burke@russell.Stanford.EDU (Tom Burke) (10/08/90)
The following is a quote within a quote that will hopefully add an
interesting slant on the discussion about emergence, both as regards
what it is and what it's good for:
Dewey and Mead used the category of emergence [to cope with the
question of how to interpret the situation in which mind has arisen
during an evolutionary process whose earliest stages contained no
mental phenomena of any sort, not even "potentially"]. Its negative
function was to resist the classic thesis that (1) since mental
phenomena now exist, they must have been implicitly or potentially
present in evolution from the very start; and (2) their potential
presence played an active part in their later realization, and was not
merely an abstract possibility. Both constituents of the classical
thesis, according to Dewey, are gratuitous assumptions which can be
avoided if we take seriously the continuous, cumulative nature of any
developmental process, for example, growth from infancy to maturity.
"The reality *is* the growth-process itself; childhood and
adulthood are phases of a continuity, in which just because it
is a history, the later cannot exist until the earlier
exists...and in which the later makes use of the registered
and cumulative outcome of the earlier--or, more strictly, *is*
its utilization.... The real existence is the history in its
entirety.... Substitute for such growth a more extensive
history of nature and call it the evolution of mind from
matter, and the conclusion is not different.... When mind is
said to be implicit, involved, latent, or potential in matter,
and subsequent change is asserted to be an affair of making it
explicit, evolved, manifest, actual, what happens is that a
natural history is first cut arbitrarily and unconsciously in
two, and then the severance is consciously and arbitrarily
canceled. It is simpler not to start by engaging in such
manoeuvers."
[J.Dewey: _Experience and Nature_, pp275-6]
The "evolution of mind from matter" epitomizes not the sudden
irruption of the mind into an otherwise material process, but a
prolonged, successive emergence of certain "qualities and efficacies"
of the behavior of organisms. These qualities and efficacies are
from the point of their first appearance genuine additions to the
behavioral repertoire of their possessors.
[T.A.Goudge: "Pragmatism's Contribution to an Evolutionary View of
Mind", _Monist_ 57.2(1973), p142]
Here the term 'emergence' labels a concrete evolutionary mechanism.
It's not that mind or consciousness "emerged" from matter so much as
that behaviors emerged from other behaviors, the whole shabang
eventually taking on a character we now think of as being "mental,"
"intelligent", etc. In this sense, mind is not something over and
above matter, but a character of the overall organization of material
processes. AI (robotics, cognitive science, etc) should hope to
discover the nature of this organization which is otherwise a product
of natural evolution.
So what is "emergence" if it is simply a matter of behaviors emerging
out of behaviors? As I see it, an emergent behavior is what you get
when a complex of behaviors is mastered as a single behavior (and which
will take on a different functional character as a single behavior
than as a disjoint complex of behaviors). Perhaps this isn't a
definition so much as an observation.
Issues concerning "complexity" are important here. But emergence is
to be understood not in terms of complex behaviors being generated
(emerging?) from a bunch of simple unit behaviors, but rather of
complexes of behaviors being mastered (habituated, routinized,
"learned") in such a way that they can function as simple units of
behavior.
For example, when a child learns how to draw a 'W' by drawing four
straight lines in the correct position, what "emerges" is the making
of four simple actions into one simple action. Drawing 'W's, like
drawing straight lines before, becomes a simple action that can be
employed in still more complex behaviors, such as drawing words.
Following Dewey, this idea should be generalizable to explain
evolution at large, not just individual growth and development. Each
such achievement of mastery of complexes into units is just one more
sashay onward in evolutionary development, at whichever level of
organization it happens to happen. (In agreement with S.J.Gould, we
can hardly expect this to generate a "linear" view of evolution, but
that's another story.)
What this seems to suggest for AI research is to try to develop
robotic-computational mechanisms that can manage to turn complexes of
actions into units of action. This may not be sufficient (who's to
say at this point?), but it does seem necessary if you want to go the
route of mimicking natural evolution in an attempt to design smart
machines that can learn and adapt to changing environments.cpshelley@violet.uwaterloo.ca (cameron shelley) (10/10/90)
In article <15705@russell.Stanford.EDU> burke@russell.Stanford.EDU (Tom Burke) writes: >The following is a quote within a quote that will hopefully add an >interesting slant on the discussion about emergence, both as regards >what it is and what it's good for: > > Dewey and Mead used the category of emergence [to cope with the > question of how to interpret the situation in which mind has arisen > during an evolutionary process whose earliest stages contained no > mental phenomena of any sort, not even "potentially"]. [stuff deleted...] > "The reality *is* the growth-process itself; childhood and > adulthood are phases of a continuity, in which just because it > is a history, the later cannot exist until the earlier > exists...and in which the later makes use of the registered > and cumulative outcome of the earlier--or, more strictly, *is* > its utilization.... The real existence is the history in its > entirety.... Substitute for such growth a more extensive > history of nature and call it the evolution of mind from > matter, and the conclusion is not different.... When mind is > said to be implicit, involved, latent, or potential in matter, > and subsequent change is asserted to be an affair of making it > explicit, evolved, manifest, actual, what happens is that a > natural history is first cut arbitrarily and unconsciously in > two, and then the severance is consciously and arbitrarily > canceled. It is simpler not to start by engaging in such > manoeuvers." > [J.Dewey: _Experience and Nature_, pp275-6] > [more stuff deleted...] >Here the term 'emergence' labels a concrete evolutionary mechanism. > [a little more...] >So what is "emergence" if it is simply a matter of behaviors emerging >out of behaviors? As I see it, an emergent behavior is what you get >when a complex of behaviors is mastered as a single behavior (and which >will take on a different functional character as a single behavior >than as a disjoint complex of behaviors). > I am not really sure what the quotation from Dewy is saying, so I'll restrict my comments to your surmise. Firstly, you state that 'emergence' is an evolutionary mechanism, one which, I presume, is envisioned as eventually reinforcing certain baseline characteristics in a group of individuals, and perhaps weeding others out. The second use you make of it, is as an abstraction of several behaviours (regardless of origin) into one 'behaviour'. I would agree that this ability (to learn more complex behaviours, ideas, whatever) can be considered 'emergent' when considered over time (the process of evolution). But then, are the results of applying that learning ability themselves emergent? It is if you leave the qualification "emergent behaviour is not obviously connected any 'previous' behaviour" out. If one is born with the 'emergent' ability to learn, is then learning to write (as you mention below) itself emergent? >For example, when a child learns how to draw a 'W' by drawing four >straight lines in the correct position, what "emerges" is the making >of four simple actions into one simple action. Drawing 'W's, like >drawing straight lines before, becomes a simple action that can be >employed in still more complex behaviors, such as drawing words. > I think that if a general ability to learn is 'emergent', then the ability to compose different instances of learning is not as interesting, and could be handled as a simpler concept. Unfortunately, I do not have a coherant General Psychological Theory of Learning to point to in support of this, so it's just my opinion. :> >Following Dewey, this idea should be generalizable to explain >evolution at large, not just individual growth and development. Each >such achievement of mastery of complexes into units is just one more >sashay onward in evolutionary development, at whichever level of >organization it happens to happen. (In agreement with S.J.Gould, we >can hardly expect this to generate a "linear" view of evolution, but >that's another story.) > This is rather vague to me. "Achievement of mastery of complexes" to me inplies a deliberate act, not a sort of statistical success that a non-anthropomorphized evolution relies on. Humans are an exception due to their ability to have and transmit 'culture', etc. What do you have in mind in terms of 'generalization'? -- Cameron Shelley | "Saw, n. A trite popular saying, or proverb. cpshelley@violet.waterloo.edu| So called because it makes its way into a Davis Centre Rm 2136 | wooden head." Phone (519) 885-1211 x3390 | Ambrose Bierce