arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (05/23/85)
From: The Arms-D Moderator (Harold Ancell) <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 38
Today's Topics:
Helicopter vs Helicopter
South Africa
Neutron bombs and nuclear winter
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Date: Wed, 22 May 85 07:52:07 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC>
Subject: Helicopter vs Helicopter
From: rrd at Mitre-Bedford
It turns
out that in a one-on-one situation (at least), and if the helo is
aware that he is about to get bounced, the helo can make a fool of the
FW - or worse - even if he is unarmed.
Interesting. What kind of armament is assumed for the FW plane? It
seems that an IR missile would make pretty short work of a chopper. I
can see it with guns though.
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Date: Wed, 22 May 85 12:59:46 EDT
From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1>
Subject: Helos
Dear Mr Barron,
Your recent contribution to the digest reminded me that I've been remiss
in thanking you for your information.
Herb Lin suggested reviewing back issues of International Defense Review,
and as my office keeps a fair archive of quite a few such publications I have
been digging around, but although I've found quite a bit on helicopter
materiel and doctrine, precious little treats the air-to-air role.
About the best I've found is in Interavia 5-85, " Helicopters prepare for
air combat" by Mark Lambert. It is relatively brief, and seems to suggest that
the USMC may be in the lead among US services dealing in this area.
Interestingly enough, the May issue of Journal of Defense & Diplomacy, while
devoted heavily to rotor wing aviation, makes no mention of this developing
tactical field.
The Soviets seem to have taken an essentially All-American innovation,
airmobile and general tac-helicopter warfare, to heart, and are putting great
emphasis on all aspects of it. They have found that the helicopter fits nicely
into their concept of the violent, deep attack by OMG, and of mass attack by
echelon. They see the helicopter, among other roles, as a means of achieving
ground support air superiority while relieving supersonic aircraft to be used
for other purposes. Their concept of heavy involvement of helicopters over the
battlefield forsees largescale contact with Allied helos. It is believed that
their Mi-28 HAVOC may be the first production combat helicopter designed with
the helo-vs-helo capability as a primary function.
J.Miller
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Date: Wednesday, 22 May 1985 19:20-EDT
From: rrd@Mitre-Bedford
Subject: Helicopter vs Helicopter
In response to both Schauble and LIN.
The first problem the fixed wing has is acquiring the helo, first visually
and then with his fire control system. (I should have said that the helo
is flying at low altitude.) This is not as easy as it sounds. The Jolly
driver from Kirtland had some F-4 and F-15 gun camera film of those
aircraft attempting to keep the pipper on an H-53 (in a dark suit) against
a snow background - the sun was shining. The H-53 was not taking evasive
action, yet the aircraft could not keep the pipper on target long enough
for the pilot to react and fire his guns. I take that back - on one
pass the fixed wing had the pipper on the "target" for about 0.1sec, but
then the film showed that he had acquired the shadow of the helo.
Helo tactics when the helo discovers that a fixed wing is up to no good -
in a ONE-ON-ONE situation. The helo turns into the fixed wing and accelerates.
This causes the fixed wing to keep bumping his nose over to try to
get and keep his sight on the helo. If he is not careful, that forest
down there becomes TREES!!! At that point, the tendency of most pilots
is to forget the helo.
Fixed wing weapons. Guns used in strafing attack seem to be the best choice.
The IR background of the earth is sufficient, it seems, to deny the
effective use of an IR seeker against a low flying helo. The same is
true of trying to get a radar lock-on for an AIM-7 engagement.
When there are more than one fixed wing attempting to engage a helo, things
begin to get a bit more dicey. On the other hand, if we add some flares,
missiles, and guns to the helo's bag of tricks...
Regards,
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Date: Wed, 22 May 85 9:26:39 EDT
From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1>
Subject: South Africa
In reply to: Andrew Knutsen, Danger from South Africa ( Response to J.Miller )
21 May 85
Mr Knutsen;
I am not totally sure I understand your response on South Africa,
although I think I know what you are saying and agree with you.
I would just like to say that I put out the question; can we discuss the
issue of the strategic value of SA to the West in coldly objective terms, from
the standpoint that a nation sometimes has to do things that don't square 100%
with its values in a simplistic sense?
It would seem we can't. And that is understandable.
The message you are responding to must be understood in context, for that
you must review the message I in turn was responding to. Someone had earlier
departed from rational discussion and stated that since I had chosen to raise
this point on the basis of Realpolitik, I probably would have been Pro-Nazi in
WWII. Instead of ignoring this as a typical unscrupulous device where logical
argument failed, I chose to respond by pointing out that Realpolitik would
have dictated far earlier opposition to Germany due to the danger posed to
the US by Nazi policies of militarism and expansionism. I then made the
comment that SA poses no threat to US security or strategic interests,*now*.
( Remember, I hold the admittedly debateable opinion that a majority regime
could potentially be anti-US and therefore endanger US interests.)
This engendered a reponse with no supporting discussion, in fact, a one
liner, if I recall, saying only: " Obviously you aren't black."
Now I can think of several discussions where this pithy little zinger of
a comeback would have made a point. In this context, however it was ignorant.
Thus, my comments, directed solely at that respondent, on the threat from
South Africa.
I am not a fan of the current regime, nor do I in any way support the
concept of apartheid. I am saying, just as I said in my evaluation of the
threat, if any, posed by SA to the US, I believe that sometimes one must see
the security of the US as the paramount interest, even when that interest
conflicts with moral interests. Remember, Churchill detested nobody more than
the Soviets, yet told Parliament, upon finding himself allied with Stalin;
" If Hitler invaded Hell, I would at least make a favorable mention of the
Devil in the Commons."
You don't need to lecture me about the suffering of the blacks at the
hands of the SA government and social system. I am aware of it, and share your
revulsion. I am suggesting study of strategic questions with a separation of
the moral from the practical. Some can do that, others can't. I do not suggest
superiority in either form.
J.Miller
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Date: Wed, 22 May 85 11:53:06 pdt
From: knutsen@sri-unix (Andrew Knutsen)
Subject: South Africa
To: J.Miller and the Arms-D Moderator
Unfortunately the "To:" header line of my message was removed,
and since the subject didnt give much information either it wasnt
clear which message I was replying to. I had meant to suggest to the
person who said you were "smug" because you seemed unsympathetic
to the situation in SA that there are often good reasons for putting
emotion aside.
There is a difference between emotion and morality, and too much
of either at the expense of the other is dangerous. On the other hand,
too much seperation of the moral from the practical (as you put it) can
also be dangerous and short-sighted.
My feeling is that in SA, as any other international situation,
we should act carefully and in such a way as not to antagonize either
party. Perhaps there is an analog with our own country in the middle
of the last century... Have we learned anything?
Andrew Knutsen
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Date: Wed, 22 May 85 04:30:29 pdt
From: rimey@Berkeley (Ken Rimey)
Subject: Neutron bombs and nuclear winter
> From: <decvax!watmath!looking!brad@Berkeley>
> Subject: Nuclear Winter and the neutron bomb
>
> It seems to me that even if the superpowers became convinced of this,
> all that would result is a strategy change involving the use of neutron
> bombs on cities instead of regular H-bombs. Neutron bombs disable the
> city and destroy the industrial base without causing a major firestorm,
> from what I have heard. (When I say destroy the industrial base, I mean
> make it unusable)
Except for its ability to kill people who are shielded from other blast
effects by say a tank, I don't see how a neutron bomb is much different
from an ordinary nuclear bomb of similar explosive power. (This
hypothetical ordinary bomb is smaller than those found on ICBMs.)
Whether a bomb is designed to produce lots of fast neutrons certainly has
no bearing on whether it will start fires. Whether any bomb will start
a firestorm, who can say?
Knocking down factories makes them unusable. The neutrons won't carry
THAT much momentum. :) Correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't think they
will induce an important amount of radioactivity.
I don't mean to address whether small bombs and careful targeting could
wipe out industry without causing nuclear winter. I suggest only that
neutron bombs are not relevant.
Ken Rimey
rimey@ucbvax
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[End of ARMS-D Digest]