@MIT-MC.ARPA:ARMS-D-Request%MIT-MC.ARPA@MIT-XX.ARPA (10/28/85)
From: Moderator <ARMS-D-Request%MIT-MC.ARPA@MIT-XX.ARPA>
Arms-Discussion Digest Monday, October 28, 1985 7:44AM
Volume 5, Issue 6
Today's Topics:
Administrivia: PLEASE PUT "Subject:" headers on your messages
False Alerts
Are SLBMs safe?
BACKLOG of OLD MESSAGES
Star Wars computing
Herbert Scoville, Jr., obituary
Hiroshima
Parnas versus Brooks
Build Your Own Bomb
Test Ban
Bulls**t and bees**t in Scientific American
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Date: Thu, 24 Oct 85 09:16:48 EDT
From: Michael_Joseph_Edelman%Wayne-MTS%UMich-MTS.Mailnet@MIT-MULTICS.ARPA
A number of messages to the digest have mentioned the many false
alarms that have occured at NORAD, mistakenly indicating that a Soviet
attack had been launched. Now, we know that it is not only acceptable,
but desireable to have false alarms in such a detection system. Given
the price we would pay for a missed alert (type II error) we would probably
accept a very large percentage of type I errors. Given that, I am curious
at what stage these 'false alarms' occur, and what the verfication procedure
following an alert is. In other words, when the computers an NORAD indicate
an attack, can the people at NORAD just look up at their radar and say
"nope, no attack today", or does the false alarm occur at such a location
in their system that their visual indication (radar or whatever) would be
affected to? At what stage in the detection/alert/response process do humans
step in and evaluate the threat, and what is the nature of their analysis?
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Date: 1985 October 25 07:02:01 PST (=GMT-8hr)
From: Robert Elton Maas <REM@IMSSS.SU.EDU>
Subject:Are SLBMs safe?
| Date: Tue, 9 Jul 85 12:48:17 PDT
| From: Chris Warack <warack@AEROSPACE.ARPA>
| Subject: Questioning the need for SDI
| Over 50% of the US missiles are SLBM's and are not vulnerable to a
| pre-emptive strike by the USSR even accounting for the ones caught
| in port. This seems to be a common misconception -- that the USA is
| vulnerable to such an attack.
Submarines with missiles are an extreme case of multiple warheads in a
single silo. Whereas an MX missile with 10 warheads sits in one silo
that can be knocked out by one enemy warhead, on a submarine something
like 40 or more warheads can be knocked out by one enemy warhead if
the submarine can be located and tracked by the enemy missile. In the
past it has been assumed submarines can't be found in the big ocean,
and you are making that assumption, but recent advances in
satellite-based observation of the ocean are beginning to make that
assumption shaky, and maybe in a few years our submarines will be
totally unhideable. Furthermore, it isn't necessary to send an ICBM or
SLBM to knock out a submarine. Just attach a bomb to its side, after
all it isn't on homeland where you can't get at it, it's out there in
the middle of the ocean where anybody an come and go at will. All you
have to do is avoid being detected by the submarine itself. Since the
kill radius of a thermonuclear warhead against a submarine is perhaps
a mile or more, it shouldn't be too hard to just sit within kill
radius but outside direct detection radius. If the bomb is smaller
than the submarine, it may be that the submarine can be tracked from
space and locally from the bomb but the bomb can't be seen from either
space or from the sub.
| The policy of deterrence centers around surviving such an attack and being
| able to retaliate.
Yup. With single-warhead missiles that are less than 100% accurate,
the attacker spends more warheads than the victim loses, so the victim
wins the retaliation. But with multiple warhead missiles or multiple
missiles of any kind in a single silo or submarine this logic breaks
down when the silo/sub can be located.
| For this reason, we have concentrated our forces in SLBM's.
Until now. This may have to change in the near future.
| In fact, a number of opponents to ICBM's (and the MX in particular)
| feel our ICBM force should be deactivated anyways, since SLBM's carry more
| warheads with sufficient accuracy to be adequate for deterrence. In
| this light the Soviets are no better off than they are now.
I thought that way myself until a few years ago when I wrote to an
author of an article in Sci.Am. and got a reply to the effect that
soon submarines may be detectable and thus we ought not to put all our
missiles in subs, have some land-based and some aircraft-based too. (I
think this was about 4 years ago, so by now I expect the day when subs
can be located is getting close.)
| If SDI actually can replace deterrence in insuring national security, then
| what excuse is there not to disarm (nuclear)?
Flip answer: if horses can fly then why do we need airplanes??
Since SDI can't replace deterrence due to the instability we pass
through while building it and the insurmountable cost of ever really
getting it completed past the instable phase, then we still need
deterrence. But like Ike or somebody said, a couple hundred H-bombs
should be sufficient deterrence to protect us. (and I add, providing
the warheads are single-per-silo/sub)
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Date: 31 Jul 1985 0647-PDT
From: CAULKINS@USC-ECL.ARPA
Subject: Star Wars computing
To: arms-d@MIT-MC
In the current issue of Science (26 July 85, Vol 229, No 4711, P367)
there is an article by R. Jeffrey Smith titled "New Doubts About
Star Wars Feasibility".
[The piece starts out by discussing the resignation of Professor
Parnas of the Univ. of Victoria, B.C. and ex-head of the Software
Engineering Research Section of the Naval Research Laboratory from 79
to 82]
"... Specifically, he [Parnas] says, the computing demands of a
comprehensive missile defense system are such that no existing
technology or innovation on the horizon is capable of ensuring its
reliability. New developments in highly touted tools of the trade,
such as artificial intelligence, automatic programming, and program
verification, will be incapable of appreciably altering this
situation. ...
Anthony Ralston, a professor of computer science at SUNY-Buffalo and
a former president of ACM [said] '...its [star wars] computer software
problems doom it to failure ... in no foreseeable future ... is there
any valid prospect of writing 10 million or 100 million or anything
approaching this number of correct lines of code.' ...
'Given the current state of software technology, he may be right', says
James Offutt, an SDI assistant director for battle management. 'I
don't think this area is as mature as weapons and sensors, for
example. But we're not concerned with present technology; we're
concerned with where we'll be in 5 or 10 years.' He is particularly
optimistic about using 'a hybrid of artificial intelligence and
numerical algorithmic programming' as well as about potential
improvements in hardware that might ease the requirements somewhat.
Daniel Cohen, director of the systems division at USC ISI and
codirector of the battle management software advisory panel, says ...
'Parnas is absolutely right that it can't be tested; that artificial
intelligence probably will not help; that program verification
techniques are still in their infancy; and that automatic programming
also will not solve this problem. Yet there is a very good chance
that this code can be written in less than 5 years. It is, after all,
not more complicated than the Apollo moon shot, by much.' ...
'Gemini V missed its landing point by 100 miles because its guidance
program implicitly ignored the motion of the earth around the sun.'
[Herb] Lin says ..."
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Received: from CMU-CS-A.ARPA by MIT-MC.ARPA 31 Jul 85 23:11:47 EDT
Date: 31 Jul 85 22:57 EDT
From: Andy.Hisgen@CMU-CS-A.ARPA
To: ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: Herbert Scoville, Jr., obituary
Message-Id: <31Jul85.225748.AH20@CMU-CS-A.ARPA>
Herbert Scoville, Jr., died on Tuesday (see obit in Wednesday's NYTimes), of
cancer. Scoville was a retired government official who had held senior
posts in the Dept. of Defense, the CIA, and the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. He was a prominent supporter of arms control
negotiations and the nuclear weapons freeze, and an outspoken opponent
of the MX missile and the Strategic Defense Initiative.
------------------------------
Received: from aerospace by MIT-MC.ARPA 12 Aug 85 12:06:13 EDT
Date: Mon, 12 Aug 85 09:02:06 PDT
From: Richard Foy <foy@AEROSPACE.ARPA>
To: poli-sci@rutgers
CC: arms-d@mit-mc.arpa
Subject: Hiroshima
Amongst all of the TV and radio programs on TV there was a lot of discussion
related to the need for using the A-bombs. One historian talked about his
research among the notes and memoranda from the period immediately before
Trinity and Hiroshima. He stated that both Eisenhower and Adnmiral Lehey
had recommended against the use of the A-bombs, that they felt that it was
both too beastly and not necessary. Does anyone have and factual information
related to the validity of these statements and/or opinions about theire
possible accuracy.
richard foy (foy@aerospace)
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Received: from ames-nas.ARPA by MIT-MC.ARPA 16 Aug 85 19:12:52 EDT
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 85 16:12:42 pdt
From: eugene@AMES-NAS.ARPA (Eugene Miya)
Message-Id: <8508162312.AA19496@ames-nas.ARPA>
Received: by ames-nas.ARPA; Fri, 16 Aug 85 16:12:42 pdt
To: arms-d@mit-mc.ARPA
Subject: Parnas versus Brooks
We have heard there is going to be a debate over the computer
reliability aspects of SDI at the end of the month in London
between Dave Parnas and Fred Brooks. Is anybody on the net
going to be attending this debate or will they happen to be in London
at the end of the Month? We are seeking people who might tape this
discussion. Supposedily, Dr. Brooks will defend SDI from the
'charges' made by Parnas in his resignation papers. Please contact
me via the net if you are attending, or if you plan to be in London
at this time, I can get you details of the location for taping.
--eugene miya
eugene@ames-nas
{ihnp4,hao,hplabs,decwrl}!ames!amelia!eugene
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Received: from Lancelot by MIT-MC.ARPA 23 Aug 85 23:50:41 EDT
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 85 20:47:25 pdt
From: Mark Stout <stout@Lancelot>
Subject: Build Your Own Bomb
To: arms-d@mit-mc.ARPA
A few years back The Progressive published a famous article about how one
can build a nuclear bomb in ones home. Does anyone happen to know what
issue that was? I would be interested in finding it.
Thanks!
--Mark Stout
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Received: from LLL-MFE.ARPA by MIT-MC.ARPA 26 Aug 85 15:28:20 EDT
Date: Mon, 26 Aug 85 12:22 PDT
From: "Morton Jim"@LLL-MFE.ARPA
Subject: Test Ban
To: arms-d@mit-mc.arpa
Concerning the Soviet Union offer for a complete moratorium on
Nuclear explosives testing, We entered into such an agreement
with them in the early sixties. We scaled down our Nuclear design
programs since there was no way to test. The Soviets apparently
did not, They abbrogated the treaty by beginning a very well planned
and executed series of tests. We were basically un prepared for
any tests for several months. During the time of the moratorium
the Soviets advanced their design plans and future projects, as well
as improving their facillities, without the additional load of
a test program. When their projects were ready, they broke the
treaty and surged ahead with their research.
Now that the U.S. has announced research plans that involve the
use of Nuclear explosives to pump X-RAY lasers etc., the Soviets
once again dangle a carrot of moratorium before us. Let us not
forget the lessons of the past.
Jim Morton
The opinions expressed are my own and not those of my employer
or any government agency.
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Received: from kestrel.ARPA by MIT-MC.ARPA 9 Sep 85 15:18:40 EDT
Received: by kestrel.ARPA (4.12/4.7)
id AA28822; Mon, 9 Sep 85 12:21:55 pdt
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 85 12:21:55 pdt
From: king@Kestrel (Dick King)
Message-Id: <8509091921.AA28822@kestrel.ARPA>
To: arms-d@mc
Subject: Bulls**t and bees**t in Scientific American
For those who want to continue to quote Scientific American on arms
control issues...
According to a Wall Street Journal, (9/6/85)
Harvard biochemist Matthew Meselson now admits that his original
"bee feces" theory of Southeast Asian yellow-rain deaths -- that
deadly toxins were not biochemical weapons but natural
cntaminants of feces -- "is not very attractive anymore." But
you wouldn't know it from an article he and four colleagues have
published in Scientific American this month.
The article went on to discuss how many of the points in the original
article that would have lead the SA reader to understand that the
hypothesis was very dubious at best was lost in the SA editing room.
True, WSJ has its own biases. If the Harvard biochemist is NOT
withdrawing his hypothesis, I suppose he will file suit against the
WSJ or at least issue a denial.
If no such event is forthcoming, I don't want to see SA quoted in an
arms control context.
-dick
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Received: from BLUE.RUTGERS.EDU by MIT-MC.ARPA 9 Sep 85 17:18:37 EDT
Date: 9 Sep 85 17:16 EDT (Mon)
From: _Bob <Carter@RUTGERS>
To: king@Kestrel (Dick King)
Cc: arms-d@mc
Subject: Bulls**t and bees**t in Scientific American
In-reply-to: Msg of 9 Sep 1985 15:21-EDT from king at Kestrel (Dick King)
I can no longer find the WSJ for 9/6 on the newsstands. How about
reproducing the relevant paragraphs of the Meselson article? I read
the SA piece and concluded (reluctantly) that the samples probably
*really were* bee droppings. I usually take SA with a large grain of
salt, but the article as it appeared had real verisimilitude. I'd be
interested in what seems to you (and WSJ) to undercut it.
_B
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Received: from kestrel.ARPA by MIT-MC.ARPA 9 Sep 85 17:32:50 EDT
Received: by kestrel.ARPA (4.12/4.7)
id AA29257; Mon, 9 Sep 85 14:36:03 pdt
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 85 14:36:03 pdt
From: king@Kestrel (Dick King)
Message-Id: <8509092136.AA29257@kestrel.ARPA>
To: arms-d@mc
Subject: Bulls**t and bees**t in Scientific American - more from the article
Date: 9 Sep 85 17:16 EDT (Mon)
From: _Bob <Carter@RUTGERS>
I can no longer find the WSJ for 9/6 on the newsstands. How about
reproducing the relevant paragraphs of the Meselson article? I read
the SA piece and concluded (reluctantly) that the samples probably
*really were* bee droppings. I usually take SA with a large grain of
salt, but the article as it appeared had real verisimilitude. I'd be
interested in what seems to you (and WSJ) to undercut it.
_B
The article is thirty column-inches. Among other things, it said that
the researchers went to Thiland to try to collect more bee droppings,
they were lucky (?) enough to get cought in a real downpour of the
stuff, they had lots of samples, no toxins detected, these negative
results were dropped from the article for "strict length limitations".
It said "Mr. Meselson said that he now generally accepts the work of
[a Canadian toxocoligist] showing that trichothecene mycotoxins don't
occur naturally in Southeast Asia ..". It says everybody believes
that the tissue samples from the victoms contained the toxins. It
said that the Canadian found an unnatural combination of mycotoxins
in the ABC News sample that constituted a much more superb killer than
any of its parts, "a coctail put together by someone who knew what he
was doing." And a bunch of other stuff.
I won't type in 30 column inches, but anyone who states that he tried
and failed to find WSJ 9/6 in his local library can get a photocopy by
sending me a USMail address, especially if he offers to type it in for
the rest of us.
-dick
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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