bjkinane@vax1.tcd.ie (02/14/91)
I am preparing a presentation on the subject of whether computers can be considered as an emerging life-form at a very primitive stage of evolution and on the future implications of this for mankind . I would welcome any views on this area.
joe@shiva.sci.com (Joe La Rocque) (02/19/91)
In article <1991Feb14.135220.7790@vax1.tcd.ie> bjkinane@vax1.tcd.ie writes: >I am preparing a presentation on the subject of whether computers can be >considered as an emerging life-form....... First off, what constitutes a 'life-form'? Taking into consideration that the 'species' of computers is varied, one might stretch the point and proclaim computers as a species evolving along the silicon line as opposed to the carbon line. But, then again, there are diverse mutated forms of cars. And, so far, I have not seen any behavior exhibited from any motor vehicle which would permit me to assert that it is intelligent (this includes it symbiotic passenger). Since I haven't been beat upon in some time, I thought I would throw this out :-). Joe La Rocque SCI Technology, Inc. Huntsville, AL
kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) (02/20/91)
In article <1991Feb19.130832.9715@shiva.sci.com> joe@shiva.sci.com (0000-Admin(0000)) writes: >In article <1991Feb14.135220.7790@vax1.tcd.ie> bjkinane@vax1.tcd.ie writes: >>I am preparing a presentation on the subject of whether computers can be >>considered as an emerging life-form....... > >First off, what constitutes a 'life-form'? Taking into consideration that >the 'species' of computers is varied, one might stretch the point >and proclaim computers as a species evolving along the silicon line >as opposed to the carbon line. Here is a quick and dirty definition, to begin discussion: 1. Life-forms reproduce - while computers are used to construct other computers, they still require human assistance. Viruses also cannot reproduce without assistance of other organisms. 2. Life-forms metabolize - that is, they concentrate energy I think these are the two fundamental ones. All of the other attributes of living systems I can think of (adaptation, high degree of organization, etc.) can be traced down to these two. --scott
eomu01@castle.ed.ac.uk (Hall) (02/20/91)
The actual biological definition of a living organism can be described
by the mnemonic "MERRING".
Movement - O.K. so I suppose some computers (more formally robots) can
be said to be able to move.
Excretion - I hardly think that a computer is able to excrete metabolic
waste products from itself (unless you count the endless
reams of garbage that I seem to be able to get out of them)!
Respiration - This is the breaking down of some form of chemical energy
source. Whilst a computer may be said to require energy
not many can be said to be able to make their own.
Reproduction - This subject has already been touched on. It only remains
(at some for me to say that I doubt that it can be said that
point in its computers making other computers can be called
life-cycle.) reproduction.
Irritability - In other words a response can be produced by doing
something to it that it doesn't like. O.K. so here is
another criterion (sorry if it is spelt wrongly) that is
satisfied by computers since I seem to be able to get a
response quite easily (usually in the form of error
messages).
Nutrition - Can a computer be said to feed itself? I think not.
Growth - I fail to see how a computer can be said to grow during the
period of its life. At lest I have never seen a computer
change in size even over several years. Have you?
This may seem to be a simple form of classification, but that fact
remains that for an organism to be considered to be alive (and hence a
life form), it must fulfill all the above criteria (with relatively few
exceptions and even then only an exception in perhaps 1 or 2 of them at
a time). Above, we can see that computers fail on 5 out of the required
7 criteria, therefore I would strongly conclude that computers cannot be
said to be true life-forms in any stage of development. However, people
always make mistakes, so perhaps in years to come we will all be
replaced by our more efficient, robotic models...who knows...?
:An ardent philosopher and scientist.szarekw@lonexc.radc.af.mil (William J. Szarek) (02/20/91)
In article <1991Feb14.135220.7790@vax1.tcd.ie> bjkinane@vax1.tcd.ie writes: >I am preparing a presentation on the subject of whether computers can be >considered as an emerging life-form at a very primitive stage of evolution and >on the future implications of this for mankind . I would welcome any views on >this area. Hmmm. Since you (I presume) consider 'computer life' to be emerging, possibly along the same path to intelligence that we (humans) have, I wonder can this be possible support for the existance of a superior diety or God that controlled our rise from plasma slime to rulers of the earth? I can see parallels between the technological advances made by people (computer's God) being applied to computers and 'called' evolution (even though natural selection has nothing to do with it). Maybe natural selection is garbage . . . Maybe there *is* a God who created us to know Him, to love Him, to serve Him, and to be happy with Him in Heaven. Maybe my ancestors are not bloody chimps and pond scum. I kinda hoped all along that I was made in the image of God! Praise be His most Holy Name and His Blessings on the science that deals with *REAL* reality. Buzz
eriks@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Erik Mark Seligman) (02/21/91)
In article <8617@castle.ed.ac.uk> eomu01@castle.ed.ac.uk (Hall) writes: >The actual biological definition of a living organism can be described >by the mnemonic "MERRING". >Excretion - I hardly think that a computer is able to excrete metabolic > waste products from itself (unless you count the endless > reams of garbage that I seem to be able to get out of them)! > >Respiration - This is the breaking down of some form of chemical energy > source. Whilst a computer may be said to require energy > not many can be said to be able to make their own. > >Nutrition - Can a computer be said to feed itself? I think not. > Each of these "failures" of the computer comes from one source: the fact that we look at computers in isolation, apart from their power sources. If, for example, I hooked up a generator (operating on oil or something) to my Mac, and called the resulting system a "computer", then I could properly say that my computer excretes (CO2 from the burning of the oil), and breathes/eats the oil itself. Not that I find these convincing criteria for life anyway... --- Erik ************************************************************************ * Erik Seligman, eriks@phoenix.princeton.edu * *----------------------------------------------------------------------* * "An eye for an eye, | "An eye for an eye * * a tooth for a tooth." | leaves the world blind." * * --Hammurabi | - Gandhi * ************************************************************************
cpshelley@violet.uwaterloo.ca (cameron shelley) (02/21/91)
In article <1991Feb14.135220.7790@vax1.tcd.ie> bjkinane@vax1.tcd.ie writes: >I am preparing a presentation on the subject of whether computers can be >considered as an emerging life-form at a very primitive stage of evolution and >on the future implications of this for mankind . I would welcome any views on >this area. Hmmm. You should also consider exactly what you mean by "evolution". Natural evolution could be looked on (in a simplified sense) as a recursive loop: beginning with birth, proceding through life, and death -- with sexual reproduction as the recursive step, spawning the next generation. As with all loops, it has an invariant: randomized mutation of the genetic code takes place at each repetition (if I may be allowed to call null a random change occasionally). Recombination from two different sources doesn't hurt either. It must be noted however that, unlike loops in most programs, the invariant is not controlled enough to close the resulting class; meaning that new species emerge from the process. In artificial evolution, such as the ongoing engineering of computers, it is questionable whether the invariant (change with generation) is random enough to open the result class as in natural evolution. The argument still holds, I think, even if you consider "computers" to mean not species but genera, order, or kingdom. I personally can't think of any counter-examples, but it would be interesting if anyone could present a good one. Btw, I'm aware not all life reproduces this way, but this seems to be the most relevant point of comparison. You might wish to consider other paradigms than evolution, an essentially undirected process. Cam -- Cameron Shelley | "Absurdity, n. A statement of belief cpshelley@violet.waterloo.edu| manifestly inconsistent with one's own Davis Centre Rm 2136 | opinion." Phone (519) 885-1211 x3390 | Ambrose Bierce
oleary@ux.acs.umn.edu (Doc O'Leary) (02/21/91)
In article <8617@castle.ed.ac.uk> eomu01@castle.ed.ac.uk (Hall) writes, among other things: >The actual biological definition of a living organism can be described >by the mnemonic "MERRING". > >Movement >Excretion >Respiration >Reproduction >Irritability >Nutrition >Growth Would you, then, say that a person in a severe coma is not a living organism? The person would fail, like a computer, to meet 5 of the 7 above (perhaps even all 7). Couldn't you, likewise, say that computer viruses are living organisms (biological?) because they meet at least 5 of the above 7? A *computer* is not a life-form anymore than is a corpse. Each is merely a system that has the potential to "contain" life. Without proper "software," neither can be considered a life-form. I'd say a major difficulty with this discussion is the varied definitions of life. Though there are similarities that make different life-forms analogous, the definition of computer life should not be the same as that of biological life. ********************** Signature Block : Version 2.1 ********************* * | * * "Was it love, or was it the idea | If at first you don't succeed . . . * * of being in love?" -- PF | you have failed. * * (Which one *is* Pink?) | * * | oleary@ux.acs.umn.edu * ****************** Copyright (c) 1991 by Doc O'Leary ********************
cpshelley@violet.uwaterloo.ca (cameron shelley) (02/22/91)
In article <1991Feb19.163133.8664@news.larc.nasa.gov> kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) writes: [...] >Here is a quick and dirty definition, to begin discussion: > >1. Life-forms reproduce > - while computers are used to construct other computers, they still require > human assistance. Viruses also cannot reproduce without assistance of > other organisms. > >2. Life-forms metabolize > - that is, they concentrate energy > You could be even more abstract here and say "Life-forms are a massive local reversal of entropy" and thus be able to talk about complexity as well as 'material' representation. Number 1 seems to interact with 2 to produce death in complicated organisms -- one cannot assemble energy endlessly and expect to reproduce (create competition) with limited resources available. >I think these are the two fundamental ones. All of the other attributes of >living systems I can think of (adaptation, high degree of organization, etc.) >can be traced down to these two. It is interesting that crystals have both of these properties. They 'grow' becoming a highly organized structure while compiling energy in the form of molecular bonds, and reproduce by splintering. Should we think of them as life-forms? I guess this is where "metabolize" comes in; on the one hand, crystals anabolize minerals to build themselves but I don't believe they have any intrinsic catabolic process which tends to break them down. Is there a geologist in the house?! Now, are viruses life-forms? Anyway, on the original topic, computers are certainly highly organized, but they do not have a metabolism in the above sense -- they do not have any intrinsic processes that break them down (excluding material fatigue), probably because they are not under any competetive pressure for resources and they don't reproduce. At present, these functions are done for the computers by their manufacturers and users. The situation may change though. So, I concur that metabolism and reproduction are necessary for life as we understand it, but complexity deserves attention as well. Cam -- Cameron Shelley | "Absurdity, n. A statement of belief cpshelley@violet.waterloo.edu| manifestly inconsistent with one's own Davis Centre Rm 2136 | opinion." Phone (519) 885-1211 x3390 | Ambrose Bierce
kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) (02/23/91)
In article <1991Feb22.154109.26616@watdragon.waterloo.edu> cpshelley@violet.uwaterloo.ca (cameron shelley) writes: >It is interesting that crystals have both of these properties. They 'grow' >becoming a highly organized structure while compiling energy in the form >of molecular bonds, and reproduce by splintering. Should we think of them >as life-forms? I guess this is where "metabolize" comes in; on the one >hand, crystals anabolize minerals to build themselves but I don't believe >they have any intrinsic catabolic process which tends to break them down. >Is there a geologist in the house?! Now, are viruses life-forms? Viruses are debatable, which is part of the problem. If you consider viruses as being life forms, then perhaps we can construct a computer which will easily fit the definition of being living. Like viruses, computers don't self-replicate, but they are used as models to instruct and design other computers, the actual construction being done by living beings. One other thing, which I forgot to mention, by the way: 3. Living things are self-repairing. By this, I mean that if injured, they heal themselves. Of course, the self-healing is fairly limited by available resources and by the organism's degree of redundancy (ie. if a head is chopped off a person, it will not grow back easily, but a loss of blood is swiftly compensated for). >Anyway, on the original topic, computers are certainly highly organized, >but they do not have a metabolism in the above sense -- they do not have >any intrinsic processes that break them down (excluding material fatigue), >probably because they are not under any competetive pressure for resources >and they don't reproduce. At present, these functions are done for the >computers by their manufacturers and users. The situation may change >though. Organization isn't enough. One thing you'll find in all organisms is a very high degree of redundancy. Even in bacteria you'll find a large amount of superfluous genetic material. Parts subject to damage tend to be duplicated. And while the degree of organization is very high, it does not always appear to be so to the naked eye (much like that of computers). >So, I concur that metabolism and reproduction are necessary for life >as we understand it, but complexity deserves attention as well. Complexity is certainly required for life, but I think that's because complexity is required for mechanisms of metabolism and reproduction. (And self-repair). --scott
dailey@frith.uucp (Chris Dailey) (02/23/91)
In article <8617@castle.ed.ac.uk> eomu01@castle.ed.ac.uk (Hall) writes: >The actual biological definition of a living organism can be described >by the mnemonic "MERRING". But a living computer would not need to follow a biological definition, would it? I would think that, by definition, a living computer MUST NOT follow the biological definition, but have its own. >Movement - O.K. so I suppose some computers (more formally robots) can > be said to be able to move. I am not always in motion. Does that mean that I am not a living organism when I am not in motion? Well, if you go to a lower level, I guess you can say that blood flows, the heart pumps, etc. But ... computers have thousands of microscopic switches moving around, not to mention hard drives continually going. >Excretion - I hardly think that a computer is able to excrete metabolic > waste products from itself (unless you count the endless > reams of garbage that I seem to be able to get out of them)! A computer generates heat. >Respiration - This is the breaking down of some form of chemical energy > source. Whilst a computer may be said to require energy > not many can be said to be able to make their own. A computer's respiration happens 'off site' at your local power plant. >Reproduction - This subject has already been touched on. It only remains >(at some for me to say that I doubt that it can be said that >point in its computers making other computers can be called >life-cycle.) reproduction. A program can reproduce itself [ex: fork() in UNIX]. Are you limiting things to just hardware? [Which you can if you want -- I would not presonally place such a restriction on the definition of a lifeform.] Maybe there exists a form of life outside the realm of the physical. How many times have you heard Dr. McCoy on Star Trek say, "It's life, Jim, but not as we know it."? >Irritability - In other words a response can be produced by doing > something to it that it doesn't like. O.K. so here is > another criterion (sorry if it is spelt wrongly) that is > satisfied by computers since I seem to be able to get a > response quite easily (usually in the form of error > messages). Is grass irritable? >Nutrition - Can a computer be said to feed itself? I think not. >Growth - I fail to see how a computer can be said to grow during the > period of its life. At lest I have never seen a computer > change in size even over several years. Have you? I have grown in many ways that do not relate to size. Mentally, emotionally, spiritually, etc. >This may seem to be a simple form of classification, but that fact >remains that for an organism to be considered to be alive (and hence a >life form), it must fulfill all the above criteria (with relatively few >exceptions and even then only an exception in perhaps 1 or 2 of them at >a time). Above, we can see that computers fail on 5 out of the required >7 criteria, therefore I would strongly conclude that computers cannot be >said to be true life-forms in any stage of development. However, people ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >always make mistakes, so perhaps in years to come we will all be >replaced by our more efficient, robotic models...who knows...? A true ORGANIC life-form, maybe. I think the goal is to go beyond what is, and create what is not yet. Maybe we'll end up creating something even better than the 'true life-forms' you speak of. It seems to me that your criteria are arbitrary, that is, based on the will and discretion of someone that had things in mind other than what we are looking for. >:An ardent philosopher and scientist. -- Chris Dailey dailey@(frith.egr|cps).msu.edu __ __ ___ | "A line in the sand." -- The Detroit News __/ \/ \/ __:>- | \__/\__/\__/ | "Allein in der sand." -- me
willdye@typhoon.unl.edu (02/26/91)
...and then there is the 'realpolitik' approach to defining life... We use the idea of life to achieve certain political goals. For example, if a signifigant minority of people have a disregard for human life and automatic weaponry, then the state has an interest in either taking away their weapons or instilling some virtues. Suppose a proposed definition of life allowed people to live out their violent fantasies by killing 'virtual' people. If this acted as a catharsis, then the state would have an interest in keeping the virtual people defined as non-life. If, however, it becomes habit- forming, instilling a desire to try the real thing, then the state has an interest in defining life in a different way. The point is, in the real world, a definition is not merely what we think it is as we sit in bemused academia. A definition will have an affect on our behavior, and the consequenses of that behavior will affect how we continue to define things. Hmmm. 'Sounds cynical and ineloquent, but can you see my point? I'm not advocating realpolitik, by the way. willdye@typhoon.unl.edu
wsinpim@wsintt01.info.win.tue.nl (Pim Lemmens) (02/26/91)
In my opinion, a very important aspect has been omitted from the ongoing discussion so far: The drive to survive. If we (or any other creature) would not have an instinct for survival or an other mechanism to protect our life, we would not be there. And if that instinct would not have been supported by the means to detect threats to our life and to repel them, it would be useless. Computers so far lack both the drive to sustain their own existence and the means to do so. They are easily maltreated and demolished and their software is easily removed. Pim Lemmens.
lintz@cis.udel.edu (Brian Lintz) (02/26/91)
In article <willdye.667540138@typhoon> willdye@typhoon.unl.edu writes: >...and then there is the 'realpolitik' approach to defining life... [stuff deleted] >The point is, in the real world, a definition is not merely what >we think it is as we sit in bemused academia. >Hmmm. 'Sounds cynical and ineloquent, but can you see my point? > willdye@typhoon.unl.edu I do see your point, but I think you are talking legal definition of life, while the original poster was talking scientific definition of life. Intersting article though. Brian Lintz
jwtlai@watcgl.waterloo.edu (Jim W Lai) (02/27/91)
In article <1791@svin02.info.win.tue.nl> wsinpim@info.win.tue.nl writes: >Computers so far lack both the drive to sustain their own existence and >the means to do so. They are easily maltreated and demolished and their >software is easily removed. With the advent of modern technology, most organic life is easily maltreated and demolished, and their DNA is easily removed.
kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) (02/27/91)
In article <1791@svin02.info.win.tue.nl> wsinpim@info.win.tue.nl writes: >In my opinion, a very important aspect has been omitted from the ongoing >discussion so far: The drive to survive. If we (or any other creature) >would not have an instinct for survival or an other mechanism to protect >our life, we would not be there. And if that instinct would not have been >supported by the means to detect threats to our life and to repel them, >it would be useless. Do bacteria have a drive for survival? They certainly have a drive to reproduce, which is a drive to keep the species surviving. But I don't know if bacteria individually have enough "intelligence" for it. I do know that bacteria are individually robust in the way that some computer systems are. --scott
minsky@media-lab.MEDIA.MIT.EDU (Marvin Minsky) (02/27/91)
In article <1791@svin02.info.win.tue.nl> wsinpim@info.win.tue.nl writes: >In my opinion, a very important aspect has been omitted from the ongoing >discussion so far: The drive to survive. If we (or any other creature) >would not have an instinct for survival or an other mechanism to protect >our life, we would not be there. And if that instinct would not have been >supported by the means to detect threats to our life and to repel them, >it would be useless. > >Computers so far lack both the drive to sustain their own existence and >the means to do so. They are easily maltreated and demolished and their >software is easily removed. Animals are easily maltreated, too. And they have no drive to survive. Instead, it is a consequence of evolution that animals accumulate many ways to avoid destructions. The combination of these gives rise to the illusion that they come from a single "survival instinct", but that's only an illusion. But that shows the great joke in the attempts to "define life" that have appeared in this newsgroup. Missing the whole point of how natural selection produces stuff. The lesson should be, you can't define stuff, only words. And then, as the above illustrates, the words you define may not have much to do with the stuff you intended them for.
cpshelley@violet.uwaterloo.ca (cameron shelley) (02/27/91)
In article <5375@media-lab.MEDIA.MIT.EDU> minsky@media-lab.media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes: [...] > >But that shows the great joke in the attempts to "define life" that >have appeared in this newsgroup. Missing the whole point of how >natural selection produces stuff. The lesson should be, you can't >define stuff, only words. And then, as the above illustrates, the >words you define may not have much to do with the stuff you intended >them for. So, it's all a language game eh? Unfortunatly, all we can do on a newsgroup is bandy mere words, as opposed to e-mailing each other our newly created life-forms to show our points. The only problem I've noticed in the discussion to date is that posters are trying to be all-encompassing rather than confining themselves to relevant details (or showing why something new is relevant). I think the trouble is with the use of 'evolution', which has lead to dispute over natural selection -- not the relevant process to apply to computer engineering I would say. More to the point of the original posting, why don't we leave the process undefined, assume computers will constitute an intelligence at some future point, and discuss how this could change our relationship with our science and technology, or anything else of merit. Cam -- Cameron Shelley | "Absurdity, n. A statement of belief cpshelley@violet.waterloo.edu| manifestly inconsistent with one's own Davis Centre Rm 2136 | opinion." Phone (519) 885-1211 x3390 | Ambrose Bierce
kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) (02/27/91)
minsky@media-lab.media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes: >But that shows the great joke in the attempts to "define life" that >have appeared in this newsgroup. Missing the whole point of how >natural selection produces stuff. The lesson should be, you can't >define stuff, only words. And then, as the above illustrates, the >words you define may not have much to do with the stuff you intended >them for. Granted, this is a good point. But manmade systems (like computers) are not evolved, but designed. Knowing the path by which lifeforms evolved might help us construct an artificial life form, but it's not required. Computers play chess. They play chess well. But they play chess in a fashion utterly unlike human beings, because they operate in a manner very different from the human brain. Nevertheless, although the mechanisms inside and the playing strategies might be quite different, the end result is the same. If a computer life form is constructed, it will probably not be constructed in any manner resembling the evolutionary method by which all living systems we know have been formed. This is because computers, again, operate in a very different fashion than organic systems. But nevertheless, the result will be the same. Only by bandying semantics about can we be sure that the result really is the same. --scott Postcript: The [famous AI professor from Georgia Tech, name deleted] method: 1. This is our computer system 2. It has behaviour X 3. Our definition of intelligence is the posession of behaviour X 4. Therefore our system is intelligent.
rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) (02/27/91)
In article <1991Feb27.134800.18153@news.larc.nasa.gov> kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) writes: > Granted, this is a good point. But manmade systems (like computers) >are not evolved, but designed. But the design has evolved (from the results of experience with prior designs). -- =*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*= Neil W. Rickert, Computer Science <rickert@cs.niu.edu> Northern Illinois Univ. DeKalb, IL 60115 +1-815-753-6940
mikeb@wdl35.wdl.loral.com (Michael H Bender) (02/28/91)
eomu01@castle.ed.ac.uk (Hall) writes;
The actual biological definition of a living organism can be described
^^^^^^^^^^
by the mnemonic "MERRING".
Movement - ...
Excretion - ...
Respiration - ...
Reproduction - ...
Irritability - ...
Nutrition - ...
Growth - ...
This may seem to be a simple form of classification, but that fact
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
remains that for an organism to be considered to be alive (and hence a
life form), it must fulfill all the above criteria (with relatively few
^^^^^^^^
exceptions and even then only an exception in perhaps 1 or 2 of them at
a time). Above, we can see that computers fail on 5 out of the required
7 criteria, therefore I would strongly conclude that computers cannot be
said to be true life-forms in any stage of development. However, people
always make mistakes, so perhaps in years to come we will all be
replaced by our more efficient, robotic models...who knows...?
Although you refer to these as CRITERIA, they sound more like SYMPTOMS
to me (i.e., CLASSIFICATION, not DEFINITION).
Mike Benderamk@rand.mel.cocam.oz.au (Adam Krebet) (02/28/91)
In article <1991Feb19.130832.9715@shiva.sci.com> joe@shiva.sci.com (0000-Admin(0000)) writes: >In article <1991Feb14.135220.7790@vax1.tcd.ie> bjkinane@vax1.tcd.ie writes: >>I am preparing a presentation on the subject of whether computers can be >>considered as an emerging life-form....... > >First off, what constitutes a 'life-form'? Taking into consideration that >the 'species' of computers is varied, one might stretch the point >and proclaim computers as a species evolving along the silicon line >as opposed to the carbon line. But, then again, there are diverse mutated >forms of cars. And, so far, I have not seen any behavior exhibited from any >motor vehicle which would permit me to assert that it is intelligent (this >includes it symbiotic passenger). > >Since I haven't been beat upon in some time, I thought I would throw this >out :-). Jokes aside, it seems to me that the need for intervention by another life form in reproduction does not necessarily disqualify one as being a life form oneself. We have a symbiotic relationship with computers in which they serve us in return for species perpetuation. However, because computers are so specialised, they rarely show much of the 'selfish gene' behavious that Richard Dawkins discusses. There is no group survival instinct as computers do not directly perpetuate their own genetic structure to successors. Software is probably a better candidate as a life-form, using computer hardware as its survival machine. There are still problems here, as there is not clearly defined and global goal in software - except to serve the specific purpose for which it was written. Now, since software can be used to simulate living things, I feel that some software systems can be seen to be living (as in some existing systems). In general though, not all programs display the behaviour of living systems. One can certainly program a 'living' being in a computer (theorem of equivalence). Who was the S.F. writer who first postulated that the universe is the result of a computer simulation?? ============================================================================ [When in doubt, don't generalise]... Adam Krebet ============================================================================
dailey@buster.cps.msu.edu (Chris Dailey) (03/01/91)
In article <1991Feb27.134800.18153@news.larc.nasa.gov> kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) writes: >minsky@media-lab.media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes: >>But that shows the great joke in the attempts to "define life" that >>have appeared in this newsgroup. Missing the whole point of how >>natural selection produces stuff. The lesson should be, you can't >>define stuff, only words. [...] > Granted, this is a good point. But manmade systems (like computers) >are not evolved, but designed. Knowing the path by which lifeforms >evolved might help us construct an artificial life form, but it's not >required. This is the only form of evolution of which we have some idea of how things work. A manmade system which is designed would probably be designed so it will evolve beyond its design. We will probably learn a lot if we do this. (Some of us believe that WE were designed, and have since evolved on our own, but I have digressed.) > Computers play chess. They play chess well. But they play chess in >a fashion utterly unlike human beings, because they operate in a manner >very different from the human brain. However, these computers are designed (in many or most cases) with the human's strategies. They are algorithmic representations of human thoughts. The only way (IMO) they could operate in a manner truly very different would be if they were the ones that taught themselves how to play. >Nevertheless, although the mechanisms >inside and the playing strategies might be quite different, the end result >is the same. But the strategies are not quite different, except that most computers do not have the pattern matching capabilities of humans are are usually made to do cost/benefit analysis on most or all possible moves instead of just the most promising ones. > If a computer life form is constructed, it will probably not be constructed >in any manner resembling the evolutionary method by which all living systems >we know have been formed. This is because computers, again, operate in a >very different fashion than organic systems. But nevertheless, the result >will be the same. I believe a computer's evolutionary method, although modeled after the evolution of living (I assume you mean, organic) systems, would be significantly different (although not necessarily different enough that we could not learn more about our own evolution). Kinda like weather patterns in comparison to living systems. >[...] >--scott -- Chris Dailey dailey@(frith.egr|cps).msu.edu __ __ ___ | "A line in the sand." -- The Detroit News __/ \/ \/ __:>- | \__/\__/\__/ | "Allein in der sand." -- me
typ125m@monu6.cc.monash.edu.au (John Wilkins) (03/01/91)
rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes: >In article <1991Feb27.134800.18153@news.larc.nasa.gov> kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) writes: >> Granted, this is a good point. But manmade systems (like computers) >>are not evolved, but designed. > But the design has evolved (from the results of experience with prior designs). Yes, but the "ecology" in which computers "evolve", the selection pressures, are those of the teleonomic interests of humans. While one can say that there is an evolutionary process going on in the refinement of computer design, it is not the blind variation and selective retention of organic or other natural systems evolution, and for that reason it is dependent upon another evolutionary process to continue: social evolution. Computer "life" is therefore supervenient upon three other Lebensformen - the biological evolutionary process, the social evolutionary process and the social or cultural evolutionary process. Computers only have life in the same way any other adaptive tool does: as expressions of human goals. -- John Wilkins, Manager, Publishing & Advertising, Monash University Melbourne, Australia - Internet: john@publications.ccc.monash.edu.au Disclaimer: IF Standard(disclaimer) THEN Applies(disclaimer) ELSIF Nonstandard(disclaimer) THEN PROBABLY (Applies(disclaimer)) ENDIF
kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) (03/01/91)
In article <1991Feb28.190553.20519@msuinfo.cl.msu.edu> dailey@buster.cps.msu.edu (Chris Dailey) writes: >In article <1991Feb27.134800.18153@news.larc.nasa.gov> kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) writes: >>minsky@media-lab.media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes: >>>But that shows the great joke in the attempts to "define life" that >>>have appeared in this newsgroup. Missing the whole point of how >>>natural selection produces stuff. The lesson should be, you can't >>>define stuff, only words. [...] >> Granted, this is a good point. But manmade systems (like computers) >>are not evolved, but designed. Knowing the path by which lifeforms >>evolved might help us construct an artificial life form, but it's not >>required. > >This is the only form of evolution of which we have some idea of how >things work. A manmade system which is designed would probably be >designed so it will evolve beyond its design. We will probably learn a >lot if we do this. (Some of us believe that WE were designed, and have >since evolved on our own, but I have digressed.) Many learning systems exist which in a sense evolve as they learn about their environment. But this is evolution in a very different sense. A system that evolves beyond its design must not do so in the same fashion as humans did. Software mutation and the weeding out of bad variants is not a good software engineering practice. >> Computers play chess. They play chess well. But they play chess in >>a fashion utterly unlike human beings, because they operate in a manner >>very different from the human brain. > >However, these computers are designed (in many or most cases) with the >human's strategies. They are algorithmic representations of human >thoughts. The only way (IMO) they could operate in a manner truly very >different would be if they were the ones that taught themselves how to >play. No, they don't at all use the same strategies that humans use. Many humans can't explain the strategies they use, and if they could, they probably would not be efficient to implement. Many good chess programs use exhaustive search strategies which, if used by humans, would result in many years for each move. On the other hand, humans can immediately discount moves using tree-pruning-type behaviour that isn't possible to implement because computers don't do pattern matching as well as humans do. Because humans and computers are better at different things, they use different strategies. The strategies used by computers were thought of by people whose job it is to think like computers (ie. programmers), and while they were indeed thought of by people, those people would not have thought of them had they not been specifically trying to tailor a solution for a system which has limitations utterly unlike the human brain. >>Nevertheless, although the mechanisms >>inside and the playing strategies might be quite different, the end result >>is the same. > >But the strategies are not quite different, except that most computers >do not have the pattern matching capabilities of humans are are usually >made to do cost/benefit analysis on most or all possible moves instead >of just the most promising ones. Computers have the disadvantage of not being able to do pattern matching very well, but they have the advantage of being able to do calculation and repeated testing of many possibilities very well. This is a very significant difference. The way I learned to extract square roots in school is very much unlike the way the SQRT reoutine on my Sun extracts them, because what is easy for me may be difficult for the grey box and vice versa. > >> If a computer life form is constructed, it will probably not be constructed >>in any manner resembling the evolutionary method by which all living systems >>we know have been formed. This is because computers, again, operate in a >>very different fashion than organic systems. But nevertheless, the result >>will be the same. > >I believe a computer's evolutionary method, although modeled after the >evolution of living (I assume you mean, organic) systems, would be >significantly different (although not necessarily different enough that >we could not learn more about our own evolution). Kinda like weather >patterns in comparison to living systems. This sounds very much like we are agreeing. --scott
dailey@buster.cps.msu.edu (Chris Dailey) (03/01/91)
In article <1991Feb28.235517.20218@news.larc.nasa.gov> kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) writes: >In article <1991Feb28.190553.20519@msuinfo.cl.msu.edu> dailey@buster.cps.msu.edu (Chris Dailey) writes: >>In article <1991Feb27.134800.18153@news.larc.nasa.gov> kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) writes: >>> Granted, this is a good point. But manmade systems (like computers) >>>are not evolved, but designed. Knowing the path by which lifeforms >>>evolved might help us construct an artificial life form, but it's not >>>required. >>This is the only form of evolution of which we have some idea of how >>things work. A manmade system which is designed would probably be >>designed so it will evolve beyond its design. We will probably learn a >>lot if we do this. (Some of us believe that WE were designed, and have >>since evolved on our own, but I have digressed.) > Many learning systems exist which in a sense evolve as they learn about >their environment. But this is evolution in a very different sense. A >system that evolves beyond its design must not do so in the same fashion >as humans did. Software mutation and the weeding out of bad variants is >not a good software engineering practice. I would tend to agree that we could not do software mutation and weeding out of bad variants with what are today's acceptable software engineering practices. Maybe this will become a new specialization? I think it is needed to accomplish 'AI' (I'll leave the reason unexplained). [...computer chess being different from human strategy...] >>However, these computers are designed (in many or most cases) with the >>human's strategies. They are algorithmic representations of human >>thoughts. The only way (IMO) they could operate in a manner truly very >>different would be if they were the ones that taught themselves how to >>play. > >No, they don't at all use the same strategies that humans use. Many humans >can't explain the strategies they use, and if they could, they probably >would not be efficient to implement. I guess I did not explain myself well. I meant that computer strategies are an attempt at quantizing human methods, or doing methods that are just beyond human capabilities to actually implement. I sure humans would play chess much more like a computer if we had brains more suited to doing so. In the meanwhile, we dream up strategies that we implement on computer ONLY BECAUSE OF THE TIME CONSIDERATIONS of us trying the same strategy. The computer is merely an extension of the programmer's brain from this perspective. [...Remainder of paragraph stating stuff I should have said :) or that we look at from different viewpoints...] >>> If a computer life form is constructed, it will probably not be constructed >>>in any manner resembling the evolutionary method by which all living systems >>>we know have been formed. This is because computers, again, operate in a >>>very different fashion than organic systems. But nevertheless, the result >>>will be the same. >> >>I believe a computer's evolutionary method, although modeled after the >>evolution of living (I assume you mean, organic) systems, would be >>significantly different (although not necessarily different enough that >>we could not learn more about our own evolution). Kinda like weather >>patterns in comparison to living systems. To the purpose of explaining my last paragraph ... Have you ever written a cellular automata program with differing rules? Even though you knew what the rules were before you ran the program, it was hard to predict what the outcomes would be like. Similar with chaos systems like the Mandelbrot set: each point is easy to find, but a point X and Y units away is [almost?] impossible to predict. >This sounds very much like we are agreeing. I think you're right. >--scott -- Chris Dailey dailey@(frith.egr|cps).msu.edu __ __ ___ | "A line in the sand." -- The Detroit News __/ \/ \/ __:>- | \__/\__/\__/ | "Allein in der sand." -- me
ftoomey@maths.tcd.ie (Fergal Toomey) (03/02/91)
Pim Lemmens writes: >In my opinion, a very important aspect has been omitted from the ongoing >discussion so far: The drive to survive. If we (or any other creature) >would not have an instinct for survival or an other mechanism to protect >our life, we would not be there. And if that instinct would not have been >supported by the means to detect threats to our life and to repel them, >it would be useless. On the other hand, it's possible that a mutation could be born tomorrow which would lack the drive to survive, but would be normal in all other respects. Such a mutant would be unlikely to last long, but in my opinion it would still count as being alive. I remember a report a couple of years ago about a sea bird colony near Sellafield (a nuclear processing plant in Wales). Apparently some of the chicks being hatched in the colony lacked the instinct to eat, and died of starvation after a couple of days. Nevertheless, while they were alive, they were alive... >Pim Lemmens. Fergal Toomey.
kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) (03/02/91)
In article <1991Mar1.143222.29977@msuinfo.cl.msu.edu> dailey@buster.cps.msu.edu (Chris Dailey) writes: >I would tend to agree that we could not do software mutation and weeding >out of bad variants with what are today's acceptable software >engineering practices. Maybe this will become a new specialization? I >think it is needed to accomplish 'AI' (I'll leave the reason >unexplained). No comment. Except to say that if we do mutation and weeding, than we need to develop an adequate mutation system and also a criterion for weeding out. Evolution (in the sense of biological systems) is very, very slow. It took quite a few million years to construct man, even though it was operating in a parallel fashion (across many different people in large populations). I think that this is not a very efficient way of developing anything, and it also tends to result in the development of systems which are not well- understood. (Maybe that's the crux of the thing.) >I guess I did not explain myself well. I meant that computer >strategies are an attempt at quantizing human methods, or doing methods >that are just beyond human capabilities to actually implement. I sure >humans would play chess much more like a computer if we had brains more >suited to doing so. In the meanwhile, we dream up strategies that we >implement on computer ONLY BECAUSE OF THE TIME CONSIDERATIONS of us >trying the same strategy. The computer is merely an extension of the >programmer's brain from this perspective. Well, yes. But the programmer is thinking in ways that he would not have thought, had he not been programming a computer. Really, every line of code executing can be traced back to a human being, or to a compiler written by a human being (or written by another compiler written by a human being, etc.). The point is that humans don't have brains which are suited to playing chess like computers. If computers had attributes like human brains they would probably be programmed with strategies that much more resemble those used by humans. But because of this, different methods are used. Perhaps, then, the methods which are used to develop a "living" computer system will also be different from those that were used to develop "living" organic systems. And as long as the end result is a system which is "living," does it matter what is inside the grey box? This is why it's important to have a "definition" of living. That is, a criterion to tell if something is alive. >To the purpose of explaining my last paragraph ... Have you ever >written a cellular automata program with differing rules? Even though >you knew what the rules were before you ran the program, it was hard to >predict what the outcomes would be like. Similar with chaos systems >like the Mandelbrot set: each point is easy to find, but a point X and >Y units away is [almost?] impossible to predict. Yes. But since the system is calculable, it's behaviour can be predicted. It's just more difficult to predict, and the pattern which occurs is not obvious at all to the naked eye. (Sorry if I tend to have a rather deterministic, nineenth century point of view on the world, but I think it's a rather good one). If it's almost impossible to predict, that just means that the tools for predicting it haven't been devised yet. >>This sounds very much like we are agreeing. >I think you're right. The whole point of the first article that I wrote was to point out that because humans and computers have fundamental differences in the way they work inside, that tasks are performed differently by computers and human beings to obtain the same result, and therefore if a living computer system is built that it probably won't be built in the same way that a living organic system is built. I don't know at all how it will be built, and if I did I'd be making a fortune on the lecture circuit. --scott
ta2cs220@troi.cc.rochester.edu (H. Y. Firooznia) (03/02/91)
In article <1991Feb28.190553.20519@msuinfo.cl.msu.edu> dailey@buster.cps.msu.edu (Chris Dailey) writes: >In article <1991Feb27.134800.18153@news.larc.nasa.gov> kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) writes: > >> Computers play chess. They play chess well. But they play chess in >>a fashion utterly unlike human beings, because they operate in a manner >>very different from the human brain. > >However, these computers are designed (in many or most cases) with the >human's strategies. They are algorithmic representations of human >thoughts. Or, perhaps you could say that the chess-playing computers are designed with some of the strategies that the human designers perceive themselves as using. This distinction is important, I think, because it seems that chess computers are, at present, not playing in quite the same fashion as humans do. Deep Thought, for instance, the current computer-chess world champion, evaluates something like 10^6 board positions per move (or some other very large number.) The new version should be able to handle 10^3 times as many. Now, maybe I'm mistaken, but it seems unlikely that humans (Kasparov included) analyze this many boards in their head when playing a game of chess. Granted, it seems that some searching is performed, but not on this scale. Yet, Kasparov can still consistently beat Deep Thought. It seems, therefore, that humans use other methods. Present-day computers use some human techniques, but nevertheless play differently from humans. Not completely differently, but significantly so. >The only way (IMO) they could operate in a manner truly very >different would be if they were the ones that taught themselves how to >play. How do you define "different"? Would you say that Deep Thought plays in a manner different from humans? How different? -Hoss
oleary@ux.acs.umn.edu (Doc O'Leary) (03/02/91)
In article <1991Feb28.215632.19322@monu6.cc.monash.edu.au> typ125m@monu6.cc.monash.edu.au (John Wilkins) writes: >rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes: > >>In article <1991Feb27.134800.18153@news.larc.nasa.gov> kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) writes: >>> Granted, this is a good point. But manmade systems (like computers) >>>are not evolved, but designed. > >> But the design has evolved (from the results of experience with prior designs). > >Yes, but the "ecology" in which computers "evolve", the selection pressures, >are those of the teleonomic interests of humans. While one can say that >there is an evolutionary process going on in the refinement of computer >design, it is not the blind variation and selective retention of >organic or other natural systems evolution, and for that reason it >is dependent upon another evolutionary process to continue: social >evolution. Computer "life" is therefore supervenient upon three other >Lebensformen - the biological evolutionary process, the social >evolutionary process and the social or cultural evolutionary process. >Computers only have life in the same way any other adaptive tool does: >as expressions of human goals. This may very well be true, but much biological life falls into the same category, namely, domesticated animals. Cows, have gone through selective breeding in order to serve human goals; so much, in fact, that (I believe) it would be impossible for some of the better milkers to survive in the wild. This doesn't make it any less of a life-form. The same can be said for breeding cats with no hair, or tail-less (I forget which breeds these are). Just as we will design computers that are more useful to us, we will geneticly alter "life" to suit our needs, caring little if it benefits the life-form. We must remember that, as we search for a definition of life that excludes computers (hw and/or sw), we must remember that the same definition will, most likely, exclude something that we would agree are undeniably alive. Don't deny computers life just because you can't give it to them. --------- Doc ********************** Signature Block : Version 2.3 ********************* * | * * "Was it love, or was it the idea | I don't speak for IBM. * * of being in love?" -- PF | Hell, I don't even work for IBM. * * (BTW, which one *is* Pink?) | * * | oleary@ux.acs.umn.edu * ****************** Copyright (c) 1991 by Doc O'Leary ********************
dailey@galaxy.cps.msu.edu (Chris Dailey) (03/03/91)
[sorry for the long message] In article <1991Mar1.205136.10670@news.larc.nasa.gov> kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) writes: >In article <1991Mar1.143222.29977@msuinfo.cl.msu.edu> dailey@buster.cps.msu.edu (Chris Dailey) writes: >>I would tend to agree that we could not do software mutation and weeding >>out of bad variants with what are today's acceptable software >>engineering practices. Maybe this will become a new specialization? I >>think it is needed to accomplish 'AI' (I'll leave the reason >>unexplained). >No comment. Except to say that if we do mutation and weeding, than we need >to develop an adequate mutation system and also a criterion for weeding out. >Evolution (in the sense of biological systems) is very, very slow. It took >quite a few million years to construct man, even though it was operating in >a parallel fashion (across many different people in large populations). But man had to restart from the beginning with each new birth. With each death, infinite discoveries are lost. This would not need be the case with computers, as death would not necessarily occur, and they would not need to evolve a library system to remember important discoveries as humans did -- it will already have that capability. >I >think that this is not a very efficient way of developing anything, and it >also tends to result in the development of systems which are not well- >understood. (Maybe that's the crux of the thing.) Under controlled circumstances, I think it would be most advantageous for a computer program to be able to evaluate its performance for various processes. If some process is costly, it could then try to create a new method to achieve the same outcomes. If it comes up with a more efficient method, it should be able to replace the old with the new -- it could keep the old method around if it [or the original programmer] wanted. This would be the program doing its own mutation and weeding. [Current software engineering practices dictate that the programmer does all mutation and weeding -- a practice staunchly supported by most software engineers. :) ] Agreed, there would need to be much work done on the performance evaluation functions and verifying that new methods are equivalent to old ones. >The point is that humans don't have brains which are suited to playing chess >like computers. [...] Nor computers like humans, etc., etc. Come to think of it I don't see how this has much to do with whether something is intelligent or not [except that chess is a specialized case where a computer is not really being intelligent, but being a computer following it's programmer's commands]. [..my reference to cellular automata and chaos deleted..] >Yes. But since the system is calculable, it's behaviour can be predicted. >It's just more difficult to predict, and the pattern which occurs is not >obvious at all to the naked eye. (Sorry if I tend to have a rather >deterministic, nineenth century point of view on the world, but I think >it's a rather good one). If it's almost impossible to predict, that just >means that the tools for predicting it haven't been devised yet. Someone mentioned a recent issue of Popular Science (I'm sorry, I just saw it at a friend's place and don't have more info on the reference) in which there was an article about MIT's insect labs. In going from point A to point B, the robot 'insect' would take different paths every time. This is the type of unpredictability I'm talking about. You might be able to get the 'insect' to take the exact same path every time, but you would have to have the 'insect' start out in exactly the same place every time -- an impossibility. (Plus the terrain that the 'insect' went over would be [minutely] different by the time he went over it again due to the fact that it went over that terrain!) I strongly believe that you can model pretty much anything in the real world with mathematics. The more accurate you want to be, the more mathematics you need to do so (and the more accurate results that you can get). The real world has a nearly infinite [you know what I mean] number of particles, so in order to simulate the universe, how much computer would you need to keep track of every single particle? There's be a catch-22 because the computer itself is a part of the universe it was trying to keep track of. But I have digressed. >>>This sounds very much like we are agreeing. >>I think you're right. >The whole point of the first article that I wrote was to point out that >because humans and computers have fundamental differences in the way they >work inside, that tasks are performed differently by computers and human >beings to obtain the same result, and therefore if a living computer system >is built that it probably won't be built in the same way that a living organic >system is built. I don't know at all how it will be built, and if I did I'd >be making a fortune on the lecture circuit. I guess we were just splitting hairs on that particular point. Although it would be based on human ideas, the architecture would be much different. Kinda like speaking a different language -- you can get an equivalent idea across (although not the exact same idea), but you use different words and a different grammar. >--scott -- Chris Dailey dailey@(frith.egr|cps).msu.edu __ __ ___ | "A line in the sand." -- The Detroit News __/ \/ \/ __:>- | \__/\__/\__/ | "Allein in der sand." -- me
dailey@galaxy.cps.msu.edu (Chris Dailey) (03/03/91)
In article <12548@ur-cc.UUCP> ta2cs220@troi.cc.rochester.edu (H. Y. Firooznia) writes: >In article <1991Feb28.190553.20519@msuinfo.cl.msu.edu> dailey@buster.cps.msu.edu (Chris Dailey) writes: >>In article <1991Feb27.134800.18153@news.larc.nasa.gov> kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) writes: >>> Computers play chess. They play chess well. But they play chess in >>>a fashion utterly unlike human beings, because they operate in a manner >>>very different from the human brain. >>However, these computers are designed (in many or most cases) with the >>human's strategies. They are algorithmic representations of human >>thoughts. > Or, perhaps you could say that the chess-playing computers are designed >with some of the strategies that the human designers perceive themselves as >using. This distinction is important, I think, because it seems that chess >computers are, at present, not playing in quite the same fashion as humans >do. I think the the computer is being used as an "extension" of the programmer's brain. The computer itself is not truly showing intelligence, it is merely following instructions. [..long paragraph with Deep Thought example deleted..] >>The only way (IMO) they could operate in a manner truly very >>different would be if they were the ones that taught themselves how to >>play. > > How do you define "different"? Would you say that Deep Thought plays in a >manner different from humans? How different? Good point. When the computer can no longer be viewed as an extension of the human programmer but rather as an independent force [but to some extent, as nothing is TRULY independent of everything else]. Is that reasoning clear? >-Hoss -- Chris Dailey dailey@(frith.egr|cps).msu.edu __ __ ___ | "A line in the sand." -- The Detroit News __/ \/ \/ __:>- | \__/\__/\__/ | "Allein in der sand." -- me
G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk (Gordon Joly) (03/03/91)
Scott Dorsey writes: > minsky@media-lab.media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes: > >But that shows the great joke in the attempts to "define life" that > >have appeared in this newsgroup. Missing the whole point of how > >natural selection produces stuff. The lesson should be, you can't > >define stuff, only words. And then, as the above illustrates, the > >words you define may not have much to do with the stuff you intended > >them for. > > Granted, this is a good point. But manmade systems (like computers) > are not evolved, but designed. Knowing the path by which lifeforms > evolved might help us construct an artificial life form, but it's not > required. > Computers play chess. > > [...] > > Only by bandying semantics about can we be sure that the result really is > the same. > --scott > > Postcript: > The [famous AI professor from Georgia Tech, name deleted] method: > > 1. This is our computer system > 2. It has behaviour X > 3. Our definition of intelligence is the posession of behaviour X > 4. Therefore our system is intelligent. Computers play chess; humans play chess better. We also do some other things, none of which the other mammals do. (0) revolt (1) make jokes (2) make love (3) make war (4) think (thinking as distinct from IQ) (5) (do) physics (6) create (art and (5) above) All this in 2.5 million years! Oh yeah, one of our creations was the computer, c.f. the above message's p.s. Some see AI as a means to discover some human psychology. Some see AI as a pragmatic software-engineering construction project. The latter build some simple tools and then the former say "yes, we have found this in the minds of our subjects". No surprise. The psychologists have recently found a positive correlation between myopia and high IQ. No surprise there either. Doctor Eliza, where are you now? Probably with Skinner's pigeons and Lorenz's geese down on the farm. Gordon Joly +44 71 387 7050 ext 3716 Internet: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk UUCP: ...!{uunet,ukc}!ucl-cs!G.Joly Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, LONDON WC1E 6BT "I didn't do it. Nobody saw me do it. You can't prove anything!"
ta2cs220@troi.cc.rochester.edu (H. Y. Firooznia) (03/04/91)
In article <1991Mar3.025707.16737@msuinfo.cl.msu.edu> dailey@galaxy.cps.msu.edu (Chris Dailey) writes: >In article <12548@ur-cc.UUCP> ta2cs220@troi.cc.rochester.edu (H. Y. Firooznia) writes: >I think the the computer is being used as an "extension" of the >programmer's brain. The computer itself is not truly showing >intelligence, it is merely following instructions. An "extension"? Perhaps. However, I think I disagree with you on the issue of whether or not it exhibits intelligence. You seem to be defining intelligence on the basis of internal operations, as opposed to behavior. I would say that Deep Thought may indeed be intelligent, when it comes to playing chess, regardless of how it does it. The problem here, I think, is the definition of intelligence. >> How do you define "different"? Would you say that Deep Thought plays >>in a manner different from humans? How different? > >Good point. When the computer can no longer be viewed as an extension >of the human programmer but rather as an independent force [but to some >extent, as nothing is TRULY independent of everything else]. Is that >reasoning clear? I don't know. Could you be more specific on what a computer would have to do (or not do) to be an independent force? Do you mean that it would have to learn its game-playing techniques by itself? What if a computer, given no instruction on how to play chess, ended up learning to play as Deep Thought does? What's the difference? -Hoss
dailey@galaxy.cps.msu.edu (Chris Dailey) (03/04/91)
In article <12565@ur-cc.UUCP> ta2cs220@troi.cc.rochester.edu (H. Y. Firooznia) writes: >In article <1991Mar3.025707.16737@msuinfo.cl.msu.edu> dailey@galaxy.cps.msu.edu (Chris Dailey) writes: >>In article <12548@ur-cc.UUCP> ta2cs220@troi.cc.rochester.edu (H. Y. Firooznia) writes: > >>I think the the computer is being used as an "extension" of the >>programmer's brain. The computer itself is not truly showing >>intelligence, it is merely following instructions. > >An "extension"? Perhaps. However, I think I disagree with you on the >issue of whether or not it exhibits intelligence. You seem to be defining >intelligence on the basis of internal operations, as opposed to behavior. >I would say that Deep Thought may indeed be intelligent, when it comes to >playing chess, regardless of how it does it. The problem here, I think, >is the definition of intelligence. So is a large database program intelligent? I'd say not. It just has the mechanics to calculate and then access a lot of information. It almost never makes inferences to find out more information unless the programmer specifically tells it to do so (including telling it HOW to do so). My definition for intelligence certainly goes beyond being able to do direct calculations from easy-to-access data. Remember some of my questions on the definitions of life and intelligence? For intelligence one of the questions I asked was about whether a plant that moves to tilt toward the sun during the day has intelligence. I am not sure, because I do not know how and why a plant does this. I would definitely say the plant shows intelligence, but I do not know if it actually HAS intelligence. [These two concepts are not mutually exclusive in my mind.] >>> How do you define "different"? Would you say that Deep Thought plays >>>in a manner different from humans? How different? >> >>Good point. When the computer can no longer be viewed as an extension >>of the human programmer but rather as an independent force [but to some >>extent, as nothing is TRULY independent of everything else]. Is that >>reasoning clear? > >I don't know. Could you be more specific on what a computer would have to >do (or not do) to be an independent force? Do you mean that it would >have to learn its game-playing techniques by itself? What does a child have to do for us to consider it [at least partially] independent of its parents? They have to take steps of their own, growing separately. They make their own decisions. They look at the way other people do things, and then decide which is best for them. I would say that to actually have intelligence (and not JUST DISPLAY intelligence) a chess program would have to be able to learn... to go beyond the known and into the unknown... to evaluate its performance and be able to improve on that. I don't even care if it is a good chess player or not. [In fact, I wouldn't be surprised if it were and would actually expect it to be a lousy chess player. :) ... but an intelligent one!] >What if a computer, >given no instruction on how to play chess, ended up learning to play >as Deep Thought does? What's the difference? Could it, though? It would have to come up with some strategy that would be [perhaps only roughly] equivalent. The difference is NOT in the way the computer/program plays chess. The difference is in WHERE THE STRATEGIES COME FROM! We believe that something is intelligence because it displays intelligence. If something displays intelligence, we often assume that it has intelligence because it learned how to do that. Isn't that why the Eliza and Doctor programs are so well known? Because they could fool people at least a LITTLE bit into believing that the computer had actually learned how to converse with you? Then when you learn the tricks used to create the program, you can then convince yourself that it was not intelligent. [Although the programmer probably was. :) ] I would say that today's genre chess program is no more intelligent than Eliza. >-Hoss -- Chris Dailey dailey@(frith.egr|cps).msu.edu __ __ ___ | "A line in the sand." -- The Detroit News __/ \/ \/ __:>- | \__/\__/\__/ | "Allein in der sand." -- me
dailey@galaxy.cps.msu.edu (Chris Dailey) (03/04/91)
Here I point out to you two fatalities of my tendency to overedit messages. Unfortunately, the first one caused the point I was making to not be properly supported, so therefore I am pointing these out: In article <1991Mar4.143106.8838@msuinfo.cl.msu.edu> I wrote: >Remember some of my questions on the definitions of life and >intelligence? For intelligence one of the questions I asked was about >whether a plant that moves to tilt toward the sun during the day has >intelligence. I am not sure, because I do not know how and why a plant >does this. I would definitely say the plant shows intelligence, but I >do not know if it actually HAS intelligence. [These two concepts are >not mutually exclusive in my mind.] I meant to say that one does not necessarily imply the other, not that they are not mutually exclusive. (Although I do also believe they are not mutually exclusive, but that lends no support to the point I was trying to make.) >I would say that today's genre chess program is no more intelligent >than Eliza. Should say, "...genre of chess programs is ...". Sorry about that. -- Chris Dailey dailey@(frith.egr|cps).msu.edu __ __ ___ | "A line in the sand." -- The Detroit News __/ \/ \/ __:>- | \__/\__/\__/ | "Allein in der sand." -- me
rsprice@PacBell.COM (Steve Price) (03/05/91)
In article <1991Mar1.205136.10670@news.larc.nasa.gov> kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) writes: >In article <1991Mar1.143222.29977@msuinfo.cl.msu.edu> dailey@buster.cps.msu.edu (Chris Dailey) writes: > >> Have you ever >>written a cellular automata program with differing rules? Even though >>you knew what the rules were before you ran the program, it was hard to >>predict what the outcomes would be like. Similar with chaos systems >>like the Mandelbrot set: each point is easy to find, but a point X and >>Y units away is [almost?] impossible to predict. > >Yes. But since the system is calculable, it's behaviour can be predicted. I read James Gleich's book on Chaos last year, and drew the conclusion that many physicists and mathematicians today disagree specifically with this assertion that in any non-trivial system behaviour can be predicted (with the degree of accurracy that seems to be desired here). The classic example is weather -- all the inputs and processes are subject to sampling, measurement (and even a wee bit of control) but the outputs vary widely from predictions; no hope of accurrate long-range weather forecasting is considered even theoretically possible (if I understood Gleich's point). >It's just more difficult to predict, and the pattern which occurs is not >obvious at all to the naked eye. (Sorry if I tend to have a rather >deterministic, nineenth century point of view on the world, but I think >it's a rather good one). If it's almost impossible to predict, that just >means that the tools for predicting it haven't been devised yet. > I heard a radio interview with the man who was awarded the Nobel Prize (partially) for the discovery of Quarks. (My ignorance is showing here since I can't recall his name -- but the other mental presences on the Net will surely compensate for my lack). He made the point that the inability to deterministically predict the behaviour of complex systems is NOT a result of our inaccurate sampling or modeling tools. It is a fundamental fact or aspect of reality. Of course he was referring specifically to reality at the quantuum level, but there are profound implications for us at the macro level; these need to be considered in any AI discussion. Remember the weather? (By the way, it is raining in California, thank God!) We specifically need to be on guard against our "common sense" notions of reality, which may often just be a "rather deterministic, nineteenth century point of view". -- Steve Price UNIX: pacbell!pbhyf!rsprice PHONE: (415)823-1951 We must live within the ambiguity of partial freedom, partial power, and partial knowledge.
ta2cs220@troi.cc.rochester.edu (H. Y. Firooznia) (03/06/91)
In article <1991Mar4.143106.8838@msuinfo.cl.msu.edu> dailey@galaxy.cps.msu.edu (Chris Dailey) writes: >In article <12565@ur-cc.UUCP> ta2cs220@troi.cc.rochester.edu (H. Y. Firooznia) writes: >>In article <1991Mar3.025707.16737@msuinfo.cl.msu.edu> dailey@galaxy.cps.msu.edu (Chris Dailey) writes: >>>In article <12548@ur-cc.UUCP> ta2cs220@troi.cc.rochester.edu (H. Y. Firooznia) writes: >> ... >>issue of whether or not it exhibits intelligence. You seem to be defining >>intelligence on the basis of internal operations, as opposed to behavior. > >So is a large database program intelligent? I'd say not. It just has >the mechanics to calculate and then access a lot of information. It >almost never makes inferences to find out more information unless the >programmer specifically tells it to do so (including telling it HOW to >do so). My definition for intelligence certainly goes beyond being able >to do direct calculations from easy-to-access data. Okay. Again, the issue here seems to be one of behavior vs. internal states. I don't know if the database program is intelligent. If, however, it was capable of conducting a conversation, I might tend to say it is intelligent. What if the program displayed intelligent behavior? Then what? [text deleted] >intelligence? For intelligence one of the questions I asked was about >whether a plant that moves to tilt toward the sun during the day has >intelligence. I am not sure, because I do not know how and why a plant >does this. I would definitely say the plant shows intelligence, but I >do not know if it actually HAS intelligence. [These two concepts are >not mutually exclusive in my mind.] When you say "has intelligence", you seem to be implying some specific form of mental operation, as opposed to behavior. If your definition has such requirements, then I suppose a plant, by that definition, would not be intelligent. I'm curious. What do you think of the Turing Test? It seems, from your definition, that a computer passing the test is not necessarily intelligent. >I would say that to actually have intelligence (and not JUST DISPLAY >intelligence) a chess program would have to be able to learn... to go >beyond the known and into the unknown... to evaluate its performance >and be able to improve on that. I think that's already been done. As to learning, and in particular discovering the "unknown", some chess programs can do that too. Excerpted from "The world's next chess champion?", Popular Science, 3/91: " Even strong players can learn from computers. Karpov used a machine, hand built by Fidelity Electronics International and equipped with Motorola's new 68040 microprocessor, to prepare for the championship he narrowly lost to Kasparov in January. 'I started in this believing that humans understood everything about chess,' says Carnegie-Mellon computer scientist Hans J. Berliner, a former World Correspondence Chess Champion and the designer of Hitech. 'I was wrong. Machines can find things humans haven't even dreamt about.'..." ... >>What if a computer, >>given no instruction on how to play chess, ended up learning to play >>as Deep Thought does? What's the difference? > >Could it, though? It would have to come up with some strategy that >would be [perhaps only roughly] equivalent. The difference is NOT >in the way the computer/program plays chess. The difference is in >WHERE THE STRATEGIES COME FROM! Okay. So in a nutshell, you're saying: For something to be intelligent, it has to learn its strategies itself. Correct? >We believe that something is intelligence because it displays >intelligence. If something displays intelligence, we often assume that >it has intelligence because it learned how to do that. Isn't that why >the Eliza and Doctor programs are so well known? Because they could >fool people at least a LITTLE bit into believing that the computer had >actually learned how to converse with you? Then when you learn the >tricks used to create the program, you can then convince yourself that >it was not intelligent. I would convince myself that the Eliza program was not intelligent in the way that I had originally perceived it to be intelligent (human way). As to whether an Eliza program is actually intelligent, I guess that depends upon your definition. Basically, I'm saying that there is no well-defined concrete thing as intelligence- it's just a general property that we observe in some living things, humans in particular. It seems that, as a result, our definition of intelligence is generally confined to human-like intelligence. So, if you're saying that Deep Thought, or Eliza, or whatever, isn't intelligent in that it isn't doing what humans are doing internally, then it isn't intelligent. But, what do you say in cases in which things aren't so well defined? -e.g. What if someone could, instead of learning things directly, have the knowledge gained by others directly implanted in their head? Would they then _not_ be intelligent? Perhaps intelligence is not so much the learned strategies, as it is the _ability_ to learn new strategies? Is this the difference between computer chess players and humans that you were talking about? If so, then what if a computer could learn new strategies on its own? Would it then be intelligent? I think the problem here is, again, when we speak of "intelligence", we really mean "human intelligence". -Hoss
carsup@extro.ucc.su.oz.au (Fisher Library support) (03/07/91)
In article <1991Feb27.150208.27855@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes: >In article <1991Feb27.134800.18153@news.larc.nasa.gov> kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) writes: >> Granted, this is a good point. But manmade systems (like computers) >>are not evolved, but designed. > > But the design has evolved (from the results of experience with prior designs). Has anyone any Proof that life itself was not designed? I think not. Remember that Scientific Knowledge is really scientific belief, and should be treated as such. Chris
reh@wam.umd.edu (Richard E. Huddleston) (03/11/91)
In article <2179@cluster.cs.su.oz.au> carsup@extro.ucc.su.oz.au (Fisher Library support) writes: >In article <1991Feb27.150208.27855@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes: >>In article <1991Feb27.134800.18153@news.larc.nasa.gov> kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) writes: >>> Granted, this is a good point. But manmade systems (like computers) >>>are not evolved, but designed. >> >> But the design has evolved (from the results of experience with prior designs). >Has anyone any Proof that life itself was not designed? I think not. >Remember that Scientific Knowledge is really scientific belief, and >should be treated as such. > >Chris Sounds like you're quoting Richard Morris. The valid replies to your line of reasoning would choke this bandwidth; I refer you to _Abusing Science_, Kitcher, MIT Press. Richard Huddleston =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= "The two most common things in the universe are hydrogen and stupidity." -- Harlan Ellison -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) (03/12/91)
In article <2179@cluster.cs.su.oz.au> carsup@extro.ucc.su.oz.au (Fisher Library support) writes: >Has anyone any Proof that life itself was not designed? I think not. >Remember that Scientific Knowledge is really scientific belief, and >should be treated as such. We don't have any proof that life wasn't designed, but we do have proof that it does evolve. It's possible that random evolution isn't completely a random process, but if so this is something that Man can't duplicate (owing to not being omnipotent, etc.) So it's not something we can discuss intelligently. --scott
cam@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) (03/13/91)
In article <1991Mar11.165932.19507@news.larc.nasa.gov> kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) writes: >In article <2179@cluster.cs.su.oz.au> carsup@extro.ucc.su.oz.au (Fisher Library support) writes: >>Has anyone any Proof that life itself was not designed? I think not. > We don't have any proof that life wasn't designed, but we do have proof >that it does evolve. It's possible that random evolution isn't completely >a random process, but if so this is something that Man can't duplicate (owing >to not being omnipotent, etc.) So it's not something we can discuss >intelligently. Only if you presume that if life was designed, then it must have been designed by an omnipotent omniscient supernatural being. This seems a hugely unnecessary presumption, especially given that it seems within the bounds of possibility that it might (on the other hand) have been "designed" by evolution, i.e., a natural process. -- Chris Malcolm cam@uk.ac.ed.aipna +44 (0)31 667 1011 x2550 Department of Artificial Intelligence, Edinburgh University 5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK DoD #205
kurt@think.com (Kurt Thearling) (03/14/91)
In article <4149@aipna.ed.ac.uk> cam@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes: >In article <1991Mar11.165932.19507@news.larc.nasa.gov> kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) writes: >>In article <2179@cluster.cs.su.oz.au> carsup@extro.ucc.su.oz.au (Fisher Library support) writes: > >>>Has anyone any Proof that life itself was not designed? I think not. > >> We don't have any proof that life wasn't designed, but we do have proof >>that it does evolve. It's possible that random evolution isn't completely >>a random process, but if so this is something that Man can't duplicate (owing >>to not being omnipotent, etc.) So it's not something we can discuss >>intelligently. > >Only if you presume that if life was designed, then it must have been >designed by an omnipotent omniscient supernatural being. This seems a >hugely unnecessary presumption, especially given that it seems within >the bounds of possibility that it might (on the other hand) have been >"designed" by evolution, i.e., a natural process. > You might be interested in "Self-Reproducing Automata and the Origin of Life," Robert C. Newman, Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 24-31. In this article the self-reproducing automaton designed by Chris Langton is analyzed to show that life is designed. From the abstract: "... Langton's very simple self-reproducing automaton is described in detail. The complexity of Langton's automaton strongly suggests that life is designed rather than accidental." Newman computes the time to required consider all of the possible designs for such a self-reproducing automaton. This time is (in his estimate) 3 * 10**139 years. He then assumes that the universe is 20 billion years old to determine that the probablility of producing the self-reproducing automaton via random formation is 10**-129. kurt ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Kurt Thearling Thinking Machines Corp. 245 First Street kurt@think.com Cambridge, MA 02142 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
u1365281@ucsvc.ucs.unimelb.edu.au (03/14/91)
In article <1991Mar13.225321.14042@Think.COM>, kurt@think.com (Kurt Thearling) writes: > > You might be interested in "Self-Reproducing Automata and the Origin of > Life," Robert C. Newman, Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith, > vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 24-31. In this article the self-reproducing automaton > designed by Chris Langton is analyzed to show that life is designed. > > From the abstract: "... Langton's very simple self-reproducing automaton is > described in detail. The complexity of Langton's automaton strongly > suggests that life is designed rather than accidental." > > Newman computes the time to required consider all of the possible designs > for such a self-reproducing automaton. This time is (in his estimate) > 3 * 10**139 years. He then assumes that the universe is 20 billion years > old to determine that the probablility of producing the self-reproducing > automaton via random formation is 10**-129. > > > kurt > Of course Lord Kelvin thought he showed Darwin was wrong by showing that the Sun would have cooled long ago if Darwin were right. Kelvin did not know about nuclear reactions. In the life case, it is wrong to take all possible combinations, since early combinations severly restrict future combinations. We call this historical constraint (see Brooks and Wiley, _Evolution as Entropy_ Chicago: 1988). Relevance to AI? Historical constraints play an important role in restricting future behaviour. Behaviour evolved oer a long time may have many constraints that some one starting from a "top-down" approach would have trouble thinking of. This raises Dreyfus's old objection to the strong AI program. John Collier Collier@HPS.unimelb.edu.au
dailey@cpsin3.cps.msu.edu (Chris Dailey) (03/15/91)
Again, I'm copying this from hardcopy, I've lost the article ID, etc. All appropriate disclaimers, therefore, apply. Most people have probably had their say about this article (it was posted 1. March '91), but I was reading back over the hardcopy and found something that still needed to be said that I failed to say in my original response. I said: >I would tend to agree that we could not do software mutation and weeding >out of bad variants with what are today's acceptable software >engineering practices. Maybe this will become a new specialization? I >think it is needed to accomplish 'AI' (I'll leave the reason >unexplained). To which Scott Dorsey replied: >No comment. Except to say that if we do mutation and weeding, than we need >to develop an adequate mutation system and also a criterion for weeding out. >Evolution (in the sense of biological systems) is very, very slow. Can a single person evolve? A single person can adapt, but this is not called evolution. I'm not necessarily thinking about the //species// adapting/evolving, but about the //individual// (in this case, the computer program) adapting. As I said in my original reply to this message, to do this, the computer would need to evaluate its own processes, try to think of a more efficient process, and then verify that the new process, if faster, is indeed equivalent. -- Chris Dailey dailey@(frith.egr|cps).msu.edu __ __ ___ | Software Engineer Wanna-be studying compiler design & __/ \/ \/ __:>- | implementation. Temporarily residing in Software \__/\__/\__/ | Engineering Lab, Engineering Bldg., MSU Campus -- cps424
aro@sibyl (Andy Ormsby) (03/16/91)
In article <1991Mar13.225321.14042@Think.COM> kurt@think.com (Kurt Thearling) writes: > You might be interested in "Self-Reproducing Automata and the Origin of > Life," Robert C. Newman, Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith, > vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 24-31. In this article the self-reproducing automaton > designed by Chris Langton is analyzed to show that life is designed. Though for an alternative view, Richard Dawkin's "The Blind Watchmaker" advocates evolution as sufficient explanation for the existence of a huge variety of complex lifeforms. > Newman computes the time to required consider all of the possible designs > for such a self-reproducing automaton. This time is (in his estimate) > 3 * 10**139 years. He then assumes that the universe is 20 billion years > old to determine that the probablility of producing the self-reproducing > automaton via random formation is 10**-129. Advocates of the anthropic principle might argue that the probabilities are not really the issue. The fact that we are able to observe our own existence makes our own existence an established fact. I'm not sure I believe this, but the argument has an attractive circularity to it. Andrew Ormsby aro@cs.aber.ac.uk Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Research Group, Department of Computer Science, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, Dyfed SY23 3BZ, Wales.
richieb@bony1.bony.com (Richard Bielak) (03/16/91)
In article <4149@aipna.ed.ac.uk> cam@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes: >In article <1991Mar11.165932.19507@news.larc.nasa.gov> kludge@grissom.larc.nasa.gov ( Scott Dorsey) writes: >>In article <2179@cluster.cs.su.oz.au> carsup@extro.ucc.su.oz.au (Fisher Library support) writes: > >>>Has anyone any Proof that life itself was not designed? I think not. > >> We don't have any proof that life wasn't designed, but we do have proof >>that it does evolve. It's possible that random evolution isn't completely >>a random process, but if so this is something that Man can't duplicate (owing >>to not being omnipotent, etc.) So it's not something we can discuss >>intelligently. > >Only if you presume that if life was designed, then it must have been >designed by an omnipotent omniscient supernatural being. This seems a >hugely unnecessary presumption, especially given that it seems within >the bounds of possibility that it might (on the other hand) have been >"designed" by evolution, i.e., a natural process. > If life was designed by some being, I would hardly call him omnipotent or supernatural. To me it looks like life is one great hack! To quote George Carlin: everything that lives, dies! I think there is a serious problem in the design. :-) ...richie -- +----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Richie Bielak (212)-815-3072 | "The sights one sees at times makes one | | Internet: richieb@bony.com | wonder if God ever really meant for | | Bang: uunet!bony1!richieb | man to fly." -- Charles Lindbergh |
smoliar@isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) (03/16/91)
In article <1991Mar14.170618.1731@ucsvc.ucs.unimelb.edu.au> u1365281@ucsvc.ucs.unimelb.edu.au writes: >In article <1991Mar13.225321.14042@Think.COM>, kurt@think.com (Kurt Thearling) >writes: > >> >> You might be interested in "Self-Reproducing Automata and the Origin of >> Life," Robert C. Newman, Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith, >> vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 24-31. In this article the self-reproducing automaton >> designed by Chris Langton is analyzed to show that life is designed. >> >> From the abstract: "... Langton's very simple self-reproducing automaton is >> described in detail. The complexity of Langton's automaton strongly >> suggests that life is designed rather than accidental." >> >> Newman computes the time to required consider all of the possible designs >> for such a self-reproducing automaton. This time is (in his estimate) >> 3 * 10**139 years. He then assumes that the universe is 20 billion years >> old to determine that the probablility of producing the self-reproducing >> automaton via random formation is 10**-129. >> >> >> kurt >> > >Of course Lord Kelvin thought he showed Darwin was wrong by showing that >the Sun would have cooled long ago if Darwin were right. Kelvin did not >know about nuclear reactions. > >In the life case, it is wrong to take all possible combinations, since >early combinations severly restrict future combinations. We call this >historical constraint (see Brooks and Wiley, _Evolution as Entropy_ >Chicago: 1988). > There is also a question of how Newman came up with his time estimate. Even assuming that you WANT to consider an unguided search through all possibilities, there is no need to assume that the search be sequential. If Kelvin did not know about nuclear reactions, Newman may not know about the Burgess shale and the possibility of truly MASSIVE possibilities all be explored concurrently. -- USPS: Stephen Smoliar 5000 Centinela Avenue #129 Los Angeles, California 90066 Internet: smoliar@venera.isi.edu
G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk (Gordon Joly) (03/17/91)
Kurt Thearling writes: > [...] > You might be interested in "Self-Reproducing Automata and the Origin of > Life," Robert C. Newman, Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith, > vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 24-31. In this article the self-reproducing automaton > designed by Chris Langton is analyzed to show that life is designed. > > From the abstract: "... Langton's very simple self-reproducing automaton is > described in detail. The complexity of Langton's automaton strongly > suggests that life is designed rather than accidental." > > Newman computes the time to required consider all of the possible designs > for such a self-reproducing automaton. This time is (in his estimate) > 3 * 10**139 years. He then assumes that the universe is 20 billion years > old to determine that the probablility of producing the self-reproducing > automaton via random formation is 10**-129. > > > kurt > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------- > Kurt Thearling Thinking Machines Corp. > 245 First Street > kurt@think.com Cambridge, MA 02142 > ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Interesting. Could somebody confirm that John von Neumann's work on self-replicating agents pre-dated Watson and Crick's discovery of DNA by several years? Gordon Joly +44 71 387 7050 ext 3716 Internet: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk UUCP: ...!{uunet,ukc}!ucl-cs!G.Joly Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, LONDON WC1E 6BT "I didn't do it. Nobody saw me do it. You can't prove anything!"
fnwlr1@acad3.alaska.edu (RUTHERFORD WALTER L) (03/17/91)
In article <1991Mar15.180803.5672@bony1.bony.com>, richieb@bony1.bony.com (Richard Bielak) writes... > >If life was designed by some being, I would hardly call him omnipotent >or supernatural. To me it looks like life is one great hack! To >quote George Carlin: everything that lives, dies! > >I think there is a serious problem in the design. :-) > >....richie But that is the mechanism which drives the self improvement process. Would we have modern buildings if every cave, lean-to, hut, cabin, etc... ever built were required to exist forever? How about every pack animal, travois, sled, cart, wagon, chariot, coach, automobile? Like the old joke says: "You can't have everything... Where would you put it?" ;-) P.S. This isn't an invite for a non-AI philosophy discussion. HoKay? --------------------------------------------------------------------- Walter Rutherford P.O. Box 83273 \ / Computers are NOT intelligent; Fairbanks, Alaska 99708 - X - / \ they just think they are! fnwlr1@acad3.alaska.edu ---------------------------------------------------------------------