christic@labrea.Stanford.EDU (06/13/91)
/* Written 2:27 pm Jun 12, 1991 by christic in cdp:christic.news */ /* ---------- "VILLAGE VOICE ON ROBERT GATES" ---------- */ ----------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY OF VILLAGE VOICE INVESTIGATION OF ROBERT GATES Christic Institute, Wednesday, June 12, 1991 The Senate will probably schedule hearings after the July 4 recess on the nomination of Robert Gates to succeed William Webster as C.I.A. director. The following is a summary, with some comments, of the article by Murray Waas in the June 4, 1991, issue of the Village Voice. The Voice's investigation suggests Gates supported sales of military technology to Iraq during Saddam Hussein's military buildup before the invasion of Kuwait. Gates was deputy national security adviser to President Bush at the time. 1. Gates vetoed objections raised by other Administration officials who opposed United States food credits program for Iran. Subsequent investigation revealed that funds from the program were used to purchase weapons. 2. In his capacity as deputy national security adviser, Gates rejected proposals that the Bush Administration restrict ``dual- use'' exports of technology and manufactured goods with potential military uses. ``As a result of Gates' decision, the Bush Administration ended up selling Saddam tens of millions of dollars in high-technology goods that were used to help develop his chemical and biological warfare capabilities and his advanced ballistic missile program,'' Waas reported in the Voice. 3. During 1987 hearings on Gates' nomination to succeed the late William Casey as C.I.A. director, Gates ``gave incomplete and misleading testimony'' about his knowledge of the use of profits from the secret sale of military supplies to Iran as a source of illegal funding for the contras. The hearings ended after four days when Gates withdrew his name from consideration. ``Gates reported directly to Casey during the early years of the Reagan-Bush Administration and helped the late [C.I.A. director] prepare congressional testimony that was later shown to be deliberately misleading,'' Waas wrote. 1. The Agriculture credits program Between 1983 and 1990 the Reagan and Bush Administrations provided more than $5.5 billion in loan guarantees for the purchase of farm products from the United States. ``These U.S. government loan guarantees were critical to the survival of Saddam's regime in the years after the Iran-Iraq war,'' Waas reported. ``Not only were they used to feed the Iraqi people, they also freed up Iraq's reservoir of foreign exchange to purchase military technology from around the world, helping to build up what would ultimately become the world's fourth largest military arsenal.'' In August 1989--the first year of President Bush's term--the Agriculture Department recommended $1 billion in new farm credits for the Iraqi regime. But other agencies were opposed, including the Federal Reserve Board, the Treasury Department and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Iraq now owed tens of billions of dollars to its creditors, and there was little hope it would ever repay its U.S. loans. The opposition was overruled by the President's National Advisory Council (NAC) on Nov. 8, 1989. By now a report was circulating inside the Federal Reserve Board warning of corruption in Iraq's management of the program. In February 1990 an internal Agriculture Department memo, later obtained by the Voice, stressed Iraq's miserable human rights record and allegations that Iraq was misusing the U.S. funds to buy weapons. ``In the worst case scenario, investigators would find a direct link to financing Iraqi military expenditures,'' the memo said. At the time Gates was chair of the ``Deputies Committee,'' an elite group that supervised the National Advisory Council. Thanks to this post Gates had become ``a bureaucratic powerhouse in the Bush Administration,'' Waas wrote. On April 16, 1990, the Deputies Committee met to review the loan program. Gates chaired the meeting. Objections were raised once again to the loan program and again were overruled. According to the Voice's sources, Gates backed the program during the meeting. 2. Sale of ``dual-use'' technology to Iraq The subject of ``dual-use'' sales to Iraq was also raised at the April 16 meeting chaired by Gates. Dennis Kloske, then Commerce undersecretary for export management, called during the meeting for new restrictions on dual-use exports. He proposed a number of options: a total economic embargo against Iraq, stricter export controls or specific limits on technology that could be used for ballistic missiles. But no policy change resulted. ``One official present at the meeting recalls Gates insisting that `they weren't going to have a policy that singled out Iraq.''' Between 1985 and 1990, both the Reagan and Bush Administrations approved 273 export licenses for the delivery to Iraq of more than $782 million worth of technology and goods with potential military applications. The list included technology that could have been used for Iraq's SCUD missile program and components for Saddam's biological and chemical weapon industry. The shipments--which were routed through Jordan, Egypt and Kuwait--violated United States law and the Administration's official policy. Gates made decisions that assured this ``tilt'' toward Iraq continued after President Bush took office. On June 8, 1990, Kloske gave Gates a written proposal that the Bush Administration control exports of missile technology to Iraq. The proposal was rejected. A final attempt by Kloske in December 1990 to restrict export licenses to Jordan for materiel with potential military use that could be transferred to Iraq was also overruled by Gates, the Voice said. 3. Did Gates mislead Congress about his knowledge of the Iran- contra affair? According to the Voice, the evidence contradicts Gates' claim that he knew nothing about the illegal White House resupply operation for the contras. The Administration officially admitted on Nov. 25, 1986 that profits from Iranian arms sales had been diverted to the contras. During confirmation hearings for his nomination as C.I.A. director Gates said that reports that reached him before the official disclosure of the affair were ``extraordinarily flimsy.'' In any event, he said he did not hear about the diversion until Oct. 1, 1986. But the Voice found evidence that Gates had been briefed on the operation much earlier in 1986 and as early as 1985 was receiving intelligence reports that secret arms sales to Iraq were producing huge profits. Richard Kerr, Gates' successor as the C.I.A.'s deputy director of intelligence, says he told Gates in August 1986 about suspicions that the proceeds from arms sales to Iran were being diverted to the contras. Gates later told the C.I.A.'s inspector general, who was conducting an internal investigation of the Iran-contra affair, that he couldn't remember the conversation with Kerr. But Gates does admit that on Oct. 1, 1986, C.I.A. national intelligence officer Charles Allen reported to him about his suspicions about the diversion. In his confirmation testimony Gates said he was ``troubled'' by the report from Allen, but that ``my first reaction was to tell Mr. Allen that I didn't want to hear any more about it. That I didn't want to hear anything about funding for the contras.'' Even if Gates was not directly involved in the illegal contra resupply operation, he was briefed at least twice about suspicions the operation existed by two senior C.I.A. officials. After both meetings he took no steps to investigate further and has admitted he preferred not ``to hear anything'' about illegal funding for the contras. Will Gates, as C.I.A. director, tell his subordinates that he would rather hear nothing about future wrongdoing or attempts to conceal secret operations from Congress? Even earlier than his meetings with Kerr and Allen, however, the Voice says Gates routinely received ``intercepts'' from the National Security Agency (N.S.A.) on huge profits from the sale of weapons to Iran. Gates was on the distribution list for N.S.A. intercepts in 1985 and 1986, a fact he did not mention during his confirmation hearing. The existence of the reports was not disclosed until the Oliver North trial more than three years later. The content of the reports was summarized by the Federal judge who presided over the Poindexter trial: ``The intelligence reports in 1986 contained the following facts: the precise amounts the Iranian [middlemen in the arms sales] were being charged for the U.S. arms that they received as part of the Iran initiative; that the [first] Iranian [middleman] complained that they were being charged six times more than the prices on a 1985 U.S. government price list that they had obtained.'' ----------------------------------------------------------------- Andrew Lang 151251507 CHRISTIC telex Christic Institute christic PeaceNet Washington, D.C. tcn tcn449 202-797-8106 voice christic@igc.org Internet 202-529-0140 BBS uunet!pyramid!cdp!christic UUCP 202-462-5138 fax cdp!christic%labrea@stanford Bitnet