arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA (07/08/85)
From: The Arms-D Moderator (Harold Ancell) <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 55
Today's Topics:
100th Monkey and Soviet View of Star Wars
Nuclear Terrorism
SDI Reliability; Re: Carter on Lin.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 85 11:32:20 PDT
From: Charlie Crummer <crummer@AEROSPACE.ARPA>
Subject: 100th Monkey and Soviet View of Star Wars
> From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
> Subject: The Hundreth Monkey...
> For the amusement of others, there is now an article that explores the
}> 100th Monkey phenomenon, in the summer 1985 issue of the Skeptical
> Inquirer, that looks at the evidence for this phenomenon. Guess what?
> Nothing of the sort ever happened. The article has the following
> statement near the end.
> "The message of the Keyes books is that you may be the Hundreth
> Monkey, whose contribution to the collective consciousness turns the
> world away from nuclear holocaust. It is hard to find fault with this
> motive. For the very same reasons, one could not fault the motives of
> a child who wrote to Santa Claus requesting world nuclear disarmament
> as a Christmas present. We can only hope that Santa Claus and the
> Hundreth Monkey are not our best chances to avoid nuclear war."
> Comments welcomed!!
Whether or not the myth of the 100th monkey has basis in fact is
rather beside the point. It serves to produce the vision in
people's minds of an achievable goal. There are other better
documented examples of the effect, e.g. the ending of slavery as an
institution in the world and the landing of a man on the moon. The
fact that a "critical mass" of people became convinced that these
goals would be achieved may not have "caused" the achievement but
it certainly set the context within which the causes arose.
The child who wrote to Santa Claus is helping to create the context
for peace because he is speaking of its possibility. This speaking
is not a magic incantation except that it may "prick the heart" of
some adults that CAN work the problem. Ronald Reagan uses this
effect by speaking into existence the entire Star Wars dream. I
work in the defense industry and in a technical talk I heard about
SDI the speaker made the comment about "the amazing power of a
presidential proclamation". If you think Santa Claus is
improbable, think carefully and seriously about SDI!
--Charlie
> ------------------------------
> Date: Wed, 26 Jun 85 15:32:39 CDT
> From: William Martin <control@ALMSA-1>
> Subject: Basic SDI / Star Wars Defense Question
> This question is so simple and obvious that I can't believe I
> haven't already run across it clearly stated and answered, but I
> sure don't recall doing so:
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> | If the SDI is hugely expensive and yet ineffectual and worthless, why |
> | are the Soviets against our attempting to create and deploy it? |
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> One would expect that they would simply say nothing on the topic,
> meanwhile snickering quietly at our folly behind closed doors.
Why suspect that they are any smarter than we are? After all, we
are working on it.
> Or are they reasoning that their public opposition to it will
> *encourage* us to go ahead with it -- if they remained quiet on the
> issue, we would drop it, so they talk it up to keep the pot boiling?
Possibly.
> Or are they insecure enough about the issue that, if we went ahead
> with a really-worthless Star Wars defense, investing billions with
> no return, they would feel compelled to invest in their own version
> of a worthless space defense system? So they are trying to save
> themselves from this fate?
I have heard from a Soviet defector who worked in the Soviet Academy
of Sciences that this is the driving reason. While their scientists
have healthy, well-founded skepticism, the military contingent, whom
we keep in power by our sabre-rattling, are in control and they are
not so sure that the U.S. couldn't do any little thing we say we
can.
> Or do they believe it is a great and workable idea, and really fear
> it as a true defense against their strategic weaponry?
I'm sure some do.
--Charlie
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 3 Jul 85 15:51:22 EDT
From: Bruce Nevin <bnevin@bbncch.ARPA>
Subject: hundredth monkey
I first heard the hundredth monkey story in a book by the biologist
Lyall Watson. He cites a reference in the anthropological literature.
I never looked it up, but got the impression that it was quite legit.
Keyes does not touch base with the original report.
The Skeptical Inquirer is quite notorious for heavy-handed axe-grinding.
Consider the shoddy way in which they have misrepresented the research
of the French statistician Michel Gauquelin, for example.
If I find Lyall Watson's reference, I will post it to this list.
Others are welcome to do this faster--I am going on vacation, and will
not have access to the books in question for at least a month.
Incidentally, Sheldrake's theory about what he calls morphogenetic field
phenomena provide a framework for understanding the hundredth monkey story
in a rational, not supernatural, way. (New Scientist likes Sheldrake,
Science said of his book `the best candidate for burning we've seen in
years', but such are the politics of science.)
Bruce Nevin
bn@bbncch.arpa
------------------------------
From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@Berkeley
Date: 3 Jul 85 01:22:21 CDT (Wed)
Subject: Nuclear Terrorism
To: LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
> I take Taylor seriously, but he's not the only one I've read or
> talked to. For example, Philip Morrison is also an ex-Manhattan
> Project person, and he believes just the opposite. Professional
> bomb designers may live in a rareified world, in which things happen
> when they order it to happen, and many technicians struggle very
> hard to implement their directives. ...
An interesting point. (One skeptical thought first: was Morrison in
bomb design, or theoretical physics?) Probably the only way to settle
it once and for all would be for one of the weapons labs to actually
build and test a bomb from Taylor's design. There is no question about
whether Taylor's design is buildable, given the materials: he gives
quite complete instructions, and there is nothing particularly hard
about it. The only remaining doubt is whether it will explode; Taylor
claims it would.
A point that comes up repeatedly in McPhee's book is that a lot of
people say "you would need your own Manhattan Project". He and Taylor
take some pains to shoot this down. For one thing, most of the really
hard physics the Manhattan Project did is declassified now, or close enough
that rough approximations can be derived from unclassified sources. For
another thing -- and I suspect this is the place where a lot of the
disagreement arises -- a "homebuilt" bomb need not come up to the high
standards of quality and predictability that "professional" bombs meet.
Taylor admits that his unclassified-sources-only design would have a low
and somewhat unpredictable yield, as I recall. But the issue is whether
you can make something that will go bang, not whether you can duplicate
the Manhattan Project.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 3 Jul 85 17:24:44 EDT
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: Nuclear Terrorism
From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry at Berkeley
[Note from the Moderator: Most of the quote from the above message
has been removed from here in the interest of saving space.]
(One skeptical thought first: was Morrison in bomb design, or
theoretical physics?)
Bomb design and engineering. He built the core of Fat Man.
Probably the only way to settle it once and for all would be for
one of the weapons labs to actually build and test a bomb from
Taylor's design. There is no question about whether Taylor's
design is buildable, given the materials: he gives quite complete
instructions, and there is nothing particularly hard about it.
The only remaining doubt is whether it will explode; Taylor claims
it would.
NO!! This "test" sweeps away all the difficulties under the rug. The
*design* is relatively simple. It is IMPLEMENTING the design that is
hard; getting plutonium and machining it, for example.
------------------------------
Date: 5 Jul 85 16:28:28 CDT (Fri)
From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@Berkeley
Subject: Nuclear Terrorism
> Probably the only way to settle it once and for all would be for
> one of the weapons labs to actually build and test a bomb from
> Taylor's design. ...
>
> NO!! This "test" sweeps away all the difficulties under the rug.
I should have made this clearer: I suggested a weapons lab because they
have access to bomb-grade fissionables, proper test sites, and some useful
(but not essential) safety equipment. They should definitely try to build
the thing using only garage-mechanic technology. In a similar vein, Ted
Taylor has been arguing for years that the only way to settle the "how
hard is it?" issue is to have one of the weapons labs *find* *out* just
how crudely they can build a bomb and still have it work. Nothing along
these lines has ever been tried.
> The *design* is relatively simple.
I'm glad to hear someone admit this, since one hears many claims to the
contrary.
> It is IMPLEMENTING the design that is hard; getting plutonium and
> machining it, for example.
Getting bomb-grade fissionables is definitely the hard part (although the
McPhee book tells some shocking stories about sloppy security); that's the
way it should be, since if the "it's not hard" faction is right, that is
our only line of defence.
I remain unconvinced that working with the stuff afterwards is all that
prohibitively difficult. You can get the metal to roughly the final
shape by casting it; for this you need a small electric furnace (see any
lab-supply catalog), crucibles (which can probably be made by hand; the
Manhattan Project made at least some of its crucibles by hand), and some
minor odds and ends. I think I would prefer to do it in an inert-gas
atmosphere -- burning uranium is nasty stuff -- but that's not hard to
set up. If the resulting shapes aren't accurate enough -- Taylor hints
that they are -- you get someone with sharp eyes, strong fingers, and
a weak mind, and hand him a template and a file. You don't need to use
machine tools at all, if you're not in a hurry. And if you're working
with plutonium, you probably want to use a glove box for all this (see
any lab-supplies catalog, or build your own as the Manhattan Project did).
Quite possibly the results will not be quite as precise as what you would
get from a weapons lab (although a patient man with a file is just as
accurate as a milling machine). As I've pointed out before, THAT DOESN'T
MATTER. What matters is whether the thing will go bang. If you don't
care about consistent, predictable yields, or about the occasional failure,
life is much easier. I don't think professional bomb-builders allow for
this, at least not enough, when they pronounce about how hard it is. (It
sure would be nice to have some experimental proof, wouldn't it?)
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 6 Jul 85 16:32:54 EDT
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: Nuclear Terrorism
To: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@UCB-VAX.ARPA
[Note from the Moderator: Once again part of quote removed.]
In a similar vein, Ted Taylor has been arguing for years that the
only way to settle the "how hard is it?" issue is to have one of
the weapons labs *find* *out* just how crudely they can build a
bomb and still have it work.
What is hard for a terrorist group is probably not hard for people
with the expertise that you find at a weapons lab. I agree that the
test you propose is a necessary one (and I believe it should probably
be done), but it is not sufficient. Failure to succeed would prove
beyond a reaonable doubt that a terrorist group could not do it, but
success would not suggest that a terrorist group could indeed do it.
Nothing along these lines has ever been tried.
Not literally true; one of the weapons labs built a bomb out of Pu-240
to show that it can be done (yield ~ 1KT).
> It is IMPLEMENTING the design that is
> hard; getting plutonium and machining it, for example.
Getting bomb-grade fissionables is definitely the hard part
(although the McPhee book tells some shocking stories about sloppy
security); that's the way it should be, since if the "it's not
hard" faction is right, that is our only line of defence.
If what you are saying is that we should safeguard bomb-grade
fissionables better than we do now, I agree entirely.
I remain unconvinced that working with the stuff afterwards is all
that prohibitively difficult.... And if you're working with
plutonium, you probably want to use a glove box for all this (see
any lab-supplies catalog, or build your own as the Manhattan
Project did).
But the Manhattan project had $20B in resources behind it (today's
dollars). That isn't a fair or relevant comparison. As for the other
tools available in a machine shop, the difficulty is not in any
individual act, but in the hundreds and thousands of places that one
can screw up with a limited supply of material with which to screw up.
Given infinite time and infinite supplies of fissionable material, you
are undoubtedly right. You didn't say that, but the real argument is
how tolerant of error is the process. When you're doing it for the
first time, it's hard. (If you assemble national resources behind it,
as South Africa or Pakistan or Brazil can do, then all bets are off.)
Quite possibly the results will not be quite as precise as what
you would get from a weapons lab (although a patient man with a
file is just as accurate as a milling machine). As I've pointed
out before, THAT DOESN'T MATTER. What matters is whether the
thing will go bang. If you don't care about consistent,
predictable yields, or about the occasional failure, life is much
easier.
If you don't care about the occasional failure, then you could just
send a design and a sample of fissionable material to the relevant
authorities, and not build a bomb at all. That is guaranteed to get
their attention; several years ago, a $1M extortion plot in Miami was
traced to a 14 year old H.S. honors science student who send
authorities a blueprint of a bomb -- I hear the officials were
considering giving in at one point, though that could be journalistic
hype.
(It sure would be nice to have some experimental proof, wouldn't
it?)
I sure don't want such proof.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 85 23:45:57 PDT
From: Richard K. Jennings <jennings@AEROSPACE.ARPA>
Subject: SDI Reliability; Re: Carter on Lin.
Although I disagree with Herb Lin on much of his analysis
concerning SDI, I do agree that the system must be more reliable
than anything this planet has ever seen. (I think such a system is
inevitable -- he feels it is impossible, at least for now).
True, as Carter argues, it is defensive -- but boy does it
make a mess! We are talking about a period when man is just emerging
from his god given cocoon to taste the heretofore restricted fruit of
space manufactureing and space habitat. Space will no longer be 'up
there' to everyone. It will be like the old west, but on a much more
deadly scale. In short, my concern is the proper environmental impact
statements are not being prepared nor considered.
For those of us who believe that the salvation of man lies on
his path to the stars, the thought of all the hazards and genralized
crap that the SDI *could* place in his way is absolutely nauseating --
even if it didn't cost a cent. Even if the USSR paid for it.
So, even if SDI goes - which is not yet certain, and is
primarily a weapons program (as opposed to a space manufacturing
program) - which I don't think it will end up being, we absolutely
100% positively do not want to fire those things off unless there
is NO OTHER HOPE.
What will more likely happen is it will wind up as a DoD
funded space manufacturing program which will be taken over by
industry in 1995 (just as they took over ICs in 1970). At that point
it will be percieved as too expensive and hazardous, and the need will
be gone. By 2000, enough strategic manufacturing will be done in
orbit, that the US will be able to reconstitute from an all out
nuclear war, blunting the interest in a bolt from the blue first
strike from our friendly neighbors to the east.
An interesting study might be to look at the infastructure of
the SDI program and see how much of it is commercially applicable.
Then review history to find out what branch of government
traditionally explores, in a colonizing way, new frontiers (ie. going
to the moon to plant a flag does not count). Then give some thought
to how much money the congress (and the custodians of the military
budget) would give to funding a commercial space colonization program
-- or talk to NASA.
To conclude: 1) space is going to be colonized in the SDI
era by the military and industry so SDI planners should consider
the effects of their weapons on men in space, and 2) SDI is the
US colonization vehicle.
RKJ.
------------------------------
Date: 2 Jul 85 18:49 EDT (Tue)
From: _Bob <Carter@RUTGERS.ARPA>
Subject: SDI Reliability; Re: Carter on Lin.
From: Richard K. Jennings <jennings at AEROSPACE.ARPA>
Although I disagree with Herb Lin on much of his analysis
concerning SDI, I do agree that the system must be more reliable
than anything this planet has ever seen. (I think such a system
is inevitable -- he feels it is impossible, at least for now).
True, as Carter argues, it is defensive -- but boy does it
make a mess!
In short, my concern is the proper environmental
impact statements are not being prepared nor considered.
I do not understand how our environmental concerns touch on
reliability, or at least reliability in the sense that Lin means it.
Instruments of war are often unreliable; they are @i(always) bad for
the environment.
_B
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 85 10:01:07 EDT
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: SDI Reliability; Re: Carter on Lin.
To: jennings@AEROSPACE.ARPA
Although I disagree with Herb Lin on much of his analysis
concerning SDI, I do agree that the system must be more reliable
than anything this planet has ever seen. (I think such a system is
inevitable -- he feels it is impossible, at least for now).
Do you think that it is inevitable that we will get systems that can
be guaranteed to work right *the first time*?
------------------------------
[End of ARMS-D Digest]