rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu (06/14/91)
El Rescate Human Rights Department Report from El Salvador
May 27-June 3, 1991
"These are the most difficult negotiations the United
Nations has ever faced, much more complex than Angola or
Namibia." --U.N. official (1)
"The government is afraid to confront the issue of the Armed
Forces. . . . The political will doesn't exist." --
Archbishop Rivera y Damas (2)
A peace settlement was reached in Angola this week after 16 years
of war and 13 months of negotiations with agreements which could
perhaps serve as a model for Salvadorans. The Angolan settlement
includes freedom for all political parties, including the
guerrilla UNITA, with access to the media; reduction of the
government army from 50,000 to 20,000 and the integration of
20,000 guerrillas into the Armed Forces; and the formation of a
joint political/military commission representing both sides to
run the country until elections, scheduled for September 1992.
Three-hundred-fifty United Nations personnel will verify the
agreements. (3)
Archbishop Rivera y Damas commented that the Angolan settlement
"must be a stimulation to the Salvadoran case," (4) but
negotiations suffered a substantial setback this week during the
17th round of talks as the government delegation presented 44
revisions to the U.N. working document on the Armed Forces. The
document, a summary of the discussions from June to October 1990,
has been under consideration since October, and consensus had
been reached on many of the issues. However, on May 29 the
government delegation "surprised everyone" (5) when it insisted
on revisions considered substantive by the FMLN, including
- The Truth Commission: The government demands that two of the
three members be military officers appointed by President
Cristiani.
- The process of "depuracion" or purging of elements of the
Armed Forces responsible for human rights violations must be
treated as an "evaluation."
- The concept of impunity must not be limited to the Armed Forces
but rather to the entire society. The government proposes "perdon
y olvido" or "forgive and forget" for all political crimes.
- The National Civil Police must be headed by military officers
and include members of the current security forces. The FMLN has
proposed that all members of the security forces be retired with
one year's salary and given a parcel of land.
- The issue of "private armies" (death squads) should not be
considered as part of the Armed Forces negotiations because "they
don't have anything to do with the military." (6)
Prior to the presentation of the revisions the atmosphere of the
talks had been described as "cordial," and Dr. Oscar Santamaria
had remarked on the "moderation and hopeful signs from the FMLN."
(7) Reporters indicated the FMLN had "eased up" on its demand
for full agreement on all points of the agenda before a cease-
fire, (8) and a diplomatic source in Caracas noted the
"flexibility" of the FMLN. (9) But the revisions were a "bath of
cold water" on the talks, according to the FMLN. (10)
President Cristiani denied the revisions were substantive, saying
they were "only observations . . . mostly a matter of editing."
He insisted the government "has the right to decide who it wants"
on the Truth Commission and to head the Civil Police, (11) but
admitted it was "difficult" to predict the outcome of the talks.
(12)
"They want our surrender." --Shafik Handal (13)
"There will not be a cease-fire until there is freedom of
the press, of circulation, of organization and of political
choice in this country." --FMLN Commander Jorge Melendez
(14)
"This is a setback to months of work," said Shafik Handal in
Caracas. "They want our surrender as though they had won a
victory, but that will not happen." (15) He insisted the changes
are not just a matter of "editing" but of words and concepts, and
concluded, "This session is at a dead end." (16)
Colonel Mauricio Vargas referred to Handal's comments as
"simplistic and false," said the changes were "in form, not
content" and accused the FMLN of "intransigence and
inflexibility." (17)
Government officials blamed the FMLN for the lack of results
during this round. Joaquin Villalobos did not participate,
apparently due to illness, and was replaced by Leonel Gonzales,
but according to Vice-Minister Ernesto Altschul the absence of
Villalobos "is an indication of divisions," and he attributed the
stalemated talks to these alleged divisions. (18)
Dr. Oscar Santamaria and President Cristiani both mentioned the
"irrational demands" of the FMLN and declared the government has
control of the entire country. (19) During his second
anniversary address to the Assembly (20), the President discussed
the "challenges of peace" but reiterated that the existence of
the Armed Forces is not up for discussion at the table and lauded
the institution's efforts "to defend democracy and freedom. . . .
It has been the bulwark for the preservation of the country."
(21)
The round of talks concluded on June 2 without agreements but
will resume in about two weeks, possibly in Mexico. Dr. Alvaro
de Soto stated the negotiations had not been "interrupted" but
are in recess for consultations, "inherent in the negotiation
process." (22) FMLN Commander Leonel Gonzalez said bilateral
meetings with the United Nations will continue during the recess
and the FMLN will consult with political parties and social
forces. (23)
"We ask you to declare the existence of ONUSAL
unconstitutional." --Cruzada Pro Paz y Trabajo, Letter to
the Supreme Court (24)
The ONUSAL Mission is expected to arrive in July, with a mandate
to verify the San Jose Human Rights Accord and an eventual cease-
fire agreement, but its personnel could face serious security
problems from the ultra-right. Early last week a leaflet was
distributed to exclusive restaurants and businesses in the
Escalon/San Benito area of the capital warning owners to abstain
from providing services to foreigners or Salvadoran nationals who
belong to the United Nations, ONUCA (UN Observers' Team for
Central America), Doctors of the World, Doctors without Borders,
ICRC (International Committee of Red Cross) or UNHCR (UN High
Commission on Refugees). The owners were threatened not to
"collaborate . . . with the internationals who are conspiring
with communism to take over the country," or they, their
businesses or their families could face "sanctions." The leaflet
was signed by the Salvadoran Anti-Communist Front. (25)
On May 30 the Cruzada Pro Paz y Trabajo published a letter to the
Supreme Court denouncing ONUSAL as "unconstitutional," as an
attack against the nation, and as an agreement "exceeding the
mandate of the Executive Branch." (26) President Cristiani
defended the ONUSAL as the "result of a mutual agreement," and
said it was not an "intervention." (27) Popular organizations
expressed concern that the threats against ONUSAL "could be the
death of negotiations." (28) Archbishop Rivera y Damas referred
to the Cruzada protest as "anachronistic" and expressed his
confidence that the presence of the ONUSAL mission "will lower
the levels of violence in the country." (29)
The Director of Immigration announced that his office has begun
to deport foreigners "involved in political activities,"
specifically mentioning persons "posing" as journalists and
"Lutheran pastors. . . . they are really agents of international
disorder . . . who receive a salary to cause problems here." (30)
"U.S. military aid is not sufficient to defeat the FMLN." --
General Accounting Office Report Washington (31)
The Armed Forces initiated counterinsurgency operations in eight
of 14 departments without much fanfare on the first day of talks,
May 25. Twenty regional battalions, seven elite battalions, and
100 companies are participating in the offensive, according to
the FMLN. (32)
Armed Forces promotions are regularly announced on May 31 and
several colonels, including Vargas, were expected to be promoted
to general. According to a press release on June 3, no important
promotions or command changes will be made at this time (33),
which could be an indication of internal strain and lack of
consensus.
The guerrillas launched a series of nation-wide attacks on May
28, targeting the electrical infrastructure and military patrols.
The First Brigade was hit again this week, and again several
civilians were injured. The FMLN apoligized for any civilian
casualties, but a representative said, "We have the duty to
defend our territory and attack their rearguard. . . . The war
hasn't ended." (34) The guerrillas claimed 717 casualties to the
Armed Forces during the month of May.
A General Accounting Office (35) study on the impact of U.S.
military aid in El Salvador was released on June 1. The report,
commissioned by Senator Edward Kennedy, concluded that U.S. aid
is "not sufficient" to defeat the FMLN, that, in spite of $1
billion in military aid, a victory of the Salvadoran government
is "unlikely" and that the FMLN has "sufficient logistical
support to continue." Investigators determined that the Armed
Forces are not capable of protecting the economy, the
infrastructure and their own installations, and that troops are
"not aggressive enough" to defeat the highly-motivated
guerrillas. In spite of efforts by Washington to "educate" the
military about human rights, "assassinations and violations
continue." (36)
"They have all chosen to lie." --Sidney Blanco, Private
Prosecutor (37)
"There is a clear coverup in this case." --Argentinian
Colonel Jose Luis Garcia (38)
"I don't expect spectacular results," said Jesuit Provincial Jose
Maria Tojeira as the eight-day evidentiary period began. Tojeira
explained that the names of the four or five colonels responsible
for the Jesuit assassinations probably would not be known this
week but said the testimonies could contribute to strengthening
the case against the defendants and eventually to the truth. (39)
Eight officers appeared in court this week, including four
colonels, three lieutenants and one captain. Four colonels
(Rivas, Machuca, Montano and Linares) were asked to provide
written statements by June 3, and two defendants, Colonel
Benavides and Lt. Ricardo Espinoze Guerra, were again brought to
appear before court officials and the prosecution.
Benavides and Espinoza Guerra both professed their innocence,
faith in God and the justice system. Benavides told the press,
"I didn't give the orders and I don't know who did." (4)
Espinoza Guerra, the commander of the Atlacatl unit responsible
for the assassinations, said his extrajudicial confession was
"illegal" and, "I didn't have anything to do with it. . . . I
don't know who did it and I did not receive any orders." (41)
Lt. Colonel Camilo Hernandez, who will be tried separately, also
said he had "faith in God," and denied ordering the destruction
of the Military School logbooks: "I didn't order it and I don't
know who did." (42)
An Argentinian Colonel, Jose Luis Garcia, appeared to testify as
to the functioning of an army during a state of emergency. He
concluded that a coverup exists in the case. "It could be a
political problem or an institutional problem," he said, "perhaps
an attitude of `we will defend the institution and its members
above all else.'" (43) Defense attorneys and Colonel Inocente
Montano protested Garcia's participation as "foreign
intervention." Montano added, "It could harm the institution and
set a bad precedent for the country." (44)
"I was going to be Lawrence of Arabia, you know, Eric of El
Salvador. . . . I thought I could save the world. --
Testimony of Major Eric Buckland, January 12, 1991 (45)
Judge Zamora requested the presence of Major Eric Buckland
through diplomatic channels and, according to Ambassador Walker
(46), the U.S. government will allow Buckland to travel to El
Salvador to answer further questions. The eight-day evidentiary
period terminates June 3 but can be extended an additional 90
days at the discretion of the judge; an extensionwould also allow
time for the appearance of other U.S. military and embassy
officials requested by the private prosecutors.
On January 12, 1990, Buckland responded to questions by the FBI
in Washington. A videotape was made of the hour-long interview
which has not yet been made available to the court. A transcript
of the interview has been circulated, however, and reveals a
highly-conflicted man who felt great loyalty to his Salvadoran
counterpart, Colonel Carlos Aviles, and loved El Salvador and all
Salvadorans after only a few months in the country.
"The enemy is not necessarily the guy carrying a weapon;
it's the mouthpiece, too." --Major Eric Buckland, Testimony,
January 12, 1990 (47)
In his testimony Buckland said he was aware of a plan to kill
Ellacuria three weeks before the November offensive. He said he
"would have accepted" the assassination because "Ellacuria was
dirty," but he thought the plot, which involved Benavides, a man
Buckland recognized as Colonel "Leon" (Oscar Leon Linares of the
Atlacatl Battalion), and several other colonels, had been blocked
by Colonel Ponce.
After the assassinations, when his friend Colonel Carlos Aviles
told him Benavides was involved, Buckland says he did not inform
his superior officers because he was "trying to protect El
Salvador," that he was afraid the U.S. government "would pull the
rug out from under the country."
Buckland reportedly suffers great guilt, believing that he
betrayed Aviles by informing North American officials about
Benavides, but he also feels manipulated. "I don't know how deep
or how wide this thing goes, but somebody's dirty. . . . There
was a plot there somewhere and I was somebody's card, Aviles'
card." He believes the objective of the plot was to finish off
the Tandona, "which would have opened the doorr for Aviles and
his boys," and suggests the top five Tandas of the military
should be paid off and sent away, because of the "corruption. . .
I don't want the country to fall." Buckland concludes that he
thought he could "save the world; . . . by helping El Salvador I
could keep this stuff from ever getting to our country." (48)
SOURCES: 1. Diario de Hoy/Notimex, 5/10/91; 2. TV 12, 6/2/91; 3.
Diario Latino, 5/30/91; 4. Radio YSAX, 6/2/91; 5. Radio YSKL,
5/30/91; 6. Radio YSU, 6/1/91; 7. La Prensa Grafica, 5/28/91; 8.
Diario de Hoy/Notimex, 5/30/91; 9. TV 12, 5/30/91; 10. Radio
YSKL, 5/30/91; 10. Radio YSKL, 5/30/91; 11. TV 12, 5/30/91; 12.
Radio Horizonte, 5/30/91; 13. Radio YSKL, 5/31/91; 14. Diario
Latino, 5/29/91; 15. Radio YSKL, 5/31/91; 16. Ibid.; 17. TV 6,
6/1/91; 18. Radio Horizonte, 6/1/91; 19. El Mundo, 6/1/91; 20.
NOTE: The 35 opposition deputies of the CD, UDN and PDC boycotted
the anniversary address, the PDC to protest government economic
and social policies, the CD and UDN to protest the captures of
two CD members last week and the propaganda campaign by
government and military officials against the coalition. "We
cannot accompany the reading of a presidential report that is not
congruent with reality," said PDC leader Roberto Viera. (Diario
Latino, 5/31/91); 21. El Mundo, 6/1/91; 22. Diario de Hoy,
6/3/91; 23. Radio YSKL, 6/3/91; 24. Diario de Hoy, 5/29/91; 25.
Original leaflet; 26. Diario de Hoy, 5/30/91; 27. Radio YSU,
5/30/91; 28. CODYDES, Radio Horizonte, 6/1/91; 29. TV 12, 6/2/91;
30. Dario de Hoy, 5/28/91; 31. Radio YSU, 6/1/91; 32. Radio
Horizonte, 5/28/91; 33. Diario de Hoy, 6/3/91; 34. Radio YSKL,
5/29/91; 35. The GAO is an office of the U.S. Congress; 36. Radio
YSKL, 6/2/91; 37. TV 12, 5/29/91; 38. El Mundo, 5/28/91; 39.
Ibid.; 40. TV 12, 5/29/91; 41. Radio Horizonte, 5/30/91; 42. TV
12, 5/27/92; 43. El Mundo, 5/28/91; 44. TV 12, 5/28/91; 45.
Transcript of Video Declaration of Major Eric Warren Buckland,
January 12, 1990, Washington, DC; 46. TV 12, 5/31/91; 47.
Transcript; 48. Ibid.
Copyright 1991, El Rescate Human Rights Department. This report
may be quoted and partially reprinted on condition that El
Rescate be cited as the source.
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