rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu (06/13/91)
/** reg.elsalvador: 178.0 **/
** Topic: Proceso 475 -29 may 91- English **
** Written 7:09 am Jun 4, 1991 by cidai in cdp:reg.elsalvador **
PROCESO 475
May 29, 1991
Stories available in English:
1. Editorial: The tragedy of the UCA case
2. Tension in the countryside
3. IDHUCA report: Botched urban attacks
Proceso is published weekly in Spanish by the Center for Information,
Documentation and Research Support of the Central American University (UCA) of
El Salvador. Portions will be sent in English to the reg.elsalvador conference
of PeaceNet. Please make sure to mention Proceso when quoting from this
publication.
Subscriptions to Proceso in Spanish can be obtained by sending a check
for US$35.00 (Americas) or $40.00 (Europe) made out to 'Universidad
Centroamericana' and sent to Apdo. Postal (01)575, San Salvador, El Salvador.
Computerized searches of Proceso (1980-present) by keyword are available upon
request.
** End of text from cdp:reg.elsalvador **
/** reg.elsalvador: 178.1 **/
** Written 7:15 am Jun 4, 1991 by cidai in cdp:reg.elsalvador **
PROCESO 475
May 29, 1991
Editorial:
The tragedy of the UCA case
The UCA case is approaching the final stretch. The week assigned to
introducing new evidence is about to close without having been adequately
taken advantage of to dig deeper and determine the identity of the masterminds
of the massacre. The new testimony given this week by defendants and other
witnesses -some for the second time- only reinforced the conspiracy of deceit,
forgetfulness and ignorance which prevails in the Armed Forces. Nevertheless,
the documents and interrogations seen this last week have produced solid
evidence of High Command involvement in the actual execution of the crime.
One of the petitions made during this phase of the case by the private
prosecutors, and granted by the judge, was to listen to the testimony of an
expert on the techniques, procedures, and forms of organization which govern
Latin American armies. Actually, the information revealed by Argentine colonel
Jose Luis Garcia was quite obvious and elementary. However, the fact that a
specialist certifies that the killer commando of the Atlacatl Battalion could
not have evaded all the defense and surveillance checkpoints surrounding the
UCA without a plan and previous instructions in hand to prevent the security
cordon from attacking or detouring it, confirms that the massacre was
previously thought out by the superior commands who controlled military
operations at that fateful moment. Even if we are to believe the absurd
hypothesis that the killer commando could have slipped by undetected on its
own, the shattering explosions and rifle fire associated with the crime -less
than a kilometer from the nerve center of the Armed Forces- would normally
have unleashed an immediate operation to investigate what was happening.
The defense attorneys' clumsy reaction to Col. Garcia's statements only
helps bolster the defendants' guilt: writing off expert testimony as "foreign
interference" does not constitute valid counterevidence. Worse yet, in
adducing that the procedures and forms of organization used in the Argentine
army are neither useful nor applicable to the Salvadoran case, the defense
shows complete ignorance of the fact that the systems of hierarchy and
procedures used in armies are the product of universal theories and doctrines;
furthermore, this leaves the defense with the obligation of demonstrating what
kind of military structure in El Salvador absolves Benavides of responsibility
for what his subordinates do and for what takes place in an area which, under
curfew conditions, can only be the job of the army and its commander to
protect; it is not the job of any security force to investigate later what
happened in Benavides' territory and on his watch, as the defense would have
us believe.
Even more revealing and pivotal are the videotaped statements made to
the FBI by Maj. Eric Buckland on January 12, 1990. Not surprisingly, this
piece of evidence was withheld by the United States for 17 months; a flawed
transcript of the video was finally turned over to the judge during this
latest stage in the case. On tape, Buckland explicitly acknowledges that at
least a month before the massacre, Col. Carlos Aviles revealed the existence
of a plan to murder the Jesuits, in particular Fr. Ellacuria; also, several
hours before the crime, when the plan had been set into motion, it was
mentioned to him again. And Buckland does not talk about the plan as if it
were the crazy idea of a few isolated soldiers, nor does he imply that it was
only a delirious figment of his own imagination, but rather backs up his
assertions with completely coherent facts and dates, clearly situating the
plan in the context of the army's criminal ideology used to stir up hate and
violence against the priests at the UCA.
The information Buckland proves he had on the UCA and Fr. Ellacuria
cannot be underestimated. Assigned to Department V (Psychological Operations)
together with Col. Aviles, Buckland was forced to learn the identity and
nature of those considered "ideological enemies," among which the UCA and its
Jesuits held a privileged place, as evidenced by the Armed Forces' persistent
and insidious campaign of attacks and slander against them, a campaign which
was stepped up shortly before the murder, when the national radio chain run by
Department V included incitements to kill Fr. Ellacuria and his brothers.
Unfortunately, Judge Zamora has not seen the need to determine the identity of
those who organized and directed the "open mike" sessions used by the army to
lay the groundwork for the massacre.
As might be expected from an adviser to Department V, the knowledge
Buckland shows about the UCA and Fr. Ellacuria coincide perfectly with the
slander and distortions used in vain by Salvadoran officers to tarnish the
moral stature and intellectual work of the Jesuits. For example, Buckland
asserts without the slightest evidence of doubt that "terrorist activities"
were planned and originated in the UCA, an assertion which coincides exactly
with the gratuitous and unfounded accusations made so often against the UCA by
then-colonel Zepeda, and publicly so on the occasion of the murder of former
attorney general Garcia Alvarado (April 1989).
Specifically, Buckland says that the afternoon before the massacre,
{Aviles told him that the plan to murder the Jesuits had been set into motion,
and even added that "the Atlacatl would probably do it," as corroborated by
testimony given by residents of the neighborhood surrounding the Jesuit
university, who noted an outstanding presence of Atlacatl troops in the
vicinity on the night of the "operation." Furthermore, the discrepancies which
have arisen during the course of the investigation between Gen. Ponce and Gen.
Zepeda, on the one hand, and Benavides and former Atlacatl commander Leon
Linares, on the other (Proceso 446), are mirrored in these statements by
Buckland to the FBI. In effect, Buckland reveals that, on Ponce's orders,
Aviles visited the Military Academy at least twice in October to persuade
Benavides, Leon Linares and other officers to postpone or desist from their
plans to murder Fr. Ellacuria and his fellow Jesuits.
These discrepancies are even reflected in the alibi chosen to evade
responsibility for the massacre. Although some attempted to make the crime
look like the work of the rebels by simulating a clash with the FMLN (as seen
in the records of the army's Intelligence section), Cap. Luis Alberto Parada
has testified that early the next morning, a military radio reported that Fr.
Ellacuria had been killed while resisting arrest. This new revelation destroys
the alibi used by all rest of the army chiefs, who claim to have heard about
the massacre several hours later on commercial radio.
Unfortunately, Judge Zamora has also refused to grant the private
prosecutors' demand for a face-to-face session with both Ponce and Zepeda
which could have helped get to the bottom of the discrepancies in their
respective testimonies. The judge adduces that both officers have the
privilege of replying to his questions in writing, forgetting that Cristiani
did a service to the cause of justice last year by waiving that privilege and
testifying in person. This weak flank in the judicial system will inevitably
lead to the repetition of such terrorist practices on the part of the army, as
we have already seen in Col. Elena Fuentes' campaign against leaders of the
Democratic Convergence, whom he holds accountable for the "terrorist acts" of
the "subversives."
There is no doubt that plans to murder the Jesuits did indeed exist. And
this can be deduced not only from Buckland's solid testimony. Janice Elmore,
former liaison officer between the Salvadoran Armed Forces and the U.S.
military, when called to testify in this stage of the case, said publicly
after the massacre that she "knew it was going to happen." It is unfortunat
that the Salvadoran judicial system is not powerful enough -and the United
States not willing enough- to see justice done in cases such as the UCA
massa{cre, even though the blood of the Jesuits could have served to unmask the
institutional nature of the killings and thus help prevent further tragedy in
El Salvador.
** End of text from cdp:reg.elsalvador **
/** reg.elsalvador: 178.2 **/
** Written 7:26 am Jun 4, 1991 by cidai in cdp:reg.elsalvador **
PROCESO 475
May 29, 1991
Tension in the countryside
In addition to the tense conflicts prevailing in the public sector, a
number of farmworker and peasant organizations have begun to step up the
pressure recently. Their fundamental demands are around the need for land to
cultivate and timely loans for planting. They have also demanded that the
Salvadoran Institute for Land Transformation (ISTA), the National Land
Financing Agency (FINATA) and the Land Bank fulfill the purposes for which
they were created [N.T.: that is, to acquire lands and sell to land reform
beneficiaries]. The organizations most conspicuous in these conflicts have
been the National Association of Agricultural Workers (ANTA), the National
Peasant Association (ANC), the Democratic Peasant Alliance (ADC) and the
Confederation of Land Reform Federations (CONFRAS).
Demands like these by landless peasants or groups of peasants evicted
from lands they had worked cooperatively during the last decade have been
prevalent for years, along with repeated denunciations of court-decreed
evictions of cooperatives at the instigation of former owners. As the economic
crisis intensifies and the living conditions of peasant families decline, the
demand for access to land has taken on increasing urgency. According to Marcos
Salazar, leader of the Union of Agricultural Workers (SITAS), the land
takeovers are occurring because "peasants lack land to work and grow food for
subsistence."
The current critical economic situation has led groups of organized
peasants to carry out a total of some 30 land takeovers as a way to pressure
FINATA and the Land Bank to negotiate and hand over the lands for long-term
cultivation.
The press has reported that ANTA asked FINATA to buy the Hacienda
Amulunga, located near the western town of Chalchuapa, which has been
abandoned for the last four years. When FINATA responded with indifference, 80
families invaded the land on February 24 with the support of ANTA. Today the
squatters are threatened with eviction by the Cuscatlan Bank, which holds the
mortgage. On May 15, ANTA reported that five of them were threatened and
beaten by members of security forces sent by the bank. This takeover marked
the beginning of a new period of rural conflict which may reach immeasurable
proportions.
In early April, the Hacienda La Soledad, located near the the
northwestern town of Metapan, was occupied by landless peasants. By this
time, land takeovers had begun to snowball. On April 11, three farmworker
organizations held a press conference to explain their decision to resort to
land takeovers, adducing that peasants had been paying rent of those lands for
a long time, yet they were fallow and not fulfilling the social role
stipulated in the law. They also reported that in February, 75 families took
over the Hacienda El Tablon, and that another 60 families took over the
Hacienda Jose Arrazola on April 8.
On May 2, ANTA announced new land takeovers as a way to pressure for the
continuation of the land reform process. The group also reported that 70
tenant farmers at the Hacienda Las Sevadias (Chalatenango) took over a large
area of land they had worked for years. A similar action was taken at the
Hacienda El Chilamatal, in western El Salvador, where the owners were trying
to sell the land and evict the tenant farmers. On May 13, ANTA said that four
days earlier, 60 peasant families had taken over the Miranda and El Sitio
farms, blaming the takeover on the lack of land and negligence on the part of
the Land Bank.
On April 15, the Salvadoran Peasants' Union (CCS) reported that the army
High Command and the Ministry of Defense had threatened to jail those who
advocated or participated in land takeovers. Despite the threats, the group
vowed to hold its ground and to step up takeovers of lands in order to turn
them over to cooperatives and to put fallow land to work, as a way to pressure
the government to order FINATA and ISTA to buy them.
Meanwhile, the Salvadoran Federation of Cooperative Associations
(FEDECOOPADES) reported that on April 13, civil defense troops in Panchimalco
partially destroyed the offices and granaries of the San Isidroooperative, and
had wounded three of its members.
Policies aimed against peasant organizations
For months, peasant organizations have denounced government agrarian
policies aimed at undercutting them and deforming the land reform process.
These policies have included delays (premeditated, according to the groups) in
awarding loans for planting, as well as new land reform laws which contradict
the original spirit of the 1980 decree.
Demands for credit have also prevailed during this period. On April 9,
ANTA warned that basic food production would drop considerably if the
Agricultural Development Bank (BFA) did not award credit on time. On May 7,
the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Associations (FENACOA)
demanded that the Central Reserve Bank award loans to its cooperatives; the
Bank's Agricultural Guarantee Fund awards loans only to cooperatives
classified three years ago by the ISTA as low-risk. On May 9, two other
agricultural organizations echoed earlier demands for BFA loans for planting,
accusing the bank of requiring collateral impossible for the farmers to
obtain.
On April 17, the National Union of Workers and Peasants (UNOC) labeled
the recently-passed land reform law (Proceso 473) "mercantilist", saying it
"undercuts solidarity among cooperative members" and that its Article 5
represents "a threat to penalize those who oppose the breakdown of
cooperatives into small plots, a measure which does nothing to solve the land
problem." The same day, the ADC also repudiated the new land reform law,
saying it was an attempt to divide peasant organizations, force small owners
to pay the agrarian debt, and eventually crush the land reform. The ADC
called the law part of a "legislative offensive, a move made while the eyes of
the public were focused on amending Article 248 of the Constitution." The
group also warned of possible new land takeovers and general pressure
tactics.
Government reaction
The government and right-wing response to recent peasant pressures and
actions was immediate and furious. On April 20, FINATA president Raul Garcia
Prieto declared that the land takeovers were part of an FMLN strategy to sow
discontent and confusion among the population, especially among peasants and
tenant farmers. He said the actions did not reflect legitimate demands,
explaining that his institution and the Land Bank bought lands for true
peasants, who had no reason to take over the land of others, adding that lands
would be according to the laws of supply and demand, and that the government
would neither expropriate nor set a price on any land.
Salvadoran vice-president Francisco Merino accused "leftist agitators" of
inciting the peasants to invade private properties in order to provoke the
government, adding that his administration would call upon the security forces
to enforce the law. On May 11, government spokespersons criticized land
takeovers by members of ANTA, in particular one in Santa Ana and two in
Ahuachapan, calling the actions part of a plan to undermine law and order.
As expected, the nation's largest business organization, ANEP, published
a communique in mid-May expressing its deep concern about "the recent surge of
illegal takeovers of private lands," and demanded that the government enforce
the law and respect for private property.
Following on the heels of these verbal reactions, the Armed Forces and
security forces have violently evicted peasants from at least two properties
since May 22, turning the squatters over to the courts.
This behavior is entirely consistent with the ruling party program. On
May 21, ARENA president Armando Calderon Sol urged the security forces to "act
drastically and place behind bars the leftist agitators who are manipulating
the peasants who usurp farmlands."
On May 22, on national radio and television, president Cristiani
announced that "the government has taken the decision to apply the letter of
the law in order to stop the agitation promoted by the FMLN with its invasions
of property." He added, "We will wield the law with enough force to ensure
that the laws of this country will no longer be violated; the laws are the
fundamental basis for harmonious and peaceful coexistence... because
enforcement without law is barbarity, but law without enforcement is
impotence."
After ten years of land reform, and of an intense military conflict
rooted precisely in the unjust distribution of land and wealth, land takeovers
are once again the order of the day, just as they were 60 years ago -and the
nation's leaders are confronting these demands with the same old attitudes and
violent methods. The ruling right-wing of El Salvador does not appear to have
learned any lessons over the last 60 years, even after ten years of war, while
the majority of Salvadorans who live in the countryside continue to live in
extreme poverty which only gets worse as ARENA's economic programs unfold.
Today's rural conflicts cry out for the government to take a step back
from its dogmas, to stop writing off real problems as FMLN conspiracies, and
to become aware of the gravity of El Salvador's land problem. If this problem
is not resolved, the country will continue to face many more years of violence
and destruction.
** End of text from cdp:reg.elsalvador **
/** reg.elsalvador: 178.3 **/
** Written 7:35 am Jun 4, 1991 by cidai in cdp:reg.elsalvador **
PROCESO 475
May 29, 1991
IDHUCA Report: Botched urban attacks
On the morning of May 28, FMLN urban commandos mounted an attack on the
First Infantry Brigade barracks in San Salvador, wounding two civilians and
damaging several private homes. The guerrillas climbed on the roof of a house
located some 300 yards east of the garrison and fired a shot with an RPG-7
rocket launcher against the military target, hitting instead the branches of a
tree in the Colonia Vairo. The wounded were identified as Walter Lopez, 17
years old, and his sister Arely del Transito Lopez, 16 years, who were treated
by the Comandos de Salvamento and taken to the Rosales Hospital (Diario
Latino, 5/28/91).
First Brigade commander Col. Francisco Elena Fuentes visited the scene of
the attack and condemned the incident, saying that Alvaro de Soto, U.N.
mediator in the negotiations between the government and the FMLN, ought to
speak out against this type of attack, which he labeled "terrorism." The top
military chief added that it was inconceivable that the government was
negotiating in Caracas with those responsible for these actions, and urged the
U.N. to "condemn incidents which affect civilians" (Diario Latino, 5/28/91).
This deplorable act came only a few days after another FMLN attack on the
First Infantry Brigade, on May 22, which took an even more tragic toll and
shocked the public: two women were killed and six other civilians were
wounded. In this attack, due to a lack of foresight and poor aim, seven
explosives launched by the urban commandos missed their target entirely,
falling instead on civilian homes located near the barracks (La Prensa
Grafica, 5/23/91). The First Brigade Commander responded to the attack by
declaring that "the FMLN not only violates human rights, but also the
agreements reached in the peace talks with the government." In condemning the
"criminal attack perpetrated by terrorist groups which caused serious damage
to the civilian population," Col. Elena Fuentes announced that his unit would
help those individuals harmed by this "new incident in which citizens' human
rights are trampled by the FMLN" (La Prensa Grafica, 5/24/91).
Reactions
These latest incidents have evoked strong public reactions. The ruling
ARENA party took the surprising initiative of proposing a resolution to the
Legislative Assembly, to be passed without going through the usual channels,
adducing that "the guerrillas' action against civilians was brutal and
constituted disrespect for human rights and the San Jose Agreement." ARENA's
motion won the immediate support of the National Conciliation Party (PCN). The
Democratic Convergence, Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and the Nationalist
Democratic Union (UDN) abstained from voting on the resolution, saying, "ARENA
and the PCN want to utilize the Assembly for their own benefit by condemning
only one of the two sides in the conflict -the FMLN- while refusing to condemn
the actions of the Armed Forces, which systematically violates human rights.
It is not a matter of the dead belonging to one side or to the other, because
here we are all Salvadorans" (El Mundo, 5/24/91). ARENA also published a paid
advertisement highlighting the refusal of the PDC, CD and UDN to vote on its
motion to "obtain a legislative censure of the acts of terrorism carried out
by the FMLN" (Diario de Hoy, 5/24/91).
The governmental Human Rights Commission (CDH) vigorously condemned the
"irrational attack perpetrated by the FMLN against civilians living near the
First Infantry Brigade," while calling on the FMLN "to comply with the San
Jose Agreement on respect for human rights, to put an end to all acts of
violence which endanger the rights and possessions of Salvadoran citizens" (El
Mundo, 5/24/91).
During a live satellite interview between Washington and San Salvador on
Worldnet's "Dialogue" program, Bernard Aronson, the U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs, replied to questions from Salvadoran
journalists by saying: "We would like to think that the FMLN is keeping its
word when it says it is committed to ending the war, but actions speak louder
than words, and although we have seen progress in the negotiations, the
violence has stepped up over the last several weeks and the negotiations have
taken a step backward" (La Prensa Grafica, 5/24/91).
The National Association of Private Enterprise (ANEP) demanded that "the
death machine which the subversives use to sow terror among the people must be
stopped, to force them to demonstrate their sincerity at the negotiating
table." ANEP added that "the subversives are giving free rein to the 'Riders
of the Apocalypse' who sow death, destruction, hunger and sickness among the
suffering people of El Salvador" (El Diario de Hoy, 5/25/91).
For his part, the auxiliary bishop of San Salvador, Monsenor Gregorio
Rosa Chavez, said in his May 26 Sunday homily that "for the Church, the failed
FMLN attack against a military barracks, which took the painful toll of two
women dead, is a clear act of terrorism." The prelate stressed that the
Church's position "is unequivocal, and that they are clear acts of terrorism
and incompatible with human dignity." He added, "the same yardstick" must be
used to measure "other violent incidents which occur unseen in the Salvadoran
countryside, in the dark of night and immersed in impunity" (La Prensa
Grafica, 5/27/91).
Finally, hundreds of residents of the neighborhoods and communities
surrounding the First Infantry Brigade barracks took out a paid advertisement
to denounce publicly "the indiscriminate aggression against their homes
perpetrated on May 22, 1991," placing the entire responsibility for the human,
moral and material damage suffered on the leaders of the FMLN, and demanded
respect for their right to life, physical and moral integrity, and private
property.
A reflection
The serious incidents represented by these botched FMLN attacks against
the First Infantry Brigade go much further than the enormous risk involved in
this kind of military operation. It is obvious that these types of military
installations are very important targets for the FMLN. But the truth is that,
just like the headquarters of the High Command [Estado Mayor], they are
located in the middle of densely populated areas. This reality always makes it
obligatory to measure the forseeable and probable consequences of any attack
on such targets. (new par.) The Salvadoran State is a party to the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949, aimed at protecting both civilian and military victims of
international conflicts; furthermore, in 1978 it ratified Protocol II
additional to the same Conventions, which protects victims of armed conflicts
not of an international nature, such as the one which has affected this
country since 1980. These texts carry the force of law in El Salvador, and
even take precedence over the nation's secondary laws; they are binding for
the Armed Forces as well as the
FMLN.
It is worth noting that the FMLN has publicly and repeatedly recognized
that these conventions apply to its own conduct.
This implies that, in the conduct of the war, each side is bound by norms
which envision minimum conditions for the protection of civilians when
military actions take place in populated areas. It must be objectively
recognized that in the latest attacks, with their tragic consequences in the
civilian population, the FMLN units did not fulfill the requirements set forth
by the applicable norms, and have committed serious violations of
international humanitarian law.
But with the same objectivity, and along the same lines, the many acts of
war recently committed by the Armed Forces and security forces, with similar
repercussions on civilians, must not be ignored; they have not received all
the publicity, denunciation and support they deserve. Auxiliary Bishop Rosa
Chavez was wise in saying that "the same yardstick must be used to measure the
other violent incidents which occur unseen in the Salvadoran countryside, in
the dark of night and immersed in impunity." His words appear to represent a
thinly veiled allusion to the horrendous massacre of El Zapote of January 21.
In this case, despite a provisional court ruling to the contrary, the Church
and a number of other organizations continue to harbor serious suspicions of
Armed Forces involvement in the massacre, and, in particular, of the First
Infantry Brigade, under the command of Col. Elena Fuentes himself. It is
ironic that this top military leader comes out now as a defender of the human
rights of the civilian population, when troops under his command have been
accused of so many human rights violations; of special importance are the
statements made last year by Cesar Vielman Joya Martinez, a deserter from the
intelligence section of the First Brigade.
Without going into the long list of harm done to civilians over the last
several months by army military operations, a few outstanding cases could be
mentioned. Two people were killed and another four were seriously wounded
after Air Force planes bombed a place known as "Planon Samuria" near Jucuaran
(Usulutan). Maria Dominga Coreas, 35 years old, and Jose Nelson Coreas, 12
years, were killed when a bomb exploded in their home. According to a sister
of one of the victims, the bomb was dropped by Air Force planes during nearby
fighting between army troops and the FMLN (Diario Latino, 4/10/91).
The Christian Committee for the Displaced of El Salvador (CRIPDES) took
out a paid advertisement asserting that for the past three months, 38
communities in Chalatenango, with a total population of several thousand
returnees and repatriates, have been suffering "the cruelty and
irresponsibility of a military operation which is killing civilian villagers
and destroying their belongings." According to CRIPDES, during the period from
January 2 and March 31, the violent attacks have left three dead, including a
nine-year-old girl, and another eight wounded, including four children.
Furthermore, 51 homes have been damaged, four completely destroyed, six head
of cattle have died and over 250,000 square yards of crops were burned (Diario
Latino, 4/5/91). For example, on January 12, 14-year-old Berta Idalia Alas was
killed near Las Vueltas following a rain of mortar fire (Diario Latino,
1/16/91). According to figures provided by the Legal Aid Office of the
Archdiocese of San Salvador [Tutela Legal], last March 7, soldiers from the
Atlacatl Battalion began to fire bullets and mortars at the town of San Jose
Las Flores (Chalatenango), yet there was no clash with the FMLN. The mortars
produced shrapnel wounds in Maria Mejia de Guardado, 50 years old, and Ana
Aracely Menjivar Hernandez, 15. Other Tutela Legal figures show that on March
9, 22-year-old Amada Etelvina Vasquez Navarrete was killed when soldiers from
the Sixth Infantry Brigade tossed a grenade at her during fighting with the
FMLN. The victim had been standing in the doorway of her house in San
Francisco Javier, Usulutan.
Conclusion
This set of incidents, which have all taken place in the context of the
armed conflict, serve as a new opportunity to reflect seriously upon the
repercussions of the war, and on the need to reach a satisfactory peace as
soon as possible. tuations, the Salvadoran people are, ironically, currently
one of the best-protected peoples in the world. Besides those tenets of
international humanitarian law which apply to the case of El Salvador, as we
saw earlier, the most important international instruments which protect and
promote human rights have been ratified by this government. Nevertheless, a
look at the current state of respect for human rights and at how vulnerable
civilians are to military operations by both sides, reveal that these norms
hardly enjoy the respect due them from both sides, although in different
measures. This situation produced the historical need for the San Jose
Agreement signed in July, 1990, according to which, and with the goal of
"humanizing the war," both sides -not only the FMLN, as Col. Elena Fuentes
asserted publicly- committed themselves to immediately taking "every necessary
step and measure ... to avoid any action or practice which involves an attack
on the life, integrity, security and freedom of the individual" (Art. 1), in
other words, to avoid destructive incidents such as those described above.
Consequently, both sides must limit the use of their weapons of war and their
firepower, and must take the safety of the civilian population into account as
a fundamental factor, if they wish to fulfill the commitments made in the
Agreement and respect all other existing norms which govern this matter.
According to the Human Rights Agreement, both sides solemnly committed
themselves to "investigate" and "sanction" cases of the type which recently
occurred. On this aspect of the Agreement, more concrete results remain to be
seen from both sides, even though the FMLN at least took public responsibility
for its role in the May 22 attack. In the coming weeks, we will be able to
appreciate the contribution made in this area by the presence of the U.N.
verification mission. A very positive sign of the times is that cases of human
rights violations are increasingly becoming a focus of public debate. This is
another consequence of the negotiations and of the San Jose Human Rights
Agreement. All in all, we must continue to insist that the San Jose Agreement
be complied with and verified more seriously and effectively.
** End of text from cdp:reg.elsalvador **