arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (05/08/85)
From: Harold G. Ancell <HGA@MIT-MC> Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 29 Today's Topics: Intelligence More KGB ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: The Moderator Subject: Mail system progress and idea on Grenada Weapons mystery Things seem to be getting ironed out. I know I can't say "If you don't get this message send me mail...."; however, everyone should be receiving their copy. Please send me mail if there are any problems. A friend of mine pointed out a possiable reason for the Administration hiding the existance of the bulk of the weapons captured in Grenada. Perhaps they (the weapons) made their way to some group (such as the contras) that the Administration didn't want to openly supply with Made in U.S. weapons. - Harold ------------------------------ Date: Mon 6 May 85 12:29:29-CDT From: Don Stuart <ICS.STUART@UTEXAS-20.ARPA> Subject: Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V3 #27 I think Jeff Miller has missed Mr. Hoffman's point. I will grant that the reports generated by government analysts contain much better guesses than anything Cockburn or the rest of us could generate. Certainly the dribbles of information that reach us have often been altered to protect sources and so forth. The difficulty for us, as Miller seems to confirm, is that they have also been altered to fit the political needs of various groups within the government. I would like to believe that such alterations do not occur before reports reach policy makers, but I know that is not true. First, there is probably some fudging for internal purposes: Casey, the JCS and everybody else have their own agendas. Second, ultimately WE ARE the policy makers. I have to decide who to vote for, what ideas to support, in order to do my 1/200000000th share of running this country. Therefore I must take what I can get and try to remember that ALL of my sources of information are badly flawed. Miller also says: So the argument that goes: "so what if the KGB is influencing my cause as long as its right?" is empty because it fails to recognize that the KGB isn't helping fund and organize because it is concerned with peace or morality, but because it is a handy means to harm the US. Say what? This claim seems to rest on two assumtions: 1) Anything that is bad for the US is wrong. 2) The KGB is an infallible judge of what is bad for the US. The first is arguable, although I think not quite true. The second is nonsense. Perhaps we should be suspicious of anything the KGB approves of, but I am not about to give them a veto over my opinions. Don ------------------------------ Date: 3 May 1985 8:44:18 EDT (Friday) From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1> Subject: More KGB I must apologize I only get to these things as I can, and it dawned on me that I had not answered the question you raised about Active Measures in relation to groups or movements. Groups are penetrated by operatives intent on a. seeking to recruit Agents of Influence, and b.using the activities of that group to influence public opinion, influence government, disrupt normal functions of commerce and government, provoke reaction from police and other governmental organs, shape and direct where possible the ideology of the group as a whole, manage the public relations of the group (propaganda) such that the target government is always presented in the worst light, and the government of the Soviet Union is presented in only a favorable light. Soviet operatives usually become very popular within groups. By pretending to espouse shared beliefs the operative feeds the egos of individuals in the group. By providing guest supporters with impressive credentials, the group self-esteem is played upon. Very often the "distinguished physicist" or whatever is a KGB operative with no factual credentials whatsoever, posing as a whatever after extremely extensive coaching. When actual professionals are used, they are KGB personnel. Most popular of all are the funds that can be provided.... the KGB has access to funds that would bring tears to the eyes of a CIA spook. Penetration of groups is accomplished through myriad organizations, in existence already, or created especially for a given operation. Thus groups tend not to suspect that they are dealing with KGB. The KGB manages a veritable multinational conglomerate of peace, labor, social-welfare, and in typically ultra-cynical Soviet fashion, religious organizations. I mentioned one very active KGB organization in my sarcastic letter of a few days back; the World Peace Council. Established in 1950 as an anti-nuclear weapons group before the Soviets had developed viable nuclear weapons, it was expelled from France in 1951 for being an espionage base and from Vienna in 1957 for subversive activities. Later it quietly reopened a satellite in Vienna clled the International Institute for Peace. It is headed by Indian Communist Romesh Chandra, an operative of the KGB. In its 32 years, this * World * organization failed to make any comment on Soviet suppression of E. German workers in 1953, Hungarians in 1956, Soviet abrogation of the nuclear test moratorium in 1961, the installation of missiles in Cuba in 1962, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, or Afghanistan in 1979. It has *never* criticized a single Soviet armament program. This organization has developed a large sympathetic following in the US, to include the congressmen I named in the previous letter. It boasts 36 allied or otherwise sponsored organizations in the US. It has provided guest speakers like Dr. Radomir Bogdanov "of the Soviet Academy of Sciences", who has spoken at a luncheon in the House of Representatives during a WPC sponsored " Dialogue on Disarmament and Detente." He is Colonel Bogdanov of the 12th Department, with an unearned doctorate, whose name was placed as author on several works by real Russian scientists in order to construct his "legend". Other names familiar to attendees at freeze rallies are Yuri Kapralov and Georgi Arbatov - who may be familiar to watchers of ABC's "Nightline" on which he regularly appears to present the Soviet viewpoint as director of the "Institute for USA and Canada," operated by the International Department, KGB. Both are officers of the KGB. I would recommend reading of; Soviet Active Measures: An Update, Special report no.101, Bureau of Public Affairs, US State Department, July 1982 Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations, Soviet Active Measures, Special report no. 88, US State Department, October 1981 ( Both above include debrief exerpts of KGB defector Major Stanislov Levchenko ) House Permanent Subcommittee on Intelligence hearings; April 1978, February 1980, July 1982. * Example of Obvious Sign of Disinformation Influence : Australian physician Helen Caldicott who has no criticism of Soviet arms policies - in fact who has nothing but admiration for Soviet intentions - claims that the US is THE villain of the arms race. J. Miller ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 6 May 85 18:33:12 EST From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC> Subject: KGB and Influence [From J. Miller - Moderator] It must be understood that during development, the subject is not aware he is dealing with KGB. In most cases the operative either passes himself off as a private Soviet citizen with counterpart views, goals, beliefs, etc., or as a third country national. But then what does the subject do to give the KGB person leverage? A person with access to classified information shouldn't be talking to anyone, regardless of whether or not the person to whom he is talking is recognizable as a KGB agent. Often the Soviets try to combine the roles of Agents of Influence with espionage. This has brought them some successes that we know of, but also some disasters, since many people who would allow themselves to be blackmailed into influence draw the line at selling secrets. Please give an example of "influence" that does NOT include selling secrets. In your response, please refrain from using examples such as "voting against cruise missiles in Germany", since such positions can easily be justified on grounds *other* than being victims of KGB influence, (e.g., a member of the German Parliament might have thought that putting missiles at sea would have been more sensible). I am curious about your questions about the KGB and finding missing kids. Are you aware of something I'm not? I doubt it. I'm saying that Soviet support of a cause doesn't *necessarily* mean that the cause is one that Americans should not support. Point is this: It is not relevant to say "what's wrong if the Sov's pour money and support into (--- fill in the blank with any undeniably worthy cause---) if its a worthy cause?" because unless that cause can be worked to the Soviet's advantage, they won't use it. I guess this is my primary objection to your position: you assume a zero-sum game: if the Soviets want X, then X must be a bad thing for the US, for any X. I don't subscribe to this position, though I do welcome evidential challenges to it. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 6 May 85 18:52:06 EST From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC> Subject: More KGB [From J. Miller - Moderator] Groups are penetrated by operatives intent on a. seeking to recruit Agents of Influence, and b.using the activities of that group to influence public opinion, influence government, disrupt normal functions of commerce and government, provoke reaction from police and other governmental organs, shape and direct where possible the ideology of the group as a whole, manage the public relations of the group (propaganda) such that the target government is always presented in the worst light, and the government of the Soviet Union is presented in only a favorable light. Many people try to do some of these things (e.g., influence public opinion or government, and shape and direct where possible the ideology of groups with which they are associated). They also criticize (often severely) the U.S. government for doing things that are silly. Does this mean that they are potential agents of influence of the KGB? I doubt it. Harold Brown and James Schlesinger don't seem to me to qualify, though you may have information we don't have. Penetration of groups is accomplished through myriad organizations, in existence already, or created especially for a given operation. Thus groups tend not to suspect that they are dealing with KGB. The KGB manages a veritable multinational conglomerate of peace, labor, social-welfare, and in typically ultra-cynical Soviet fashion, religious organizations. My own bias is not to believe any group from the S.U. Thus, KGB association per se is irrelevant. ... the World Peace Council failed to make any comment on ... Soviet abrogation of the nuclear test moratorium in 1961.. I don't know enough on the other Soviet misdeeds you mention, but I do know about the so-called abrogation. In December 1960, before resumption of Soviet testing, the U.S. stated that it would no longer be bound by the moratorium. (This does not take away from your general point.) ...This organization has developed a large sympathetic following in the US, to include the congressmen I named in the previous letter. I follow with great interest a variety of "peace through disarmament" movements. I also follow with great interest a variety of "peace through strength" movements. Am I subject to "improper influence" or do I get to make up my own minds about things? (Or is it part of KGB "cleverness" that makes me believe the latter while the former is true?) Other names familiar to attendees at freeze rallies are Yuri Kapralov and Georgi Arbatov - who may be familiar to watchers of ABC's "Nightline" on which he regularly appears to present the Soviet viewpoint as director of the "Institute for USA and Canada," operated by the International Department, KGB. *Of course* these people would give the "official" Soviet line; why would anyone expect anything less? It isn't a whole lot different than Cap Weinberger or Ken Adelman going around and making speeches about US policy. Thanks for the references you gave us. * Example of Obvious Sign of Disinformation Influence : Australian physician Helen Caldicott who has no criticism of Soviet arms policies - in fact who has nothing but admiration for Soviet intentions - claims that the US is THE villain of the arms race. I'm afraid I agree with you here, at least to some extent. Certainly Caldicott is one-sided. An intellectually respectable argument can indeed be made that the US is the primary mover in the arms race, but she doesn't make it. (A different argument with the reverse conclusion, also intellectually respectable, is possible as well.) ------------------------------ [End of ARMS-D Digest]
arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (05/11/85)
From: The Arms-D Moderator (Harold G. Ancell) <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA> Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 29 Today's Topics: Background on SDI Unreliable Information KGB and Influence Agents Request for where to get State Dept Special Reports ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Note from Moderator: Pardon this late digest; MC was having problems last night. - Harold ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 6 May 85 13:06:20 pdt From: ihnp4!uw-beaver!ssc-vax!eder@Berkeley (Dani Eder) Subject: Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V3 #27 In order to provide the net with some information on SDI, I submit herewith a presentation made to the Royal Aeronautical Society, New Zealand Division, Christchurch, New Zealand, 8 March 1985, by Peter Downey, who was then Director of Preliminary Design, Research and Engineering Division, Boeing Aerospace Company. Preliminary Design is where SDI work is being done at Boeing. The words are Mr. Downey's. My own opinions do not necessarily agree. [My comments will appear in brackets such as these]. -------------------------------------------------------------------- The Strategic Defense Initiative and Space Peter Downey March 8, 1985 The historical approach to strategic nuclear warfare has been to develop larger numbers of more sophisticated offensive weapons. The awesome destructiveness of even a small percentage of these weapons could ruin the whole world if the nuclear winter theory of Sagan and others (Turco, R. P., O. B. Toon, T.P. Ackerman, J.B. Pollack, and C. Sagan. "Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Nuclear Explosions." TTAPS Report, Science, 23 December, 1983.) holds true. President Reagan's announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in March 1983 signaled a fundamental change in this historical approach. The promise of SDI was expressed by Lieutenant General Abrahamson, director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO): "The United States has set a goal --to achieve, through measures that are defensive, as well as through arms control, deep reductions in nuclear offensive forces" (Department of Defense. The Strategic Defense Initiative: Defensive Technologies Study, U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1984.). To achieve this goal, SDI must protect allied people and military forces from offensive nuclear weapons (Department of Defense. Defense Against Ballistic Missiles: An Assessment of Technologies and Policy Implications, U.S. Government Printing Office, April, 1984.). The first, ongoing step of this initiative is to study defensive system technologies that could intercept ballistic missiles and reentry vehicles. Once proven, these technologies could provide the basis for an effective defense system that will -- o Eliminate the ability of ballistic missiles to support preemtive nuclear strikes. o Create an environment conducive to negotiated force reductions by negating the value of ballistic nuclear missile forces. This paper reviews the historical evolution of offense and defense and relates this to the current use of space for offensive nuclear weapons. From this perspective, the broad requirements for strategic defense and the options for meeting these requirements are defined and evaluated. Though it is early to select an approach from the many possibilities, the intent of this paper is to show that near-term concepts of reasonable technical risk can fulfill the promise of SDI. [TO BE CONTINUED ---] ------------------------------ Date: Wed 8 May 85 01:01:27-EDT From: Rob Austein <SRA@MIT-XX.ARPA> Subject: unreliable information Jeff, Two things you have posted recently are bothering me. One has already been mentioned by a number of people (the zero sum game assumption), so I won't elaborate on it since you will probably already have responded to it by the time I get this. The other one is from your comments on the low quality of information available to the public (as opposed to the intel community). I won't argue with your assertion that what is available to the intel community is superior; I had already come to the conclusion that the general public doesn't really have access to much real information on intel matters. What bothers me is the what seems to be the inescapable conclusion of your argument, namely, that since the general public doesn't have access to real information, we should not be forming opinions on these matters and should certainly not be acting on these opinions. I just don't see this as a viable alternative. I may well be reading something into your position that you didn't put there; if so, please tell me where I am erring. --Rob <sra@mit-xx.arpa> ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 8 May 85 01:50:36 EST From: Christopher C. Stacy <CSTACY@MIT-MC> Subject: KGB and Influence Date: Mon, 6 May 85 18:33:12 EST From: Herb Lin <LIN> Please give an example of "influence" that does NOT include selling secrets. Often people don't start out selling secrets, but are worked up to it gradually. They start out making a seemingly hamrless mistake, and then are intimidated (ie., their jobs threatened) into actual illegal activities. Probably Mr. Miller can come up with some better examples, but here is a (rather simple and blatant) scenario which has been used to directly subvert persons working in classified areas. First, you are identified and targeted as a new operative. Your security access, personal, professional, and finiancial status is evaluated. You are approached in a public social setting, say at a bowling alley, by a friendly KGB agent claiming to be a salseman of some kind. Acquaintances are made and so forth. You are talked into obtaining for the agent some unclassified information (say, a list of people you work with.) While the initial and subsequent conversations are going on, you are unknowingly photographed with the agent. As time goes by, more unclassified information of various sorts is obtained for the agent. Sometimes you might even be paid or otherwise compensated for the trouble he has gone to. The agent starts asking for sensitive unclassified material. Eventually he works his way up to asking for actually classified material. Somewhere along the way you realize (at least to some extent) what is going on, and objects. When pressed, the agent explains that he is a KGB agent and that you have been working for him, and that you are going to continue to do so one last time. He presents you with photos showing you and he talking, you passing him (supposedly "classified") documents of some sort or another, and possibly even being paid for your services. He threatens to expose your espionage activities to the authorities if you don't do this last job. You do the last job. Now he's really got you, and can use you any time he wants. Probably regularly. You may possibly be reimbursed for your services.If you have been targeted for the long term, they may decide new job moves they wish you to make to get to the material they want. Etc. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 8 May 85 06:25:51 EST From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC> Subject: KGB and Influence To: CSTACY@MIT-MC Your example is a good one, and if I were KGB or CIA that is how I would do it. Still, it ultimately involves revealing secrets, and I think most of us would agree that a person who does such things is doing wrong things. What I still don't understand one way or the other is what "being influenced" means (as contrasted to being an operative as I think you described). ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 8 May 85 14:05:04 EDT From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1> Subject: Soviet Intelligence Dear Don, Just a couple of points on your letter in the last digest. I don't know what to tell you about reconciling intel facts and what elected officials release. I would suggest that rather than expecting to be told intel secrets so as to select your leaders, ( who decides what intel to divulge, and how much?), vote carefully for the leaders you trust the most to act responsibly with our state secrets. I'm not advocating that people shouldn't read works such as Cockburn's book, if you go back to my original comments on Jong's review, you will see that my objection is to the use of that work in criticizing defense policy. The conclusions in the book about Soviet weaknesses are based on some very superficial intelligence on Cockburn's part. I can't criticize the author for the quality of intelligence - I have a good idea of what is available to a civilian doing research - nor would I criticize conclusions written from a standpoint informing the reader that those conclusions are based solely on the scratched surface of intel on the Soviet military. I feel Cockburn goes too far. Even Suvarov conveys a hesitancy to make any major pronouncements about the strengths or weaknesses of the army he'd served. Also; regarding your comments on KGB: 1) I personally use the yardstick that what is bad for the US is wrong. I read Morganthau and believe in the pragmatism of Realpolitik. We have to, because the USSR operates that way. 2) The KGB doesn't care about your opinions, nor the opinions of any followers of any movements that they have seen fit to use. In a Democratic society, all opinions are valid. (Theoretically.) The aims of the KGB have little to do with the aspirations of the groups infiltrated. Their aims are to find ways to increase conflict between the groups and the target government, utilizing all means of "Active Measures" to escalate the conflict, alienate the public from the government, and pressure government officials to adopt policies shaped by public demand which was in turned shaped by manipulation. If you are an individual who espouses the beliefs of the freeze movement, I have no quarrel with you. If you are a member of a freeze group, I have no quarrel with you, but I would attempt to suggest you monitor well your membership. If you are a member of a freeze group and either refuse to believe that Soviet intelligence might use you to their own ends because your ego won't permit, or claim that KGB support and activities are OK as long as they help you, I'm an opponent. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 8 May 85 14:54:06 EDT From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1> Subject: KGB For Kevin Saunders - ( whose address as given proves indigestable to the system.) Sometimes I wish the intelligence services could waste taxpayers' money and create a full-time group to screen intelligence for purposes of release to the public. ( If you are personally affronted by "...this agents of influence twaddle", I suggest you contact the nearest Soviet embassy. It was they who coined the phrase Agent of Influence, as well as Active Measures. We simply make use of the translation.) I suppose we could publish the information gleaned from known KGB operations in the US - there might be an argument in favor of compromising our own counterintelligence operations conducted when hostile collectors or agents are detected - just so that some comfortably ensconsed civilians, with nothing personally at stake, might have nice topics for discussion. The most insipid whining I hear comes from those who, from armchairs well-distanced from the sharp edge, bitch and moan that the nasty government has no right to deprive them of secrets, regardless of danger to lives or painstakingly constructed intelligence and counterintelligence programs. > If you feel I'm saying YOU are an "enemy agent" or disloyal because the KGB finds your pet cause useful...you don't read well. > If you are mad because someone points out that the KGB finds your pet cause useful,......tough. > If you really believe the KGB uses any cause it "espouses" to promote world peace...I'll know you've never had business with them. By the way, note that I make no argument with your assessment of the military-industrial-government complex. I'm an intelligence professional. I try not to argue about those things I'm not qualified to argue about. - J. MILLER ------------------------------ Date: 9 May 85 16:37 PDT From: Tom Perrine <tom@LOGICON.ARPA> Subject: References Where are the State Dept Special Reports available from? How about the House committee hearings minutes? Should I try my local library or write to someplace in D.C. ? Thanks, Tom Perrine ------------------------------ [End of ARMS-D Digest]