yamauchi@cs.rochester.edu (Brian Yamauchi) (12/02/90)
In article <GREENBA.90Nov30154938@gambia.crd.ge.com> greenba@gambia.crd.ge.com (ben a green) writes: In article <1990Nov30.180650.26648@watdragon.waterloo.edu> cpshelley@violet.uwaterloo.ca (cameron shelley) writes: In article <GREENBA.90Nov30092227@gambia.crd.ge.com> greenba@gambia.crd.ge.com (ben a green) writes: > ... >reasoning and self awareness in any >non-trivial senses require language. > How do you figure that? Do you mean a mental language? If so, what do you consider 'mentalese' to be like? No, not a mental language. An actual, socially derived language. What is reasoning without talking to oneself, or actually writing to oneself? We do this all the time when reasoning with tough problems. Now cats can solve tough problems, but there is no way to classify their performance as reasoning beyond just the statement that they solve the problems. When we humans reason, we clearly use language. For some forms of reasoning, in particular formal deductive reasoning, this is certainly true. However, other types of problem solving (such as spatial reasoning) seem to involve visual simulations (imagery) rather than language. One psychological experiment involved mental rotation of three-dimensional shapes to determine whether two shapes were equivalent, and the results indicated that the time required was proportional to the number of axes necessary to rotate one of the shapes into a similar orientation as the other. (Sorry, I don't remember the reference.) More generally (and intuitively), many types of problem solving behavior seem to involve visualizing the effects of actions rather than performing logical/linguistic inference. On the other hand, I would agree that an organism which can perform logical reasoning can solve many problems which cannot be solved by imagery alone. Self awareness is more subtle and perhaps here I am relying on an unpopular position that self awareness is learned by interacting with other people. I would argue that self-awareness is learned through interacting with one's environment -- regardless of whether that environment includes people. At the most basic level, one learns that one can directly control the actions of his body (but not the rest of the world) through his thoughts. This strikes me as the core of the separation between self and non-self. Any control over the "non-self" world requires intermediate use of the body. This can include both sensorimotor activities and social communication. You could look at the difference between these forms of interaction in terms of the length of the chain between thought and effect on the world. Self: mind --> body Direct Action: mind --> body --> world Communication: mind --> body --> other people --> world Furthermore, tactile and force sensing are directly related to sensors on the surface of body, and this (combined with the linkage of tactile/force sensing to pleasure and pain) would serve to reinforce the separation between self and non-self (i.e. hit the table with the hammer and you don't feel much -- hit your foot with the hammer and it hurts!) -- _______________________________________________________________________________ Brian Yamauchi University of Rochester yamauchi@cs.rochester.edu Computer Science Department _______________________________________________________________________________
greenba@gambia.crd.ge.com (ben a green) (12/03/90)
In article <YAMAUCHI.90Dec1145515@heron.cs.rochester.edu> yamauchi@cs.rochester.edu (Brian Yamauchi) writes: Path: crdgw1!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!ub!uhura.cc.rochester.edu!rochester!sol!yamauchi From: yamauchi@cs.rochester.edu (Brian Yamauchi) Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy Date: 1 Dec 90 19:55:15 GMT References: <4832@gara.une.oz.au> <GREENBA.90Nov30092227@gambia.crd.ge.com> <1990Nov30.180650.26648@watdragon.waterloo.edu> <GREENBA.90Nov30154938@gambia.crd.ge.com> Sender: news@cs.rochester.edu (Usenet news) Organization: University of Rochester Lines: 75 In article <GREENBA.90Nov30154938@gambia.crd.ge.com> greenba@gambia.crd.ge.com (ben a green) writes: In article <1990Nov30.180650.26648@watdragon.waterloo.edu> cpshelley@violet.uwaterloo.ca (cameron shelley) writes: In article <GREENBA.90Nov30092227@gambia.crd.ge.com> greenba@gambia.crd.ge.com (ben a green) writes: > ... >reasoning and self awareness in any >non-trivial senses require language. > How do you figure that? Do you mean a mental language? If so, what do you consider 'mentalese' to be like? No, not a mental language. An actual, socially derived language. What is reasoning without talking to oneself, or actually writing to oneself? We do this all the time when reasoning with tough problems. Now cats can solve tough problems, but there is no way to classify their performance as reasoning beyond just the statement that they solve the problems. When we humans reason, we clearly use language. For some forms of reasoning, in particular formal deductive reasoning, this is certainly true. However, other types of problem solving (such as spatial reasoning) seem to involve visual simulations (imagery) rather than language. Yes, we can use visual imagery to solve problems. But the question was do we need language in order to reason. I don't equate problem solving with reasoning. Vocabulary is a problem in this field, I know, but I try to stick as close as I can to ordinary language, and IMHO reasoning is a manipulation of words (as in talking to oneself) or writing (as in solving mathetical problems). Problems can be solved by intuition without any reasoning. -- Ben A. Green, Jr. greenba@crd.ge.com Speaking only for myself, of course.
BKort@bbn.com (Barry Kort) (12/12/90)
In article <GREENBA.90Dec3092259@gambia.crd.ge.com> greenba@gambia.crd.ge.com (Ben A. Green) writes: > Problems can be solved by intuition without any reasoning. I suspect that philosophers and logicians working on intuitionist logic would take exception to the suggestion that intuition is not a form of reasoning. Creative problem solving and model-based reasoning (inlcuding the use of analogies, metaphors, and parables) may not be as formalized or mechanized as Aristotelian Logic or Boolean Logic, but these fluid forms of reasoning may yet be crystalized into systematic methods. Barry Kort Visiting Scientist BBN Labs Cambridge, MA
greenba@gambia.crd.ge.com (ben a green) (12/14/90)
In article <61527@bbn.BBN.COM> BKort@bbn.com (Barry Kort) writes: In article <GREENBA.90Dec3092259@gambia.crd.ge.com> greenba@gambia.crd.ge.com (Ben A. Green) writes: > Problems can be solved by intuition without any reasoning. I suspect that philosophers and logicians working on intuitionist logic would take exception to the suggestion that intuition is not a form of reasoning. Barry and others are taking "reasoning" to be an honorific term. I don't disparage intuition by distinguishing it from reasoning. Ordinary language, which willhave to do until we can agree on a technical vocabulary, suggests that reasoning is a matter of arguing from statements of facts to statements of conclusions, both of which involve statements, and a fortiori, language. That's all I meant, and I am surprised at the disagreement. -- Ben A. Green, Jr. greenba@crd.ge.com Speaking only for myself, of course.