arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (07/02/85)
From: The Arms-D Moderator (Harold Ancell) <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 53
Today's Topics:
Conventional Terrorism
SDI Software etc.
Krytrons
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 25 Jun 85 20:25:53 PDT
From: Richard K. Jennings <jennings@AEROSPACE.ARPA>
Subject: Herb Lin "Pre-empting Terrorism"
How far are we prepared to go pre-empting terrorism? Should
we assume that hostages held by terrorists are already 'dead' and say
target any airport where a hijacked airliner lands with an ICBM?
From what I understand of the terrorist problem this policy
would probably break the cycle just as Hiroshima convinced governments
to find better ways to solve their problems. Terrorists rely on
sympathy from some quarter. Targeting havens would couple a cost to
this sympathy which would, I think, remove it.
Such a policy would probably have to be executed at least once.
Rich.
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 85 07:54:50 pdt
From: alice!wolit@Berkeley
Subject: J. Miller on Terrorism
First of all, the use of terms like "terrorists" to describe only
one side in this situation is more than a bit gratuitous. How is it
that lobbing 2300-pound shells into residential areas (as we did
several months ago from the battleship New Jersey) is "civilized",
while single-handed assaults on heavily-fortified military
installations (like the car bombing of the Marine barracks) is
"cowardly" and a "terrorist" act? If the use of violence to achieve
one's aims is uncivilized, then that term applies equally as well to
the the US military as to the Amal militia -- more so, perhaps, as we
usually see those fighting for their own land as more legitimate than
foreign invaders.
Lebanon is in the midst of a civil war. The US intervened directly in
support of one side (a distinct minority at that). American school
children (at least in the North) are taught to resent the attempts by
England to support the Confederacy during our own civil war -- and
that was by means of economic aid alone, not by troops actually
engaged in combat, as the US did in Lebanon.
If one argues that the passengers on Flight 847 were innocent
civilians, then realize that the same is true of the Shi'ites who were
kidnapped by Jewish gunmen and are being held hostage across the
border in Israel. (Note how much less "neutral" accurate terms like
"gunman" and "hostage" sound when applied to the actions of our
proxies instead of those nasty Moslems!)
The US keeps forgetting that throwing their weight around all over the
world, rattling sabers and engaging in violence, is not the way to
improve the security of its citizens. Bullies become targets, for
reasons that are obvious to any five-year old. It also becomes clear
at times like this -- with Reagan and his Joint Chiefs reduced to
sitting on their hands and whining -- that billions poured into the
weapons to fight the kinds of wars THEY'D like to fight are absolutely
wasted in the situations that arise in the REAL world.
Jan Wolitzky, AT&T Bell Labs, Murray Hill, NJ; 201 582-2998; alice!wolit
(Affiliation given for identification purposes only)
------------------------------
Date: 26 Jun 1985 08:27 EDT (Wed)
From: Wayne McGuire <MDC.WAYNE%MIT-OZ@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: Berri, Mideast Politics, & Strategy
To: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller@APG-1.ARPA>
I'll take up your points about Israel in in a later message, but for
the moment, on the question of Nabih Berri: certainly no American
government official I've heard has suggested that Berri is an
"honorable" man (whatever that means in the jungle of world politics).
He's instead viewed as the best option in a rotten situation. Nor
would anyone in their right mind do anything but condemn all acts of
terrorism in the harshest terms.
It seems to me, however, that you are venting--and understandably
so--a good deal of gut rage at Berri and the Shiite terrorists who
hijacked our fellow citizens, but that you are providing very little
in the way of substantive political analysis. (I'll acknowledge,
however, that most of your policy suggestions have been temperate and
reasonable.) Simple expressions of outrage one can hear in any local
bar; the more beer the better ("Nuke Beirut!"). Angry talk and
actions, alas, come cheap, while the consequences of policies made in
anger are often unacceptably expensive. Praise the Lord, there are
some wise heads around the nation and in the government who are
mightily angry about events in Lebanon, but who haven't abandoned
their powers of reason:
1) Stansfield Turner, who has just written a fine book on intelligence
matters--_Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition_--comments in
_The Boston Globe_, 6/21/85:
"There is a greater chance of negotiating the release of the
hijacked Americans in Beirut than there was for negotiating the
release of the American hostages in Iran six years ago....
"The American ties of the Moslem Shiite leader, Nabih Berri, and
the 'not totally unreasonable demands' of the hijackers present a
better opportunity for a negotiated release....
"'You have a moderate man in reasonable authority--Mr. Berri--who
understands America because he was once married to an American and has
six children here,' said Turner. 'And the hijackers' demands don't
seem totally unreasonable compared to the Iranian situation, where
they wanted us to return the Shah, something we simply couldn't
do....'"
2) Helena Cobban (author of a study, _The Shia Community and the
Future of Lebanon_) in _The New York Times_, 6/23/85, p. E23:
"In their haste to 'do something'--to make an example of these
hijackers and prove that the United States will fight back--they
[Henry Kissinger and his fellow blusterers] have neglected to look as
closely as they must at the situation on the ground in Lebanon. They
don't seem to understand that Nabih Berri, as a relative moderate and
pragmatic deal-maker, may offer the best hope for a stable Lebanon....
"Nabih Berri and his moderate colleagues in the leadership of the
Amal movement could play a key part in this stabilizing process, if it
ever has a chance to take root. The United States should take care
not to unnecessarily increase the pressure on Mr. Berri. He is, or
could be, part of the long-term solution--and we should treat him
accordingly. He and his allies have been put on the spot in the
hostage crisis--for they cannot be seen by their more radical
constituency to be caving in to the Americans--but they remain the
only force capable of holding a middle ground between American
pressure and the radicals in their own community.
"Before that middle ground disappears--before the United States
resorts to armed retaliation and it comes to a major confrontation
with the Shiites--Washington had better remember the lesson learned in
the last 400 years by Turks, Egyptians, French, Syrians and Israelis
alike. In Lebanon, all outsiders get beaten in the end."
3) From a front page article in _The Wall Street Journal_, 6/24/85:
"Events of the next few days may determine just how much of a
threat to Western interests emerges from Lebanon's Shiites. If the
relatively moderate Shiite leaders trying to work out an exchange of
the hijacked American airline passengers in return for Shiites held by
Israel are successful, their leadership and influence over more
radical elements will be strengthened. But if they fail, some
analysts fear, they could be swept aside by more extreme and
anti-Western Shiites already jockeying for power....
"... the key question for the West is whether the Shiites will
continue to be led by men with ... modest goals or whether they will
be taken over by more radical forces fired up to spread Iranian-style
revolution. At the moment, the dominant figure in Amal is Nabih
Berri.... Many who have dealt with Mr. Berri's disciples consider
them basically pro-Western....
"But Mr. Berri is a weak leader. He is squeezed between the
moderates that he controls and much more radical Shiites led by
charismatic clerics, and he risks losing credibility with the radicals
if he appears to be cooperating with the U.S. in any way...."
_The Wall Street Journal_ article explores the Lebanese political
situation in considerable depth, with a proper regard for the
dimension of history and for cultural nuances and complexities.
An opinion of my own: I'm pessimistic that Berri or any relatively
moderate forces will survive in Lebanon, although we should do our
best to nurture reasonable people against impossible odds. Berri
could easily disappear tomorrow. Religious fanaticisms--Jewish,
Christian, and Moslem--are on the rise in the Middle East, goading one
another into ever greater excesses, and I doubt that any outside
forces are going to be able to restrain them. They may just have to
spend themselves, and we can only hope they don't drag the entire
planet into a conflagration with them. What is ominous is that there
seem to be no lack of people who, for a variety of motivations, are
eager and determined to push America directly into the middle of these
mad proceedings.
Wayne McGuire <mdc.wayne%mit-oz@mit-mc>
------------------------------
Date: 26 Jun 85 02:57 EDT (Wed)
From: _Bob <Carter@RUTGERS.ARPA>
Subject: SDI Software...
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>
Here is an abstract of a paper recently completed.
I look forward to reading the full text when an FTPable filename is
announced. But, after reading just the abstract, I fear the
author may have telegraphed his punches.
The feasibility of designing and developing such a system
(requiring upwards of ten million lines of code) is examined * * *
The conclusion is that software considerations alone would make
the feasibility of a "fully reliable" comprehensive defense
against ballistic missiles questionable.
Date: Tuesday, 25 June 1985 09:46-EDT
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>
FYI, the Safeguard ABM system required 3 M lines, and the software
for NORAD is about 3 M lines too.
Just tripling the number of lines probably won't be the heart of the
argument, so the contention must be some mix of
a. The computational task presented by SDI is so much more
complex than that of NORAD as to present a problem that
is somehow qualitatively different, and
b. SDI, unlike NORAD, must be "fully reliable."
To carry off (a) would require a demonstration that the task presents
a fundamental theoretical problem. I doubt that the manuscript will
assert that SDI is not computable, or even not practically
computable. Perhaps it will show convincingly that SDI will be very
complicated or very hard or that it will have to be computed too
quickly to allow human intervention at the level that NORAD does.
It might then argue that because human intervention is not possible
"full reliability" is essential. But surely that is a false issue.
SDI will not launch an attack, let alone a nuclear attack. So even
if one accepts the peculiar argument that anything involving
matters nuclear must be shown to be preternaturally safe, it has no
relevance here.
Why then "fully reliable?" A priori, there is no reason for SDI to
be any more reliable than any other defense: It must reliably raise
the uncertainty cost of a potential attacker to a level which makes
it reasonably unlikely that he will attack. It must be reliable, in
other words, in precisely the sense that NORAD has proven itself
reliable.
Perhaps the paper will succeed convincing me that I am wrong about
the general nature of defenses. Or it may show me that I am right
about defenses in general, but for some reason wrong about @i(this)
defense. I have enjoyed your postings enough to half hope so. But
if it does succeed in convincing me, surely it will do so on
political grounds, not technical ones. And the mise en scene of the
argument is technical. I suppose that is what really troubles me the
most. If I intuit your point correctly it seem to me a point that
travels under false pretenses.
I'm a willing and interested listener to good faith expressions of
political opposition to SDI. I (and, I suspect, some other readers
of ARMS-D) tire of tendentious mock-learning from various Experts for
Social Responsibility.
_B
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 29 Jun 85 10:48:15 EDT
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: SDI Software...
To: Carter@RUTGERS.ARPA
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>
.... The conclusion
is that software considerations alone would make the
feasibility of a "fully reliable" comprehensive defense
against ballistic missiles questionable...
Perhaps it will show convincingly that SDI will be very
complicated or very hard or that it will have to be computed too
quickly to allow human intervention at the level that NORAD does.
NORAD human intervention involves making decisions about the extent to
which a set of signatures indicates a threat to the US. This is a
simpler task than doing that *and* deciding which missiles to attack
with what weapons, etc...
It might then argue that because human intervention is not possible
"full reliability" is essential. But surely that is a false issue.
SDI will not launch an attack, let alone a nuclear attack. So even
if one accepts the peculiar argument that anything involving
matters nuclear must be shown to be preternaturally safe, it has no
relevance here.
Full reliability in the context of a defensive system means that is
does its assigned task with 100% assurance. You are right about it
not launching an attack, but that is not its assigned task. (Human
intervention is not possible because of the time scales, not because
of the reliability requirements.)
Why then "fully reliable?" A priori, there is no reason for SDI to
be any more reliable than any other defense: It must reliably raise
the uncertainty cost of a potential attacker to a level which makes
it reasonably unlikely that he will attack. It must be reliable, in
other words, in precisely the sense that NORAD has proven itself
reliable.
This is precisely the point of the entire SDI debate: the defense of
population is *entirely* different than the defense of missile silos.
The President has proposed to replace, not supplement, deterrence,
where deterrence is defined as the threat of unacceptable punishment
if the SU attacks, and therefore they will not attack. In my paper, I
*do* argue that for more limited goals (such as enhancing deterrence),
SDI *is* feasible. Therefore, the apparently technical argument over
feasibility of SDI is in fact a *political* debate over the actual
goals of SDI.
A portion of my paper discusses this point, and provides
documentation.
------------------------------
Date: 28 Jun 85 19:06:16 CDT (Fri)
From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@seismo
Subject: SDI? What about spacewar autopilot?
> It seems to me Reagan's strategic-defense plan is orders of
> magnitude more difficult than writing an autopilot for the classic
> video game "spacewar". Yet as far as I know nobody has written the
> spacewar autopilot...
It's not quite the same thing, but one of the folks at 1127 in Murray
Hill (the birthplace of Unix) -- Peter Weinberger? -- wrote a "battle
computer" for their local implementation of Asteroids. By all accounts
it works very well. "When your compile finishes, you just turn on the
battle computer to keep the asteroids at bay, and come back to it later."
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 30 Jun 85 23:51:12 PDT
From: rimey%ucbmiro@Berkeley (Ken Rimey)
Subject: Re: krytrons
>From: William Martin <control@ALMSA-1>
We have seen extensive mention of these krytrons ...
and also mention on the net and a general description
of them as a "fast-switch" type of device.
Aren't they mildly radioactive, and thus fall under the NRC
regulations for such things as tritium-containing night-sights
and the like?
Are vacuum tubes and transistors radioactive? Am I correct in
thinking that a krytron is one or the other?
If not, and these things are "only useful for building atomic
weapons", as some news stories have implied, why are they
available for public sale at all?
A fast electrically controlled switch should be a generally useful
device for experimental physics. Actually, I recall reading that
krytrons are used in some types of photocopying machines.
3) Aren't there dozens of other technical doohickeys out there
just as important to making atomic weaponry as krytrons?
Maybe I am being naive, but what do you need for a fission bomb other
than a casing, U-235 (or plutonium), high explosive, blasting caps, a
fast switch, a capacitor bank, and a power supply? Maybe a neutron
source? Perhaps the "blasting caps" need to be high-tech. But
basically, a fission bomb is a pretty simple thing, and doesn't
require dozens of "technical doohickeys".
Ken Rimey
rimey@ucbvax
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[End of ARMS-D Digest]