gnu@hoptoad.uucp (John Gilmore) (01/02/91)
I) Does this mean that Dr. Dobb's is now an "export restricted" item,
and thus can not be mailed to any non-US subscribers?
No, it's even more bizarre than that. It's OK to publish and export a
description of DES on paper, but not OK to export "software" that
implements it. Is a listing of a program on paper "software"? Ask the
Office of Munitions Control, they implement this particular export
regulation. (Yes, they think cryptography is a munition. Yes, they
are serious. Yes, they are stupid. See below.)
II) Does this now mean that Comp-U-Serv must restrict non-US subscriber
access?
Doubtful. The act of transferring the program out of the country would
be made by the subscriber, not the service. I think it's pretty well
established that if I instruct a computer to break the law, it is I that
is at fault, and not the owner of the computer.
If you think that this state of affairs [the export control nonsense
about DES] is a problem, here is a good person to write to in the
goverment:
Bill Clements
Office of Technology and Policy Analysis
Bureau of Export Administration
US Department of Commerce
Room 4069-A
14th & Constitution Avenues, NW
Washington, DC 20230
A copy to Larry Christensen in the General Counsel's Office, Room 3327,
would help. I explained a bunch of things about encryption and export,
and how it is in the real world to Larry, and his response was "Your
government needs to know this stuff!". *Your* letter will help!
The Commerce Dept. is trying to wrest control of crypto export away from
the State Department (Office of Munitions Control), but they need support
from the users. If they can wave a hundred letters in their face, from
computer experts and users, that helps a lot.
--
John Gilmore {sun,pacbell,uunet,pyramid}!hoptoad!gnu gnu@toad.com
Just say no to thugs. The ones who lock up innocent drug users come to mind.jfh@rpp386.cactus.org (John F Haugh II) (01/02/91)
In article <14475@hoptoad.uucp> gnu@hoptoad.uucp (John Gilmore) writes: >The Commerce Dept. is trying to wrest control of crypto export away from >the State Department (Office of Munitions Control), but they need support >from the users. If they can wave a hundred letters in their face, from >computer experts and users, that helps a lot. Hopefully you will mention in your letter that DES should not be restricted by the Commerce Department either. There is no reason to restrict DES software (or even hardware). The technology is not secret - there is nothing to prevent Saddam Hussein from reading the appropriate Federal Register sections or FIPS PUB 46. -- John F. Haugh II UUCP: ...!cs.utexas.edu!rpp386!jfh Ma Bell: (512) 832-8832 Domain: jfh@rpp386.cactus.org "While you are here, your wives and girlfriends are dating handsome American movie and TV stars. Stars like Tom Selleck, Bruce Willis, and Bart Simpson."
bhoughto@hopi.intel.com (Blair P. Houghton) (01/03/91)
In article <18874@rpp386.cactus.org> jfh@rpp386.cactus.org (John F Haugh II) writes: >not secret - there is nothing to prevent Saddam Hussein from reading >the appropriate Federal Register sections or FIPS PUB 46. True, but then there's nothing to keep him from reading Nobel and Einstein, so let's just sell him giant, ballistic guns and nuclear warheads... ...i.e., there's something to be said for prohibiting the export of sensitive technologies, regardless of the availability of related scientific information. --Blair "Knowledge is not implementation."
jik@athena.mit.edu (Jonathan I. Kamens) (01/03/91)
In article <14475@hoptoad.uucp>, gnu@hoptoad.uucp (John Gilmore) writes: |> Doubtful. The act of transferring the program out of the country would |> be made by the subscriber, not the service. I think it's pretty well |> established that if I instruct a computer to break the law, it is I that |> is at fault, and not the owner of the computer. Indeed. The README file (~ftp/pub/kerberos/README.ftp) which any person trying to retrieve Kerberos from Project Athena's archive site (athena-dist.mit.edu) must retrieve in order to get the instructions for getting the rest of Kerberos says, right at the top: Export of this software from the United States of America is assumed to require a specific license from the United States Government. It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating export to obtain such a license before exporting. -- Jonathan Kamens USnail: MIT Project Athena 11 Ashford Terrace jik@Athena.MIT.EDU Allston, MA 02134 Office: 617-253-8085 Home: 617-782-0710
jfh@rpp386.cactus.org (John F Haugh II) (01/03/91)
In article <1548@inews.intel.com> bhoughto@hopi.intel.com (Blair P. Houghton) writes: >In article <18874@rpp386.cactus.org> jfh@rpp386.cactus.org (John F Haugh II) writes: >>not secret - there is nothing to prevent Saddam Hussein from reading >>the appropriate Federal Register sections or FIPS PUB 46. > >True, but then there's nothing to keep him from reading >Nobel and Einstein, so let's just sell him giant, ballistic >guns and nuclear warheads... The amount of information required to go from Einstein to a working nuclear device is non-trivial. The amount of effort required to go from FIPS PUB 46 to a working DES machine is trivial. I have a copy of FIPS PUB 46 sitting somewheres in this room. >...i.e., there's something to be said for prohibiting the >export of sensitive technologies, regardless of the availability >of related scientific information. > > --Blair > "Knowledge is not implementation." In the case of DES it is. The whole world of cryptography requires that cryptosystems be open to examination. DES is published so that everyone may stare at it and uncover any holes they might find. So, while I need to know how to create the appropriate neutron density to get a bomb to go "BOOM" instead of "bzzt", with DES I only need to read the PUBs and start typing. -- John F. Haugh II UUCP: ...!cs.utexas.edu!rpp386!jfh Ma Bell: (512) 832-8832 Domain: jfh@rpp386.cactus.org "While you are here, your wives and girlfriends are dating handsome American movie and TV stars. Stars like Tom Selleck, Bruce Willis, and Bart Simpson."
mjr@hussar.dco.dec.com (Marcus J. Ranum) (01/03/91)
bhoughto@hopi.intel.com (Blair P. Houghton) writes: >...i.e., there's something to be said for prohibiting the >export of sensitive technologies, regardless of the availability >of related scientific information. In this case, it's like restricting the sale of blackpowder muzzle loader rifles - DES is not useful to an "enemy" power, unless they are Real Dumb, especially since the RSA algorithm has been published, and they can bloody well just use that. Restricting DES source is like banning the sale of flint knives to people who have a charge account at Interarms. mjr. -- "Don't include .signature twice" [From the notebooks of a heretic, 1990] -- "Don't include .signature twice" [From the motebooks of a heretic, 1990]
bhoughto@pima.intel.com (Blair P. Houghton) (01/03/91)
In article <1991Jan02.202703.8608@decuac.dec.com> mjr@hussar.dco.dec.com (Marcus J. Ranum) writes: >bhoughto@hopi.intel.com (Blair P. Houghton) writes: >>...i.e., there's something to be said for prohibiting the >>export of sensitive technologies > >Restricting DES source is like banning the sale >of flint knives to people who have a charge account at Interarms. There's no sense in giving your enemies free access to your intellectual property. If the problem is that our _allies_ are having trouble getting it, then the US Department of State is blowing chunks. Ob. internals: Yes, RSA is more nasty than DES, but DES is still virtually infallible. How much "harder" is it to crack an RSA'ed password than a DES'ed one? --Blair "Call for votes: talk.politics.unix"
ronnie@mindcraft.com (Ronnie Kon) (01/03/91)
In article <1991Jan02.202703.8608@decuac.dec.com> bhoughto@hopi.intel.com (Blair P. Houghton) writes: > >...i.e., there's something to be said for prohibiting the >export of sensitive technologies, regardless of the availability >of related scientific information. Gee, I'm sure glad the Ruskies have never thought of sending a student to UC Berkeley to get them a copy of the crypt() function (which implements DES encryption). Thank God for the US Commerce department. :-) Ronnie -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ronnie B. Kon | "I don't know about your brain, but kon@groundfog.stanford.edu | mine is really bossy." ...!{decwrl,ames}!mindcrf!ronnie | -- Laurie Anderson
janm@dramba.neis.oz (Jan Mikkelsen) (01/04/91)
[Somehow, I don't think this is the right place for this discussion. Followups to sci.crypt] In article <18875@rpp386.cactus.org> jfh@rpp386.cactus.org (John F Haugh II) writes: >The amount of information required to go from Einstein to >a working nuclear device is non-trivial. The amount of >effort required to go from FIPS PUB 46 to a working DES >machine is trivial. I have a copy of FIPS PUB 46 sitting >somewheres in this room. It is for DES as well ... See below ... > The whole world of cryptography >requires that cryptosystems be open to examination. DES >is published so that everyone may stare at it and uncover >any holes they might find. So, while I need to know how to >create the appropriate neutron density to get a bomb to go >"BOOM" instead of "bzzt", with DES I only need to read the >PUBs and start typing. Sure, many people have written pieces of software which perform DES encryption. It is considerably more difficult to design a piece of hardware with specific characteristics, for example, very high encryption speed, tamper resistance, small size, or the ability to operating in a hostile environment. These are the things which cannot be built using the FIPS specification alone. These should be sensitive, not the algorithm itself (which it isn't). I suspect that it was much easier for the Americans to restrict all implementations, rather than spending lots of time trying to figure out which implementations to restrict, and which not to restrict. Of course, this is pure supposition. Perhaps it would make more sense to allow software for export, but not real, physical, hardware. Ultimatly this does all the work. -- Jan Mikkelsen janm@dramba.neis.oz.AU or janm%dramba.neis.oz@metro.ucc.su.oz.au "She really is."
gnu@hoptoad.uucp (John Gilmore) (01/04/91)
People can endlessly debate the small points of the rules; I want to understand the big ones. WHY SHOULD PRIVACY TECHNOLOGY BE ILLEGAL? Why does the US government think that privacy is something neither its subjects, nor the citizens of other countries, should have? Back to details... From: jfh@rpp386.cactus.org (John F Haugh II) > Hopefully you will mention in your letter that DES should not be > restricted by the Commerce Department either. There is no reason > to restrict DES software (or even hardware). True. Commerce Dept. rules are that software which is freely available to the public is treated like documents, e.g. can be exported to any destination under no-paperwork General Licence GTDA. But this limits commercial usage of encryption, which is a serious problem; multinational companies are at a severe disadvantage in computer security if they do their r&d in the US, because they can't export the result. DES is not the be-all and end-all of encryption either. It's just the "sticking point" where the Munitions people refuse to allow export. There should be no controls on the import, export, or use of encryption. From: bhoughto@hopi.intel.com (Blair P. Houghton) > . . . there's something to be said for prohibiting the > export of sensitive technologies, regardless of the availability > of related scientific information. What exactly is "sensitive" about the availability of PRIVACY? From: janm@dramba.neis.oz (Jan Mikkelsen) > It is considerably more difficult to design a piece of hardware > with specific characteristics, for example, very high encryption speed, > tamper resistance, small size, or the ability to operating in a hostile > environment. . . These should be sensitive, not the algorithm itself What exactly is sensitive about the ability to produce a tamper resistant package? Do we not wish anyone who wants a tamper resistant package to have one? The only reason I can see for outlawing tamper resistance is if the government wants to undetectably tamper with our things. Small size? What is sensitive about SMALL devices that provide privacy? If privacy itself is OK, why not portable privacy? High speed encryption? I presume the problem is high volume, not high speed. If privacy itself is OK, what business is it of the government's how much data you choose to keep private? I would think that the government would encourage people with a lot of private data (credit card companies, gun registration lists, payroll information for large companies, etc) to have good means for keeping their information private. Hostile environments? Hostile to what? Certainly a privacy-assuring device should operate in environments hostile to privacy :-). High temperatures, humidity, radiation, etc? I don't think techniques for heat-sinking, sealing, shielding, etc are export-controlled, though there are some that are classified (and thus aren't even available to the U.S. public). -- John Gilmore {sun,pacbell,uunet,pyramid}!hoptoad!gnu gnu@toad.com Just say no to thugs. The ones who lock up innocent drug users come to mind.
barmar@think.com (Barry Margolin) (01/04/91)
In article <14511@hoptoad.uucp> gnu@hoptoad.uucp (John Gilmore) writes: >People can endlessly debate the small points of the rules; I want to >understand the big ones. WHY SHOULD PRIVACY TECHNOLOGY BE ILLEGAL? >Why does the US government think that privacy is something neither its >subjects, nor the citizens of other countries, should have? There are a couple of reasons. First of all, it's high-tech, and there are export regulations on most of our higher technologies. I think the purpose of this is to try to make sure we maintain the lead in *applications* of high technology; for instance, we can maintain the lead in weather simulation, which generally requires supercomputers, by making it hard for foreigners to get supercomputers. Also, smuggling high-tech devices to enemy nations is frequently done by pretending to be a purchaser from a friendly nation. As far as DES in particular is concerned, the NSA is extremely (read "overly") paranoid about foreigners getting our encryption technology. A few years ago the NSA tried to get all research on cryptology declared "unclassified but sensitive." This would have required all papers on cryptology to be sent to the NSA for approval to publish, and foreigners would generally not be allowed to attend conferences on cryptology. It's not clear whether they're worried about foreigners learning how to break our codes or use codes that we can't break; it's probably some of both. The academic community went up in arms about those restrictions, and I think the NSA eventually gave up. However, they did manage to get the Commerce Dept to restrict export of encryption mechanisms, and this has stuck. Since no large companies depend heavily on such devices for their income, there wasn't enough complaint to prevent it. -- Barry Margolin, Thinking Machines Corp. barmar@think.com {uunet,harvard}!think!barmar
src@scuzzy.in-berlin.de (Heiko Blume) (01/04/91)
bhoughto@pima.intel.com (Blair P. Houghton) writes: >Ob. internals: >Yes, RSA is more nasty than DES, but DES is still virtually >infallible. since it has not been proven, that there isn't a much faster algorithm than the published one, it's quite possible that the NSA has added some bogus stuff to the algorithm. that way they can break crypted data easily while the others have a hard time with the slower algorithm. also, why do you think did they shorten the key from 128 to 56 bits in the first place? How much "harder" is it to crack an RSA'ed password than >a DES'ed one? potentially very much, since you can make your keys (passwords) longer when the crackers' machines speed catches up. how about a key with 1000 *digits* compared to 56 *bits* ?! besides, DES still has the problem of how to securely exchange the password and the authentification lack. -- Heiko Blume <-+-> src@scuzzy.in-berlin.de <-+-> (+49 30) 691 88 93 public source archive [HST V.42bis]: scuzzy Any ACU,f 38400 6919520 gin:--gin: nuucp sword: nuucp uucp scuzzy!/src/README /your/home
peter@micromuse.co.uk (Peter Galbavy) (01/04/91)
In article <1991Jan04.022637.12550@scuzzy.in-berlin.de> src@scuzzy.in-berlin.de (Heiko Blume) writes: > >potentially very much, since you can make your keys (passwords) longer >when the crackers' machines speed catches up. how about a key with >1000 *digits* compared to 56 *bits* ?! RSA. Excuse my ignorance, but what is RSA - I would like to keep up :-) I presume you can tell me but not give me any example code ? Similar to DES ? If RSA has been around a while - sorry about asking, but cryptography is only a passing interest. -- Peter Galbavy Tech Support, Micromuse Ltd Phone: +44 71 352 7774 E-Mail: P.Galbavy@micromuse.co.uk Disclaimer: Time flies like an arrow... Fruit flies like a banana
janm@dramba.neis.oz (Jan Mikkelsen) (01/05/91)
In article <14511@hoptoad.uucp> gnu@hoptoad.uucp (John Gilmore) writes: >People can endlessly debate the small points of the rules; I want to >understand the big ones. WHY SHOULD PRIVACY TECHNOLOGY BE ILLEGAL? >Why does the US government think that privacy is something neither its >subjects, nor the citizens of other countries, should have? I agree, privacy technology should not be illegal. I cannot see the justification for restricting software DES implementations, nor most hardware implementations. I have a couple of Schlumberger M64 smart cards lying around which do DES in a monolithic chip, with secure key storage. I don't know what the situation with devices like this is in the United States, but I that it would be very hard to enforce a restriction on devices such as this. There are however, other aspects of an implementation for which I can see the justification for treating as sensitive, which have nothing to do with DES, or any other crypto system. For example: > I don't think techniques for >heat-sinking, sealing, shielding, etc are export-controlled, though >there are some that are classified (and thus aren't even available to the >U.S. public). Now, what can be done about making crypto systems more available to the masses? -- Jan Mikkelsen janm@dramba.neis.oz.AU or janm%dramba.neis.oz@metro.ucc.su.oz.au "She really is."
brnstnd@kramden.acf.nyu.edu (Dan Bernstein) (01/05/91)
In article <1991Jan04.130100.8499@micromuse.co.uk> peter@micromuse.co.uk (Peter Galbavy) writes: > RSA. Excuse my ignorance, but what is RSA - I would like to keep up RSA is the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman public-key encryption scheme. For details see Koblitz's cryptography text. > :-) I presume you can tell me but not give me any example code ? > Similar to DES ? As an encryption system, RSA is indeed under the supposed control of our munitions folks. Furthermore, RSA is (in the United States) patented, so that for the privilege of being able to exponentiate modulo some large number in all situations without being sued, you must pay $25 per year per number. > cryptography > is only a passing interest. That would be nice. :-) (I know what you meant.) ---Dan
allbery@NCoast.ORG (Brandon S. Allbery KB8JRR) (01/05/91)
As quoted from <14511@hoptoad.uucp> by gnu@hoptoad.uucp (John Gilmore): +--------------- | People can endlessly debate the small points of the rules; I want to | understand the big ones. WHY SHOULD PRIVACY TECHNOLOGY BE ILLEGAL? | Why does the US government think that privacy is something neither its | subjects, nor the citizens of other countries, should have? +--------------- The rest of your message continues the implication that it's all a plot to make privacy illegal. That isn't the intent. Despite the fact that it's all for nought, the U.S. government is worried about hostile foreign powers violating *its own* privacy by decrypting its DES-encypted data. Considering that anyone who wants to type in code from Andrew S. Tanenbaum's COMPUTER NETWORKS can bring up DES, this is a bit silly, but nonetheless your assumption that it's Big Brother out to get us is equally silly. ++Brandon -- Me: Brandon S. Allbery VHF/UHF: KB8JRR on 220, 2m, 440 Internet: allbery@NCoast.ORG Packet: KB8JRR @ WA8BXN America OnLine: KB8JRR AMPR: KB8JRR.AmPR.ORG [44.70.4.88] uunet!usenet.ins.cwru.edu!ncoast!allbery Delphi: ALLBERY
jfh@rpp386.cactus.org (John F Haugh II) (01/07/91)
In article <1991Jan5.022309.19716@NCoast.ORG> allbery@ncoast.ORG (Brandon S. Allbery KB8JRR) writes: >The rest of your message continues the implication that it's all a plot to >make privacy illegal. You could read it that way, however the government's actions clearly do limit the amount of privacy which two citizens of different countries may have. >That isn't the intent. Despite the fact that it's all for nought, the U.S. >government is worried about hostile foreign powers violating *its own* privacy >by decrypting its DES-encypted data. Considering that anyone who wants to >type in code from Andrew S. Tanenbaum's COMPUTER NETWORKS can bring up DES, >this is a bit silly, but nonetheless your assumption that it's Big Brother >out to get us is equally silly. The point that the algorithm is public knowlege should be stressed as the reason to legalize exporting software DES technology. Hardware DES technology exports should be extended to include "friendly" countries, just as supercomputer technology exports are limited. As others have pointed out, hardware DES should continue to be restricted from export to potentially hostile countries. -- John F. Haugh II UUCP: ...!cs.utexas.edu!rpp386!jfh Ma Bell: (512) 832-8832 Domain: jfh@rpp386.cactus.org "While you are here, your wives and girlfriends are dating handsome American movie and TV stars. Stars like Tom Selleck, Bruce Willis, and Bart Simpson."
amanda@visix.com (Amanda Walker) (01/08/91)
In article <1991Jan5.022309.19716@NCoast.ORG> allbery@ncoast.ORG (Brandon S. Allbery KB8JRR) writes: >That isn't the intent. Despite the fact that it's all for nought, the U.S. >government is worried about hostile foreign powers violating *its own* privacy >by decrypting its DES-encypted data. Not so, as I understand. DES is only approved for unclassified data. For any kind of classified communication, other (non-public) encryption methods are used. -- Amanda Walker amanda@visix.com Visix Software Inc. ...!uunet!visix!amanda -- "I was born in Iowa--I just *work* in outer space" --Star Trek IV
lupienj@hpwadac.hp.com (John Lupien) (01/09/91)
In article <1991Jan3.232017.15364@Think.COM> barmar@think.com (Barry Margolin) writes: >In article <14511@hoptoad.uucp> gnu@hoptoad.uucp (John Gilmore) writes: >>WHY SHOULD PRIVACY TECHNOLOGY BE ILLEGAL? > >There are a couple of reasons. "ostensibly", of course. >First of all, it's high-tech, and there are >export regulations on most of our higher technologies. I think the purpose >of this is to try to make sure we maintain the lead in *applications* of >high technology; for instance, we can maintain the lead in weather >simulation, which generally requires supercomputers, by making it hard for >foreigners to get supercomputers. Kind of a bogus argument. All that really does is ensure that foreign supercomputer markets will be supplied by foreign supercomputer manufacturers. Similarly for other high tech, of course. >Also, smuggling high-tech devices to >enemy nations is frequently done by pretending to be a purchaser from a >friendly nation. Yes it is, but this doesn't relate to the question, which in context could be re-cast as "should unfriendly nations have privacy?" The bit about "unfriendly nations" is kind of transient, too: Iraq was a better friend than Iran for some time after the Iranian revolution. >As far as DES in particular is concerned, the NSA is extremely (read >"overly") paranoid about foreigners getting our encryption technology. Well, perhaps that's not what "the NSA" is concerned about. The NSA is in charge of national security. They desire that the information related to national security should be secure. This may involve the use of encryption. If so, decryption becomes problematic: they do not want "others" to be able to decrypt security related information. Rumors that DES is breakable kind of make the DES issue moot, if true, but DES is not the only cryptographic technology which NSA seeks to control. >A few years ago the NSA tried to get all research on cryptology declared >"unclassified but sensitive." This would have required all papers on >cryptology to be sent to the NSA for approval to publish, and foreigners >would generally not be allowed to attend conferences on cryptology. >It's not clear whether they're worried about foreigners learning how to >break our codes or use codes that we can't break; it's probably some of >both. I would guess that it's more of the latter. Specifically, US citizens are subject to eavesdropping along with everybody else, and the possibility that the content of the communications taking place are not available to the eavesdroppers has an unsettling effect to the policy makers that benefit therefrom. >The academic community went up in arms about those restrictions, and I >think the NSA eventually gave up. However, they did manage to get the >Commerce Dept to restrict export of encryption mechanisms, and this has >stuck. Since no large companies depend heavily on such devices for their >income, there wasn't enough complaint to prevent it. Well, that seems a bit out of line with reality. Banks, insurance companies, major financial institutions of many kinds use encryption as the backbone of the financial networks. The management of these companies are naturally unwilling to stick their necks out. >Barry Margolin, Thinking Machines Corp. >barmar@think.com >{uunet,harvard}!think!barmar --- John R. Lupien lupienj@hpwarq.hp.com