dave@cogsci.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) (11/09/90)
For the last year or so, I've been working on a bibliography of recent work in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, and philosophy of AI. I keep intending to distribute it when it's complete, but of course it's never complete as I'm always coming across new things. So maybe I should just distribute it as it is. It consists of 645 entries, divided into 4 parts: 1. "First-person" issues (consciousness, qualia etc) [190 entries] 2. "Third-person" issues (intentionality, etc) [243 entries] 3. Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence [110 entries] 4. Miscellaneous topics [102 entries] About 70% of the entries are annotated with a 1-or-2-line summary, and occasionally criticism. The other 30% I either haven't read, or haven't got around to annotating yet. Of course none of the bibliographies are complete, but part 4 is particularly feeble, without any attempt at thoroughly covering the areas involved. Note that volume and page references are not included. The vast bulk of the bibliography consists of books and papers from the last 10-15 years, although a little earlier material is included where it is directly relevant to current concerns. I've enclosed a section-by-section summary below. To get a copy, write to me at dave@cogsci.indiana.edu. The files take up about 100K in total. Dave Chalmers (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu) Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition Indiana University. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bibliography of recent work in the Philosophy of Mind and Cognition =================================================================== Compiled by David Chalmers Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition Indiana University Bloomington, IN 47408. E-mail: dave@cogsci.indiana.edu. Summary ------- 1. "First-person" issues (consciousness, qualia etc) [190] 1.1 Subjectivity (esp. Nagel) [24] 1.2 The Knowledge Argument (Jackson) [12] 1.3 Functionalism and Qualia (including Absent Qualia, etc) [24] 1.4 Inverted Spectrum [10] 1.5 Qualia, General [17] 1.6 Are Programs Enough? (Searle) [31] 1.7 Machines and Conscious Mentality (other) [13] 1.8 Mind-Body Problem (Misc) [5] 1.9 The Existence of Subjective Experience [2] 1.10 Consciousness -- Eliminativist Perspectives [9] 1.11 Consciousness -- Functional Accounts [17] 1.12 Consciousness, General [16] 1.13 Subjective Mental Content [4] 1.14 Dualism [4] 2. "Third-person" issues (esp. intentionality) [243] 2.1 The Reality of Propositional Psychology [41] 2.1a General [9] 2.1b Sententialism (esp. Fodor) [12] 2.1c Instrumentalism (esp. Dennett) [15] 2.1d Syntactic Functionalism (esp. Stich) [5] 2.2 Psych & Neuroscience, Eliminativism (esp. Churchlands) [18] 2.3 Narrow/Wide Content [37] 2.3a Why Reference is not in the Head (Putnam) [8] 2.3b Implications for Psychology (Burge, Fodor) [17] 2.3c The Status of Narrow Content [9] 2.3d Miscellaneous [4] 2.4 Causal Theories of Content [29] 2.4a Information-Theoretic Accounts (Dretske) [9] 2.4b Causal Accounts, General [7] 2.4c Teleological Approaches (Millikan) [7] 2.4d Situation Semantics (Barwise/Perry) [6] 2.5 Theories of Content, Misc [8] 2.6 Representation (General) [4] 2.7 Supervenience, Reduction, Mental Causation [35] 2.7a Supervenience (Kim, etc) [12] 2.7b Anomalous Monism (Davidson) [8] 2.7c Token Identity (Davidson, etc) [4] 2.7d Mental Causation [7] 2.7e Mental/Physical, Misc [4] 2.8 Functionalism (General) [22] 2.9 Computationalism (General) [10] 2.10 Perception/Modularity/Plasticity (Fodor, Churchland) [9] 2.11 Nativism (Chomsky, Fodor) [16] 2.12 Misc Phil of Mind [11] 3. Philosophy of AI [110] 3.1 Can Machines be Conscious? -- see Section 1. 3.2 The Turing Test [7] 3.3 Godelian Arguments (Lucas) [21] 3.4 Philosophy of Connectionism [28] 3.5 Foundations of Connectionism (more empirical) [5] 3.6 Connectionism & Structured Representation (Fodor/Pylyshyn) [10] 3.7 Foundations of AI (somewhat empirical) [6] 3.8 Computation and Semantics [5] 3.9 The Frame Problem [9] 3.10 Analog and Digital Processing [5] 3.11 Levels of Analysis (Marr, etc) [5] 3.12 Philosophy of AI, Misc [9] 4. Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Misc Topics [102] 4.1 Colour, General [13] 4.2 Colour Incompatibilities [6] 4.3 Split Brains [5] 4.4 Personal Identity (tiny selection) [5] 4.5 Pain [3] 4.6 Dreaming [9] 4.7 Phenomenal Qualities and the Sorites Paradox [6] 4.8 Mental Images (Pylyshyn, Kosslyn) [14] 4.9 Sensation and Perception, General [3] 4.10 Emotions, etc [4] 4.11 Free Will (tiny) [7] 4.12 Animal Cognition [5] 4.13 Brains in Vats (Putnam) [13] 4.14 Rationality [9] -- Dave Chalmers (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu) Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University. "It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."
dave@cogsci.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) (11/10/90)
For the last year or so, I've been working on a bibliography of recent work in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, and philosophy of AI. I keep intending to distribute it when it's complete, but of course it's never complete as I'm always coming across new things. So maybe I should just distribute it as it is. It consists of 654 entries, divided into 4 parts: 1. "First-person" issues (consciousness, qualia etc) [190 entries] 2. "Third-person" issues (intentionality, etc) [243 entries] 3. Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence [119 entries] 4. Miscellaneous topics [102 entries] About 70% of the entries are annotated with a 1-or-2-line summary, and occasionally criticism. The other 30% I either haven't read, or haven't got around to annotating yet. Of course none of the bibliographies are complete, but part 4 is particularly feeble, without any attempt at thoroughly covering the areas involved. Note that volume and page references are not included. The vast bulk of the bibliography consists of books and papers from the last 10-15 years, although a little earlier material is included where it is directly relevant to current concerns. I've enclosed a section-by-section summary below. To get a copy, write to me at dave@cogsci.indiana.edu. The files take up about 100K in total. Dave Chalmers (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu) Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition Indiana University. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bibliography of recent work in the Philosophy of Mind and Cognition =================================================================== Compiled by David Chalmers Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition Indiana University Bloomington, IN 47408. E-mail: dave@cogsci.indiana.edu. Summary ------- 1. "First-person" issues (consciousness, qualia etc) [190] 1.1 Subjectivity (esp. Nagel) [24] 1.2 The Knowledge Argument (Jackson) [12] 1.3 Functionalism and Qualia (including Absent Qualia, etc) [24] 1.4 Inverted Spectrum [10] 1.5 Qualia, General [17] 1.6 Are Programs Enough? (Searle) [31] 1.7 Machines and Conscious Mentality (other) [13] 1.8 Mind-Body Problem (Misc) [5] 1.9 The Existence of Subjective Experience [2] 1.10 Consciousness -- Eliminativist Perspectives [9] 1.11 Consciousness -- Functional Accounts [17] 1.12 Consciousness, General [16] 1.13 Subjective Mental Content [4] 1.14 Dualism [4] 2. "Third-person" issues (intentionality, representation etc) [243] 2.1 The Reality of Propositional Psychology [41] 2.1a General [9] 2.1b Sententialism (esp. Fodor) [12] 2.1c Instrumentalism (esp. Dennett) [15] 2.1d Syntactic Functionalism (esp. Stich) [5] 2.2 Psych & Neuroscience, Eliminativism (esp. Churchlands) [18] 2.3 Narrow/Wide Content [37] 2.3a Why Reference is not in the Head (Putnam) [8] 2.3b Implications for Psychology (Burge, Fodor) [17] 2.3c The Status of Narrow Content [9] 2.3d Miscellaneous [4] 2.4 Causal Theories of Content [29] 2.4a Information-Theoretic Accounts (Dretske) [9] 2.4b Causal Accounts, General [7] 2.4c Teleological Approaches (Millikan) [7] 2.4d Situation Semantics (Barwise/Perry) [6] 2.5 Theories of Content, Misc [8] 2.6 Representation (General) [4] 2.7 Supervenience, Reduction, Mental Causation [35] 2.7a Supervenience (Kim, etc) [12] 2.7b Anomalous Monism (Davidson) [8] 2.7c Token Identity (Davidson, etc) [4] 2.7d Mental Causation [7] 2.7e Mental/Physical, Misc [4] 2.8 Functionalism (General) [22] 2.9 Computationalism (General) [10] 2.10 Perception/Modularity/Plasticity (Fodor, Churchland) [9] 2.11 Nativism (Chomsky, Fodor) [16] 2.12 Misc Phil of Mind [11] 3. Philosophy of AI [119] 3.1 Can Machines be Conscious? -- see Section 1. 3.2 The Turing Test [7] 3.3 Godelian Arguments (Lucas) [21] 3.4 Philosophy of Connectionism [32] 3.5 Foundations of Connectionism (more empirical) [8] 3.6 Connectionism & Structured Representation (Fodor/Pylyshyn) [10] 3.7 Foundations of AI (somewhat empirical) [7] 3.8 Computation and Semantics [5] 3.9 The Frame Problem [9] 3.10 Analog and Digital Processing [5] 3.11 Levels of Analysis (Marr, etc) [6] 3.12 Philosophy of AI, Misc [9] 4. Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Misc Topics [102] 4.1 Colour, General [13] 4.2 Colour Incompatibilities [6] 4.3 Split Brains [5] 4.4 Personal Identity (tiny selection) [5] 4.5 Pain [3] 4.6 Dreaming [9] 4.7 Phenomenal Qualities and the Sorites Paradox [6] 4.8 Mental Images (Pylyshyn, Kosslyn) [14] 4.9 Sensation and Perception, General [3] 4.10 Emotions, etc [4] 4.11 Free Will (tiny) [7] 4.12 Animal Cognition [5] 4.13 Brains in Vats (Putnam) [13] 4.14 Rationality [9] -- Dave Chalmers (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu) Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University. "It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."