[comp.ai.philosophy] Of sex and philosophy

turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin) (10/05/90)

-----
kirlik@chmsr.UUCP (Alex Kirlik) says,
>> Now here's where I have problems.  What measure are we going to use
>> to measure success, that is, who has got the inside track on what I
>> should value, what the "utilities" in my choice engine should be?

In article <3565@media-lab.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>, minsky@media-lab.MEDIA.MIT.EDU (Marvin Minsky) writes:
> I actually had a point to make that illuminates this problem, though
> it doesn't solve it.  I wasn't telling you what to do.  I was saying
> something quite different: that maybe you might say to yourself, "Am I
> really liking this?  What am "I", indeed?  When one part of my brain
> "likes" something very much, is it possible that there are other parts
> of my brain -- maybe much <larger, better, more evolved -- whatever
> you think>> that are being suppressed, put out of it, deprived of life
> and liberty etc.  Ask yourself (as some stoic philosophers did, I
> suspect) -- "Who are those little proto-mammalian pleasure centers in
> my brain to tell me what I really *should* like.

Those larger, more evolved parts of the brain do not themselves
care that much about life and liberty, the value of which lies
partly in those proto-mammalian pleasure centers.  A lizard knows
to flee or fight when its life is in danger, and will struggle
against what it views as confinement, but DeepThought does not
care whether it is ever allowed to play another game of chess. 

Mr Minsky does well to point out that a person is many things,
even at the level of what makes us persons.  But I don't think he
stays faithful to his vision, that personal identity lies in the
composite, and is not to be identified with any of the parts
separately.  Ironically, he worries that the proto-mammalian
pleasure center will kick around the more evolved part of his
brain, as if "he" is more the latter than the former.  But that
there is a worry, that he can attach to it the emotional phrase
"life and liberty", shows that his proto-mammalian brain is
involved in bringing this caution against itself!  

The stoics are wrong because the fears and hopes that make them
want to suppress certain emotions and drives are themselves part
of what they want to suppress.  Man has always worried about that
which drives him, but that worry is wrongly attached to thinking
man, because the part that thinks has no need to worry. 

Philosophy sooner or later comes down to sex.  Mr Minsky thinks
that it is only the proto-mammalian pleasure center that fixates
a man on certain curves, and then by turning off the more evolved
parts of his brain.  Not so.  Were we like lizards, many of the
things that people look for in their partners -- social ability,
intelligence, wealth, religious compatibility, political
correctness, sexual sophistication, whatever -- would not matter.
It is likely that one role the larger parts of the brain evolved
to serve was the more sophisticated selection of a mate.  When
one looks at the variety and occasional sophistication of human
sexual behavior, it is clear that the more evolved parts of the
brain have not been turned off, but are playing a full role in
it.  (Doubters should begin their investigation by adding
alt.sex.bondage to their reading list.)

Russell

sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (10/05/90)

In article <13197@cs.utexas.edu> turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin) writes:
>-----
>The stoics are wrong because the fears and hopes that make them
>want to suppress certain emotions and drives are themselves part
>of what they want to suppress.  Man has always worried about that
>which drives him, but that worry is wrongly attached to thinking
>man, because the part that thinks has no need to worry. 

In fact I would even go further.  The stoics are dangerous because they
are trying to suppress the human alert signals which tell us about our
basic operational needs.  The raw emotions of the proto-mammalian centers
are all signal fundamental, survival-related needs.  Fear is what makes us
pay attention to, and deal with, that which could harm us.  If it is
occasionally triggered by something that is not truly dangerous, this does
not make it any less vital to survival.  The man who truly *has* no fear is
the man who will be killed quite young.

>Philosophy sooner or later comes down to sex.  Mr Minsky thinks
>that it is only the proto-mammalian pleasure center that fixates
>a man on certain curves, and then by turning off the more evolved
>parts of his brain.  Not so.  Were we like lizards, many of the
>things that people look for in their partners -- social ability,
>intelligence, wealth, religious compatibility, political
>correctness, sexual sophistication, whatever -- would not matter.
>It is likely that one role the larger parts of the brain evolved
>to serve was the more sophisticated selection of a mate.  When
>one looks at the variety and occasional sophistication of human
>sexual behavior, it is clear that the more evolved parts of the
>brain have not been turned off, but are playing a full role in
>it.

A very good point.  This is why I like to distinguish between primary (or raw)
emotions and composite or secondary emotions.  The basic sex drive of the
proto-mammalian pleasure center is a primary emotion.  It ensures that all
humans have a fundamental drive to reproduce, however it is actually manifest
in behavior.  [That is it is what ensures that *all* humans are interested in
sex in some form, and to some degree - even those who loathe it].  However,
the sexual desires and responses we are conscious of are much more complex
then a simple reproductive urge.  I, for instance, am particularly responsive
to the styles of clothing that were current just as I entered puberty in the
mid 1960's [i.e. I like mini-skirts].  This is clearly a cognitive level
response, since it is based on prior experience, and requires recognition of
complex relationships (like what clothing is, and how it relates to sexual
identity, and so on).

This kind of interection between cognition and primary emotions is nearly
universal.  It is the source of phobias, and many other complex social
interactions.  It also seems to me that this is the basis of what we call
personality.  I am a unique person, with my own unique style because my
cognitive skills interact with my emotions a different way than do yours.
Thus to deny emotions, and emotional responses is to deny individuality.


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uunet!tdatirv!sarima				(Stanley Friesen)

jwtlai@watcgl.waterloo.edu (Jim W Lai) (10/07/90)

In article <8@tdatirv.UUCP> sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) writes:
>The basic sex drive of the
>proto-mammalian pleasure center is a primary emotion.  It ensures that all
>humans have a fundamental drive to reproduce, however it is actually manifest
>in behavior.  [...]  However,
>the sexual desires and responses we are conscious of are much more complex
>then a simple reproductive urge.  I, for instance, am particularly responsive
>to the styles of clothing that were current just as I entered puberty in the
>mid 1960's [i.e. I like mini-skirts].  This is clearly a cognitive level
>response, since it is based on prior experience, and requires recognition of
>complex relationships (like what clothing is, and how it relates to sexual
>identity, and so on).

Would it not be more accurate to say the sex drive is a drive towards sex?
Reproduction does not necessarily follow, and the conscious realization that
sex is required for reproduction has not been universal in human societies.

>This kind of interection between cognition and primary emotions is nearly
>universal.  [...]  It also seems to me that this is the basis of
>what we call personality.  [...]
>Thus to deny emotions, and emotional responses is to deny individuality.

I agree that denial of emotional responses is in general a nonadaptive
behavior.  I believe human beings are incapable of true stoicism as we have
many emotional responses are "wired-in".  Whether or not mastery of one's
emotions is a virtue or not depends on one's belief system.  A lack of
emotional response is still a response, and still allows for individuality,
albeit in a very limited sense.

sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (10/09/90)

In article <1990Oct7.005440.23109@watcgl.waterloo.edu> jwtlai@watcgl.waterloo.edu (Jim W Lai) writes:
>
>Would it not be more accurate to say the sex drive is a drive towards sex?
>Reproduction does not necessarily follow, and the conscious realization that
>sex is required for reproduction has not been universal in human societies.

True.  I was rather thinking about it from a different perspective, that of
an biologist.  From an evolutionary point of view the purpose of sex is
reproduction.  As in many other behaviors, the immediate purpose for the
being doing the action is different than the evoutionary purpose of the action.
So, yes, within the human mind the sex drive is implemented as a simple
response pattern that encourages sexual behavior.
[This kind of 'disagreement' comes from having different perspectives on
these matters, I always speak first as a biologist - in reality we really
agree in most essentials (I think)].


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uunet!tdatirv!sarima				(Stanley Friesen)