arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (05/24/85)
From: The Arms-D Moderator (Harold Ancell) <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 39
Today's Topics:
Confession
South Africa
ERWs
Moral vs. Practical
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Date: Wed, 22 May 85 16:02:01 EDT
From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1>
Subject: Confession
Reference responses on South Africa -
I must confess a bit of Devil's advocacy. I cannot honestly claim to be a
pure Realpolitikal purist as I have said; the argument which can be made that
an overwhelming imbalance in terms of US strategic and economic interests
should cause the US to side with Arab states against Israel has not influenced
my support of the Israelis. My motive is indeed moral as opposed to practical,
i.e. support for the only democracy in the Near East.
I stand exposed.
J.Miller
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Date: 23 May 85 02:52:04 EDT
From: Hank.Walker@CMU-CS-UNH
Subject: South Africa
The discussion of South Africa has not clearly distinguished between
optimizing short-term and long-term interests. Clearly, in the short term,
it is in our strategic self-interest to support the current regime, if only
because alternatives are unknowns. Supporting the current regime is clearly
NOT in our long-term self-interest. This assumes that the current regime
can't last, and that the longer it lasts, the more anti-US a majority
government will be. I also assume that a change in the near future will
afford a reasonable chance for a pro-US government. Would those that
disagree with the above please discuss why supporting the current South
African government is in our long-term strategic interests.
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Date: Thu, 23 May 85 10:36:42 EDT
From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1>
Subject: ERWs
Someone recently tried to argue that the ERW's effectiveness against
WP [Warsaw Pact - Mod.] armor could be easily defeated by the
attackers by spreading their armor formations out. Scott Renner's
reply that such dispersion would be exactly what the NATO commanders
would wish for was right on target. The WP's best chances rest with
the principle of mass. When massed, their numbers and willingness to
accept horrible casualty rates can overcome NATO AT defenses.
Splintered, they are severely disadvantaged by superior Western ATGWs.
The Soviet leadership was faced with the likelihood that they would
have to drastically rethink their offensive concepts. Their ensuing
Active Measures campaign suceeded in warping rational debate in the
West into a disinformation/propaganda victory whereby westerners
convinced themselves that a weapon which destroyed people but left
property alone (how capitalist!) was somehow more evil than existing
nuclear weapons.
It could be argued that ERW's primary AT capability would have lain
with the threat of use, as opposed to actual employment, in causing
enemy forces to forgo tactics of mass. Personally, I believe the use
of the weapon would trigger a violent NBC retaliation by a frustrated
enemy.
There is a lot to be said for deterrence.
If my neighbor is a hoodlum, and I had reason to believe he earnestly
wanted to come over and beat the !@$$#! out of me, I might buy a
shotgun. I might never intend on shooting him, but the conspicuous
presence of the shotgun would probably cause him to modify his
intentions.
J.Miller
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Date: Thu, 23 May 85 14:57:50 PDT
From: Charlie Crummer <crummer@AEROSPACE.ARPA>
Subject: Moral vs. Practical
> From J. Miller
> In reply to: Andrew Knutsen, Danger from South Africa ( Response to J.
> Miller )
> 21 May 85
> Mr Knutsen;
> I am not totally sure I understand your response on South Africa,
> although I think I know what you are saying and agree with you.
> I would just like to say that I put out the question; can we discuss the
> issue of the strategic value of SA to the West in coldly objective terms,
> from the standpoint that a nation sometimes has to do things that don't
> square 100% with its values in a simplistic sense?
I am curious. Are you questioning whether or not such a discussion is
possible from a philosophical point of view, whether or not Mr.
Knutsen will agree to such a discussion, or whether you think it is possible
for Mr. Knutsen to be "coldly objective"? One who considers himself to
be "coldly objective" is in danger of having this naive view exploited by
a pragmatic realist. It is naive, e.g., to think that the point of view
from which you are "coldly objective" is the ONLY one or the RIGHT one.
For example, our tacticians in Vietnam were being "coldly objective" in
their battle decisions but since the VC were not playing the same game
they, the VC, were able to win.
>
> It would seem we can't. And that is understandable.
> ... Realpolitik would
> have dictated far earlier opposition to Germany due to the danger posed to
> the US by Nazi policies of militarism and expansionism.
That these were the policies was a matter of opinion in the early '30s.
Some would have said that the policies were the economic recovery of
Germany and the reunification of the German-speaking peoples. Which was
the REAL Realpolitik?
> I then made the
> comment that SA poses no threat to US security or strategic interests,*now*.
> (Remember, I hold the admittedly debateable opinion that a majority regime
> could potentially be anti-US and therefore endanger US interests.)
Whether a majority regime would be hostile to the US is a matter that the
US has some power over. Realpolitik would suggest that white minority
rule in SA has its days numbered and we had better figure out how to
deal with that reality rather than dream about returning to some past
golden empirical age.
> ... I believe that sometimes one must see
> the security of the US as the paramount interest, even when that interest
> conflicts with moral interests.
Platonic moral interests, e.g. the golden rule, etc., are integral with
the long-term security interests of any nation. Nations that have failed to
recognize this have experienced erosion of both.
> Remember, Churchill detested nobody more
> than the Soviets, yet told Parliament, upon finding himself allied with
> Stalin, "If Hitler invaded Hell, I would at least make a favorable mention
> of the Devil in the Commons."
Of course, this was a statement about Churchill's view of Hitler, not a
statement of Realpolitik.
> I am suggesting study of strategic questions with a separation of
> the moral from the practical. Some can do that, others can't. I do not
> suggest superiority in either form.
> J.Miller
Have you really convinced yourself that it is possible to separate moral
from "practical" considerations? Would you say that we lost the Vietnam
war because of an excess of moral considerations or a lack of good practical
judgment? (Part of the Real World is that under our form of government
we do not win wars without the support of the American people.)
> ------------------------------
> Date: Wed, 22 May 85 11:53:06 pdt
> From: knutsen@sri-unix (Andrew Knutsen)
> Subject: South Africa
> To: J.Miller and the Arms-D Moderator
> ... I had meant to suggest to the
> person who said you were "smug" because you seemed unsympathetic
> to the situation in SA that there are often good reasons for putting
> emotion aside.
Is it really possible for a human to put aside his emotions and still
act? The difference between opinion and decision is action and action
does not happen without some emotion.
> There is a difference between emotion and morality, and too much
> of either at the expense of the other is dangerous.
Please explain what you mean by "emotion" and "morality".
> On the other hand,
> too much separation of the moral from the practical (as you put it) can
> also be dangerous and short-sighted.
I agree.
> My feeling is that in SA, as any other international situation,
> we should act carefully and in such a way as not to antagonize either
> party. Perhaps there is an analog with our own country in the middle
> of the last century... Have we learned anything?
> Andrew Knutsen
--Charlie
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[End of ARMS-D Digest]