larryc@poe.jpl.nasa.gov (Larry Carroll) (10/27/90)
Consciousness is part of the Universe, therefore it must affect other parts of the Universe. (As evidenced by all this debate about the topic, which wouldn't exist if it weren't for the subject of the debate!) Just how we can objectively observe & measure it is unclear, of course, because we know so little about the form & function of the organ that generates it. But the mere fact that we can't observe it directly & publicly isn't enough reason to say it can't be studied. After all, no one has ever directly & publicly observed an atom; we must probe atomic nature indirectly & with instruments. (Indeed, it's one of the biggest ironies of this whole debate that the only phenomena we CAN observe directly is consciousness.) Further, the other parts of the Universe can affect consciousness. Every time we sleep we turn our consciousness off (though not for an entire sleep period; about every 90 minutes we dream, which is arguably a conscious activity). We can alter consciousness in other ways, through chemical & electronic means, through meditation, etc. The very act of focusing our attention on one part of our environment alters our consciousness. The subject of our attention becomes part of our consciousness; other parts of the environment disappear from our consciousness. The process of learning affects our consciousness; we become aware of more & at the same time are able to relinquish conscious attention to old parts of our subjective universe, letting them become automatic processes. Larry Carroll "Takes-us" (correct pronunciation of Texas) Dancin' Fool
reh@wam.umd.edu (Richard E. Huddleston) (10/27/90)
In article <10126@jpl-devvax.JPL.NASA.GOV> larryc@poe.jpl.nasa.gov (Larry Carroll) writes: >Consciousness is part of the Universe, therefore it must affect other parts >of the Universe. (As evidenced by all this debate about the topic, which >wouldn't exist if it weren't for the subject of the debate!) Just how we can >objectively observe & measure it is unclear, of course, because we know so >little about the form & function of the organ that generates it. But the >mere fact that we can't observe it directly & publicly isn't enough reason to >say it can't be studied. After all, no one has ever directly & publicly >observed an atom; we must probe atomic nature indirectly & with instruments. >(Indeed, it's one of the biggest ironies of this whole debate that the only >phenomena we CAN observe directly is consciousness.) > >Further, the other parts of the Universe can affect consciousness. Every >time we sleep we turn our consciousness off (though not for an entire sleep >period; about every 90 minutes we dream, which is arguably a conscious >activity). We can alter consciousness in other ways, through chemical & >electronic means, through meditation, etc. The very act of focusing our >attention on one part of our environment alters our consciousness. The >subject of our attention becomes part of our consciousness; other parts of >the environment disappear from our consciousness. The process of learning >affects our consciousness; we become aware of more & at the same time are >able to relinquish conscious attention to old parts of our subjective >universe, letting them become automatic processes. > > Larry Carroll > "Takes-us" (correct pronunciation of Texas) > Dancin' Fool If we can't define consciousness (not that I'm so sure of that), we can at least study it by it's leavings: memories. Anything that can _remember_ is in some way conscious. Perhaps the problem with defining consciousness is similar to defining life; it doesn't have just one form or one aspect. Interestingly, each form of biological life seems to be amply equipped with just enough consciousness to implement its DNA coding. Will the same be true for sufficiently sophisticated computers? Of course. The reason we don't see more consciousness in our technology is that we're still supplying it -- therefore the computers themselves don't need it to carry out their end of the tasks we design them for. There are some exceptions, of course, but even human consciousness takes a while to gel into something we'd recognize as such. I doubt that a properly designed system (one capable of acquiring consciousness) would start whistling dixie the first time we turned it on. Sleep is an interesting event. The problems involved with updating information in extensively distributed systems has me thinking that perhaps large distributed systems will need to "sleep" (and _dream_) for a period of time in order to reconcile new data -- and, much like humans deprived of sleep, these systems will experience a drastic drop in performance directly proportional to their unmet need for sleep. Of course, the actual unmet need is dreaming; perhaps the function of dreaming in biological life forms is to integrate previous associations with newly acquired data. My personal experience certainly indicates that periods in my life where I'm doing something new and/or intense stimulate vivid and largely remembered dreams. It seems to me that Crick advanced some ideas along this line a few years back. Apologies in advance if I'm merely restating previous arguments; I'm an undergrad (freshman) who's new to the Net.
csmith@cscs.UUCP (Craig E. Smith) (10/30/90)
In <10126@jpl-devvax.JPL.NASA.GOV> larryc@poe.jpl.nasa.gov (Larry Carroll) writes: >Consciousness is part of the Universe, therefore it must affect other parts >of the Universe. (As evidenced by all this debate about the topic, which >wouldn't exist if it weren't for the subject of the debate!) A grain of sand on the beach has gravitational effects on all of the universe, but that doesn't mean it is significant. > ... Just how we can >objectively observe & measure it is unclear, of course, because we know so >little about the form & function of the organ that generates it. But the >mere fact that we can't observe it directly & publicly isn't enough reason to >say it can't be studied. After all, no one has ever directly & publicly >observed an atom; we must probe atomic nature indirectly & with instruments. >(Indeed, it's one of the biggest ironies of this whole debate that the only >phenomena we CAN observe directly is consciousness.) I don't believe we can objectively observe or measure consciousness, because it is a concept which is too general, vague, and subjective. I don't think the concept of consciousness is really very useful to Artificial Intelligence (even the word intelligence is too vague to be of much practical value), and it will need to be replaced with more specific ideas relating to particular functions of the brain. Easily observed psychological phenomenon, while interesting, are not by themselves very useful in trying to determine how intelligent machines (like the brain) work, but can be useful in verifying models based on more solid observation of the internal structure, and operation of the brain. Trying to determine how the brain works from observable psychological characteristics is like trying to figure out the internal workings of a computer by playing video games on a terminal. It may be of some help, but not very much. Personally, I think that what we call consciousness is merely an artifact of the functioning of some area of the brain that integrates, and prioritizes information from the senses, that has been processed, or stored in other parts of the brain. I would not say that we should completely abandon trying to build models of intelligent behavior based on psychological phenomenon, but I think there are severe limits on how far we can go in a reasonable time span with this type of approach, because it ignores too much of the complex underlying processing that goes into the functioning of the brain. -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------- If you want a picture of the future, | Internet: csmith@cscs.UUCP imagine a boot stomping on a human | UUCP: ... uunet!cscs!csmith face - forever. - George Orwell |---------------------------------
lev@suned0.nswses.navy.mil (Lloyd E Vancil) (11/06/90)
In article <1990Oct27.070636.4144@wam.umd.edu> reh@wam.umd.edu (Richard E. Huddleston) writes: >If we can't define consciousness (not that I'm so sure of that), we can at >least study it by it's leavings: memories. Anything that can _remember_ is >in some way conscious. Perhaps the problem with defining consciousness >is similar to defining life; it doesn't have just one form or one aspect. Too simple. My computer remembers, better than I do, and I'm 99.999% sure it's not conscious. I think your second comment was closer to the mark. Could it be that what we call consciousness is a continum, a thing that has no boundrys and is therefore undefinable because it is unknowable in its totality? I am remineded of the thought experiments proposed by those who are speculating about N demesional space. Specifically, how would a 2d critter percieve the intrusion of a 3d critter into 2d space and conversly, how would we, as 3d critters, preceieve 4d critters intrusion into our space? In the same sense, could consciousness be the by-product of some other process? Could consciousness be an "Emergent property" of some other function? Like the 2d critter that sees a 2d "slice" of a 3d object suddenly "pop" into existance, could consciousness be a "3d slice" of some more complex function? I guess "Emergent" would be a missnomer, devolving might be better. I'm not proposing some mystical solution for the question, it is possible for us to propose n-demesional critters so why couldn't we understand some more complex function? L. -- * suned1!lev@elroy.JPL.Nasa.Gov sun!suntzu!suned1!lev . lev@suned1.nswses.navy.mil + . + * S.T.A.R.S.! The revolution has begun! * My employer has no opinions. These are mine!
reh@wam.umd.edu (Richard E. Huddleston) (11/08/90)
In article <5891@suned1.Nswses.Navy.MIL> lev@suned0.nswses.navy.mil (Lloyd E Vancil) writes: >In article <1990Oct27.070636.4144@wam.umd.edu> reh@wam.umd.edu (Richard E. Huddleston) writes: >>If we can't define consciousness (not that I'm so sure of that), we can at >>least study it by it's leavings: memories. Anything that can _remember_ is >>in some way conscious. Perhaps the problem with defining consciousness >>is similar to defining life; it doesn't have just one form or one aspect. > >Too simple. My computer remembers, better than I do, and I'm 99.999% sure it's >not conscious. I think your second comment was closer to the mark. Could it >be that what we call consciousness is a continum, a thing that has no boundrys >and is therefore undefinable because it is unknowable in its totality? > >I am remineded of the thought experiments proposed by those who are speculating about N demesional space. Specifically, how would a 2d critter percieve the >intrusion of a 3d critter into 2d space and conversly, how would we, as 3d >critters, preceieve 4d critters intrusion into our space? > >In the same sense, could consciousness be the by-product of some other process? >Could consciousness be an "Emergent property" of some other function? Like the >2d critter that sees a 2d "slice" of a 3d object suddenly "pop" into existance, >could consciousness be a "3d slice" of some more complex function? > >I guess "Emergent" would be a missnomer, devolving might be better. > >I'm not proposing some mystical solution for the question, it is possible for >us to propose n-demesional critters so why couldn't we understand some more >complex function? > >L. >-- > * suned1!lev@elroy.JPL.Nasa.Gov sun!suntzu!suned1!lev > . lev@suned1.nswses.navy.mil + . > + * S.T.A.R.S.! The revolution has begun! * > My employer has no opinions. These are mine! >In article <1990Oct27.070636.4144@wam.umd.edu> reh@wam.umd.edu (Richard E. Huddleston) writes: >>If we can't define consciousness (not that I'm so sure of that), we can at >>least study it by it's leavings: memories. Anything that can _remember_ is >>in some way conscious. Perhaps the problem with defining consciousness >>is similar to defining life; it doesn't have just one form or one aspect. > >Too simple. My computer remembers, better than I do, and I'm 99.999% sure it's >not conscious. I think your second comment was closer to the mark. Could it >be that what we call consciousness is a continum, a thing that has no boundrys >and is therefore undefinable because it is unknowable in its totality? Two thoughts come to mind here: one, that is storage of bits equivalent to the rich, sensory impressions I retain and call memory? While I admit to being pretty new to the field, it seems that we have nowhere near the types of data structures that would enable the computer to _remember_ that continum of impressions that we so easily accumulate. The second thought that struck me was that it may be possible the Herbert Simon is right in his rather dry and unsentimental assessment of consciousness: that consciousness is merely the pool that our biologically programmed processes swim in -- and our experience of consciousness is both quantitatively and qualitatively absolutely no different from what a machine might experience in the carrying out of its function. But it seems that his opinion is highly outdated, and solves the consciousness problem by eliminating the data that don't agree with his Skinnerish view. Minsky's Frames concept, on the other hand, seems perpetually valid -- if one considers the list elements as structures of varying, rather than single, type. Frames then provide an organization and context-grouping method for data structures of varying and complex type: sense, emotion, procedure, etc. Kind of like multi-media (right term?), where all kinds of data is linked together in a meaningful fashion. When we get an operating system that deals with those types of structures as primitives, we may finally have a thinking machine. >I am remineded of the thought experiments proposed by those who are speculating >about N demesional space. Specifically, how would a 2d critter percieve the >intrusion of a 3d critter into 2d space and conversly, how would we, as 3d >critters, preceieve 4d critters intrusion into our space? > >In the same sense, could consciousness be the by-product of some other process? >Could consciousness be an "Emergent property" of some other function? Like the >2d critter that sees a 2d "slice" of a 3d object suddenly "pop" into existance, >could consciousness be a "3d slice" of some more complex function? P.D. Ouspensky, _The Psychology of Man's Possible Evolution_? What an interesting analogy. It seems here that we run into the unverifiability issues; lots of ideas abound in certain circles about what consciousness might be -- but those circles are also populated by kooks and con-artists. Personal experiences of various forms of consciousness are subjective. >I guess "Emergent" would be a missnomer, devolving might be better. > >I'm not proposing some mystical solution for the question, it is possible for >us to propose n-demesional critters so why couldn't we understand some more >complex function? Again, I'm not so sure of the certainty of verification. But an interesting question, nonetheless. Lots to think about.
srmaddox@eos.ncsu.edu (STEPHEN RAND MADDOX) (11/10/90)
>Too simple. My computer remembers, better than I do, and I'm 99.999% sure it's >not conscious. I dont mean to pick with points, I usually enjoy just reading this base but it seems to me that your computer doesn't remember things any different than a book does. It just records the information and may even have elaborate systems of retrieval that search for key words. A conscious entity, however, would seem to remember with a series of associations produced through input from the physical world and not just scan written material. 'Remembering' may well be part of that which makes us conscious.
fostel@eos.ncsu.edu (Gary Fostel) (11/10/90)
I looked up Kuhn's "definition" of science, wondering if cog. sci,
AI or related subjects would fit. Kuhn is also a post World War II
philosopher of science, and his definition (beginning of chapter 2 in
"Structure of Scientific ..." is delightfully recursive. I don't have it
here at hand, but paraphrasing it (hopefully accurately) he say that
science is that research activity that follows or builds upon previous
scientific achievements. (!)
By this sort of definition, a great many things can get bootstrapped up
as a "science" and then stay a science by satisfying only a very weak
membership test later on. This is actually a fairly good match to the
modern usage of the term "science", but it is descriptive, not proscriptive.
In that book he is clearly describing how things are rather than how they
ought to be.
----GaryFostel---- Department of Computer Science
North Carolina State Universitycpshelley@violet.uwaterloo.ca (cameron shelley) (11/10/90)
In article <1990Nov9.202525.11717@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> fostel@eos.ncsu.edu (Gary Fostel) writes: > > > I looked up Kuhn's "definition" of science, wondering if cog. sci, > AI or related subjects would fit. Kuhn is also a post World War II > philosopher of science, and his definition (beginning of chapter 2 in > "Structure of Scientific ..." is delightfully recursive. I don't have it > here at hand, but paraphrasing it (hopefully accurately) he say that > science is that research activity that follows or builds upon previous > scientific achievements. (!) > > By this sort of definition, a great many things can get bootstrapped up > as a "science" and then stay a science by satisfying only a very weak > membership test later on. This is actually a fairly good match to the > modern usage of the term "science", but it is descriptive, not proscriptive. > In that book he is clearly describing how things are rather than how they > ought to be. > And like any old boy's club, it is a hard one to join if you're new in town! :> -- Cameron Shelley | "Logic, n. The art of thinking and reasoning cpshelley@violet.waterloo.edu| in strict accordance with the limitations and Davis Centre Rm 2136 | incapacities of the human misunderstanding..." Phone (519) 885-1211 x3390 | Ambrose Bierce
cam@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) (11/14/90)
In article <1990Nov9.202525.11717@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> fostel@eos.ncsu.edu (Gary Fostel) writes: > I looked up Kuhn's "definition" of science, wondering if cog. sci, > AI or related subjects would fit. .... > In that book he is clearly describing how things are rather than how they > ought to be. This is one of Lakatos' criticisms of Kuhn, which he lampoons as the "democratic model of science", i.e., it's science if most scientists think it is. -- Chris Malcolm cam@uk.ac.ed.aipna 031 667 1011 x2550 Department of Artificial Intelligence, Edinburgh University 5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK
smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) (11/18/90)
In article <3489@aipna.ed.ac.uk> cam@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes: >In article <1990Nov9.202525.11717@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> fostel@eos.ncsu.edu (Gary >Fostel) writes: > >> I looked up Kuhn's "definition" of science, wondering if cog. sci, >> AI or related subjects would fit. .... >> In that book he is clearly describing how things are rather than how they >> ought to be. > >This is one of Lakatos' criticisms of Kuhn, which he lampoons as the >"democratic model of science", i.e., it's science if most scientists >think it is. It certainly is an easy target for lampoon, but we ought to appreciate how sticky the situation can become. I am reminded of an analogous remark I included on a recent article on algorithmic composition of music, when I claimed that "we may be able to say little more than that music education is that which entitles one to have his behavior judged as 'musical' after his education is complete." Trying to define science is no easier than trying to define music. Musicians assume patterns of behavior based on those of other musicians (Satie's definition: "Music is what happens at concerts."); so it would not be ludicrous to say that scientists assume patterns of behavior based on those of other scientists. ========================================================================= USPS: Stephen Smoliar 5000 Centinela Avenue #129 Los Angeles, California 90066 Internet: smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu "It's only words . . . unless they're true."--David Mamet
msellers@mentor.com (Mike Sellers) (11/21/90)
In article <15724@venera.isi.edu> smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) writes: >In article <3489@aipna.ed.ac.uk> cam@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes: >>In article <1990Nov9.202525.11717@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> fostel@eos.ncsu.edu (Gary >>Fostel) writes: >> >>> I looked up Kuhn's "definition" of science, wondering if cog. sci, >>> AI or related subjects would fit. .... >>> In that book he is clearly describing how things are rather than how they >>> ought to be. >> >>This is one of Lakatos' criticisms of Kuhn, which he lampoons as the >>"democratic model of science", i.e., it's science if most scientists >>think it is. > >It certainly is an easy target for lampoon, but we ought to appreciate how >sticky the situation can become. I am reminded of an analogous remark I >included on a recent article on algorithmic composition of music, when I >claimed that "we may be able to say little more than that music education >is that which entitles one to have his behavior judged as 'musical' after >his education is complete." Which brings to mind the "music" of, say, John Cage or Laurie Anderson. For many people, music seems to be one of those things that they are able to recognize without a distinct set of criteria, even if (or maybe especially if) they are not deeply musically educated. The same often seems to hold true with non-scientists' views of what it is that scientists do and what science is, with equally frustrating results for the scientist as for the performance artist. >Trying to define science is no easier than trying >to define music. Musicians assume patterns of behavior based on those of other >musicians (Satie's definition: "Music is what happens at concerts."); so it >would not be ludicrous to say that scientists assume patterns of behavior based >on those of other scientists. It is not ludicrous to say, and in fact is a widely held attitude -- all you have to see this in action is wander into a lab and watch a graduate student and his or her advisor at work! However, this sort of description is unsatisfying, and leaves the reader with the distinct impression that these scientists (or musicians, or artists, or politicians) don't really *know* what it is that they are about, and that they are once again trying to snow us all so they can spend more of our taxpayer dollars on some fool project. It also weakens the case often touted by those championing the conclusions of science, that as a method of describing the world it is somehow qualitatively better than what the poor ignorant souls of previous eras had available to them. If we cannot describe science any better than to say that 'science is what scientists do, and what scientists do, precisely, is what other scientists do', then I suggest that science and its practitioners are not epistemilogically in a position that is any more defensible than any other describer of the world, such as a shaman, priest, philosopher, artist, or politician. If this is the case, then it ought to give all who claim to practice science pause, and remind us all of the true fallibility of this epistemilogical paradigm that lurks beneath its seemingly robust crust. > Stephen Smoliar >Internet: smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu -- Mike Sellers msellers@mentor.com Mentor Graphics Corp. "I used to think that the brain was the most wonderful organ in my body. Then I realized who was telling me this." -- Emo Phillips
marick@m.cs.uiuc.edu (Brian Marick) (11/22/90)
msellers@mentor.com (Mike Sellers) writes: >If we cannot describe science any better than to say that 'science is what >scientists do, and what scientists do, precisely, is what other scientists do', >then I suggest that science and its practitioners are not epistemilogically >in a position that is any more defensible than any other describer of the >world, such as a shaman, priest, philosopher, artist, or politician. This is Paul Feyerabend's position in _Against Method_. Worth reading. Brian Marick Motorola @ University of Illinois marick@cs.uiuc.edu, uiucdcs!marick
eliot@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Eliot Handelman) (11/23/90)
In article <15724@venera.isi.edu> smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) writes:
; I am reminded of an analogous remark I
;included on a recent article on algorithmic composition of music, when I
;claimed that "we may be able to say little more than that music education
;is that which entitles one to have his behavior judged as 'musical' after
;his education is complete." Trying to define science is no easier than trying
;to define music. Musicians assume patterns of behavior based on those of other
;musicians (Satie's definition: "Music is what happens at concerts."); so it
;would not be ludicrous to say that scientists assume patterns of behavior based
;on those of other scientists.
Yes, but look how inadequate Satie's definition is. It doesn't begin
to cover a zillionth of all musical activity, and entirely misses the
media -- nor does Satie even indicate a loophole whereby that inclusion
might be at least potentially signalled. Perhaps that may be also true
of "science" -- a word almost as useless and as limiting as the word "music."