rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu (06/14/91)
PROCESO 476
June 5, 1991
Stories available in English:
1. Editorial: Disagreement in Caracas
2. Positions harden as the war steps up
3. News Briefs
4. IDHUCA report: Evidence in the UCA case
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PROCESO 476
June 5, 1991
Editorial:
Disagreement in Caracas
The latest round of talks in Caracas ended without any agreements on the
Armed Forces or on a cease-fire. The modest results of this round did appear
to take anyone by surprise. Even its structure and agenda were designed more
along the lines of the methods used in last year's talks than of the recent
marathon round in Mexico. For the seventh time since the United Nations began
mediating the talks, the two sides have come out empty-handed on the issue of
the Armed Forces. This time, however, the customary mutual recriminations and
charges of responsibility for the lack of progress have been much more bitter
than usual, and both Cristiani and the FMLN have expressed an uncommon
readiness to continue and intensify the war until the adversary is beaten
down.
This does not mean that they are about to abandon the negotiating
process. In fact, absolute control over the course of the peace process is not
within anyone's reach. The mediating role of the U.N. has offered an extensive
understanding of the nature of the Salvadoran conflict, in which the four
countries which work most closely with the mediator are now full participants.
Consequently, over and above the appreciations and intentions of the two
sides, the true circumstances and needs of El Salvador are beginning to
dictate the course of the process, although not its speed.
Not even the United States -which used to have no trouble in
manipulating the international image and information available about the
Salvadoran conflict- has been able to escape this new development. The Bush
administration, which at first strongly opposed the arrival of a U.N. human
rights verification mission before a cease-fire was in place, finally gave in
to what western diplomacy considered most opportune.
So despite the inevitable stops and starts, the peace process continues
to forge ahead. This does not mean that all hurdles have been crossed or that
the death squads will not continue to respond to it with violence and
brutality. Our experience made it foreseeable that, after irrational
accusations published by the right wing in El Diario de Hoy against U.N.
mediation and verification, and against "internationalists", the death squads
have once again raised their heads, threatening the lives and possessions of
those Salvadorans who provide services to members of the U.N. verification
mission in particular, and to international humanitarian organizations in
general.
The imminent arrival of ONUSAL and the future establishment of the Truth
Commission have already the provoked new hatred and fear among those who
murdered Monsenor Romero, the U.S. land reform advisers and the four U.S.
religious women, as well as those who ordered the massacres of peasants in Las
Hojas, El Mozote, the Sumpul River, etc.
The Armed Forces has once again promised to fight back against the
extreme right wing, although not once during its thousands of "operatives" and
murder missions has it managed to clash with the death squads. This is the
same type of unfulfilled promise made three months ago by the military after a
new wave of kidnappings of wealthy businessmen came to the public eye, yet
even today, just as in 1986, the military has shown neither the ability nor
the willingness to arrest the kidnappers.
The damage caused to the government's credibility by the brazen
reappearance of the extreme right-wing death squads, both internationally and
in the negotiations, can scarcely be overestimated. It should thus come as no
surprise that Cristiani would rather escalate the confrontation with the FMLN,
even if it means greater suffering for the civilian population. For its part,
official propaganda from the U.S. State Department, far from offering the
Salvadoran government its public support and protection from the death-squad
threat, has adopted the evasive tactics which in Cristiani are understandable,
stubbornly blaming the FMLN for all the setbacks of the Caracas talks.
It cannot be denied that the FMLN has also hardened its position by
going back to the idea of eliminating or merging the two armies. But that is
no excuse for demanding that the rebels compromise on everything that it is
the government's duty to concede for the sake of justice and democracy, but
does not because of military or death-squad veto.
Both Cristiani and the FMLN must be warned that if they step up the
military actions as mutually promised, they will risk hardening instead of
beating down the other side -unless, of course, one side's military drive
brings the other to the point of collapse, which is obviously far from
occurring in El Salvador.
If military pressure is not the solution, then what is the use of
sweeping the murderers and death squads out of the army, an ethical
prerequisite to any cease-fire and future disarming of the rebels? The
specious response of the United States has been simply to ignore and cover up
for the terrorist nature of the Armed Forces. Meanwhile, the only viable
alternative, even though only in the medium and long term, lies in the
effectiveness of the slow and costly process of U.N. verification and
monitoring of institutionalized violence.
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PROCESO 476
June 5, 1991
Positions harden as the war steps up
The two parties to the negotiations agree that the peace talks have
reached an stage which will irreversibly lead to the end of the war. During
the latest round of talks held on the outskirts of Caracas, Venezuela, from
May 24 to June 2, the two sides did not, however, reach any agreements around
the hoped-for establishment of a cease-fire. Thus, as the two sides' positions
on the different points of the negotiating agenda become increasingly
difficult to reconcile, the levels of armed confrontation are escalating.
The month of May saw the highest level of military activity so far this
year, with 47 confrontations and 32 rebel attacks, according to reports from
the Armed Forces Press Office (COPREFA). The fighting left 149 casualties (34
dead and 115 wounded) on the government side and 152 casualties (58 dead and
94 wounded) among the rebels. Radio Venceremos, on the other hand, said in its
monthly report that the rebels had caused a total of 771 government
casualties, including 11 officers and 14 NCOs. The rebel radio station also
reported that its stepped-up campaign of sabotage targeting the electrical
system had knocked down 258 towers and posts and had included attacks against
three hydroelectric energy plants and four electrical sub-stations.
Difficult progress in the peace talks
The negotiations continue to unfold within this adverse context, with a
clear hardening of positions on both sides. The recent Caracas meeting was
held in an atmosphere of mutual recrimination, with each side accusing the
other of obstructing the peace process and negotiating in bad faith.
The army accused the FMLN of launching a plan to destabilize the nation
by manipulating unions, promoting land takeovers and public sector strikes,
and sabotaging the nation's electrical production and distribution system. The
FMLN complained that Cristiani does not have the power to implement the
agreements signed by the government negotiating team last April. Rebel leaders
said the fact that the constitutional amendments agreed upon during the last
round and passed by the outgoing legislature have yet to be ratified by the
current legislature only shows that the government is unable to fulfill the
commitments it makes in the talks. The FMLN proposed that the negotiations
include "new mechanisms and better guarantees which reinforce its credibility"
as a way to overcome these weaknesses in the process.
In the FMLN's view, military actions are the best means to pressure the
government and the Armed Forces to undertake a real restructuring of
Salvadoran society. Thus the rebels are reluctant to agree to a cease-fire in
the absence of previous measures which would guarantee that El Salvador is
truly on the road to democracy. Faced with the military's stubborn resistence
to measures aimed at cleaning up its ranks and restructuring the institution,
the FMLN has revised the terms under which it would be willing to progress to
a cease-fire, a measure so vital to consolidating and furthering the peace
process.
The FMLN holds that a cease-fire does not imply unconditional surrender.
On the contrary, just before the latest round of talks in Venezuela, rebel
leaders said repeatedly that the FMLN not only plans to hold on to its weapons
during a future cease-fire, but also demands full protection for carrying out
political activities during the period it terms "armed peace," with freedom of
travel and access to all mass media. On May 26, the FMLN put forth a new
demand related to this point: in a Radio Venceremos broadcast, the rebels
declared that they would only sign a cease-fire once the U.S. government
ordered a "total" cutoff of military aid to the Salvadoran Armed Forces,
saying, "Washington must understand that the time has come for a total cutoff
of U.S. aid, logistics and advisers for the war." Providing a broader context
for this position, rebel commander Shafick Handal stated, "the goal in El
Salvador is not only to silence the guns. The war is not isolated from the
whole of national reality. The war is an effort to transform the nation, its
political life, and to unify the nation around a certain form of economic
development and democracy."
In this context of mutual recrimination, it was assumed from the start
of the last round of talks that no cease-fire agreement would be reached.
"Let's not have any illusions about an immediate cease-fire; this will be the
most complex and difficult peace process ever negotiated by the United
Nations," commented a source close to the negotiations.
The principal discrepancies between the two sides had to do with the
future of the Armed Forces. Specifically, the FMLN delegation accused the
other side of trying to modify the U.N. document on how to restructure the
military, with the aim of "doing everything possible to delay the
negotiations." Commander Handal told the press that the government delegation
had proposed at least 40 changes to the document, all directed at "eliminating
the possibility of ending military impunity."
Such differences made it impossible for the two sides to sign any
agreements at all during this round of talks. The FMLN accused the government
of hardening its position on military isues. The government delegation, in
turn, accused the FMLN of intransigence. Consequently, the talks ended in a
deadlock. U.N. mediator Alvaro de Soto did not appear discouraged, however,
and expressed confidence that the peace process is irreversible: "No, the
talks have not bogged down. Evidently, an effort of this kind will always have
its ups and downs, but I have the impression that here in Caracas we have not
broken off the talks, but rather have suspended a process that still has a
chance of success."
Military context of the negotiations
Even though stepped-up military activity before each round of talks has
become the norm, the level of violence related to this latest set of talks in
Caracas was higher than usual. The FMLN in particular has abandoned its
previous position of keeping a low military profile so as not to interfere in
the negotiations, presumably because the army has not reciprocated.
The FMLN denounced an enormous army military operation targeting
guerrilla-held zones. The Armed Forces' campaign was reportedly of an
extraordinary magnitude, covering eight of the nation's 14 departments and
including over 100 companies, six elite battalions and 20 regional battalions.
According to COPREFA reports, there were 25 clashes and 14 rebel attacks in
eight departments from May 21-31 alone.
FMLN offensive activities continue to prove the rebels' ability to
operate throughout the entire country, including in the army's strategic
rearguard. Some of these actions, however, have taken an unjustifiable toll on
the civilian population. On May 21, guerrillas attacked forward positions of
the Fifth Infantry Brigade near San Vicente, and harassed Brigade headquarters
as well as the National Police and National Guard with rifle fire and
explosives.
On May 22, urban commandos attacked the headquarters of the First
Infantry Brigade in San Salvador, launching at least twelve grenades with
RPG-7 and RPG-18 weapons fired from the eastern side of the barracks. The
shots showed wretched aim. Only one hit the military target, while another hit
a private home, killing two women aged 52 and 55. The attack also left six
civilians and three soldiers wounded; ten houses were damaged and two private
automobiles were destroyed. On May 28, the urban commandos launched another
botched attack against the barracks. This time, only one shot was fired from
an RPG-7, hitting a private home in Colonia Vairo and wounding two civilians.
As part of the ongoing rebel campaign against the electrical system,
FMLN units attacked the "Jalacatl" electrical substation located on the
outskirts of San Miguel, and blew up a number of posts and towers in many
parts of the country.
The negotiations are up against the historic challenge of putting a
stop, as soon as possible, to the irrational maelstrom of violence which is
bleeding the country to death. Yet the meager and slow progress of the talks
only benefit militaristic positions on both sides. Recent mutual warnings of
more war leave little room for hope.
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PROCESO 476
June 5, 1991
News Briefs:
CRUSADE: On May 30, the morning daily El Diario de Hoy published an open
letter from the Crusade for Peace and Work to Supreme Court president Mauricio
Gutierrez Castro, urging him to take legal action to prevent the "imminent and
illegal arrival of the delegation of United Nations officials, ONUSAL, who
plan to implement a transition from a government which was legitimately
elected by the Salvadoran people to a de facto government produced by
'consensus'in the negotiations currently taking place between the government
and the FMLN murderers." The Crusade placed the arrival of ONUSAL in the
overall framework of "attacks by national and international organized neo-
communism-socialism against our beloved fatherland."
PONCE: Defense Minister Rene Emilio Ponce promised that the Armed Forces would
investigate the origin of the so-called "Salvadoran Anticommunist Front" which
recently passed out leaflets threatening foreigners linked to organizations
such as ONUSAL, the International Red Cross, Doctors without Borders and other
"internationalists," calling them "Communists." According to Gen. Ponce, so
far the Armed Forces has "no leads which could help locate [the Front's]
members, but we will continue to investigate in order to prevent the threats
from being carried out."
KILLERS: On May 29, in statements before the Fourth Penal Court, Col.
Guillermo Benavides reiterated his claim to innocence in the case of the UCA
massacre: "I have faith in the all-powerful Lord, my conscience is at peace
and I am confident that by the end of the investigation, justice will be done
in El Salvador... I am the party most interested in seeing that this
investigation gets to the bottom of things." He stated that the only reason he
has been charged is because he was head of the security commando of the zone
in which the murders took place. Nevertheless, he was unable to explain his
relationship to the commandos who carried out the crime. Lt. Jose Ricard
Espinoza Guerra, head at the time of the Atlacatl Battalion commando unit
which carried out the massacre, testified on May 30 that he was innocent and
that his supposed extrajudicial confession was written by the Commission to
Investigate Criminal Acts, which he says behaved unprofessionally. Espinoza
added, "I'm still asking myself why we were charged... whether all of this is
based on mere presumption."
REPORT: President Cristiani, in a report on his second year in government read
before the Legislative Assembly on June 1, stressed: "In our position as
General Commander of the Armed Forces, we wish to reiterate and make perfectly
clear that in the negotiations currently taking place, the existence itself of
the Armed Forces is not on the table. The military will continue to be the
only armed wing of the Salvadoran people." He added, "The military is the
bastion of institutionality of our fatherland, which means it has a higher
level of identification with the interests and yearnings of the people, while
maintaining its apolitical nature and loyally fulfilling its constitutional
duties." Legislative deputies from the Christian Democratic Party (PDC),
Democratic Convergence (CD) and Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN) did not
attend the speech.
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PROCESO 476
June 5, 1991
IDHUCA Report:
Evidence in the UCA case
On May 23rd, Fourth Penal Judge Ricardo Zamora opened a period in the
trial phase of the UCA case in which new evidence could be introduced. For
private prosecutors Henry Campos and Sidney Blanco, this new period offered an
opportunity to further explain their viewpoints on the progress of the case
and to introduce new petitions which would widen the range of evidence
registered in the case files and attempt to clear up the many discrepancies.
Surely for the private prosecutors and families of the victims, this was a
last chance to try and compensate for the many serious flaws seen in the case
to date, and perhaps rectify some of them before it is too late. We should
recall that on May 6th, the two young lawyers made their debut in the case by
presenting the same Fourth Penal Judge with a 36-page brief which is the
cornerstone of the private prosecutors' strategy to establish the truth and
seek justice in this crucial case.
In this new stage, and as a second important step, the private
prosecutors presented a 50-page brief written with the purpose of
"making this admittedly limited period useful in finding out a little
more about the events which culminated in the unjust and horrendous
crime of November 16, 1989; but first, we will present a general
exposition on the progress of the investigation which, in the current
stage, demonstrates that the administration of justice still faces an
enormous challenge given the obstruction and lack of good faith on the
part of sectors of the Armed Forces and private interest groups,
attitudes which are still tolerated by some public officials, regardless
of whether the voices of various sectors of Salvadoran society are heard
or understood in the frustrating silence which demands truth and
justice."
The brief carefully and critically analyzes the investigations carried out so
far, the role played by the Commission to Investigate Criminal Acts, the work
of the Honor Commission, and the investigative work of the Court during 1990;
this is followed by a petition to the Court to carry out a series of
proceedings. It is worth recalling that this stage in the case is very short
yet very dynamic; there are only eight peremptory days to produce the
requested evidence and sworn statements.
Within this context, the private prosecutors asked the judge to order
the Defense Ministry to turn over a number of documents which could help solve
the crime and reinforce the evidence against the defendants. They also asked
the judge to send requests for information to the director of the National
Police, the President of El Salvador, the United States Embassy, and the head
of the Executive Unit (SIU) of the Commission to Investigate Criminal Acts. In
particular, some 30 requests for information were addressed to Defense
Minister Rene Emilio Ponce alone. In a ruling on May 23, the judge invalidated
eleven of these requests on the part of the private prosecutors and accepted
the rest.
The private prosecutors proposed four face-to-face "confrontations"
before the judge between pairs of witnesses who had contradicted each other
during the phase of instruction: generals Rene Emilio Ponce and Juan Orlando
Zepeda; colonels Carlos Mauricio Guzman Aguilar and Oscar Alberto Leon
Linares; colonels Dionisio Ismael Machuca and Manuel Antonio Rivas, in
relation to the work of the Honor Commission and the SIU; and Col. Juan
Vicente Eguizabal and Maj. Rene Guillermo Contreras Barrera, who needed to
clarify which of the two was responsible for the report stating that
"terrorist delinquents using automatic weapons murdered the 'JESUIT
fathers'... on the grounds ... of the UCA at 00:30 hours on 16 November," as
well as who was collecting information on enemy activity.
The judge only admitted the last of these confrontations, arguing that
the other proposed witnesses have the privilege of testifying in writing. The
encounter between Col. Eguizabal and Maj. Contreras never took place because
the latter failed to show up at the court on May 29th.
One of the stumbling-blocks in the case has always been the fact that
top military officers, among others, enjoy the privilege of not having to
testify in person. During a meeting with President Cristiani and members of
the High Command last August, the judge suggested that the administration of
justice in this case would benefit from personal testimony on the part of
these top officials. President Cristiani waived his privilege and testified in
person before the court. For almost a month subsequently, a number of top
military officers followed his example and also waived their privilege. But
since October 2nd, no top military officer has waived his privilege; it is
worth mentioning that Defense Minister Rene Emilio Ponce has never waived his
privilege and has provided three sworn statements only in writing.
The private prosecutors also requested that a number of previous
witnesses -almost all of them top military officers- elaborate on their
previous statements given during the phase of instruction. The judge agreed to
cite only Col. Guzman Aguilar, former SIU chief Col. Rivas, and U.S. Major and
former military adviser Erick Buckland. Col. Rivas failed to appear before the
court, apparently because he felt he was among those who enjoy the privilege
of not testifying in person according to Art. 205 of the Criminal Procedural
Code. New testimony was requested from Maj. Buckland in light of his January
1990 statements to the FBI, in which he claimed to have had prior knowledge of
a plan to murder the Jesuits; this information was not made available to the
judge until after Buckland testified in person before the court in San
Salvador last September. Attempts to obtain Buckland's testimony this time
were frustrated because Foreign Ministry paperwork took too long to meet the
peremptory eight-day deadline stipulated by law for the period of new
evidence. The judge will request Buckland's testimony before a rogatory
commission in the United States during an extraordinary period of new evidence
which lasts three months.
The private prosectors also asked for a number of new witnesses to be
called: Eugenio Acosto Rodriguez, in charge of Radio Cuscatlan at the moment
of the crime; Col. Francisco Elena Fuentes, commander of the First Infantry
Brigade; Col. Inocente Orlando Montano, vice-minister of Public Security;
Mauricio Sandoval, head at the time of the National Information Center;
Enrique Altamirano Madriz, director of the daily El Diario de Hoy; and
Argentinian colonel Jose Luis Garcia. Acosta and Sandoval were to be
questioned about the threats against the Jesuits aired on Radio Cuscatlan
during the open-mike broadcasts heard at the beginning of the November 1989
offensive.
The only new witness admitted by the judge was the Argentinian colonel,
who was asked to clarify a number of issues related to how an army operates
under similar crisis and security circumstances such as those seen during the
offensive, as well as different levels of command and responsibility. Since
statements made by top Salvadoran military chiefs during the phase of
instruction produced confusion and even flagrant discrepancies around these
points, the private prosecutors were forced to resort to an independent expert
on the matter. The defense attorneys and Col. Montano opposed the appearance
by the Argentinian officer, calling it just another expression of "foreign
intervention." As Fr. Tojeira, Jesuit Provincial for Central America,
explained in reply to these comments, Col. Garcia came to El Salvador to
"state clearly how an army functions institutionally." His testimony was
unequivocal, and the judgments he proffered totally refute the military's
position which holds that the authors of the massacre were isolated
individuals acting on their own.
The private prosecutors also requested that defendants Guillermo Alfredo
Benavides and Jose Ricardo Espinoza Guerra expand on their previous testimony.
Both reiterated their innocence, as did Lt. Col. Carlos Camilo Hernandez.
Finally, the private prosecutors requested the establishment of rogatory
commissions in foreign courts in order to hear the testimony of a number of
witnesses who are outside El Salvador, almost all of whom are U.S. military
officers or officials formerly assigned to the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador.
Their jobs and work relationships put them in a position to know certain
details about the crime, and none of them has voluntarily offered to share
their information. The judge may extend the strict eight-day deadline, which
has already expired, for a period of three months in order to obtain testimony
from witnesses overseas. Diplomatic channels must be used to get these
witnesses to testify, and it can be assumed that almost all have diplomatic
immunity. Accordingly, the U.S. government must decide not to waive diplomatic
immunity in order to cooperate fully with Salvadoran justice, or not. It will
also have to guarantee that all bureaucratic paperwork is taken care of during
the three-month period, otherwise this testimony will also be lost. This
opportunity has become a true yardstick to measure the real willingness of the
U.S. government to solve the murders at any cost, thus permitting a break with
institutionalized impunity. If this does not occur, it will be a fatal setback
for U.S. efforts to establish a sound judicial system in El Salvador.
Besides all these requests made by the young lawyers, the judge used his
own powers to request sworn statements from the members of the High Command
who signed a letter dated February 22nd, 1991, asking the Commission to
Investigate Criminal Acts to broaden its investigation. The judge also cited
several military witnesses.
One of them, Cap. Luis Alberto Parada Fuentes, on active duty in the
National Intelligence Directorate (DNI) in November, 1989, testified on May
28th that Cap. Fernando Herrera Carranza had found out about the death of Fr.
Ellacuria by MX [military] radio on the morning of November 16th, and that at
the time, the news was that "Ellacuria had been killed while resisting
arrest." Col. Guzman Aguilar, then-head of the DNI, who also testified on May
28th, insisted that Herrera Carranza had heard of the murders over commercial
radio.
The judge also called two officers who had staff responsibilities in the
security commando headed by Benavides at the time of the crime, majors Herbert
Oswaldo Vides Lucha (intelligence) and Miguel Castillo Gonzalez (operations).
The two once again denied any knowledge of the operation which culminated in
the murders, despite their strategic positions on Benavides' staff and their
presence in the Military Academy that night. The judge asked other military
officers, including colonels Leon Linares and Machuca, to send sworn
statements.
This latest period, which ended June 3rd, obviously produced no
spectacular results. But in a way, as Fr. Tojeira said, "it could help to firm
up the already-existing evidence against the defendants, and could also help
establish more clearly that there are others who masterminded the crime."
For this prospect to become real, vigorous action is needed on the part
of the U.S. government, which must waive diplomatic immunity and allow its
staff to "tell what they know." Congressmember Joe Moakley, chairman of the
House Task Force monitoring this case, has stated that the recent House
decision to delay any consideration on U.S. military aid to the Salvadoran
army until September is aimed to help "bring to justice all those officers and
soldiers of the Armed Forces who may have been involved in the murders of the
six Jesuits and their two co-workers." This is a wise decision. There is a
deep conviction shared by many Salvadorans that the truth has not emerged in
this case, as if some hidden forces are trying to "block out the sun with one
finger." Let us see if events over the next three months produce a significant
turnabout in the state of affairs in this final stretch leading to the jury
trial.
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