be talking to
anyone, regardless of whether or not the person to whom he is talking
is recognizable as a KGB agent.

         Often the Soviets try to combine the roles of Agents of 
    Influence with espionage. This has brought them some successes 
    that we know of, but also some disasters, since many people who 
    would allow themselves to be blackmailed into influence draw the 
    line at selling secrets.

Please give an example of "influence" that does NOT include selling
secrets.  In your response, please refrain from using examples such as
"voting against cruise missiles in Germany", since such positions can
easily be justified on grounds *other* than being victims of KGB
influence, (e.g., a member of the German Parliament might have thought
that putting missiles at sea would have been more sensible).

         I am curious about your questions about the KGB and finding 
    missing kids. Are you aware of something I'm not?

I doubt it.  I'm saying that Soviet support of a cause doesn't
*necessarily* mean that the cause is one that Americans should not
support. 

         Point is this: It is not relevant to say "what's wrong if 
    the Sov's pour money and support into (--- fill in the blank with 
    any undeniably worthy cause---) if its a worthy cause?" because 
    unless that cause can be worked to the Soviet's advantage, they 
    won't use it.

I guess this is my primary objection to your position: you assume a
zero-sum game: if the Soviets want X, then X must be a bad thing for
the US, for any X.  I don't subscribe to this position, though I do
welcome evidential challenges to it.

------------------------------

Date: Mon,  6 May 85 18:52:06 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC>
Subject:  More KGB

[From J. Miller  - Moderator]

         Groups are penetrated by operatives intent on a. seeking to 
    recruit Agents of Influence, and b.using the activities of that 
    group to influence public opinion, influence government, disrupt 
    normal functions of commerce and government, provoke reaction 
    from police and other governmental organs, shape and direct where 
    possible the ideology of the group as a whole, manage the public 
    relations of the group (propaganda) such that the target 
    government is always presented in the worst light, and the 
    government of the Soviet Union is presented in only a favorable 
    light.   

Many people try to do some of these things (e.g., influence public
opinion or government, and shape and direct where possible the
ideology of groups with which they are associated).  They also
criticize (often severely) the U.S. government for doing things that
are silly.  Does this mean that they are potential agents of influence
of the KGB?  I doubt it.  Harold Brown and James Schlesinger don't
seem to me to qualify, though you may have information we don't have.

         Penetration of groups is accomplished through myriad 
    organizations, in existence already, or created especially for a 
    given operation. Thus groups tend not to suspect that they are 
    dealing with KGB. The KGB manages a veritable multinational 
    conglomerate of peace, labor, social-welfare, and in typically 
    ultra-cynical Soviet fashion, religious organizations.  

My own bias is not to believe any group from the S.U.  Thus, KGB
association per se is irrelevant.

    ... the World Peace Council failed to make any comment on ...
    Soviet abrogation of the nuclear test moratorium in 1961..

I don't know enough on the other Soviet misdeeds you mention, but I do
know about the so-called abrogation.  In December 1960, before
resumption of Soviet testing, the U.S. stated that it would no longer
be bound by the moratorium.  (This does not take away from your
general point.)

    ...This organization 
    has developed a large sympathetic following in the US, to include 
    the congressmen I named in the previous letter. 

I follow with great interest a variety of "peace through disarmament"
movements.  I also follow with great interest a variety of "peace
through strength" movements.  Am I subject to "improper influence" or
do I get to make up my own minds about things? (Or is it part of KGB
"cleverness" that makes me believe the latter while the former is
true?)

    Other names familiar to attendees at 
    freeze rallies are Yuri Kapralov and Georgi Arbatov - who may be 
    familiar to watchers of ABC's "Nightline" on which he regularly 
    appears to present the Soviet viewpoint as director of the 
    "Institute for USA and Canada," operated by the International 
    Department, KGB.

*Of course* these people would give the "official" Soviet line; why
would anyone expect anything less?  It isn't a whole lot different
than Cap Weinberger or Ken Adelman going around and making speeches
about US policy.

Thanks for the references you gave us.

         * Example of Obvious Sign of Disinformation Influence :
    Australian physician Helen Caldicott who has no criticism of 
    Soviet arms policies - in fact who has nothing but admiration for 
    Soviet intentions - claims that the US is THE villain of the arms 
    race.

I'm afraid I agree with you here, at least to some extent.  Certainly
Caldicott is one-sided.  An intellectually respectable argument can
indeed be made that the US is the primary mover in the arms race, but
she doesn't make it.  (A different argument with the reverse
conclusion, also intellectually respectable, is possible as well.)

------------------------------
[End of ARMS-D Digest]

arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (05/11/85)

From: The Arms-D Moderator (Harold G. Ancell) <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA>


Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 29
Today's Topics:

			 Background on SDI
		       Unreliable Information
			 KGB and Influence
			       Agents
	Request for where to get State Dept Special Reports
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Note from Moderator: Pardon this late digest; MC was having problems
last night.

					- Harold

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 6 May 85 13:06:20 pdt
From: ihnp4!uw-beaver!ssc-vax!eder@Berkeley (Dani Eder)
Subject: Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V3 #27

In order to provide the net with some information on SDI, I submit
herewith a presentation made to the Royal Aeronautical Society,
New Zealand Division, Christchurch, New Zealand, 8 March 1985, by
Peter Downey, who was then Director of Preliminary Design, Research
and Engineering Division, Boeing Aerospace Company.  Preliminary
Design is where SDI work is being done at Boeing.

     The words are Mr. Downey's.  My own opinions do not necessarily
agree.  [My comments will appear in brackets such as these].
--------------------------------------------------------------------

	The Strategic Defense Initiative and Space

		Peter Downey	March 8, 1985

     The historical approach to strategic nuclear warfare has been to
develop larger numbers of more sophisticated offensive weapons.  The
awesome destructiveness of even a small percentage of these weapons
could ruin the whole world if the nuclear winter theory of Sagan and
others (Turco, R. P., O. B. Toon, T.P. Ackerman, J.B. Pollack, and
C. Sagan. "Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Nuclear Explosions."
TTAPS Report, Science, 23 December, 1983.) holds true.  President
Reagan's announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in
March 1983 signaled a fundamental change in this historical approach.
The promise of SDI was expressed by Lieutenant General Abrahamson,
director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO):
"The United States has set a goal --to achieve, through measures that
are defensive, as well as through arms control, deep reductions in
nuclear offensive forces" (Department of Defense.  The Strategic
Defense Initiative: Defensive Technologies Study, U.S. Government
Printing Office, April 1984.).  To achieve this goal, SDI must protect
allied people and military forces from offensive nuclear weapons
(Department of Defense.  Defense Against Ballistic Missiles: An Assessment
of Technologies and Policy Implications, U.S. Government Printing
Office, April, 1984.).  The first, ongoing step of this initiative
is to study defensive system technologies that could intercept
ballistic missiles and reentry vehicles.

     Once proven, these technologies could provide the basis for an
effective defense system that will --
o  Eliminate the ability of ballistic missiles to support preemtive
   nuclear strikes.
o  Create an environment conducive to negotiated force reductions
   by negating the value of ballistic nuclear missile forces.

     This paper reviews the historical evolution of offense and defense
and relates this to the current use of space for offensive nuclear
weapons.  From this perspective, the broad requirements for strategic
defense and the options for meeting these requirements are defined and
evaluated.  Though it is early to select an approach from the many
possibilities, the intent of this paper is to show that near-term
concepts of reasonable technical risk can fulfill the promise of SDI.

    [TO BE CONTINUED ---]
 
------------------------------

Date: Wed 8 May 85 01:01:27-EDT
From: Rob Austein <SRA@MIT-XX.ARPA>
Subject: unreliable information

Jeff,

Two things you have posted recently are bothering me.  One has already
been mentioned by a number of people (the zero sum game assumption), so
I won't elaborate on it since you will probably already have responded
to it by the time I get this.

The other one is from your comments on the low quality of information
available to the public (as opposed to the intel community).  I won't
argue with your assertion that what is available to the intel
community is superior; I had already come to the conclusion that the
general public doesn't really have access to much real information on
intel matters.  What bothers me is the what seems to be the
inescapable conclusion of your argument, namely, that since the
general public doesn't have access to real information, we should not
be forming opinions on these matters and should certainly not be
acting on these opinions.  I just don't see this as a viable
alternative.  I may well be reading something into your position that
you didn't put there; if so, please tell me where I am erring.

			--Rob <sra@mit-xx.arpa>

------------------------------

Date: Wed,  8 May 85 01:50:36 EST
From: Christopher C. Stacy <CSTACY@MIT-MC>
Subject:  KGB and Influence

    Date: Mon,  6 May 85 18:33:12 EST
    From: Herb Lin <LIN>

    Please give an example of "influence" that does NOT include selling
    secrets.

Often people don't start out selling secrets, but are worked up to it
gradually.  They start out making a seemingly hamrless mistake, and
then are intimidated (ie., their jobs threatened) into actual illegal
activities.  Probably Mr. Miller can come up with some better examples,
but here is a (rather simple and blatant) scenario which has
been used to directly subvert persons working in classified areas.

First, you are identified and targeted as a new operative.
Your security access, personal, professional, and finiancial
status is evaluated.  You are approached in a public social
setting, say at a bowling alley, by a friendly KGB agent
claiming to be a salseman of some kind. Acquaintances are made
and so forth.  You are talked into obtaining for the agent
some unclassified information (say, a list of people you work
with.)  While the initial and subsequent conversations are
going on, you are unknowingly photographed with the agent.

As time goes by, more unclassified information of various sorts is
obtained for the agent.  Sometimes you might even be paid or otherwise
compensated for the trouble he has gone to.  The agent starts asking
for sensitive unclassified material.  Eventually he works his way up
to asking for actually classified material.  Somewhere along the way
you realize (at least to some extent) what is going on, and objects.
When pressed, the agent explains that he is a KGB agent and that you
have been working for him, and that you are going to continue to do so
one last time.  He presents you with photos showing you and he
talking, you passing him (supposedly "classified") documents of some
sort or another, and possibly even being paid for your services.  
He threatens to expose your espionage activities to the authorities if
you don't do this last job.  You do the last job.  Now he's really got
you, and can use you any time he wants.  Probably regularly.  You may
possibly be reimbursed for your services.If you have been targeted 
for the long term, they may decide new job moves they wish you to make 
to get to the material they want. Etc.

------------------------------

Date: Wed,  8 May 85 06:25:51 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC>
Subject:  KGB and Influence
To: CSTACY@MIT-MC

Your example is a good one, and if I were KGB or CIA that is how I
would do it.  Still, it ultimately involves revealing secrets, and I
think most of us would agree that a person who does such things is
doing wrong things.  What I still don't understand one way or the
other is what "being influenced" means (as contrasted to being an
operative as I think you described).

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 8 May 85 14:05:04 EDT
From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1>
Subject: Soviet Intelligence

Dear Don,
     Just a couple of points on your letter in the last digest.
I don't know what to tell you about reconciling intel facts and 
what elected officials release. I would suggest that rather than 
expecting to be told intel secrets so as to select your leaders, 
( who decides what intel to divulge, and how much?), vote 
carefully for the leaders you trust the most to act responsibly 
with our state secrets.


     I'm not advocating that people shouldn't read works such as 
Cockburn's book, if you go back to my original comments on Jong's 
review, you will see that my objection is to the use of that work 
in criticizing defense policy. The conclusions in the book about 
Soviet weaknesses are based on some very superficial intelligence 
on Cockburn's part. I can't criticize the author for the quality 
of intelligence - I have a good idea of what is available to a 
civilian doing research - nor would I criticize conclusions 
written from a standpoint informing the reader that those 
conclusions are based solely on the scratched surface of intel on 
the Soviet military. I feel Cockburn goes too far. Even Suvarov 
conveys a hesitancy to make any major pronouncements about the 
strengths or weaknesses of the army he'd served.


     Also; regarding your comments on KGB:

     1) I personally use the yardstick that what is bad for the 
US is wrong. I read Morganthau and believe in the pragmatism of 
Realpolitik. We have to, because the USSR operates that way.

     2) The KGB doesn't care about your opinions, nor the 
opinions of any followers of any movements that they have seen 
fit to use. In a Democratic society, all opinions are valid. 
(Theoretically.) The aims of the KGB have little to do with the 
aspirations of the groups infiltrated. Their aims are to find 
ways to increase conflict between the groups and the target 
government, utilizing all means of "Active Measures" to escalate 
the conflict, alienate the public from the government, and 
pressure government officials to adopt policies shaped by public 
demand which was in turned shaped by manipulation.


     If you are an individual who espouses the beliefs of the 
freeze movement, I have no quarrel with you.
     If you are a member of a freeze group, I have no quarrel 
with you, but I would attempt to suggest you monitor well your 
membership.
     If you are a member of a freeze group and either refuse to 
believe that Soviet intelligence might use you to their own ends 
because your ego won't permit, or claim that KGB support and 
activities are OK as long as they help you, I'm an opponent.

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 8 May 85 14:54:06 EDT
From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1>
Subject: KGB

For Kevin Saunders - ( whose address as given proves indigestable 
                       to the system.)

     Sometimes I wish the intelligence services could waste taxpayers' money 
and create a full-time group to screen intelligence for purposes of release to 
the public.
     
     ( If you are personally affronted by "...this agents of influence 
twaddle", I suggest you contact the nearest Soviet embassy.  It was they who 
coined the phrase Agent of Influence, as well as Active Measures. We simply 
make use of the translation.)

     I suppose we could publish the information gleaned from known KGB 
operations in the US - there might be an argument in favor of compromising our 
own counterintelligence operations conducted when hostile collectors or agents 
are detected - just so that some comfortably ensconsed civilians, with nothing 
personally at stake, might have nice topics for discussion.
     The most insipid whining I hear comes from those who, from armchairs 
well-distanced from the sharp edge, bitch and moan that the nasty government 
has no right to deprive them of secrets, regardless of danger to lives or 
painstakingly constructed intelligence and counterintelligence programs.



        > If you feel I'm saying YOU are an "enemy agent" or disloyal
          because the KGB finds your pet cause useful...you don't read well.
        > If you are mad because someone points out that the KGB finds your 
          pet cause useful,......tough.
        > If you really believe the KGB uses any cause it "espouses" to 
          promote world peace...I'll know you've never had business with them.  


     By the way, note that I make no argument with your assessment of the 
military-industrial-government complex. I'm an intelligence professional. I 
try not to argue about those things I'm not qualified to argue about.

      



- J. MILLER

------------------------------

Date:  9 May 85 16:37 PDT
From: Tom Perrine <tom@LOGICON.ARPA>
Subject: References

Where are the State Dept Special Reports available from? How about the
House committee hearings minutes? Should I try my local library or
write to someplace in D.C. ?

Thanks,
Tom Perrine

------------------------------
[End of ARMS-D Digest]