richard@cs.mu.OZ.AU (Richard Hagen) (10/08/90)
On 7 Oct 90 21:48:51 GMT, eliot@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Eliot Handelman) said: > That's what Derrida says, and that's why "there is nothing beyond the > text." Ok, could someone explain what the semiotics people mean by the word ``text''? richard
hiho@csd4.csd.uwm.edu (Mark Peterson) (10/08/90)
From article <RICHARD.90Oct8155943@mullauna.cs.mu.OZ.AU>, by richard@cs.mu.OZ.AU (Richard Hagen): > > On 7 Oct 90 21:48:51 GMT, > eliot@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Eliot Handelman) said: >> That's what Derrida says, and that's why "there is nothing beyond the >> text." > > Ok, could someone explain what the semiotics people mean by the word ``text''? > > richard It depends entirely on which ones you ask. And I think I'd withhold judgment on whether Derrida counts as one of them or not. It's hard to get a straight answer... much less a straight question... from these boys and girls. (ex: the text is that through which the author's absence is presenced....like that.) And just in case you haven't heard this one.... "What do you get when you cross a Deconstructionist with a Mafia hitman?" "You get an offer you can't understand." -) hiho -- mark peterson | hiho@csd4.csd.uwm.edu | "If you can think of a thing, dept of philosophy | voice: (414)335-5200 | it must exist somewhere." uw-washington county | | west bend, wi. "home of the electric wok."
eliot@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Eliot Handelman) (10/09/90)
In article <RICHARD.90Oct8155943@mullauna.cs.mu.OZ.AU> richard@cs.mu.OZ.AU writes:
;
;On 7 Oct 90 21:48:51 GMT,
;eliot@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Eliot Handelman) said:
;> That's what Derrida says, and that's why "there is nothing beyond the
;> text."
;
;Ok, could someone explain what the semiotics people mean by the word ``text''?
;
;richard
It means, roughly, the entire universe of discourse.
Eagleton explains this in the following way. Supposing I need a
definition of the word "consciousness": Webster's says that it
is the "quality or state of being aware." If I look up "aware," it's
defined as "having or showing realization, perception or knowledge,"
and gives "conscious" as a synonym. (In the penguin dictionary of
Psychology the definitions for awareness and consciousness indicate
each other, and otherwise say nothing). I then look up perception, etc,
and eventually discover that I'm in a loop of some sort. The trouble is
that there IS no "original referent," or "universal signifier," in
terms of which the whole edifice of "meaning" is built. Things only
appear to be defined in terms of each other. You will say: "ah, but
if I can point to a referent, then we can agree on a common term."
Thus some people have thought that they can avoid the loops by
resisting abstraction: but you can't. A dog is a dog not because it
has four legs, is furry, eats dog food, but rather, because it's
NOT a cat, nor is it a fire-engine. So things are really defined
in terms of what they are not, not in terms of what they are. What
they are are merely negative instances of other pieces of language.
Now, what is a text? It is a set of pointers to other bits of
text. Evidently one wants to say, yes, but a newspaper article
about how a fire broke out is really ABOUT this particular event,
the fire breaking out. But try to imagine how a Roger Schank
story "understander" would "understand" this story: it would
have a built-in "fire breaking out" script which would be triggered
by the event (of reading the story). Around here the absence of
any referent turns into the Chinese Room puzzle, and we all know
how easily that one's resolved. The question is, when you read this
story, do you act on a script? One likes to hope not, but the
general mechanism by which the suitable inference is made STILL
need not be "grounded" (as Harnad likes to say) in reality,
experience or whatnot: in fact, one might question whether any such
uinderstanding EVER is "grounded." For instance: I've never been
in a fire; I never even saw a balzing conflagration (of newspaper
-worthy reportage). Yet I understand what is "meant" by such words;
but only through different discourses, not through experience. I
can "imagine" the fire and that's good enough. But that's not
good enough to create a universal signifier. And in the end
there is only this huge tangled web of "meaning," which seems
to act "as though" somethiung were "meant" -- that's clearly its
purpose -- and yet, it's all there by virtue of it somehow having
got there and grown up all by itself.
Perhaps one might like to think of "language" as an emergent
property, but what would it emerge from?rjf@canon.co.uk (Robin Faichney) (10/09/90)
In article <3202@idunno.Princeton.EDU> eliot@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Eliot Handelman) writes: >Now, what is a text? It is a set of pointers to other bits of >text. Evidently one wants to say, yes, but a newspaper article >about how a fire broke out is really ABOUT this particular event.. >I understand what is "meant" by such words; >but only through different discourses, not through experience. I >can "imagine" the fire and that's good enough. But that's not >good enough to create a universal signifier. And in the end >there is only this huge tangled web of "meaning," which seems >to act "as though" something were "meant" -- that's clearly its >purpose -- and yet, it's all there by virtue of it somehow having >got there and grown up all by itself. Would it be correct to say, in these terms, that the only correspondence between the text and the physical world is in our imaginations?