telecom@ucbvax.ARPA (10/17/84)
From: Jon Solomon (the Moderator) <Telecom-Request@MIT-MC>
TELECOM Digest Wednesday, 17 Oct 1984 Volume 4 : Issue 102
Today's Topics:
Two modems on one phone line
Eavesdropping.
Re: TELECOM Digest V4 #101
Re: TELECOM Digest V4 #101
Long Distance Information service
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Date: 14 Oct 1984 21:01 MDT (Sun)
Sender: KPETERSEN@SIMTEL20
From: Keith Petersen <W8SDZ@SIMTEL20>
Subject: Two modems on one phone line
If the two modems do not require the d.c. current that is normally
present on the phone line, you should be able to connect them together
using one of those modular "Y" jacks that are sold to allow plugging
two devices into the phone line. Just don't plug it into the phone
line. The modems should talk to each other if you have a command to
force "answer mode" on one and "originate" on the other.
--Keith
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Date: 15 Oct 1984 06:20-PDT
Sender: GEOFF@SRI-CSL
Subject: Eavesdropping.
From: the tty of Geoffrey S. Goodfellow <Geoff@SRI-CSL.ARPA>
n062 1528 14 Oct 84 BC-EAVESDROP High-Level Group to Combat Soviet
Eavesdropping By DAVID BURNHAM c.1984 N.Y. Times News Service
WASHINGTON - President Reagan, acting on on intelligence reports
that Soviet eavesdropping is a serious security threat, has ordered
the creation of a cabinet-level group to combat it.
Reagan signed a directive three weeks ago spelling out the extent
of the threat and ordering a government move to reduce the loss of
government and private industry information that might help the Soviet
Union or other nations.
According to the unclassified version of the president's order,
equipment that is used to eavesdrop on telephone conversations and
other kinds of electronic messages is now widely available and ''is
being used extensively by foreign nations.'' The order added that the
technology ''can be employed by terrorist groups and criminal
elements.''
With the widespread use of microwave towers and satellites to
transmit telephone messages and other data, the messages of
government, businesses and individuals have become increasingly
subject to interception. Antennas in Cuba and on Soviet trawlers
cruising offshore reportedly are able to identify and record much of
this traffic.
While the Ford and Carter administrations were concerned about the
problem and ordered some changes in government practices to deal with
it, Reagan's National Security Decision Directive 145 is the first
public assertion by a president that international eavesdropping
constitutes a threat to the United States.
The president's directive was obtained after Walter G. Deeley, the
National Security Agency's deputy director for communications
security, disclosed in an interview that the agency hoped to equip
government and industry with 500,000 special telephones. The
telephones are meant to make it far more difficult for eavesdroppers
to conduct electronic surveillance.
Reagan said that both government and privately owned
communication networks transmit large amounts of classified and
unclassified information that, when put together, can reveal important
secrets.
''The compromise of this information, especially to hostile
intelligence services, does serious damage to the United States and
its national security interests,'' Reagan's directive said.
''A comprehensive and coordinated approach must be taken to
protect the government's telecommunications and automated information
systems against current and anticipated threats,'' the document
continued. ''This approach must include mechanisms for formulating
policy, for overseeing systems security resources programs, and for
coordinating and executing technical activities.''
The directive, written by the staff of the National Security
Council, established the Systems Security Steering Group, made up of
the secretaries of state, treasury and defense, the attorney general,
the director of the Office of Management and Budget and the director
of central intelligence.
In addition to setting overall policies, the directive said the
steering group was responsible for reviewing all communication
security proposals before they were submitted ''to the Office of
Management and Budget for the normal budget review process.''
The directive's explicit requirement that the budget office review
and approve all electronic security programs appeared to thwart
efforts by the National Security Agency, which suggested this summer
that it should become the ''national focal point for communications
security requirements and funding.''
The National Security Agency is the nation's largest and most
secret intelligence organization. With an estimated annual budget of
$4 billion, its twin missions are to collect electronic intelligence
all over the world and protect the sensitive communications of the
United States. It also serves as the principal adviser to the
president and the National Security Council on communication security
questions.
Reagan's directive set up the National Telecommunications and
Information Systems Security Committee, subordinate to the
cabinet-level steering group. This committee has 14 members, including
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the director of the top security agency.
The committee was ordered to establish two subcommittees, one focusing
on telephone security and the other on computer security.
In a third major assignment, Reagan authorized the security agency
to serve as the ''national manager'' for telephone and computer
security. In this role, the agency was authorized to conduct, approve
or endorse all government research on this problem.
The president's directive also orders the agency to examine
government telecommunications and computer systems to determine their
''vulnerability to hostile interception and exploitation.''
The order explicitly authorized the agency to monitor ''official
communications'' but added that such monitoring ''shall be conducted
in strict compliance with the law, Executive Orders and applicable
presidential directives.''
The presidential directive did not say the agency had the right to
monitor the communications of private corporations, but guidelines
under which such monitoring may be conducted were approved by Attorney
General William French Smith earlier this year. nn
nyt-10-14-84 1825edt ***************
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Date: Mon, 15 Oct 84 10:56:49 cdt
From: ihnp4!tellab1!rcl@Berkeley (Opus)
Subject: Re: TELECOM Digest V4 #101
Regarding "Notes on the Network";
This book was replaced in 1983 by "Notes on the BOC INTRA-LATA
Networks". the new "Notes..." may be purchased from the same source
listed for the old "Notes..."
Ron Lewen (ihnp4!tellab1!rcl)
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Date: Mon, 15 Oct 84 16:55:15 EDT
From: Joe Pistritto <jcp@BRL-TGR.ARPA>
Subject: Re: TELECOM Digest V4 #101
What are the data rates associated with the popular trunk types?
In particular, I know that T1 is 1.544 Mbps, how about T2 &
T3?
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Date: Tue 16 Oct 84 16:04:17-EDT
From: Robert Scott Lenoil <G.LENOIL@MIT-EECS>
Subject: Long Distance Information service
Now that MCI and SPRINT are offering long distance directory service
comparable to AT&T's, one question comes up: how are they doing it?
Are they buying the service from AT&T, or do they have access to
directory information via the RBOCs? (By the way, MCI's service, like
AT&T's, allows two free long distance information requests per month,
with all others at 10% off AT&T's rates (currently $.50). SPRINT does
NOT allow any initial free requests, and their price is the same as
AT&T's; no deals here.)
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End of TELECOM Digest
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