arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (05/18/85)
From: The Arms-D Moderator (Harold Ancell) <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 34
Today's Topics:
More KGB and South Africa
Intelligence and Cockburn
DEFCONs Query
Desirability of Neutron Weapons
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Date: Fri, 17 May 1985 01:09 EDT
From: CM.UROP.LEE%MIT-OZ@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject:
I think we could rightly surmise that if the KGB were indeed as
formidably, especially in influencing others, as Mr. Miller supposes
that the U.S. would be in considerably worse shape than it is. Of
course my main supposition is that the KGB heads are not stupid, as
most people have essentially assumed. Miller has taken the quite firm
stand that everything that the SU supports, it does so for strictly
nationalistic or communistic objectives (such as subverting the rest
of the world or some other such idea). While this is certainly
debatable and may be true in some limited sense, it hardly means we
should simply oppose all of their actions. The KGB must definitely be
based on some feedback loop, albeit degenerate if it parallels the
CIA. However, it should be able to realize that if actions that it
wants and thus supports are opposed by the US simply because the Su
supports them, then they should simply oppose them also. This has
some obvious advantages aside from accomplishing the SU original goals
since the CIA spends all of its time trying to figure out what is
really wrong with the activity that the KGB supports. Furthermore,
this alienates the CIA from those clear thinking people around the
world who simply take a stand on an issue based on reasonable
arguments instead of examining whether the SU opposes them or not.
Later, when this approach fails as it will eventually, the KGB can
simply go back to opposing the original event.
Although this scenerio is simplistic, it proves one major point:
either opposing or supporting an issue simply because the SU does the
same or opposite is not only a poor judgement but is the best thing
that the KGB can hope for. Furtherfore, classified information tends
to exacerbate the situation. As usual, both organizations are only as
persuasive as people think they are. And then there are the
intelligence officers whose job it is not to analyze the situations
but to try to figure out what the other side is doing and visa-versa.
Well, I guess it beats unemployment.
lee
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Date: Fri, 17 May 85 9:37:30 EDT
From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1>
Subject: Disinformation
Reference Mike Kelly's message on Helen Caldicott :
If a story appeared in the news tomorrow that the KGB had succeeded in
penetrating the military, either with their own personnel or suborned US
personnel, I'm sure Mr Kelly would be among the vanguard in calling for
reform, resignations and general major housecleaning in Defense. I somehow
doubt that he could rationalize that the subjects concerned be left alone
since we live in a democracy.
I wonder if he would assume, given such a penetration, that everybody
in the defense establishment is an enemy agent.
He seems to feel, martyrlike, that charges of KGB infiltration of the
freeze are to be interpreted as accusations against the loyalty of the
movement's collective membership. KGB is not a wastrel bunch. They always
attempt to suborn only important individuals. I therefore have no doubts
about Mr Kelly's unblemished status.
> "J. Miller implies that Helen Caldicott is a Soviet dupe ( or worse )"
I'm fascinated by the number of respondents who love the word "dupe." My
only two observations on the use of this McCarthyite term are; I've never used
it, some seem to love to drape themselves with it as if to say: "I stand
before the world, slandered!"
Since I never used the term, Mr Kelly's opening sentence is no more than
intellectual whimpering. I did say some things about Caldicott's heavily one-
sided media blitz against US defense policy. If she is not in any way
connected with KGB, then I say "Congratulations KGB - no need to spend any
time ,effort or money - you can't possibly get better service."
The only thing I admire about the KGB is their ability to accomplish
their mission of serving the USSR's strategic interests with the support of
their own poulace as well as large segments of their targets' populaces. I'm
jealous. I would rather emulate an enemy's tactics to defeat him then sit back
and accomodate him, philosophizing about how that is the "democratic thing to
do."
By the way, KGB penetration of the Freeze has already been proven, so I
do hope I have Mr Kelly's permission to climb up out of Hell, leaving behind
Hitler, Stalin and all the other "enemies of democracy" whose ranks swell, I
suppose, every time someone questions the Holy Rites of Freeze.
J. Miller
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Date: Fri, 17 May 85 10:00:15 EDT
From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1>
Subject: More South Africa
Reference Anonymous message 16 May
from ihnp4!mgnetp!ltuxa!ttrdc!mjk@Berkeley
regarding S. Africa discussions:
Regarding your in-depth, informative comments, please share with us
whatever information you have pertaining to threats against black US citizens,
here in the US, originating from South Africa. I had no information about
threats posed by SA *to the US* when I said I *as a US citizen* felt no threat
from SA. Obviously your response was based on objective data concerning SA
operations against the US.
.....or could it be you just responded without reading carefully?
J. MILLER
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Date: Fri, 17 May 85 11:08:41 EDT
From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1>
Subject: Intelligence and Cockburn
Mr Stuart:
If you were to look way back in the archives, you would see that the
furor over Cockburn did indeed have much to do with the question of the
strengths and vulnerabilities of the Soviet army. The purpose behind comments
on quality of intelligence were specifically to point out that the
intelligence community is very aware of of inherent Soviet weaknesses, but
that many of those weaknesses are offset by other known factors. Cockburn
merely scratches the surface and then pronounces the Soviet military as
conclusively weaker than our defenses warrant.
If you look at our position in C. Europe, you would think that the WP
edge of roughly 3:1 in armor and only about 1.8:1 in manpower would not be too
threatening, given traditional Soviet inefficiency, poor maintenance, training
and c3i. Their Pact allies are questionable, although popular conceptions that
they might actually switch sides are far off-mark.
But the battle will not be fought using only those forces lined up to
start. Firstly, the WP allies will be most heavily used in First Echelon
attacks. Their effectiveness will not be a major factor as their main purpose
is to engage NATO and inflict the maximum casualties before becoming combat-
ineffective, whereupon they will be followed up by Soviet Echelons. If we are
assuming it is they who will invade, the problem is that only they will know
precisely where they will do it. They can mass their forces for breakthrough
while NATO must cover all bases. They will only be a few hundred miles from
their bases of logistics, with LOCs covered by theater air superiority. The
forces they can bring in from the Western military districts of the USSR will
drive the ratios even more unbalanced. Nato will depend on the REFORGER
concept to get US forces into theater, as well as long exposed trans Atlantic
air and sea lanes for logistics. As fast and violent as this battle is likely
to be, the time factor involved in getting significant US personnel or
materiel to Europe, organized and deployed, will be a problem. The factors of
mass and reinforcement are the greatest threat from the Soviets to NATO.
Numbers still count for something. The Soviets are not Egyptians or
Syrians. They will execute their battle plans effectively within their
limitations. Obsolete armor will still kill supermodern armor when used in
overwhelming numbers - even if they lose 3-4 tanks to kill every one of
NATO's. The Soviet military leadership is willing to take such losses.
I recommend Suvarov's "Inside The Soviet Army" for a taste of strengths
and weaknesses in context. He describes amazing problems in the Soviet
military, but warns that those weaknesses do not offset the leadership's
obsession with building military strength, the combat potential of their
forces, or of the imposed attitude of leadership, party, army and people
toward the " Glavniy Vrag "- the Main Enemy, the US.
------------------------------
Date: 17 May 85 11:07:05 EDT
From: Hank.Walker@CMU-CS-UNH
Subject: DEFCONs
I'm getting slightly confused about the correct DEFCON sequence. There was
a recent movie called DEFCON 4, implying 4 was war. So does a post
yesterday. WarGames used DEFCON 1 as war. In Henry Kissinger's books, the
1973 worldwide alert was a DEFCON 3, and that the US has never been to
DEFCON 2, implying that DEFCON 1 was war. Any military types out there want
to clarify this?
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 17 May 85 09:12:06 PDT
From: Richard Foy <foy@AEROSPACE.ARPA>
Subject: Accusations
The recent discussions relating to people being dupes of the KGB makes me
wonder how close we are to the days of HUAC, the Joe MaCarthy days when
people were blacklisted and worse for no valid reason. I for one don't
relish thatidea.
------------------------------
Date: 17 May 85 13:19:56 CDT (Fri)
From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@Berkeley
Subject: desirability of neutron weapons
> How will the soldiers know? I can think of two ways: either their
> officers tell them, or they each wear film badges. The first system is
> more likely to produce mutiny than kamikazes. The second system might work,
> but it would require a lot of indoctrination to convince a soldier that
> once the film turns black, he is dead. This sort of training is bad for
> morale. Would the Soviets provide it?
Actually, film badges must be developed before yielding meaningful results,
some fiction to the contrary. They are after-the-fact measurement devices
only, not practical warning devices. I'd be very surprised to see Soviet
soldiers equipped with them. On the other hand, it is not beyond the
bounds of possibility that Soviet *tanks* have real-time radiation-warning
equipment, if for no other reason than that operation in a high-fallout
environment requires precautions that are a serious hindrance elsewhere.
Anybody know for sure?
Another possibility is that Soviet soldiers who are aware of the existence
of radiation weapons might consider *any* nearby nuclear airburst a probable
neutron weapon. It's not necessary that they *actually* be dying, just
that they think they are.
> What will they do once they find out? ...
> ... Polish units might even change sides.
I doubt very much that they would side *with* the people who've just killed
them! An independent attack *against* nearby Soviet forces is not out of
the question, however. It's not (quite) the same thing.
> Would a kamikaze armored unit be especially effective? Good question.
> Anyone got an answer?
As you pointed out, it's a little hard to say for sure. One (imperfect)
analogy that offers some guidance can be found in WW2 (speaking of
kamikazes...). The average Japanese soldier of the time -- and most
especially the officers -- thoroughly believed that surrender was too
disgraceful to be a realistic option; better to die fighting. So
Japanese soldiers trapped in a hopeless situation tended to consider
death inevitable. Their usual response was to kill as many enemies as
possible first. They did not usually commit suicide, although this
was (to some degree) an honorable recourse in a hopeless situation. The
overall result was that they made very nasty opponents.
I believe there is some small history of roughly-similar behavior from
Western soldiers, when facing conditions where surrender is clearly a
bad idea, although I'm not certain of this.
Whether this carries over to Soviet soldiers who believe that death
is inevitable, is a very good question. Most non-ethnic Soviet soldiers
will believe they are fighting for the survival of Mother Russia, not
for the greater glory of Communism. How will they respond? This issue
is too important to be ignored, yet I have seen no serious study of it.
Does anyone know whether the issue *has* been studied?
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
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[End of ARMS-D Digest]