mpdevine@watdragon.waterloo.edu (Michel P. Devine) (02/05/91)
In article <3035@yarra-glen.aaii.oz.au> dnk@yarra-glen.aaii.oz.au (David Kinny) writes: >What is it that leads you to believe that introspection is one of >the greatest sources of information about our cognitive processes ? >I would regard it as a most unreliable source of information about the >true nature of those processes. The objective study of aspects of cognition, while important and possibly beneficial, differs substantially from the experience which is by necessity purely subjective. The attempt to separate the observed phenomena from the observer works well in domains where pure deterministic reasoning is applicable, but my experience is that people and even animals are infuriatingly unpredictable, except at the coarsest level of functioning (for example, living beings run away from danger) and therefore the black box or machine model of life may be inappropriate. I should preface my comments on this important topic with a little background. I once held with the AI clan with the fanaticism of the hardcore believer, a "faith" born of despair at the failure of philosophy and religion to enlighten me on the true nature of the universe. Viewing the world as a Great Machine is comfortable for the cognoscenti and leads to a feeling of vast power and (usually) superiority over less illuminated and gullible masses. My fall from grace came about with my attempt to make music intelligible to computers. After consulting scores of so-called music experts, it became increasingly clear that, in contradiction with their claims, they were most certainly *not* in the possession of clear-cut rules for music appreciation. The resulting angst built over the span of years, a gnawing suspicion, then a fear, finally terror, that I was WRONG in a basic way. I should be careful to point out that I do not repudiate the machine model in toto, but that I consider it incomplete. It is true that it is possible to assign specialized functions to parts of the brain, but it is pure speculation to conclude that we are purely mechanistic. The destruction of my most dearly held beliefs has been cataclysmic but necessary (I should note that the process is still ongoing). Perhaps the collapse of the hierarchy of so-called "Levels of Being" is at fault; I think the major weakness of AI research is essentially an optimistic and enthusiastic over-simplification of nature. I will very briefly present a simple breakdown of the aforementioned LoB: 1. Material 2. Life 3. Consciousness 4. Self-awareness Most "classical" philosophical systems make use of some such structure to explain nature. Plants are typically thought to reside at level 2, animals at level 3 and humans at 4, although it may be argued that dolphins may also qualify (how would anyone verify or discount this?). Self-awareness amounts to separating the program from the programmer: we can change our opinions, our beliefs at any time. The levels represent qualitative differences in thinking ability or "intelligence". For example, the ability of plants to orient their photoreceptors with the sun seems to be the action of some kind of thought, although not necessarily consciousness. Animals seem to be free of most neuroses by virtue of their lack of self-consciousness, living entirely in the present, but without the ability to forecast the effect of their actions. My point is that the only reality to which we have direct access is our own, and even then from a very limited vantage point, namely we may come to know ourselves, but we shall never truly know anyone else. It is our predilection as scientists to search for all-encompassing paradigms, explanations and simplifications. Assuming that we are nothing more than ambulatory formal systems leads to logical contradiction as pointed out in a previous posting. f It seems therefore only rational to conclude that our basic assumption is incorrect, or at least dubious. So, what is the truth? I don't know, but I am not satisfied with the purely mechanical answer. It does not address the most mysterious aspects of intelligence, namely intuition, creativity and so on, and therefore it is naive, and in fact degrading. Who really wants to believe that he is no more than a complex automaton? No AI researcher truly applies such reasoning to himself, his family or co-workers which thereby indicates a split between belief and action that is most telling.. >It seems to me that introspection produces subjective and unreliable >information about a tiny subset of our higher level cognitive processes, >If we could understand the workings of a lizard mind it would be a >major step towards understanding human cognitive processes. > I don't understand how you can relate the lizard mind to the human mind. I can I know how lizards think, without becoming a lizard? Certainly, I can dissect lizards, make a list of parts and try to assemble one from my kit, but is it possible that I have thereby misplaced the crucial ingredient "life"? On a related note, isn't it interesting that our medical experts pursue the understanding of life solely from studying dead material? Perhaps that is why most hospitals are rotten places to go when one is sick... I think that introspection provides subjective and crucial information about a process most of us are almost studiously ignoring. Introspection is the *only* way to know for certain what is really going on in your brain, whether it agrees with any given theory or not. Most of our activity is below our level of awareness, but it is possible (I am tempted to say "essential") to become *more* conscious, to acquire more control. I should stress that I have barely skimmed the surface of objections to the AI viewpoint regarding its ultimate aim. There exist many books that one can consult, many techniques which with to experiment. I recommend E.F. Schumacher's "Guide to the Perplexed" as a good starting point, since it fleshes out my argument and transcends it. Ken Wilber's books are also useful. Michel Devine -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- mpdevine@watdragon.waterloo.{edu|csn} (519) 884-7123 Michel P. Devine mpdevine@watdragon.uwaterloo.ca CS Dept., U. Waterloo {uunet|utzoo|decvax|utai}!watmath!watdragon!mpdevine Waterloo, Ont. N2L3G1
erich@eecs.cs.pdx.edu (Erich Stefan Boleyn) (02/12/91)
mpdevine@watdragon.waterloo.edu (Michel P. Devine) writes: >I should preface my comments on this important topic with a little background. >I once held with the AI clan with the fanaticism of the hardcore believer, >a "faith" born of despair at the failure of philosophy and religion to >enlighten me on the true nature of the universe. Viewing the world as a >Great Machine is comfortable for the cognoscenti and leads to a feeling >of vast power and (usually) superiority over less illuminated and gullible >masses. My fall from grace came about with my attempt to make music >intelligible to computers. After consulting scores of so-called music >experts, it became increasingly clear that, in contradiction with their claims, >they were most certainly *not* in the possession of clear-cut rules for music >appreciation. The resulting angst built over the span of years, a gnawing >suspicion, then a fear, finally terror, that I was WRONG in a basic way. >I should be careful to point out that I do not repudiate the machine >model in toto, but that I consider it incomplete. It is true that it is >possible to assign specialized functions to parts of the brain, but it is >pure speculation to conclude that we are purely mechanistic. The destruction >of my most dearly held beliefs has been cataclysmic but necessary (I should >note that the process is still ongoing). You seem quite bitter about the experience. Why must a mechanistic universe have no good explanation of emotions and intuition? Just because we don't understand the mechanisms does not mean that it does not exist. When I hear explanations that there must be "something more" to the universe than a mechanism in operation, many seem to also hold an undercurrent of revulsion to attributing all of the beauty of the world to "just a machine". Why must a mechanistic view be ugly? The term "machine" has long been synonymous with "unemotional" and "brittle", but it need not be that way. My view of the world is (like many other people's) deeply related to the aesthetics involved. It has been established that some of the most efficient dynamically adaptive algorithms for complex demands are quite simple. Even neural networks (extremely primitive compared to the real thing, mechanistic or not ;-) show some really interesting adaptive capabilities. My view of a mechanistic world is extremely *rich*, full of sensuality and imagery of incredible complexity, with feelings, life, and all the other amenities... It could even allow for a God if done right. The point of science is more to find consistent generalized models than to find some ephemeral "truth". It is always a danger to call a model, however accurate, the "truth" about the situation. *My* point is that, although you could be correct, of what value is it for science as a whole (or even a subdiscipline like Cognitive Science) to disregard its models totally... science's tenet is to discover empirical relationships. Now, admittedly, there is a strong debate about whether cognitive science fits the bill, so to speak, but can it hurt to try? > ...I think the major weakness of AI research is essentially an >optimistic and enthusiastic over-simplification of nature. I would agree, but some of us *are* trying to address the problem. Cognitive Science started changing the questions asked and the methods and knowledge used to address these questions... and the newly emerging field of Artificial Life asks different questions completely (I made a posting about 4-6 months back about the problem of assumptions and bad questions in the field of Artificial Intelligence). >The levels represent qualitative differences in thinking ability or >"intelligence". For example, the ability of plants to orient their >photoreceptors with the sun seems to be the action of some kind of >thought, although not necessarily consciousness. Some extremely simple algorithms for self-adaptive and self-configuring systems seem to be able to do this quite well. > ...Animals seem to be free >of most neuroses by virtue of their lack of self-consciousness, living >entirely in the present, but without the ability to forecast the effect >of their actions. This is still being worked on, I must admit ;-). > ...My point is that the only reality to which we have direct >access is our own, and even then from a very limited vantage point, namely >we may come to know ourselves, but we shall never truly know anyone else. Yeah? So what. Can you truly know what its like to be physically female (or even socially, that was wierd enough) ? Believe me, I've thought about this quite a bit... I'm told that many aspects of what I've discussed with some female friends of mine are quite close (one even gave me a very funny look ;-). >It is our predilection as scientists to search for all-encompassing >paradigms, explanations and simplifications. Assuming that we are nothing >more than ambulatory formal systems leads to logical contradiction as pointed >out in a previous posting. This is not necessarily the case. The current theory claims that our "logic" resides on a different level than the formal system. It may well be that the godel statement that will clog us is a set of patterns. (it is well known in medical circles that certain frequencies of strobing light can send epileptics into convulsions, and I think that you could engineer the right patterns or stimulus to knock a heathy person out too). The right kind of shock to one's system can even kill us. One could then think of a godel string as a "shock to the system", since how do we know what form they would take? >It seems therefore only rational to conclude that our basic assumption is >incorrect, or at least dubious. Dubious? Agreed... I think the current model has problems too, but that does not mean it has no use... > ...So, what is the truth? I don't know, but >I am not satisfied with the purely mechanical answer. It does not address >the most mysterious aspects of intelligence, namely intuition, creativity >and so on, and therefore it is naive, and in fact degrading. How does it not address intuition and creativity? There are some very interesting models of creativity being worked on right now (I heard of one being worked on by Hofstadter called a "slipnet"... most interesting). I don't know about this being automatically naive... there have been suggestions that questions about "intelligence" and "conciousness" being naive in themselves (I admit it, I am one of the suggesters ;-). Degrading? This sounds a bit like elitism... why are we better than the rocks and stars? We're more interesting to ourselves, I'll grant you, and we can do neat things, but they are beautiful too. > ...Who really >wants to believe that he is no more than a complex automaton? No AI >researcher truly applies such reasoning to himself, his family or co-workers >which thereby indicates a split between belief and action that is most telling. I'm not sure what I believe... but I fit in the model too... many people I know call me "intense" because I find everyone so fascinating, and am constantly curious about them. This is also the reason why I have a tremendous fear of death. I am going out on a limb here, but in trying to be what I feel as an honest scientist, I feel one should think critically about everything, and am therefore an agnostic. (Atheism in my view would be an assumption too) > ...On a related note, isn't it interesting that our medical >experts pursue the understanding of life solely from studying dead material? It is an unfortunate carryover from the past... >Perhaps that is why most hospitals are rotten places to go when one is sick... Personally I think that most human technology is very slapstick... with little elegance... and medicine is near the top of my list (make that barbaric). >I think that introspection provides subjective and crucial information about >a process most of us are almost studiously ignoring. Introspection is the >*only* way to know for certain what is really going on in your brain, >whether it agrees with any given theory or not. Yes, but so many people have fundamentally disagreed about how the human mind operates from introspection... can we rely on their interpretations for real information that is not just useable in a social context? I agree that introspection is useful, but one must be careful, it may well be that our internal states that we percieve don't well correspond to what's going on (assuming a mechanistic model, of course ;-), as it seems a dangerous assumption that we can... and look how far it got in the last 4000 years (and that's just the time during recorded history), and it would be naive to assume that they were stupid, or even that much less intelligent than ourselves. Erich "I haven't lost my mind; I know exactly where it is." / -- Erich Stefan Boleyn -- \ --=> *Mad Genius wanna-be* <=-- { Honorary Grad. Student (Math) }--> Internet E-mail: <erich@cs.pdx.edu> \ Portland State University / >%WARNING: INTERESTED AND EXCITABLE%<
erich@eecs.cs.pdx.edu (Erich Stefan Boleyn) (02/12/91)
Oops! I made a mistake on the part about being female... (missed reviewing it before posting, and misinterpreted his statement to boot... what can I say, I'm embarassed ;-). erich@eecs.cs.pdx.edu (Erich Stefan Boleyn) writes: >mpdevine@watdragon.waterloo.edu (Michel P. Devine) writes: >> ...My point is that the only reality to which we have direct >>access is our own, and even then from a very limited vantage point, namely >>we may come to know ourselves, but we shall never truly know anyone else. OK, I agree that we may only know ourselves directly. One theory of communication is that we can only hint at what lies underneath, and that is all "communication" is. How well do we even know ourselves, though? Sometimes it takes someone who is not cluttered by our own internal pressures to tell us things that we didn't conciously recognize... and how complete is a model if one purposely (although, not necessarily intentionally) ignores certain often quite significant aspects? And I think that nobody has *no* illusions, we simply cannot be that well informed. This does not also imply that no correspondence exists at all, just that it is tenuous. There *does* seem to be some correspondence, and in some cases the ability to abstractly think about what its like to be another being (like my example of thinking about what it would be like to be physically female without ever being so myself, which IMHO, seems to have worked OK for a first approximation). Building a model of someones mind does not necessitate knowing the internal states by introspection, though, unless checking it for validity along that route. Some, like myself, may argue that this could even cause confusion. Erich "I haven't lost my mind; I know exactly where it is." / -- Erich Stefan Boleyn -- \ --=> *Mad Genius wanna-be* <=-- { Honorary Grad. Student (Math) }--> Internet E-mail: <erich@cs.pdx.edu> \ Portland State University / >%WARNING: INTERESTED AND EXCITABLE%<
mpdevine@watdragon.waterloo.edu (Michel P. Devine) (02/14/91)
In article <1574@pdxgate.UUCP> erich@eecs.cs.pdx.edu (Erich Stefan Boleyn) writes: >Why must a mechanistic universe have no good explanation of emotions >and intuition? A very good question. I think the problem lies in assigning meanings. I don't want to give a full expose on this complex matter, but I will briefly outline my point. A "sign" is something that has no meaning in and of itself, but that refers to something else. For example, our mathematical language consists entirely of signs; every part is arbitrary and ordered according to agreed upon rules. So, it is not possible to refer to something which has no sign, or for which no sign can be constructed. In that sense, our modeling tools, based on math, are necessarily a "closed system". The assignment of the signs to something outside the system (for example, the intuitive idea of the number 2) is a mysterious process happening within the mind of the observer, and therefore hard to analyse, let alone detect. If the universe is mechanistic, then there must be some description constructed out of signs that captures it, in all its glory. On the other hand, there are "symbols" which are both signs (pointers to) and are themselves greater than signs. In psychological terms, the symbols have meaning but the signs do not. Symbols are things like "father", "water", "pain", "mathematician" which are not purely conceptual but much richer in content and association. The problem with the mechanistic view, as I see it, is that it precludes anything but an arbitrary assignment to the axioms of nature, i.e, there are no intrinsic meanings since everything is a denotation. But what does it denote? That is where the importance of establishing a science of symbols comes in. > When I hear explanations that there must be "something more" to the >universe than a mechanism in operation, many seem to also hold an >undercurrent of revulsion to attributing all of the beauty of the world to >"just a machine". I agree. I too consider machines beautiful, but perhaps the perception of beauty is due to something in me that is inherently non-mechanical. > My view of a mechanistic world is >extremely *rich*, full of sensuality and imagery of incredible complexity, >with feelings, life, and all the other amenities... It could even allow >for a God if done right. I don't understand that last statement. Any God would still have to be around and if the universe is mechanical, why do we need it/Him? and where is he hiding? I like your statement "if done right", because it is familiar to me...although not satisfying since I prefer experience to argument. > *My* point is that, although you could be correct, of what value is >it for science as a whole (or even a subdiscipline like Cognitive Science) >to disregard its models totally... science's tenet is to discover >empirical relationships. Now, admittedly, there is a strong debate about >whether cognitive science fits the bill, so to speak, but can it hurt to >try? > Right. One cannot ditch all models because they are necessary. However, there *is* a scientific discipline that can answer our questions, but it isn't CS. According to Wilber (author of many fascinating books) a scientific fact is established by the following procedure: 1. Injunction. A recipe or procedure is provided. Following the recipe should result in 2. Experience. The person looks at the result of following the instructions, interprets, analyzes and forms a new personal world view. 3. Validation. One consults a group of peers who have acquired the knowledge to verify the truth. Facts are based on agreement with established authority. So, a mathematical theorem is a procedure by which I can acquire the same mind-state as the author and thereby verify his claim; similarly for the physical sciences. With this very broad definition of the scientific paradigm, one can attack the consciousness problem. Note that all three steps are essential. To paraphrase Wilber, a person who has not acquired the skills necessary to make an informed statement ought to be ignored. This may sound harsh, and even non-conformist in an age where the nation gobbles up the word of the inexpert and uninformed on a daily basis (I'm thinking of actors and "personalities" on talk shows), but it seems only reasonable. By this definition of science, there are many sciences of the mind that are extremely sophisticated, have a large body of theoretical knowledge *and* groups of experts for validation. It is entirely possible that the Tibetans, the Indian Gurus and Zen Masters (not to mention the Christian "mystics") have more to say about the mind than CS. I admit readily that I don't "buy" the mystic's viewpoint. However, if I insist on being scientific, then I *must* carefully consider their arguments, try out their exercises and find out for myself, whether this is the prevalent "scientific" (read, conventional) tactic or not. Besides, I never understood why a nation like Tibet never developed technology; perhaps they were concentrating on something more "organic"? > >>The levels represent qualitative differences in thinking ability or >>"intelligence". For example, the ability of plants to orient their >>photoreceptors with the sun seems to be the action of some kind of >>thought, although not necessarily consciousness. > > Some extremely simple algorithms for self-adaptive and self-configuring >systems seem to be able to do this quite well. > Yes, but the pattern (algorithm) does not do justice to the plant. We still can't build plants, even though we can build systems that behave somewhat like plants. >The right kind of shock to one's system can even kill us. One could then >think of a godel string as a "shock to the system", since how do we know >what form they would take? > Sorry, I don't understand these statements relating godel strings to our systems at all. > > Degrading? This sounds a bit like elitism... why are we better than >the rocks and stars? We're more interesting to ourselves, I'll grant you, >and we can do neat things, but they are beautiful too. > Absolutely. We are *both* better (I can things they can't) and not better (we're all the same). I am going out on a limb here, but >in trying to be what I feel as an honest scientist, I feel one should >think critically about everything, and am therefore an agnostic. (Atheism >in my view would be an assumption too) I disagree; agnosticism is a way of saying that I'm not willing to take a stand. Most agnostics I know are actually atheists who, for social reasons, prefer not to be singled out. (I am not criticising since I have spent a long time as an agnostic, and I may change yet, but I'm not sure :-). > > Yes, but so many people have fundamentally disagreed about how the >human mind operates from introspection... can we rely on their >interpretations for real information that is not just useable in a social >context? No, let us not rely on anyone else. Introspection is taken up for *personal* discovery. If something generic surfaces, we shall celebrate but chances are that the result of introspection is to increase the disparity between us and the people around us, as we gain more understanding and clarity. Then, it is almost impossible to communicate directly; but that is not new. Michel -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- mpdevine@watdragon.waterloo.{edu|csn} (519) 884-7123 Michel P. Devine mpdevine@watdragon.uwaterloo.ca CS Dept., U. Waterloo {uunet|utzoo|decvax|utai}!watmath!watdragon!mpdevine Waterloo, Ont. N2L3G1
dailey@frith.uucp (Chris Dailey) (02/14/91)
In article <1574@pdxgate.UUCP> erich@eecs.cs.pdx.edu (Erich Stefan Boleyn) writes: >mpdevine@watdragon.waterloo.edu (Michel P. Devine) writes: [... much neat material by both authors deleted...] >> ...On a related note, isn't it interesting that our medical >>experts pursue the understanding of life solely from studying dead material? > It is an unfortunate carryover from the past... I hope you gentlemen are not suggesting human vivisection ... (Actually, most any other type of vivisection would disgust me, as well.) >>Perhaps that is why most hospitals are rotten places to go when one is sick... > Personally I think that most human technology is very slapstick... with >little elegance... and medicine is near the top of my list (make that >barbaric). Artificial intelligence is at the top of mine. (Please note humor.) >>I think that introspection provides subjective and crucial information about >>a process most of us are almost studiously ignoring. Introspection is the >>*only* way to know for certain what is really going on in your brain, >>whether it agrees with any given theory or not. > Yes, but so many people have fundamentally disagreed about how the >human mind operates from introspection... can we rely on their >interpretations for real information that is not just useable in a social >context? I agree that introspection is useful, but one must be careful, >it may well be that our internal states that we percieve don't well >correspond to what's going on (assuming a mechanistic model, of course ;-), ...and may actually be contrary to what's going on. > Erich > "I haven't lost my mind; I know exactly where it is." Appropriate for all of us, I'd say. -- Chris Dailey dailey@(frith.egr|cps).msu.edu __ __ ___ | "A line in the sand." -- The Detroit News __/ \/ \/ __:>- | \__/\__/\__/ | "Allein in der sand." -- me
GONLERA@YaleVM.YCC.Yale.Edu (02/17/91)
Correction: In my previous post I meant to say "And although I do NOT believe that there is a God, neither do I believe that you can whip one up using mechanistic equations, etc, etc." Leroy Gonzalez gonlera@yalevm
stephens@latcs1.oz.au (Philip J Stephens) (02/18/91)
Before I begin, I would just like to mention that I'm quite uninformed about the current state of AI investigation in regards to models of consciousness, so some of my questions may be hum-drum to some. But hey, you've got to start somewhere! (And it will be short...) Michel P. Devine writes: >I should be careful to point out that I do not repudiate the machine >model in toto, but that I consider it incomplete. It is true that it is >possible to assign specialized functions to parts of the brain, but it is >pure speculation to conclude that we are purely mechanistic. With the theories of Quantum Mechanics and Chaos been so successful of late (not that I have read enough about them), I am curious to know whether or not the brain is as susceptible to unpredictability as, for instance, the weather. Do neurons always behave in a deterministic fashion, or do they exhibit random fluctuations? Could a neural network amplify these variations in behaviour like a ball bouncing amongst an array of pegs, never producing the same result from the same initial conditions? Just how much is known about living neural networks, and is it a fair assumption to say that they are purely mechanical in function? I quite often wonder about the rationale behind searching for a deterministic model of the brain, when so much natural phenomena is chaotic and inherently unpredictable in nature. Obviously there are some quite dramatic philosophical implications that would be raised if the brain were found to be governed by the laws of Chaos, but I am often surprised to find that the majority of people find these implications unsavory rather than potentially revolutionary. With the scientific models of the world gradually leaning towards an acknowledgement of the unpredictable nature of the universe, why do people still cling so dramatically to mechanistic models of consciousness? [I think I already know some of the reasons, but I want to hear the views of others first]. </\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\></\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\> < Philip J. Stephens >< "Many views yield the truth." > < Hons. student, Computer Science >< "Therefore, be not alone." > < La Trobe University, Melbourne >< - Prime Song of the viggies, from > < AUSTRALIA >< THE ENGIMA SCORE by Sheri S Tepper > <\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/><\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/>
erich@eecs.cs.pdx.edu (Erich Stefan Boleyn) (02/19/91)
stephens@latcs1.oz.au (Philip J Stephens) writes: >Michel P. Devine writes: >>I should be careful to point out that I do not repudiate the machine >>model in toto, but that I consider it incomplete. It is true that it is >>possible to assign specialized functions to parts of the brain, but it is >>pure speculation to conclude that we are purely mechanistic. > With the theories of Quantum Mechanics and Chaos been so successful >of late (not that I have read enough about them), I am curious to know >whether or not the brain is as susceptible to unpredictability as, for >instance, the weather. Do neurons always behave in a deterministic >fashion, or do they exhibit random fluctuations? From what I have read of research on the matter, there seems to be quite strong evidence that they behave deterministically by probabilistic rules. The properties of neuron firing come from the actions of a large number of protein gates that let ions through with a certain probability based on the presense of other proteins or magnetic fields (depending on which type of gate we are speaking of, there are a large number of types present). The overall effect of all of these probabilities seem to be a fairly deterministic firing ability, but if you want to model it that closely, it reduces to quantum mechanical problems. > Could a neural >network amplify these variations in behaviour like a ball bouncing >amongst an array of pegs, never producing the same result from the >same initial conditions? Yes, there has been some work that shows very chaotic results. The most interesting results I have heard of are measuring certain patterns in the human brain (sorry, I can't remember the reference, but I think that it was on a "NOVA" program sometime in the last year or two). > Just how much is known about living neural >networks, and is it a fair assumption to say that they are purely >mechanical in function? Whoa. It seems that you are mixing "chaotic" with "random". They are not the same phenomena. Chaos is fundamentally a study of deterministic systems... systems that appear random on the surface, but have well-defined relationships running them. Chaotic systems are quite mechanistic, but they don't seem to follow our idea of > I quite often wonder about the rationale behind searching for a >deterministic model of the brain, when so much natural phenomena is >chaotic and inherently unpredictable in nature. Obviously there are >some quite dramatic philosophical implications that would be raised if >the brain were found to be governed by the laws of Chaos, but I am >often surprised to find that the majority of people find these implications >unsavory rather than potentially revolutionary. If you are speaking of the brain being inherently *random*, I agree that it would be dramatic. As for it being chaotic, I think that many people already believe this. The arguments about the random/nonrandom nature of the underlying mechanisms in the brain rage as we speak ;-). Some people imply that the "random" parts need to be truly random for the brain to work as a true intelligence, so that even the stochastic laws on top wouldn't give rise to intelligence. I don't find the idea of randomness so much unsavory as counter-intuitive. It would be quite interesting, though... it twists my mind. Part of the problem might be that we cling to the macro-scale interpretation of waves, for instance... but that's another discussion ;-). > With the scientific models of the world gradually leaning towards an >acknowledgement of the unpredictable nature of the universe, why do >people still cling so dramatically to mechanistic models of >consciousness? [I think I already know some of the reasons, but I >want to hear the views of others first]. There is a *lot* of evidence to imply determinism, at least on the macro-level... and neurons appear to function on the macro-level, enless you insist that the quantum fluxations are still present. If they are truly random anyway, they so nearly cancel out that it is almost not worth the effort, and on top of that the stimulus that we give it would introduce its own "fluxuations", so to speak, as stimulus from the real world has irregularities in it. There are certain arguments that I am not addressing, but I don't think it is the function of science to give up before it tries. Erich "I haven't lost my mind; I know exactly where it is." / -- Erich Stefan Boleyn -- \ --=> *Mad Genius wanna-be* <=-- { Honorary Grad. Student (Math) }--> Internet E-mail: <erich@cs.pdx.edu> \ Portland State University / >%WARNING: INTERESTED AND EXCITABLE%<