mcdermott-drew@cs.yale.edu (Drew McDermott) (06/13/91)
In article <1991Jun12.232457.2962@news.media.mit.edu> minsky@media-lab.media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes: >Conversants never do, in >fact, know that they are talking about the same things. It is always >a matter of convention, convergence, and good fortune -- even in the >case of "mathematical truths". When you and I both talk about "that >chair over there", our internal models differ substantially, but not >enough to make most practical interactions too difficult. And the >cchir itself changes imperceptibly from one moment to the next as it >loses and gains atoms and suffers thermal agitations of its internal >degrees of freedom. There is no chair, indeed, from a modern physical >point of view, only boundaries imposed by observers.... Okay, but what about this objection: There are no observers, indeed, but only boundaries imposed by .... who?? Why do we grant such rock-solid existence to observers and not to chairs? Surely we're not genuflecting toward the almighty self here? I think this is a genuine conundrum, but whatever solution we work out for explaining why people are objectively real will also work for chairs. In any case it will not do to say that the reality of macroscopic objects is merely imposed by an observer, because the observer is itself just another macroscopic object. -- Drew McDermott
minsky@media-lab.media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) (06/14/91)
In article <1991Jun13.163734.10165@cs.yale.edu> mcdermott-drew@cs.yale.edu (Drew McDermott) writes: > >Okay, but what about this objection: There are no observers, indeed, >but only boundaries imposed by .... who?? > >Why do we grant such rock-solid existence to observers and not to >chairs? Speak for yourself. Each mind has many poorly defined parts -- I call them agencies. It is only naive people -- that is, people who have read too much philosophy -- that grant rock-solid existence to their "self". It is a pre-Freudian idea that an observer makes clear distinctions, "believes" propositions, etc.
ISSSSM@NUSVM.BITNET (Stephen Smoliar) (06/14/91)
In article <1991Jun13.163734.10165@cs.yale.edu> mcdermott-drew@cs.yale.edu (Drew McDermott) writes: > In article <1991Jun12.232457.2962@news.media.mit.edu> > minsky@media-lab.media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes: > >Conversants never do, in > >fact, know that they are talking about the same things. It is always > >a matter of convention, convergence, and good fortune -- even in the > >case of "mathematical truths". When you and I both talk about "that > >chair over there", our internal models differ substantially, but not > >enough to make most practical interactions too difficult. And the > >cchir itself changes imperceptibly from one moment to the next as it > >loses and gains atoms and suffers thermal agitations of its internal > >degrees of freedom. There is no chair, indeed, from a modern physical > >point of view, only boundaries imposed by observers.... > >Okay, but what about this objection: There are no observers, indeed, >but only boundaries imposed by .... who?? > >Why do we grant such rock-solid existence to observers and not to >chairs? > >Surely we're not genuflecting toward the almighty self here? > >I think this is a genuine conundrum, but whatever solution we work out >for explaining why people are objectively real will also work for >chairs. In any case it will not do to say that the reality of >macroscopic objects is merely imposed by an observer, because the >observer is itself just another macroscopic object. > Poor Descartes! All that business about separating out mind and body has really been taking quite a beating lately. Now, just when you thought it was safe to go into the philosophy library, here comes Drew ready to take on the COGITO! By the time we are all done with him, all Descartes will have left to his name will be a few fragments of analytic geometry (pathetically Euclidean, at that)! However, if we can overcome our fear of solipsism (or at least Chris Hutchison's fear), perhaps the COGITO is not quite as arbitrary as Drew's accusation makes it out to be. Ultimately, it all boils down to this question of whether or not "genuflecting toward the almighty self" is nothing more than blind faith. After all, what the COGITO is basically saying is that because I am exercising my "mental powers" (whatever they may be), I can attribute to myself a "rock-solid existence" which I cannot attribute to that chair I observe over there. As I see it, here is where solipsism comes in the door to prop up the COGITO: The question, as Drew formulated it, is quite appropriate. Why should the class of observers be any better off than the class of chairs? The answer provided by solipsism is that they are not any better off. However, there is ONE observer who IS better off; and that is Drew's "almighty self." The solipsistic argument goes that the self is the ONLY observer that needs to be taken into account. Any other observers do, indeed, have the same status as chairs: They are all products of the interpretative process which constitutes observation. The COGITO then goes one step further by basically asserting that the "self" behind that interpretative process is essentially an emergent property of the process. This is a bit convoluted and kind of heady. It is probably better discussed in a congenial bar over a few beers. However, I do not see it as a patently silly point of view which may impede our attempts to make progress in artificial intelligence. Minsky is quite right that we should "get on with the work of making machines that can solve problems and communicate with one another as best they can." As we learn more about the technology of situated automata, it becomes more and more feasible to think of building those machines on a foundation of solipsism. Indeed, from a point of view of sound engineering, there may be no other viable way in which to build them. =============================================================================== Stephen W. Smoliar Institute of Systems Science National University of Singapore Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Kent Ridge SINGAPORE 0511 BITNET: ISSSSM@NUSVM "He was of Lord Essex's opinion, 'rather to go an hundred miles to speak with one wise man, than five miles to see a fair town.'"--Boswell on Johnson
mcdermott-drew@cs.yale.edu (Drew McDermott) (06/14/91)
In article <9106140011.AA14996@lilac.berkeley.edu> ISSSSM@NUSVM.BITNET (Stephen Smoliar) writes: >In article <1991Jun13.163734.10165@cs.yale.edu> mcdermott-drew@cs.yale.edu >(Drew McDermott) writes: >> >>Okay, but what about this objection: There are no observers, indeed, >>but only boundaries imposed by .... who?? >> >>Why do we grant such rock-solid existence to observers and not to >>chairs? >> >>Surely we're not genuflecting toward the almighty self here? >> >>I think this is a genuine conundrum, but whatever solution we work out >>for explaining why people are objectively real will also work for >>chairs. In any case it will not do to say that the reality of >>macroscopic objects is merely imposed by an observer, because the >>observer is itself just another macroscopic object. >However, if we can overcome our fear of solipsism (or at least Chris >Hutchison's fear), perhaps the COGITO is not quite as arbitrary as Drew's >accusation makes it out to be. Ultimately, it all boils down to this question >of whether or not "genuflecting toward the almighty self" is nothing more than >blind faith. After all, what the COGITO is basically saying is that because I >am exercising my "mental powers" (whatever they may be), I can attribute to >myself a "rock-solid existence" which I cannot attribute to that chair I >observe over there. The problem is this: It's now becoming clear that the self is a construct of the brain. [Okay, clear to a handful of computationally enlightend people.] Hence the sentence "I can attribute existence to myself," actualy means that "the brain can attribute existence to its 'self' ". But deciding that the brain itself exists is not addressed by this formula. When I question the existence of a macroscopic object, I am not invoking skepticism. I'm just following up Minsky's point that macroscopic objects are not simple collections of microscopic parts (atoms, e.g.). A river is not a collection of water molecules, because the particular molecules involved are always changing. Let's call it a "system" of molecules for want of a better term. The puzzle is to find the systems in a universe of constantly moving quarks and leptons. It won't do to say "Find an observer and let it find the systems," because the observers are just systems themselves. >As I see it, here is where solipsism comes in the door to prop up the COGITO: >The question, as Drew formulated it, is quite appropriate. Why should the >class of observers be any better off than the class of chairs? The answer >provided by solipsism is that they are not any better off. However, there >is ONE observer who IS better off; and that is Drew's "almighty self." In Descartes' day it might have been plausible to suppose that at least one observer was directly observed. But we now realize that the brain consists of many "observers" (if the term has any meaning) that apparently conspire to advertise the presence of a single virtual observer. This entity, being at best a self-fulfilling hallucination, is in no position to serve as the foundation of all ontology and epistemology. >This is a bit convoluted and kind of heady. It is probably better discussed in >a congenial bar over a few beers. What isn't? As we learn more about the technology of situated automata, >it becomes more and more feasible to think of building those machines on a >foundation of solipsism. Indeed, from a point of view of sound engineering, >there may be no other viable way in which to build them. I disagree completely with this idea. The machines may someday arrive at a solipsistic position, but if so, it will be false, as we can see when we start to build them. -- Drew McDermott
minsky@media-lab.media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) (06/15/91)
Now I understand better what McDermott meant. I think I also understand better what Smoliar meant. I rather liked his use of the term "solipsism" to make a nice point about objective truth being largely (or entirely) unavailable, so that our "knowledge" is always to some degree really, only "belief" and that belief itself is not ever clearly about "things" but is an internal repationship between the person's "self-fulfilling hallucination conspiracy", as McDermott put it, and other parts of that person's representational data structures. "I believe X" means, in that interpretation, something sort of like "the imaginary person-self S that is me has stored an X expression in the (imaginary) part of S's memory that is used for expressions that are not to be easily changed."
ISSSSM@NUSVM.BITNET (Stephen Smoliar) (06/15/91)
In article <1991Jun14.153701.842@cs.yale.edu> mcdermott-drew@cs.yale.edu (Drew McDermott) writes: > >When I question the existence of a macroscopic object, I am not >invoking skepticism. I'm just following up Minsky's point that >macroscopic objects are not simple collections of microscopic parts >(atoms, e.g.). A river is not a collection of water molecules, >because the particular molecules involved are always changing. Let's >call it a "system" of molecules for want of a better term. The puzzle >is to find the systems in a universe of constantly moving quarks and >leptons. It won't do to say "Find an observer and let it find the >systems," because the observers are just systems themselves. > > >As I see it, here is where solipsism comes in the door to prop up the > >COGITO: > >The question, as Drew formulated it, is quite appropriate. Why should the > >class of observers be any better off than the class of chairs? The answer > >provided by solipsism is that they are not any better off. However, there > >is ONE observer who IS better off; and that is Drew's "almighty > self." > >In Descartes' day it might have been plausible to suppose that at >least one observer was directly observed. But we now realize that the >brain consists of many "observers" (if the term has any meaning) that >apparently conspire to advertise the presence of a single virtual >observer. This entity, being at best a self-fulfilling hallucination, >is in no position to serve as the foundation of all ontology and >epistemology. > Why not? Where are its points of weakness as far as support is concerned? As I understand your argument above, we cannot have either ontology or epistemology until we have entities. I am willing to join you in using the word "systems" for those entities; and I agree that finding those systems is basically our "first problem." Where I do NOT agree is with your claim that observers are not qualified to find those systems by virtue of being systems themselves. Why should this disqualify them? As I have been trying to argue to Chris Hutchison, it may create a confusion which can only be resolved by dialog among those observers; but all this means is that one set of hypotheses about what systems are may be displaced by another set. This would mean that any foundation we have for ontology and epistemology may not be strictly static and is highly subjective, but to disqualify it as being a foundation may be pushing the metaphor of a building's foundation too far. =============================================================================== Stephen W. Smoliar Institute of Systems Science National University of Singapore Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Kent Ridge SINGAPORE 0511 BITNET: ISSSSM@NUSVM "He was of Lord Essex's opinion, 'rather to go an hundred miles to speak with one wise man, than five miles to see a fair town.'"--Boswell on Johnson
G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk (Gordon Joly) (06/17/91)
Drew McDermott writes: > > In article <1991Jun12.232457.2962@news.media.mit.edu> minsky@media-lab.media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes: > >Conversants never do, in > >fact, know that they are talking about the same things. It is always > >a matter of convention, convergence, and good fortune -- even in the > >case of "mathematical truths". When you and I both talk about "that > >chair over there", our internal models differ substantially, but not > >enough to make most practical interactions too difficult. And the > >cchir itself changes imperceptibly from one moment to the next as it > >loses and gains atoms and suffers thermal agitations of its internal > >degrees of freedom. There is no chair, indeed, from a modern physical > >point of view, only boundaries imposed by observers.... > > Okay, but what about this objection: There are no observers, indeed, > but only boundaries imposed by .... who?? > > Why do we grant such rock-solid existence to observers and not to > chairs? > > Surely we're not genuflecting toward the almighty self here? > > I think this is a genuine conundrum, but whatever solution we work out > for explaining why people are objectively real will also work for > chairs. In any case it will not do to say that the reality of > macroscopic objects is merely imposed by an observer, because the > observer is itself just another macroscopic object. > > -- Drew McDermott As Rufus T. Firefly said, "any child of five can see that this is a chair. Bring me a child of five..." ____ Gordon Joly +44 71 387 7050 ext 3716 Internet: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk UUCP: ...!{uunet,ukc}!ucl-cs!G.Joly Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, LONDON WC1E 6BT Order is paramount in anarchy.
G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk (Gordon Joly) (06/17/91)
Marvin Minsky writes: > Now I understand better what McDermott meant. > > I think I also understand better what Smoliar meant. I rather liked > his use of the term "solipsism" to make a nice point about objective > truth being largely (or entirely) unavailable, so that our "knowledge" > is always to some degree really, only "belief" and that belief itself > is not ever clearly about "things" but is an internal repationship > between the person's "self-fulfilling hallucination conspiracy", as > McDermott put it, and other parts of that person's representational > data structures. "I believe X" means, in that interpretation, > something sort of like "the imaginary person-self S that is me has > stored an X expression in the (imaginary) part of S's memory that is > used for expressions that are not to be easily changed." A mere imagined hurricane in teacup. Gordon. ____ Gordon Joly +44 71 387 7050 ext 3716 Internet: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk UUCP: ...!{uunet,ukc}!ucl-cs!G.Joly Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, LONDON WC1E 6BT Order is paramount in anarchy.
dave@tygra.Michigan.COM (David Conrad) (06/19/91)
In article <1991Jun14.153701.842@cs.yale.edu> mcdermott-drew@cs.yale.edu (Drew McDermott) writes: > >The problem is this: It's now becoming clear that the self is a >construct of the brain. [Okay, clear to a handful of computationally >enlightend people.] Hence the sentence "I can attribute existence to >myself," actualy means that "the brain can attribute existence to >its 'self' ". But deciding that the brain itself exists is not >addressed by this formula. No, it isn't, but so what? What is most important, it seems to me, is that an intelligent agent can achieve its goals without being able to prove that anything, *not even the hardware on which it is implemented*, exists. I can think (I'm actually doing it right now!) without being able to *prove* that my brain exists. This is no obstacle. The question for AI seems to be: "Does an agent which 'believes' in objects, observers, etc. work 'better' than a solipsistic one? Does it 'learn' faster? Can it do more?" This, I will admit, is out of my league. >The puzzle >is to find the systems in a universe of constantly moving quarks and >leptons. It won't do to say "Find an observer and let it find the >systems," because the observers are just systems themselves. > Is this puzzle merely one of philosophy? I cannot see why it is necessary for us to solve the ultimate question of "Life, the Universe, and Everything" before we can succeed with AI. (The answer, by the way, is 42.) >I disagree completely with this idea. The machines may someday arrive >at a solipsistic position, but if so, it will be false, as we can see >when we start to build them. > If you have a disproof of Solipsism, I'm waiting with baited breath. If you simply mean that I know that the machine isn't the one true observer because I know that I myself am also an observer, this is no more help to the machine than you telling me that you really exist helps me to dispell my own solipsistic feelings. David R. Conrad dave@michigan.com -- = CAT-TALK Conferencing Network, Computer Conferencing and File Archive = - 1-313-343-0800, 300/1200/2400/9600 baud, 8/N/1. New users use 'new' - = as a login id. AVAILABLE VIA PC-PURSUIT!!! (City code "MIDET") = E-MAIL Address: dave@Michigan.COM