Bo Chi <chi@vlsi.waterloo.edu> (02/04/91)
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china news digest.china net.social culture china.china study forum (1-31-91)
Contents
Notes from the Editor
In Search of the Chinese Self......................................Zhitian Luo
An Old Man, His Sinking Boat, and the Roaring Ocean.....................Xingyi
Some Thoughts on Skocpol's STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS..........Qingjia Wang
(280 Lines)
Notes from the Editor
The 21st century is around the corner. Is China, as a nation, ready for
the future? Are Chinese intellectuals competent for the role when history
moves forward? Or have they successfully identified their role facing the
changes in today's world, East and West? The most possible way to answer these
frustrating questions is to look at what they have experienced and to examine
the history when Chinese people lingered over similar questions at the turn of
the 20th century. Mr. Luo Zhitian's review focuses on two Western studies that
have attempted to recapitulate the hard path of Liang Qichao, the most
influential Chinese reformer of this century, towards self-identity. However,
the review writer's effort goes beyond objective reading of the two books.
Following a similar line, Xingyi wants to introduce the private side of Li
Hongzhang, another significant figure in the modern Chinese history, especially
the history of reforming China's age-old tradition to respond to the Western
challenge. Mr. Wang Qingjia introduces a distinguished scholarship on
revolution, the most striking social phenomenon of Chinese society in this
century. By putting these pieces together, the editor hopes, as Chinese say,
"Cast a brick to get a gem"--a modest spur to induce others to come forward
with valuable contributions. The satisfactory answers to the above questions,
and, thus, to China's future, doubtlessly depend on efforts of generations of
Chinese men and women, especially Chinese intellectuals.
**********************************************
In Search of the Chinese Self
LIANG CH'I-CH'AO AND THE MIND OF MODERN CHINA. By Joseph R. Levenson.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard. 1959.
LIANG CH'I-CH'AO AND INTELLECTUAL TRANSITION IN CHINA, 1890-1917. By Hao Chang.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard. 1971.
Zhitian Luo (Dept. of History, Princeton University)
Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao (Liang Qichao, 1873-1929) was among the very first Chinese
intellectuals who supported the radical reform of the traditional Chinese
society. After the conservative coup of 1898, he was exiled to Japan and
gradually split with the ideas of constitutional monarchy advocated by his
teacher Kang Youwei. He is one of the very few Chinese intellectuals who has
become the subject of at least three systematic studies in English. (The third
study by Philip C. Huang will not covered by this review.)
Mr. Joseph Levenson's sparkling pioneer work is built on the assumption
that "every man has an emotional commitment to history and an intellectual
commitment to value, and he tries to make these commitments coincide." With
Western impact in the 19th century, however, "history and value were torn apart
in many Chinese minds." In Liang's case, he "was intellectually alienated from
his tradition, seeing values elsewhere [the West], but still emotionally tied
to it, held by his history." And Liang's whole intellectual life is but a
continuous struggle of seeking to ease such a tension by smothering the
conflict between history and value. Facing the sharp contrast between Chinese
failure and Western success in history, Liang made unremitting efforts, though
from different approaches at different stages of his life, to assert "the
equivalence of China and the West" in value, while China itself was in "full
process of Westernization." This is Liang's "personal identity", Levenson
claims, by citing Alfred Whitehead, "a locus which persists, an emplacement for
all the occasions of experience." It is also a question concerned and answered
by the generation of Zhang Zhidong previous to Liang and the generation of the
communists after Liang, a question "to which each of the society's simultaneous
ideas can be construed as an answer." Thus, from the intellectual development
of an individual thinker, Liang Qichao, Levenson has been able to read to
Chinese society on the whole and "the mind of modern China."
Levenson divides Liang's life into three phases. From 1873 to 1898, Liang
"tried to smuggle Western values into Chinese history" by arguing that "Western
and Chinese ideals were really the same." From 1898 to 1912, he discarded his
Confucian cover, but took the issue of nations instead of cultures for
comparison and presented the issue in cultural-change as between "the new" and
"the old", not between the West and China. Finally, after World War I, he
reintroduced "the West" and "China" as meaningful abstractions but arranged
them in a dichotomy of "matter", the advancement of the West, and "spirit", the
forte of China.
Mr. Hao Chang's framework is that "the intellectual changes that took place
in the decade from the mid 1890s to the early 1900s" is a more important
watershed than the May Fourth generation in the cultural transition from
traditional to modern China." Liang "stands as a central figure" who linked
Confucian past with present intellectual schools. The nationalist aspect of
Liang's ideal of "new citizen" was shared by the neo-traditionalists, the
liberals, and the communists.. This looks very much like Levenson's notion of
intellectual transition from Confucian culturalism to modern (Western)
nationalism. However, Chang considers the Chinese intellectuals responding to
the external impact within the traditional Chinese, notably Confucian, context.
Chang suggests there were two parallel intellectual worlds in China from
the 1840s to the mid 1890s: a small number of marginal treaty-port scholars
who were under strong Western impact, and the majority of more orthodox
intellectual elites whose central concerns remained the classical Confucian
ones. Only through the reform movement of the 1890s did the two interact and
synthesize a new set of nationwide intellectual concerns and ideals. Liang's
thought were formed through even more complex sources, Tan Citong's "cosmic
dynamism", Yan Fu's version of social Darwinism and English liberalism, just
name a few. His exile to Japan in 1898 opened a broader intellectual world to
him: somewhat Westernized Japanese ideas and Japanese translation of Western
ideas. His visit to the United States in 1903, however, caused a further
change of his ideal of "new citizen". He saw "familism" and "village
mentality" in the overseas Chinese community, on the one hand; he sensed
"economic imperialism" from American industrial power, on the other hand. Both
stood in the way of growth of Chinese nationalism. He turned to a preference
for political authoritarianism for defending China against imperialism.
Along this direction Liang went back to stress again China's traditional
"private morality (Si De), although he preferred Western "public morality"
(Gong De) that could promote the cohesion of a group. One may see the
similarity to Levenson's third phase: "back to China". However, Chang argues
that Liang's attempt was not to "placate his emotional need to assert China's
national heritage". At the same time, the fact that the Confucian tradition
continued to exist in the ethos of Liang's modern ideal of "new citizen" shows
that he was not alienated from the very tradition he grew up with, as Levenson
suggested.
Both authors consider Liang as a transition figure between a Confucian past
and a communist present. Mao himself admitted his intellectual debt to Liang.
The two studies could contribute more to our understanding of modern Chinese
intellectual history if the authors had examined the Western ideas in both
their Chinese version and their original context. Chang strongly opposes
Levenson's theme of Liang's seeking equivalence of China and the West.
However, whether Levenson's conclusion is appropriate or not, the question he
raises about a Sino-Western confrontation or conflict, a sort of psychological
unbalance, existed undeniably in the minds of many modern Chinese
intellectuals. The repeated debates on wholesale-Westernization in the 1930s
in China, the 1960s in Taiwan, and recently the 1980s in China, particularly
the sharp and painful tone of the debates, unblossomed explicitly such a
psychological tension.
The Western impact facilitated the revelation of China's existing problems;
at the same time, it concealed many of these problems as well. For a long
period imperialism was perceived as the root of most, if not all, of China's
problems. Psychologically, such a concept was apt to be accepted by many
disappointed Chinese intellectuals. With the imperialist powers gradually
disappearing from the Chinese political arena, and with the recurring
frustration following the various revolutions of 1911, the nationalists and the
communists, more Chinese and Westerners gradually realized that China's primary
problems are indeed native ones. In a sense, the Western impact not only
aroused the question of seeking equivalence of China and West, but offered new
political, economic, military, cultural, and even ethical paradigms that could
be adopted to resolve China's problems. Both the eclectic and the wholesale-
Westernizationists comprehended step-by-step the significance of the latter and
shifted their focus on it. From Liang's extensive writings one can easily find
the evidence of such a shift.
Underneath Levenson's interpretation of confrontation between China and the
West in "the mind of modern China" one can sense a Weberian assumption that the
Chinese religions, notably Confucianism and Taoism, had spirits that
discouraged capitalism. In the late 1940s and early 1950s when Levenson wrote
his book, Weber's thesis seemed to be reasonable. History, however, changed
the question and drew new answers. The economic success of the "Four Small
Dragons" proved the inappropriateness of such a Weberian corollary. Many new
studies indicate that modernization is indeed not necessary to be
Westernization. Hence, Liang's presentation of change between "the old" and
"the new" instead of "China" and "West" seemed very suggestive, although he
himself did not insist on it.
******************************
An Old Man, His Sinking Boat, and the Roaring Ocean
MEMOIRS OF LI HUNG CHANG. William F. Mannix (Ed.) Boston: Houghton. 1913.
Xingyi
Li Hung Chang (Li Hongzhang) (1823-1901) played a very significant role in
the period when China failed her first response to the challenge of the Western
"barbarians". Li, the general-official, came to prominence in the 1860s under
the tutelage of Zeng Guofan as commander of the crack Huai army against the
peasant troop of the Taiping. An old-fashioned reformer, he was a major
engineer for the self-strengthening movement of the late 19th century when the
massive introduction of Western technology shook Chinese self-confidence. He
helped develop railways, telegraph lines, shipping companies, arms manufacture,
and modern Chinese education. Unfortunately, his talent could not save Qing
from its collapse and himself from humiliation by his conservative and radical
colleagues, as well as by foreign invaders.
The enjoyable memoirs of Li is based upon his 170,000 word notes. The
original manuscripts were found in many different cities of China by his
nephew, who served as the Governor of Guangdong and Guangxi. However, many
details raised doubts about the authenticity of the memoirs. For example, Li,
a loyal minister of the Qing, described the Majesty Empress Dowager (Cixi) in a
frivolous tone, "The Empress is a strange woman, contradictory, and headstrong
as the devil at times..." Also, Li, a very careful person, was unlikely to
make mistakes about some important events and characters mentioned in the book.
It is safe to assume that Li's original notes, if they ever existed, were
heavily edited and dramatized by the American editor for the Western readers.
Despite the doubts, the book, which was prepared as early as 1908 by people who
were obviously familiar with Li, renders into English the beautifully executed
characters of the great Viceroy and his time.
The memoirs cover the period of the 1880s and 1890s, especially Li's
involvement in and observations about the restoration through reform, the
Japanese War in 1895 and its shocking aftermath, the 1898 radical reform, and
the 1900 Boxer Movement. After the Japanese War, Li served as the peace
commissioner to carry on the difficult negotiations with the Japanese. While
the world considered him an astute and successful diplomat who saved China from
utter humiliation at the hands of the conquerors, Li's colleagues and many
Chinese hated and despised him for "paving the way for the total dismemberment
of the nation." He was stunned when the Japanese negotiator demanded that the
Chinese government should turn over the fortress, munitions, and defence
installations at Tianjin and Shanhaiguan, the railway and rolling stock of the
Tianjin line... Li aired his deep sigh in the middle of the night, "If words
and gesticulations could win armed battles, the palace and the Tsung Li Yamen
(Office of the Premier Minister) would need neither soldiers nor ships. I
wonder if I had died in a foreign land, died in the service of my country,
would my enemies have laughed, railed, or shed tears?" His anguish was that
China and her government were too weak to be saved. Nobody can be sure that
history will not again put somebody on Li Hongzhang's tragic and helpless
position.
In 1896 when Li was 73, an uneasy journey brought him to Russia, Germany,
England, and America. The pages of the memoirs reveal Li's fascination about
the foreign land, where he enjoyed learning new things, including kissing a
beautiful woman's hand. Li was amused by the blondness of American people.
Once he told a reporter in New York City that he himself, the majesty, was a
writer (for many government documents). As soon as the reporter got Li's
words, he ran back with great satisfaction and prepared his story of the day:
Li Hung Chang, a Writer Who Axes on Any Man Dares Blue Pencil His Stuff. When
he visited the Golden Gate of San Francisco Bay, the old man could not help to
be tearful like a child, facing the endless waves that separated him from his
motherland. The memoirs provide a rare opportunity to know Chinese perceptions
of the Western world in those days.
In the last a few years of Li's dramatic life, he observed Kang Yuwei and
Liang Qichao's reform with great concern and deep worry. He said, "I don't
believe in tearing down one's home in order to build a new one which is to have
a gable which the other lacked." In his opinion, Kang proposed to cure all the
ills of the nation by one great dose of reform medicine. A century has gone
by, Chinese people have tried different ways--tearing down the building,
preserving the building, and renovating the building. However, many confused
Chinese still believe that all ills can be cured by one great dose of the
reform medicine--Free Market!
*********************************************
Some Thoughts on Skocpol's Approach Towards Revolutions
STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and
China. By Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. pp. 407
Qingjia Wang (Dept. of History, Syracuse University)
The influence of Marxism on the modern world is not only related to the
content of Marxist theory but also to the impact of the communist revolutions
in Russia and China. One cannot understand Marxism without studying these
revolutions. With her insight, originality, intelligence, and knowledge, Theda
Skocpol has made a fresh contribution to studies of social revolutions in her
book, STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS. She combines the 1911 Revolution and the
1949 Revolution in China together under one title of "social revolutions".
Skocpol's book includes three parts: speculation on the existing
revolutionary theories; explanation of the causes of the revolutions in Russia,
France, and China; and analysis of the aftermath of these revolutions.
Before the 1911 Revolution, China had experienced repeated rebellions,
humiliation of defeat by foreign powers since 1840, especially the defeat by
Japanese in 1895, and the economic plight because of the costly wars and
rebellions. A number of Chinese gentry, the dominant class in Skocpol's
analysis, strived for reformation and revolution to rescue China. They finally
obtained temporarily success in 1911. In regard to her account of Chinese
gentry as a revolutionary force, Skocpol de-emphasizes an important point that
most Chinese gentry still respected the two hundred years' rule by Manchu, a
minority in southern Manchuria. They had been constantly assimilating Manchu
officials and soldiers into dominant Han culture. Although nationalism played
its role in the 1911 Revolution, as Skocpol recognizes, most gentry still
placed their hope on the Manchu rulers up to the 1898 Reformation when the
success seemed in hands with the support of Emperor Guangxu. By contrast, the
nationalists led by Sun Yat-sen were mainly composed by overseas Chinese with
their slogan "Wipe out Manchu, Restore Han China." They are hardly considered
as typical Chinese gentry even in Skocpol's definition. Sun Yat-sen and his
followers are normally overseas merchants and students, especially those in
Japan. They were liberal-oriented with their nationalism mainly demonstrated
in their antipathy to the Manchu ruler rather than to foreign powers. Sun
Yat-sen even accepted some supports from Japan and Britain. When the 1898
Reformation ultimately failed in the incident of the "Death of Six Gentlemen",
nationalism nevertheless became prevalent. Sun Yat-sen finally led
nationalists to overturn the Ching Dynasty through the 1911 Revolution. So,
the participants of the 1898 Reformation and those of the 1911 Revolution were
largely different groups. The former were normally Chinese gentry, the latter
probably not.
Skocpol's analysis on Chinese peasants and Chinese revolutions are
revealing although the sufficient justification is lacking. First, the
prolonged process of peasant reaction in China was created by Skocpol herself
through her attempt of embracing the 1911 and the 1949 Revolution together.
Actually, historians can hardly consider the 1911 Revolution as a peasant
revolution. The revolution was initiated from the urban uprisings in some big
cities. In a sense, it is even unlikely to call these urban uprisings a social
revolution because of the little impact on social basis. Some old officials
just paid lip-service to the new regime in 1911 while still keeping their local
authority. Given this difficult situation, Sun Yat-sen had to yield the power
to Yuan Shih-kai, an ex-general of the Ching Dynasty, in a few months. When
Yuan accessed to the power, he restored almost everything of a feudal dynasty,
including to his status as an emperor for two months.
Second, although Skocpol intends to treat the 1911 and the 1949 Revolutions
integrally, in practice, she always divides her analysis separately. In most
cases, she depicts the revolutionary situation in China centering in the period
before 1911. She deliberately avoids talking the situation in the 1940s which
generated the 1949 revolution. In my opinion, however, the 1949 Revolution is
a true social revolution of peasants organized by a few communist leaders.
Skocpol's analysis would be more convincing if she can have more consideration
of the peasant participation in this revolution.
Third, Skocpol successfully explains the agrarian structure in Chinese
modern history. In defining the pattern of peasant revolution, she gives a
conclusion of this structure and its significance in the 1949 Revolution:
"That structure did not afford settled Chinese peasants institutional autonomy
and solidarity against landlords. But it did, in periods of political-economic
crisis, generate marginal poor-peasant outcasts whose activities exacerbated
the crisis, and whose existence provided potential support for oppositional
elite-led rebellions--including, in the twentieth-century context, a
revolutionary movement." She is correct to study the 1949 Revolution in the
light of the effects of China's agrarian structure, peasants' attitudes and
behavior. Skocpol, however, misses a fact that it is this structure that to a
great extent fails the 1911 Revolution. It seems thus evident the 1911
Revolution and the 1949 Revolution are different, even in Skocpol's terms of
the agrarian structure in China, though she purposely seeks to put these two
Revolutions on the same table. (QINGJIA@SUVM.ACS.SYR.EDU)
Issue Editor: Zemin Zhang csf-books@postgres.berkeley.edu
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