rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu (06/24/91)
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U.S. MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE DRUG WAR IN PERU AND BOLIVIA
by Margaret Quigley
Media coverage of the U.S.-led drug war in Peru and Bolivia
has been marred by an uncritical acceptance of the Bush and
Reagan Administrations' theory of narco-terrorism. Narco-
terrorism (the term was coined by U.S. Ambassador Lewis Tambs in
1984 in the mistaken belief that revolutionary guerrillas were
defending a drug traffickers' laboratory) is an analysis which
assumes an extensive and ongoing alliance between drug
traffickers and leftist guerrillas. Under narco-terrorism theory,
U.S. drug war forces engage in counterinsurgency against those it
defines as narco-terrorists in order to eliminate cocaine
production and by doing so eradicate cocaine use in the United
States.
Narco-terrorism has become the cornerstone of U.S. drug war
policy, and military aid virtually the only aid available to
coca-growing countries, despite forceful arguments for the need
for meaningful, economic development aid for coca-growing
countries, including a well-funded crop substitution program to
help farmers switch to crops other than cocaine. Peruvian
journalist Gustavo Gorriti, among others, has argued ("Atlantic",
7-89) for a shift in the drug war's focus from counterinsurgency
to economic development. More recently, Peru's President Alberto
Fujimori declined all U.S. military aid after his request for
development aid was ignored, despite a last minute trip to Peru
by Vice President Quayle urging him to accept the military aid.
Under narco-terrorism, international drug traffickers,
members of violent revolutionary guerrilla movements like the
Sendero Luminoso ("Shining Path"), and poor coca-growing farmers
are all equally essential targets of the drug war. Media coverage
has spoken, for example, of the need for the U.S. to "help Peru's
fragile democracy defend itself" against the farmers who grow
coca as well as against the leftist guerrillas ("U.S. News and
World Report", 9-18-89). In contrast, the Peruvian army, while
supportive of counterinsurgency efforts against leftist rebels,
rejects narco-terrorism theory and argues that coca eradication
projects, in the absence of development and crop substitution
aid, actually force small farmers to turn to revolutionary
movements. General Alberto Arciniega has argued, "To be a drug
trafficker and a coca grower are two different things...I want to
attack the coca problem--but not by attacking the "campesino"."
("New York Times Magazine", 3-4-90) The Congress of Bolivian
Workers has stated that, while it does not support narco-
traffickers, "it is peasants who have suffered from state
violence while narco-traffickers and their laboratories appear to
enjoy immunity." ("Guardian" , 10-25-89)
Other criticisms of narco-terrorism theory have been raised
but have failed to receive substantial mainstream media coverage.
Narco-terrorism absorbs the majority of funds earmarked for the
drug war (more than seventy per cent of U.S. funds to fight drugs
goes to the police and military). As a result, other possible
approaches to decrease drug use in the United States are ignored
or de-emphasized, including stopping the flow of U.S.-made
solvents necessary for cocaine production (and not available in
the coca-growing and cocaine-producing countries) or interdicting
cocaine at the U.S. borders or after its entry to the United
States. Additionally, the exploration of supply-side approaches,
such as expanding domestic drug education and treatment programs
in order to reduce the U.S.'s demand for cocaine are also de-
emphasized.
The single-mindedness of narco-terrorism theory also
obscures coverage of the racial issues underpinning much of the
conflict in the region. In its drive to eradicate the centuries-
old traditional cultivation and use of coca by the mostly Indian
farmers in the Andean region rather than to eliminate cocaine or
cocaine use, narco-terrorism theory has been called culturally
insensitive as well as naive. In general, the media make only
infrequent references to racial realities in Peru, a country with
a majority Indian population dominated by a white minority. For
example, one article in the "Washington Post" (2-2-90) did mention
that the mass arrests of 15,000 people in February was "largely
an exercise in rounding up the usual suspects: young, dark-
skinned men with Indian features." The same article claimed,
however, that it was the white minority that feels "under attack
by a majority that stems mostly from Indian stock."
Media reports of the 1989 presidential election in Peru
provide another clear example of the media's failure to deal
adequately with racial politics. Novelist and newcomer to
politics Mario Vargas Llosa was a conservative advocating an IMF-
style austerity program and supported primarily by the wealthy,
most of European descent. Alberto Fujimori (of Japanese descent
and also a political novice) received extensive support from poor
Peruvians, mostly Indians; Fujimori opposed Vargas Llosa's
economic program, claiming it would create too much suffering.
Although most of the media avoided explicit mention of the racial
and class issues infusing the race, coverage often resonated with
the undertones of such politics. Vargas Llosa, for example, was
described by the "Washington Post" as a "patrician savior" and an
"urbane man of the First World who happened to be born in the
Third and suffers it `like a disease.'" The "Post" described
Fujimori, on the other hand, as "a dark horse" with "a simple
message" and as "the undistinguished president of the National
Engineering University and the former host of a little-watched
political talk show...not even a prominent member of the 100,000
strong Japanese community in Lima."
Media coverage, which under the influence of narco-terrorism
has minimized the importance of such complex factors as poverty
and race, has also provided inadequate coverage both of human
rights abuses by the Peruvian government and of activities by
government-allied right-wing death squads. Media coverage has
instead placed a disproportionate emphasis on the Peruvian
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) revolutionary guerrilla movement,
which is seen as a principal ally of international drug
traffickers. In Peru, the claimed link between drug traffickers
and the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla movement has been variously
described as a "tactical alliance" ("Los Angeles Times", 9-11-89),
an "uneasy coexistence" ("Newsweek", 4-24-89), a "constantly
shifting alliance" ("Boston Globe", 6-15-9), or even "an
ideological convergence of interests." ("American Spectator", 7-89)
Most often, however, assumptions about the identity between
the Sendero Luminoso and drug traffickers are implicit rather
than expressed. "New York Times" reporting was typical in its
conflation of drug traffickers with guerrillas. One story (3-18-
90) mentioned that U.S. aid "may be used against narcotics
traffickers or against their guerrilla protectors," quoting an
American official who said "You can't draw a black and white line
between the two." The "Times" later (4-12-90) headlined an account
of a clash between guerrillas and U.S. civilian troops, "U.S.
Pilots in Peru Join Battle Against Forces of Coca Trade."
Another "Times" headline (4-22-90) stated, "U.S. Will Arm Peru to
Fight Leftists in New Drug Push." The story described Sendero
Luminoso as "an increasingly important factor in anti-drug
operations, blurring the line between counterinsurgency and the
cocaine war."
In fact, the exact relationship between the Sendero Luminoso
and the narco-traffickers who act as emissaries from the
Colombian cocaine cartels is unclear. In a "NACLA Report on the
Americas" (3-89) on "Coca: the Real Green Revolution," Jo Ann
Kawell described the relationship as a "complex and highly
conflictive" one where "Sendero does not act at the behest of the
narcos or in alliance with them." It seems clear that the
Sendero guerrillas collect a mandatory "tax" on the farmers'
coca, as they do on all products in the regions they control, in
exchange for advocating for the farmers with the drug
traffickers, whose activities the guerrillas also tax. In an
article that discusses at length the Sendero guerrillas' brutal
acts against farmers, prostitutes, and homosexuals, among others,
the "New Yorker" (1-4-88) also concludes that Sendero Luminoso does
not itself take part in the drug trade.
Nevertheless, media coverage has consistently accepted the
U.S. contention that war against Sendero Luminoso is a necessary
part of the drug war. The violent activities of the Sendero
Luminoso have provided a number of sensationalistic stories,
including "Bloody Footprints on Peru's Shining Path" ("U.S. News
and World Report", 9-18-89), "With the Shining Path: A Rare and
Risky Encounter With Peru's Fanatic Guerrilla Movement"
("Newsweek", 4-24-89), and "Terror Coming Out of the Hills: We Walk
With Fear" ("Los Angeles Times", 7-1-88) At the same time, while
the media repeatedly describe Sendero guerrillas as savage,
brutal, evil, and murderous, the drug traffickers who buy the
coca, transform it into cocaine, and ship it to the United States
at immense profit, are barely mentioned. The war against drugs
has become, in the popular media, the war against the Sendero
Luminoso. In May, for example, the "New York Times" (5-20-90)
reported, "Drug experts in La Paz said the presence of the
Shining Path guerrilla organization in Peru greatly inhibited
raids and other interdiction activities against drug laboratories
and traffickers there. As a result, they said, the price of coca
leaf in Peru has not collapsed as in Bolivia." No other
viewpoint was presented.
Nor have the mainstream media adequately covered the
government's role in the deaths of more than 15,000 citizens
during the ten-year conflict, which has been marked by extensive
human rights abuses by both sides. Amnesty International has
documented that "a high proportion of the dead were victims of
extrajudicial execution by government forces" and that more than
3,000 people have "disappeared" in the past eight years, the
highest rate of forced disappearances in the world.
The "New Yorker" has commented that "there is a feeling among
human rights monitors in the country that the severity of the
repression [in Peru] has not really registered with the
international community." Media coverage which ignores
government human rights abuses contributes to this. For example,
a number of newspapers and magazines (including "U.S. News and
World Report", 5-25-87) have referred without elaboration to
Sendero Luminoso's "loss of key leaders in a bloody prison
uprising." As an Amnesty International report established in
early 1987, several hundred Sendero prisoners who had already
surrendered to prison officials were nevertheless executed on the
spot by government forces.
Coverage by the "New York Times" also provides a good example
of how the government's role in political violence can be
obscured. The "Times" (3/25/90) initially reported accurately that
deaths from political violence in Peru--3,198 reported in
1989--were "about evenly divided" between the government and
Sendero guerrillas. Less than a month later, however, the "Times"
(4/22/90) claimed, "Last year, 3,198 deaths were attributed to
guerrilla violence--a five year high." The next day, even the
"Times"' liberal columnist Tom Wicker referred to the 3,198 "deaths
attributed to the guerrillas" in 1989.
Media coverage has sometimes read like an apologia for the
government's bloody counterinsurgency war. The "Los Angeles Times"
(7-1-88) reported, "This frustration [over Sendero Luminoso
violence] has persuaded many officials that there is no option
but to respond to rebel brutality with army brutality." The "New
York Times" (8-31-88) stated, "Some Government officials have
argued privately that human rights abuses committed by security
forces will be reduced if the new anti-terrorist legislation
closes legal loopholes that until now have been skillfully
exploited by Shining Path and its lawyers."
Coverage of the government-sponsored Rodrigo Franco Command
(RFC), a right-wing death squad that first surfaced in 1988, has
also been marked by an inadequate and uncritical analysis. For
example, the "Los Angeles Times" (8-17-89) was still referring to
"alleged right-wing death squads" nine months after a "New York
Times" (12-4-88) story, "Death Gang Linked to Peru's Rulers,"
reported that "extremists within Peru's leading party are
sponsoring a paramilitary group that has claimed credit for death
threats, bombings, and at least two murders over the past four
months." About the same time, a "Newsweek" story (12-26-88)
commented, "Despite the rising [Sendero Luminoso] violence,
Peruvian courts convicted only 5% of the suspected terrorists who
were brought to trial last year. A frustrated Rodrigo Franco
Command vows that a rebel or sympathizer will now die for every
government official slain." Although the article mentioned that
the Rodrigo Franco Command (which it described as made up of
"disaffected police, soldiers and party hotheads") had threatened
"journalists, human rights activists, television comics who poke
fun at the government, even the government's own investigators,"
it failed to question the RFC's claim that it would kill only
those who were rebels or sympathizers. A year later, only the
socialist "Guardian" (11-8-89) reported that all documents
collected by the parliamentary commission investigating the links
between Peru's ruling party and the RFC death squad had
disappeared.
For the most part, the national media has ignored the
current and historical role of the CIA in drug wars and drug
trafficking. For example, the "New York Times" published a number
of stories (3-15-89, 5-7-89) that praised Bolivia's then-
presidential candidate Hugo Banzer Suarez, without mentioning
either Banzer's well-documented ties to drug traffickers or the
role the CIA played in the coup that brought him to power as
Bolivia's military dictator ("In These Times", 5-3/9-89; "Guardian",
7-7-89)).
Nor has the CIA-sponsored privatisation of the drug war in
Peru and Bolivia, paralleling that of the Nicaraguan contra
supply network, received much coverage. In fact, a "New York
Times" story (3-25-90), which discussed the CIA's drug-trafficking
role in Southeast Asia during the 1970's but failed to mention
the CIA's role in today's drug war, was incongruously headlined,
"CIA Shedding Its Reluctance to Aid in Fight Against Drugs." An
early story on the CIA's role appeared in "The Nation" (8-13/20-88)
and this year the "Philadelphia Inquirer" (5-30-90) revealed that
"a dozen veterans of the Reagan Administration's illicit effort
to aid Nicaragua's contra rebels" were working on the war against
cocaine in Peru, including several civilian pilots employed by
the CIA-linked National Air Transport and executives of Betac
Corporation, a consultant to the Defense Department on the drug
war. Two weeks later, a "New York Times" article (6-13-90) detailed
a number of problems facing National Air Transport, including the
indictment of the company's chief aircraft operations officer for
conspiracy to smuggle drugs. Although the article, "Management
Woes Hobble U.S. Air Fleet in Drug War," did not mention the
"Inquirer"'s allegations, it did claim that there was no current
CIA link to National Air Transport.
The ideology of the war against drugs, as played out in the
U.S. media, has substituted sensationalism and jingoism for a
more complex analysis. The media has both failed to describe
adequately and failed to look critically at the role of the
American-led drug war in the Andean countries. The theory of
narco-terrorism is being used to legitimize the transfer of
massive amounts of military equipment, without congressional
approval, to countries with enormous needs for peaceful economic
development. As drug war becomes literal war, media coverage of
the U.S. drug war in Peru and Bolivia has continued to filter
information uncritically through the lens of narco-terrorism,
which distorts as much as it reveals.
***Margaret Quigley is an Archivist with Political Research
Associates in Cambridge, Mass. This article originally appeared,
in a shorter form, in "Extra!", the newsletter of the New York-
based media watchdog group, Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting.