spaf@cs.purdue.EDU (Gene Spafford) (09/07/90)
In article <55@hyprion.ddmi.com> rabbit@hyprion.UUCP (Dr. Roger Rabbit) writes: >You know - I wonder why the SS just doesn't get a computer expert to >come with them to the site of the raid and duplicate the hard drive >contents? Why do they need to take someone's machine?? ... And, I DON'T >want to hear anything that implies that "Oh well, if we're raiding them, >they must be guilty of something...." Believe it or not, it has to do with your rights to trial and to challenge evidence. As it has been explained to me by lawyer-types (prosecutors and "private" lawyers alike), there is the concept of "best evidence." If something is going to be introduced as evidence in a trial, the law requires that the best version of the evidence be produced, i.e., the original version, if possible. If a copy was introduced, the defense could challenge it and claim that the copy was not the same as the original -- that it had been doctored by the prosecution to make it look bad, or that accidental changes had been made, or that it wasn't a complete copy. According to both statute and case law, that objection would probably have to be sustained. Thus, a copy might not be admissable as evidence, and it is difficult to make a case when you can't introduce evidence! That's one reason why, when something is under investigation, they continue to hold the system long after the search warrant has been executed -- if an indictment is brought later, they need the system as evidence in the trial. If a challenge is made by the defendant about the material introduced as evidence, the prosecution needs to be able to fire up the system in the courtroom to prove their point. (I'm told that the normal course of prosecution is such that it may take upwards of 2 years for an indictment to be made. Thus, the equipment needs to be held all that time. This is a hardship for the defendant, but not at all unusual -- cases involving the seizure of cars, boats, printing presses (in counterfeiting cases), business records and so on often result in in the material being held for similar lengths of time. The belief is that it is more important to preserve the evidence to allow you to challenge it in court than it is to return it to you quickly.) Certainly, the prosecution could produce the experts to claim that a copy was a true and accurate copy, but the defense could have a lot of fun trying to cast doubt in the jury's minds by holding up 3.5" floopy disks and pointing at mounds of printouts and asking the experts to explain how they know it's a true copy, and how all that data is encoded, and how the know the software is correct and.... Ever try explaining all that to someone who is doesn't know about computers and may be mildlu computer-phobic? Now imagine explaining that to a jury of 12 similar people and convincing them beyond any reasonable doubt. Also, btw, that is part of the reason why peripherals are also taken during search warrants -- they are part of the system, and if the prosecution is going to print off copies of things, it needs to be done without "contaminating" the system with "outside" equipment or software. (I'm also told {and have seen} that the law enforcement agencies have very limited equipment resources, and the only way they can be sure to have a printer that works with the hardware/software on the confiscated system is to take the printer that's already attached.) Obviously, this is pretty silly -- as computer literate individuals, we understand that copies (when done correctly) are exactly the same as the originals, but the law wasn't developed by people who know computers. The law was developed when evidence was paper files or adding machine tapes, and xerox copies or handwritten copies were not allowed if the originals were available. (Someone made a snide comment earlier about SJ Games' laser printer being taken. It is my understanding that the above rationale is standard practice with the Feds. If you look in the NIJ (National Institutes of Justice) handbooks and similar texts on organizing computer crime investigation, you will see the same thing given as advice to local law enforcement types. If you don't like it, contact your Congress-criter about amendments to the Federal rules of evidence -- don't continue to abuse me for reporting information that I have spent time researching.)
mnemonic@walt.cc.utexas.edu (Mike Godwin) (09/08/90)
Gene Spafford lectures on evidence law: >Believe it or not, it has to do with your rights to trial and to >challenge evidence. As it has been explained to me by lawyer-types >(prosecutors and "private" lawyers alike), there is the concept of >"best evidence." The "best evidence rule" has been modified by the Federal Rules of Evidence both in reference to duplicates and in reference to computer data. These rules were adopted by Congress in 1975. See below. > If something is going to be introduced as evidence >in a trial, the law requires that the best version of the evidence be >produced, i.e., the original version, if possible. If a copy was >introduced, the defense could challenge it and claim that the copy was >not the same as the original -- that it had been doctored by the >prosecution to make it look bad, or that accidental changes had been >made, or that it wasn't a complete copy. According to both statute >and case law, that objection would probably have to be sustained. >Thus, a copy might not be admissable as evidence, and it is difficult >to make a case when you can't introduce evidence! It would help if you actual read some evidence law rather than relying on anedotal recitations of common-law evidence rules from the prosecutors you talk to. Consider the following excerpts from Article X of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Rule 1001. Definitions For purposes of this article the following definitions are applicable: [text omitted] (3) Original. An "original" of a writing or recording is the writing or recording itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it. An "original" of a photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom. If data are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an "original." (4) Duplicate. A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the original. Rule 1002. Requirement of Original [This is the common-law Best Evidence Rule as it has been codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence; it is therefore the rule to which Spafford refers.] To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress. Rule 1003. Admissibility of Duplicates. [This is the rule Spafford hasn't heard of.] A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. Two points should be noted here. First, it is clear that a printout of the contents of a hard disk counts as an original under the definitions section. Second, duplicates are admissible unless there is some dispute as to their provenance. As a practical matter, all the Assistant U.S. Attorney would have to do is direct that duplicates be made, then put on witnesses as to the duplication process. The duplicated data would then be admissible. (Of course, as a practical matter, only "duplicates" would ever be admitted into evidence--the actual hard disk would almost certainly NOT be admitted into evidence, since its mere presence is not evidence of of its content.) >That's one reason why, when something is under investigation, they >continue to hold the system long after the search warrant has been >executed -- if an indictment is brought later, they need the system as >evidence in the trial. If a challenge is made by the defendant about >the material introduced as evidence, the prosecution needs to be able >to fire up the system in the courtroom to prove their point. They need to do this about as often as they need to drive cars into the courtroom to demonstrate getaway tactics. Even if the prosecution anticipates that there will be a dispute over the provenance of any duplicates made, it hardly prevents the U.S. Attorney's office from giving the defendant *duplicates* of the siezed information. And few if any judges will sustain an objection over the prosecution's expert testimony showing chain of custody. Moreover, Spafford's comment does not address the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment implications of seizure of a *non*-defendant's property. >(I'm told that the normal course of prosecution is such that it may >take upwards of 2 years for an indictment to be made. Thus, the >equipment needs to be held all that time. This is a hardship for the >defendant, but not at all unusual -- cases involving the seizure of >cars, boats, printing presses (in counterfeiting cases), business >records and so on often result in in the material being held for >similar lengths of time. The belief is that it is more important to >preserve the evidence to allow you to challenge it in court than it is >to return it to you quickly.) It is also believed that any pressure brought to bear on the defendant provides additional motivation for plea bargains. >Certainly, the prosecution could produce the experts to claim that a >copy was a true and accurate copy, but the defense could have a lot of >fun trying to cast doubt in the jury's minds by holding up 3.5" floopy >disks and pointing at mounds of printouts and asking the experts to >explain how they know it's a true copy, and how all that data is >encoded, and how the know the software is correct and.... Ever try >explaining all that to someone who is doesn't know about computers and >may be mildlu computer-phobic? I do not share Spafford's contempt for juries. Juries have managed to learn and make decisions about complex matters since the beginning of the Republic. And the fact that a 3.5-inch floppy disk can hold the equivalent of pages and pages of text is not a complex matter; I defy you, Spafford, to find a single potential juror who would have trouble believing that such a disk could hold that much data, once you assured him that it could. >Now imagine explaining that to a jury >of 12 similar people and convincing them beyond any reasonable doubt. This is no great challenge. >(I'm also told {and have seen} that the law enforcement >agencies have very limited equipment resources, and the only way they >can be sure to have a printer that works with the hardware/software on >the confiscated system is to take the printer that's already >attached.) So we're too believe that the Feds have to keep Steve Jackson's LaserJet because the federal government can't afford one of its own? Been down to the federal courthouse lately, Gene? Back when I was a law clerk, I used to visit it all the time. Amazingly, they seem able to afford all sorts of equipment. >(Someone made a snide comment earlier about SJ Games' laser printer >being taken. It is my understanding that the above rationale is >standard practice with the Feds. If you look in the NIJ (National >Institutes of Justice) handbooks and similar texts on organizing >computer crime investigation, you will see the same thing given as >advice to local law enforcement types. If you don't like it, contact >your Congress-criter about amendments to the Federal rules of evidence >-- don't continue to abuse me for reporting information that I have >spent time researching.) Your research is minimal, so far as I can tell. Example: the NIJ handbooks are *not statutory law*. You don't need to have your Congressman amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to change the handbook provisions. Rather than take Spafford's "researching" at face value, I advise readers of this conference to take a look at legal scholarship concerning the Best Evidence Rule. A good place to start is Cleary and Strong, "The Best Evidence Rule: An Evaluation in Context," 51 Iowa L.Review 825, 1966. The authors note, inter alia, that the need for strict readings of the Best Evidence Rule has been reduced by modern legal procedures as well as by modern technology. --Mike Mike Godwin, UT Law School | "We need a new cosmology. mnemonic@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu | New Gods. New Sacraments. (512) 346-4190 | Another drink." | --Patti Smith
a577@mindlink.UUCP (Curt Sampson) (09/08/90)
> spaf@cs.purdue.EDU writes: > > That's one reason why, when something is under investigation, they > continue to hold the system long after the search warrant has been > executed -- if an indictment is brought later, they need the system as > evidence in the trial. If a challenge is made by the defendant about > the material introduced as evidence, the prosecution needs to be able > to fire up the system in the courtroom to prove their point. The problem with this, and allowing originals but not copies to be used as evidence, is that it's so easy to change the original undetectably! If I have some files on disk, it's very easy for pretty much anybody to go in and change files with a text editor, and who would ever know? If it's on an IBM you can set the system date and time to absolutely anything you like with a simple DOS command. I guess that this is yet another reason we need the EFF. Incidently, were I to use my computer to do anything illegal, I certainly wouldn't be foolish enough to leave my data on disk where anybody could see it. For sixty or seventy dollars you can buy a copy of PC-Tools and DES encrypt all of your important files. There are any number of programs around that will let you encrypt files for free (PKZIP with the -s option, for example), though I'm not sure how secure these are. With PC-Tools you just have to do a COMPRESS (which defragments the disk and clears all empty clusters) after you encrypt all of your sensitive stuff and presto, no evidence. I think that the ease of encrypting data (and then making multiple copies of it in case of loss) is going to make law enforcement's job a lot tougher in the future. -cjs ( Curt_Sampson@mindlink.UUCP )
browns@iccgcc.decnet.ab.com (Stan Brown, Oak Road Systems) (09/12/90)
In article <36981@ut-emx>, mnemonic@walt.cc.utexas.edu (Mike Godwin) writes: [lots of interesting stuff, with (thank goodness) citations so we know he's not just making it up. Editorial comment: if persons who disagree with others would give their references instead of just saying, "Believe me because I'VE DONE RESEARCH," the signal-to-noise ratio of this and other newsgroups would rise. Of course the volume of postings would probably shrink! :-) ] But to get to the point, I'd like to ask some questions. I'm posting rather than emailing because I think there may be general interest. > Consider the following excerpts from Article X of the > Federal Rules of Evidence: > > Rule 1001. Definitions > For purposes of this article the following definitions are applicable: > [text omitted] > > (3) Original. An "original" of a writing or recording is the writing or > recording itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect > by a person executing or issuing it. An "original" of a photograph > includes the negative or any print therefrom. If data are stored in > a computer or similar device, any printout or output readable by sight, > shown to reflect the data accurately, is an "original." Mike, how can the contents of a hard disk be printed in a way that meets this definition? I'm not thinking of ASCII files, which obviously present no problem. I suppose dBASE files and spreadsheet commands can be printed using their internal print commands. But what about .EXE files and similar binary stuff? > (4) Duplicate. A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the same > impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of > photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical > or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other > equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the original. Does this definition include ordinary photocopies as duplicates? I understand handwritten copies are not "duplicates" as defined above, but are they completely invalid or valid only when nothing better is available? > Rule 1002. Requirement of Original > [This is the common-law Best Evidence Rule as it has been codified > in the Federal Rules of Evidence; it is therefore the rule to which > Spafford refers.] > To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the > original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as > otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress. > > Rule 1003. Admissibility of Duplicates. > [This is the rule Spafford hasn't heard of.] > A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless > (1) a genuine question is raised Presumably as opposed to a frivolous question, just to delay things? > as to the authenticity of the original ^^^^^^^^ Shouldn't that be duplicate? > or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate > in lieu of the original. I'm curious--couldd you give an example of (2)? [>> = earlier posting by Gene Spafford] >>(I'm told that the normal course of prosecution is such that it may >>take upwards of 2 years for an indictment to be made. Thus, the >>equipment needs to be held all that time. This is a hardship for the >>defendant, but not at all unusual -- cases involving the seizure of >>cars, boats, printing presses (in counterfeiting cases), business >>records and so on often result in in the material being held for >>similar lengths of time. The belief is that it is more important to >>preserve the evidence to allow you to challenge it in court than it is >>to return it to you quickly.) > > It is also believed that any pressure brought to bear on the defendant > provides additional motivation for plea bargains. Seems like one of the many unfair parts of RICO, that it institutionalizes seizure onm indictment. And the seizure itself may work irretrievable harm, even if the defendant is found innocent and the property ultimately restored. Stan Brown, Oak Road Systems, Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A. (216) 371-0043 The opinions expressed are mine. Mine alone! Nobody else is responsible for them or even endorses them--except my cat Dexter, and he signed the power of attorney only under my threat to cut off his Cat Chow!
fnord@spdcc.COM (Dan Schaeffer) (09/13/90)
Let's keep in mind also the purpose of the "Best Evidence Rule," a concept which manages to elude a fairly steady stream of lawyers and judges, despite its simplicity. The Best Evidence Rule, as codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 1002, says the following: "To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress." What does this mean? The key phrase is "[t]o prove the content". All it says is that a witness can't just get up on the stand and say, "Yes, the document in issue says X." If you want to prove that the document says X, you have to have the document. Whether it can be a duplicate or must be an original is dependent on factors noted in other rules. There are some exceptions to this Best Evidence Rule, such as for expert witnesses, but essentially, that's it: you can't say what a document contains; you have to produce the document itself. D. J. Schaeffer "Loewenstein, Loewenstein." [fnord@ursa-major.spdcc.com]
jmc@Gang-of-Four.usenet (John McCarthy) (09/13/90)
As far as I can see, no-one actually answered Gene Spafford's question about whether the law sees a difference between the New York Times and a basement produced sheet. I have never heard of such a difference being argued in a censorship case. The legal movement has been in the direction off erasing differences. For example, advertisements have been granted First Amendment protection to some extent. Concerning "best evidence". There obviously needs to be some compromise here between keeping evidence and letting someone get on with his work. There are several possibilities. 1. A person's disk could be printed and he could stipulate via his lawyer that the printout was correct. Then he could have his disk back. When facts are stipulated by the prosecution and defense, judges permit reneging on the stipulation only in exceptional cases. 2. He could have a right to a copy of the confiscated files. 3. If his computer was an IBM PC XT, this could be stipulated, and he could get his computer back. Any PC XT or the documentation of the PC XT would be acceptable evidence if he should destroy the one he got back. I believe courts would support such compromises on the grounds that refusal by prosecutors to make them would constitute "unreasonable search and seizure".
mnemonic@walt.cc.utexas.edu (Mike Godwin) (09/13/90)
In article <856.26ed16bf@iccgcc.decnet.ab.com> browns@iccgcc.decnet.ab.com (Stan Brown, Oak Road Systems) writes: > >Mike, how can the contents of a hard disk be printed in a way that meets >this definition? I'm not thinking of ASCII files, which obviously >present no problem. I suppose dBASE files and spreadsheet commands can >be printed using their internal print commands. But what about .EXE >files and similar binary stuff? Well, let me note first of all that in most of the seizures I know about, it's been the text files that have been of primary interest to law-enforcement folks. But let's say they want to prove software piracy. Since the rules of evidence allow some kinds of duplicates to be considered, in effect, originals, and other kinds of duplicates to be just as admissible as originals, the logical thing to do, it seems to me, would be to have the government witness download binary files from the system in question, then run it on her own system or on the government's. That should be testimony sufficient to persuade a jury that software theft was going on. The problem is, neither the issues nor the procedures have been hammered out yet. There may be cases we haven't anticipated, and the procedures err on the side of inclusiveness precisely because the law-enforcement establishment is so hazy on what the legal and social issues are. >Does this definition include ordinary photocopies as duplicates? Yes. >I understand handwritten copies are not "duplicates" as defined above, >but are they completely invalid or valid only when nothing better is >available? The latter. >> Rule 1003. Admissibility of Duplicates. >> [This is the rule Spafford hasn't heard of.] >> A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless >> (1) a genuine question is raised > >Presumably as opposed to a frivolous question, just to delay things? Right. Judges know when the challenge is frivolous. >> as to the authenticity of the original > ^^^^^^^^ >Shouldn't that be duplicate? No. This clause applies, I think, to cases in which it is not the document's contents but the document's authenticity that is in question. (E.g., the Howard Hughes will that left money to Melvin Dummar.) >> or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate >> in lieu of the original. > >I'm curious--couldd you give an example of (2)? Not offhand. It may be that the drafters had no particular example in mind, but wanted to leave an out in the event that an obvious unfairness came along. >> It is also believed that any pressure brought to bear on the defendant >> provides additional motivation for plea bargains. > >Seems like one of the many unfair parts of RICO, that it >institutionalizes seizure onm indictment. And the seizure itself may >work irretrievable harm, even if the defendant is found innocent and the >property ultimately restored. You'll find no disagreement here on that score. --Mike Mike Godwin, UT Law School |"If the doors of perception were cleansed mnemonic@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu | every thing would appear to man as it is, (512) 346-4190 | infinite." | --Blake
mnemonic@walt.cc.utexas.edu (Mike Godwin) (09/13/90)
In article <JMC.90Sep12150942@Gang-of-Four.usenet> jmc@Gang-of-Four.usenet (John McCarthy) writes: >As far as I can see, no-one actually answered Gene Spafford's question >about whether the law sees a difference between the New York Times >and a basement produced sheet. I have twice posted citations on this point of law; I assume propagation delay has prevvented them from reaching you. If you or anyone else needs them again, drop me a line. And for a quick answer: the law sees no difference between the two. --Mike Mike Godwin, UT Law School |"If the doors of perception were cleansed mnemonic@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu | every thing would appear to man as it is, (512) 346-4190 | infinite." | --Blake
gl8f@astsun.astro.Virginia.EDU (Greg Lindahl) (09/13/90)
In article <JMC.90Sep12150942@Gang-of-Four.usenet> jmc@Gang-of-Four.usenet (John McCarthy) writes: >As far as I can see, no-one actually answered Gene Spafford's question >about whether the law sees a difference between the New York Times >and a basement produced sheet. Spaf only asked because he seemed to think that someone said it was ok to print nasty stuff (credit card #'s, libel, slander) if you were part of the "press". Nobody claimed that. Like many discussions on Usenet, this one isn't going anywhere fast. -- "Perhaps I'm commenting a bit cynically, but I think I'm qualified to." - Dan Bernstein
a577@mindlink.UUCP (Curt Sampson) (09/13/90)
> brad@looking.on.ca writes: > > If I were a computer criminal, I might just create a very special printer > with a bank of non-volitile storage in it. Or, for that matter, just buy one > of the modern printers you can get these days with 4 megs ram, etc. > > I would use that storage, normally, to keep all the stolen access codes, > calling card numbers, and other incriminating data. Pretty easy, with the > high speed link I have to my printer, to fetch the codes from it. Sounds like a lot of trouble to me. Why not just take your infomation and DES encrypt it with any of the popular packages that do this (such ask PKZIP, which will compress it while you're at it)? Then just conveniently "forget" the password. If you want to hide it a little better you might write a program that will attach it to the end of a .EXE file, so that it looks like just another overlay. It would take 30 seconds to encrypt or decrypt and attach or unattach a largish file to, say, TELIX.EXE (or substitute your favourite executable for your favourite OS here) if you knew the password. -cjs ( Curt_Sampson@mindlink.UUCP )
brad@looking.on.ca (Brad Templeton) (09/14/90)
I have always been amused at reading how the goons confiscate printers when they move in. How silly! Yet it got me thinking... If I were a computer criminal, I might just create a very special printer with a bank of non-volitile storage in it. Or, for that matter, just buy one of the modern printers you can get these days with 4 megs ram, etc. I would use that storage, normally, to keep all the stolen access codes, calling card numbers, and other incriminating data. Pretty easy, with the high speed link I have to my printer, to fetch the codes from it. (I would also have the machine erase stuff if disconnected improperly, keeping backups somewhere far away.) Or I could hide this info in little hidden places in all kinds of semi-smart or smart peripherals -- including some off the shelf. So if we fight (correctly) to stop them from confiscating everything, this may drive the real criminals to such tricks, which may lead to grander confiscation. I point this out -- I don't know if there's an answer. -- Brad Templeton, ClariNet Communications Corp. -- Waterloo, Ontario 519/884-7473
iceman@Apple.COM (Ice) (09/15/90)
|> (Curt Sampson) writes: |Sounds like a lot of trouble to me. Why not just take your infomation and DES |encrypt it with any of the popular packages that do this (such ask PKZIP, which |will compress it while you're at it)? Then just conveniently "forget" the |password. If you want to hide it a little better you might write a program |that will attach it to the end of a .EXE file, so that it looks like just |another overlay. It is one thing to talk about conveniently forgetting your password, and quite another thing to say that when the SS guys have you handcuffed to your sofa describing your upcoming prison term. I personally know that in such a situation I would find that my memory was working pretty well. If the SS KNOWS that the files are encyrpted, they will lean on you. Better to disguise them, via your overlay idea or whatever. As a standard security measure, I rewrote parts of the Resource and File Managers on my Mac. Files created under the modified system look like junk to the old system, but the new system can read the old files. Thus, I do most of my daily work under the old system, but when I am doing very sensitive work, I boot off a floppy that installs the appropriate toolbox patches, and -presto!- text files appear where there was only garbage'd resource files before. Nice and transparent, and even a Mac Hacker would write off the "encrypted" files as junk, since the normal OS can't even read them. :-) As for SS-proof backup, I recommend taking your valuable text files and posting stories to alt.sex.bondage that have the data encoded in them via the first word of each sentence, first char of every word (except 'a' and 'the'), etc. That way, you can be sure to get your data back by going to any NetNews site and downloading stuff from the story archives :-)! =short example= Samuel's erotic carresses ravaged the exquistely taunt stomach, each raking violently into crying Eve, gyrating openly, her orgasm making every neural-receptor open wide. Hey, it worked for those Rose-Cross fellows! Perhaps someone could write an a.s.b. auto-encryptor - you give it the text file, it turns it into an a.s.b. story. I can't imagine the algorithm would be too difficult. -ice "Um..." - Zippy the pinhead
a577@mindlink.UUCP (Curt Sampson) (09/15/90)
> iceman@Apple.COM writes: > > |> (Curt Sampson) writes: > |Sounds like a lot of trouble to me. Why not just take your infomation and > DES |encrypt it with any of the popular packages that do this (such ask > PKZIP, which |will compress it while you're at it)? Then just conveniently > "forget" the |password. > > It is one thing to talk about conveniently forgetting your password, > and quite another thing to say that when the SS guys have you handcuffed to > your sofa describing your upcoming prison term. I personally know that in > such a situation I would find that my memory was working pretty well. If the > SS KNOWS that the files are encyrpted, they will lean on you. > Better to disguise them, via your overlay idea or whatever. This statement saddens me quite a bit. I was, of course, thinking of "forgetting" the password while being interrogated in court. The tactics your SS use don't seem to be much different from those of various governments in Central America. -cjs ( Curt_Sampson@mindlink.UUCP )
n357cw@tamuts.tamu.edu (Kevin Alexander) (09/17/90)
Let me ask this of the Usenet readersip... Suppose I were to post 100's of Credit Card numbers, or login procedures for sensitive computers, or AT&T proprietary source code on one of the newsgroups.. When this message would be distributed throughout the world, would the Secret Service be able to confiscate each machine which that particular posting resides? This is the same thing that happens to many BBS operators (SysOps) when a user or two posts "non-public-domain" messages and the SS catches it before the SysOp can delete it.. Makes you wonder......... ------ Kevin Alexander n357cw@tamuts.tamu.edu (no fancy .sig needed)
john@qip.UUCP (John Moore) (09/18/90)
In article <8306@helios.TAMU.EDU> n357cw@tamuts.tamu.edu (Kevin Alexander) writes:
]Let me ask this of the Usenet readersip... Suppose I were to post
]100's of Credit Card numbers, or login procedures for sensitive
]computers, or AT&T proprietary source code on one of the newsgroups..
]When this message would be distributed throughout the world, would the
]Secret Service be able to confiscate each machine which that particular
]posting resides?
By their current logic, they could go to each site, hold everyone
at gunpoint, and snatch all the computers. If they really did this,
can you imagine the havoc it would cause!
--
John Moore HAM:NJ7E/CAP:T-Bird 381 {ames!ncar!noao!asuvax,mcdphx}!anasaz!john
USnail: 7525 Clearwater Pkwy, Scottsdale,AZ 85253 anasaz!john@asuvax.eas.asu.edu
Voice: (602) 951-9326 Wishful Thinking: Long palladium, Short Petroleum
Opinion: Support ALL of the bill of rights, INCLUDING the 2nd amendment!brnstnd@kramden.acf.nyu.edu (Dan Bernstein) (09/18/90)
In article <8306@helios.TAMU.EDU> n357cw@tamuts.tamu.edu (Kevin Alexander) writes: > Let me ask this of the Usenet readersip... Suppose I were to post > 100's of Credit Card numbers, or login procedures for sensitive > computers, or AT&T proprietary source code on one of the newsgroups.. > When this message would be distributed throughout the world, would the > Secret Service be able to confiscate each machine which that particular > posting resides? Suppose you were to publish the same information in an advertisement in a national newspaper. When that advertisement would be distributed throughout the world, would the Secret Service be able to confiscate each newspaper in which that particular advertisement resides? One might ask the same question about any other communications medium. ---Dan
john@qip.UUCP (John Moore) (09/19/90)
In article <26938:Sep1814:48:2390@kramden.acf.nyu.edu> brnstnd@kramden.acf.nyu.edu (Dan Bernstein) writes: ][In article <8306@helios.TAMU.EDU> n357cw@tamuts.tamu.edu (Kevin Alexander) writes: ][> Let me ask this of the Usenet readersip... Suppose I were to post ][> 100's of Credit Card numbers, or login procedures for sensitive ][> computers, or AT&T proprietary source code on one of the newsgroups.. ][> When this message would be distributed throughout the world, would the ][> Secret Service be able to confiscate each machine which that particular ][> posting resides? ][ ][Suppose you were to publish the same information in an advertisement in ][a national newspaper. When that advertisement would be distributed ][throughout the world, would the Secret Service be able to confiscate ][each newspaper in which that particular advertisement resides? The newspaper would not publish the list in the first place. Electronic media is special in that frequently there is no editor. -- John Moore HAM:NJ7E/CAP:T-Bird 381 {ames!ncar!noao!asuvax,mcdphx}!anasaz!john USnail: 7525 Clearwater Pkwy, Scottsdale,AZ 85253 anasaz!john@asuvax.eas.asu.edu Voice: (602) 951-9326 Wishful Thinking: Long palladium, Short Petroleum Opinion: Support ALL of the bill of rights, INCLUDING the 2nd amendment!
bzs@world.std.com (Barry Shein) (09/20/90)
Reading over these discussions indicates to me there really is a need for some overview or reference to basic law as regards freedom of speech and freedom of press and other related issues. >The newspaper would not publish the list in the first place. Electronic media >is special in that frequently there is no editor. This raises all sorts of issues I am only dimly aware of. A "newspaper" has more than one part, as far as freedom of the press is concerned. Parts which are "news" are much freer from various allegations of wrongdoing than parts which are editorials, ads etc. The basic rationale is that in order to publish real news in a timely fashion there is limited ability (time) to substantiate all facts. However, the same does not apply to sections like opinion columns which, one presumes, are authored with more time to check facts. On a related note, I believe the copyright laws as apply to news proper are quite different than other publishing copyrights (don't they only retain rights for something like four days? Maybe that was hearsay, but I'd like to hear from someone who knows.) And ads have their own set of standards entirely, not the least of which is caused by multiple independent parties being involved. For example, a paper might take an innocuous sounding classified ad which turns out to be quite criminal in its intent (e.g. fraudulant claims) and not be held liable in any way. Obviously the paper can't check every ad although some things are considered to fall within the purview of common sense (e.g. full page miracle cancer-cure ads, blatant advertisements for prostitution the paper could be held (ir)responsible for.) On another dimension, the telephone company, by virtue of its being a common carrier and having no editorial function, is not held responsible in the slightest for whatever criminal acts you might commit over their lines. The extent of their responsibility is to cooperate with law enforcement agencies when requested (properly.) Now, on yet another dimension (!) there certainly seems to be some sort of perception of "ability and intent to edit" smattered throughout. For example, short of the obscenity laws perhaps, there would seem to be a difference between my doing a live "man on the street" TV segment and one of those street-men blurting into the mike "Candidate George is in bed with the Mafia!" versus the station's manager using his/her editorial spot to make the same claim. The point being, the existence and/or claim of a editorial presence seems to be in there somewhere, at least conceptually, but what does the law actually say? These issues seem, to me anyhow, to be very critical and fundamental to the entire issue of "electronic speech". What does the law say about common carriers? What does the law say about an editorial presence? Timeliness? How do these relate to e-mail, electronic publications, public access systems (BBS), USENET, etc? Interesting questions. But I feel like we're all groping around in the dark (perhaps everyone is!) -- -Barry Shein Software Tool & Die | {xylogics,uunet}!world!bzs | bzs@world.std.com Purveyors to the Trade | Voice: 617-739-0202 | Login: 617-739-WRLD
denning@src.dec.com (Dorothy Denning) (09/20/90)
Mike Godwin's insistance that the real issues weren't addressed at the Neidorf trial reminds me of the following story: A lawyer, a law student, and a judge were sharing a beer in a bar. The lawyer said "In my courtroom, I call the issues as I see them." The student said "In my courtroom, I will call the issues as they really are." The judge said "In my courtroom, they ain't nothing til I call them." Dorothy denning@src.dec.com
edp@ipl31.enet.dec.com (Eric Postpischil (Always mount a scratch monkey.)) (09/20/90)
In article <4572@qip.UUCP>, john@qip.UUCP (John Moore) writes: >][Suppose you were to publish the same information in an advertisement in >][a national newspaper. When that advertisement would be distributed >][throughout the world, would the Secret Service be able to confiscate >][each newspaper in which that particular advertisement resides? >The newspaper would not publish the list in the first place. Electronic media >is special in that frequently there is no editor. First, that's just begging the question. You haven't answered it, just avoided it. Second, it well might happen. Most newspapers probably wouldn't publish if they knew what the list was. But suppose you just took out an ad and supplied a bunch of numbers to print -- some newspapers might print it. Supposing they did, what's the answer to the question? -- edp
mellman@motcid.UUCP (Tom Mellman) (09/21/90)
In article <1990Sep19.184804.3012@src.dec.com> denning@src.dec.com (Dorothy Denning) writes: >Mike Godwin's insistance that the real issues weren't addressed at >the Neidorf trial reminds me of the following story: > > [ funny story about how Power Determines Reality deleted. ] I'd say the "real issue" is in the eye of the beholder. In my eye, it's not how Neidorf can escape the wrath of a mercenary FBI, but how the ethic of theft is being perverted in an overzealous attempt to create wealth. -- Reply-to: motcid!mellman@uunet.uu.net
lars@spectrum.CMC.COM (Lars Poulsen) (09/21/90)
In article <26938:Sep1814:48:2390@kramden.acf.nyu.edu> brnstnd@kramden.acf.nyu.edu (Dan Bernstein) writes: DB> Suppose you were to publish [stolen credit card numbers] in an DB> advertisement in a national newspaper. When that advertisement DB> would be distributed throughout the world, would the Secret DB> Service be able to confiscate DB> each newspaper in which that particular advertisement resides? In article <4572@qip.UUCP> john@qip.UUCP (John Moore) writes: JM> The newspaper would not publish the list in the first place. JM> Electronic media [are] special in that frequently there is no editor. For a small publication, the editor and publisher are often the same person. No big deal. The reason that most publications would hesitate to print this hypothetical ad, is that the publisher may be held criminally liable for what appears in his publication. Indeed, for a small publication, the printing apparatus might be confiscated. By analogy, it may not be unreasonable to hold the "publisher" (i.e. the owner/SYSOP) jointly liable with the poster for whatever appears on the bulletin board. Indeed, this may require that the SYSOP not allow unmoderated discussion except within closed user groups whose members have all signed a pledge of responsible behaviour and are all known to the SYSOP. Seems pretty reasonable to me ... -- / Lars Poulsen, SMTS Software Engineer CMC Rockwell lars@CMC.COM
n357cw@tamuts.tamu.edu (Kevin Alexander) (09/21/90)
In article <4572@qip.UUCP> john@qip.UUCP (John Moore) writes: >In article <26938:Sep1814:48:2390@kramden.acf.nyu.edu> brnstnd@kramden.acf.nyu.edu (Dan Bernstein) writes: >][Suppose you were to publish the same information in an advertisement in >][a national newspaper. When that advertisement would be distributed >][throughout the world, would the Secret Service be able to confiscate >][each newspaper in which that particular advertisement resides? >The newspaper would not publish the list in the first place. Electronic media >is special in that frequently there is no editor. >-- Well, John, I seem to remember in my history classes (I'm too young to have actually lived it) about the so called ``Pentagon Papers'' being printed in the papers.. I do believe that these papers wereb't for the public's eyes, and yet the editor in this instance chose to go with the story.. (This is not a FLAME! -- I don't like flame wars..)
john@qip.UUCP (John Moore) (09/22/90)
In article <8418@helios.TAMU.EDU> n357cw@tamuts.tamu.edu (Kevin Alexander) writes: ]In article <4572@qip.UUCP> john@qip.UUCP (John Moore) writes: ]>In article <26938:Sep1814:48:2390@kramden.acf.nyu.edu> brnstnd@kramden.acf.nyu.edu (Dan Bernstein) writes: ]>][Suppose you were to publish the same information in an advertisement in ]>][a national newspaper. When that advertisement would be distributed ]>][throughout the world, would the Secret Service be able to confiscate ]>][each newspaper in which that particular advertisement resides? ]>The newspaper would not publish the list in the first place. Electronic media ]>is special in that frequently there is no editor. ]>-- ] ]Well, John, I seem to remember in my history classes (I'm too young to have ]actually lived it) about the so called ``Pentagon Papers'' being printed ]in the papers.. I do believe that these papers wereb't for the public's ]eyes, and yet the editor in this instance chose to go with the story.. It is true that the Pentagon Papers were not for the public's eyes. However, they were not of criminal value (unlike credit card numbers) and did bear on major public issues. This is not to imply that I think they should have been published! PS - I am not too you to remember. -- John Moore HAM:NJ7E/CAP:T-Bird 381 {ames!ncar!noao!asuvax,mcdphx}!anasaz!john USnail: 7525 Clearwater Pkwy, Scottsdale,AZ 85253 anasaz!john@asuvax.eas.asu.edu Voice: (602) 951-9326 Wishful Thinking: Long palladium, Short Petroleum Opinion: Support ALL of the bill of rights, INCLUDING the 2nd amendment!
brad@looking.on.ca (Brad Templeton) (09/22/90)
The answer to the question is "nobody knows." Recently a Toronto newspaper was charged with permitting classified ads for escort services which engaged in prostitution. Prostitution is not illegal, but in the grand craziness of the law, soliciting for it is. The paper complained the police were trying to censor it. For undisclosed reasons, the charges were dropped. The moral is that you pays your money, you takes your chances, when it comes to issues like this. -- Brad Templeton, ClariNet Communications Corp. -- Waterloo, Ontario 519/884-7473
mnemonic@walt.cc.utexas.edu (Mike Godwin) (09/22/90)
In article <4619@qip.UUCP> john@qip.UUCP (John Moore) writes: > >It is true that the Pentagon Papers were not for the public's eyes. However, >they were not of criminal value (unlike credit card numbers) and did >bear on major public issues. Actually, the federal government argued strongly for the position that the Pentagon Papers should be regarded as stolen *property*. --Mike Mike Godwin, UT Law School |"If the doors of perception were cleansed mnemonic@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu | every thing would appear to man as it is, (512) 346-4190 | infinite." | --Blake
jxxl@huxley.cs.nps.navy.mil (John Locke) (09/26/90)
In article <37497@ut-emx.uucp> mnemonic@walt.cc.utexas.edu (Mike Godwin) writes: > Actually, the federal government argued strongly for the position that > the Pentagon Papers should be regarded as stolen *property*. Although, as I recall, Ellsberg copied the Papers on a Xerox and snuck the copies out a few at a time. --
mnemonic@walt.cc.utexas.edu (Mike Godwin) (09/26/90)
In article <1474@huxley.cs.nps.navy.mil> jxxl@taurus.cs.nps.navy.mil (John Locke) writes: > >Although, as I recall, Ellsberg copied the Papers on a Xerox and snuck >the copies out a few at a time. That's correct, but the government characterized the information as property, not the paper. --Mike Mike Godwin, UT Law School |"If the doors of perception were cleansed mnemonic@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu | every thing would appear to man as it is, (512) 346-4190 | infinite." | --Blake
karl@sugar.hackercorp.com (Karl Lehenbauer) (09/30/90)
In article <1990Sep20.221955.10879@spectrum.CMC.COM> lars@spectrum.CMC.COM (Lars Poulsen) writes: >By analogy, it may not be unreasonable to hold the "publisher" (i.e. the >owner/SYSOP) jointly liable with the poster for whatever appears on the >bulletin board. >Indeed, this may require that the SYSOP not allow unmoderated discussion >except within closed user groups whose members have all signed a pledge >of responsible behaviour and are all known to the SYSOP. >Seems pretty reasonable to me ... If this were the case, it would be the end of Usenet. Further, it would have a chilling effect on free speech via bulletin boards. As a sysop, I would have to be very careful to never allow anything out that was in the least bit controversial, and would always want to err on the side of not allowing a message to go out unless I was really sure there was no chance of me getting in trouble for it. Shouldn't the poster of the message be accountable for its contents? Or by your reasoning, shouldn't the phone company have to listen to *all* the phone conversations going on at any time to make sure nothing illicit was being said, done or planned? They tried this in Eastern Europe, you know. Further, this would be a new and time-consuming burden on sysops and introduce potentially long delays in messages getting out. If a sysop let a bad message go out and it was gatewayed to a bunch of other machines, or one was forged or somehow illicitly injected into the network, by your reasoning wouldn't the owner/sysops of all the machines the message went to be liable? If that were the case, it would definitely be the end, because nobody has the resources to monitor, for example, all the traffic on the Usenet. I used Prodigy several times, and it is a heavily censored system, i.e. Prodigy's censors examine every article posted before it goes into the message base, and people on it were complaining that the censors were capricious, arbitrary and would not state reasons why specific articles had been censored. Not only is there nothing like talk.religion.*, talk.politics.*, soc.motss on Prodigy (they dropped a forum in which fundamentalist Christians and homosexuals and homosexual rights advocates were going at it, although they claimed it was for a different reason), but you can't even mention or talk about most products by name because advertising is a big part of their revenue base (about 20% of your display is permanently dedicated to advertising when using it -- ads are continually updated in this area the whole time you're on) and they don't want anyone to get free advertising. Consequently messages of the "Yeah, I bought a Frobozz 917 and it works really well" are censored. If this is IBM's view of the future of personal electronic communications (Prodigy is a joint-venture of IBM and Sears), and there is every reason to believe it is since this is what they chose to provide, it is a bleak future indeed. (The reason they do this, I think, is that Prodigy is supposed to be a "family" system. Under your one account you can set up logins for your other family members. So they don't want anything in there that some kid is going to read. But that restricts everything on the system to a very low common denominator, namely that every message must be so inoffensive that *nobody* is going to be offended by it... and that is censorship. -- -- uunet!sugar!karl -- Usenet access: (713) 438-5018
jimp@sequent.UUCP (James Pilcher) (10/05/90)
In article <6657@sugar.hackercorp.com> karl@sugar.hackercorp.com (Karl Lehenbauer) writes: >In article <1990Sep20.221955.10879@spectrum.CMC.COM> lars@spectrum.CMC.COM (Lars Poulsen) writes: >>By analogy, it may not be unreasonable to hold the "publisher" (i.e. the >>owner/SYSOP) jointly liable with the poster for whatever appears on the >>bulletin board. > >>Indeed, this may require that the SYSOP not allow unmoderated discussion >>except within closed user groups whose members have all signed a pledge >>of responsible behaviour and are all known to the SYSOP. > >>Seems pretty reasonable to me ... > >If this were the case, it would be the end of Usenet. Further, it would >have a chilling effect on free speech via bulletin boards. As a sysop, >I would have to be very careful to never allow anything out that was >in the least bit controversial, and would always want to err on the side of >not allowing a message to go out unless I was really sure there was no chance >of me getting in trouble for it. > >Shouldn't the poster of the message be accountable for its contents? > >Or by your reasoning, shouldn't the phone company have to listen to *all* the >phone conversations going on at any time to make sure nothing illicit was >being said, done or planned? They tried this in Eastern Europe, you know. > While I agree with you that holding sysop responsible for everything would be a disaster, you should note that a phone line is SUPPOSED to be private, whereas a net is assumed to be public. Bulletin boards have been misused in all kinds of ways; should a sysop who runs a board for child molesters be free of all responsibility? This has happened, here in Portland, by the way.
karl@sugar.hackercorp.com (Karl Lehenbauer) (10/08/90)
In article <43541@sequent.UUCP> jimp@crg1.UUCP (James Pilcher) writes: >While I agree with you that holding sysop responsible for everything would >be a disaster, you should note that a phone line is SUPPOSED to be private, >whereas a net is assumed to be public. Bulletin boards have been misused in >all kinds of ways; should a sysop who runs a board for child molesters >be free of all responsibility? This has happened, here in Portland, by >the way. At the kind of data densities and volumes we're talking about with a Usenet feed, approximately 10 megabytes per day and growing geometrically, it is entirely possible that this sort of thing will go on without the sysops knowledge at all. Sure, if your login banner or other things put up by the sysop solicit or encourage the use of the system for illegal purposes, or if it is somehow clear that illegal activities are going on with the Sysop's knowledge and consent, I think the sysop should get in trouble. But on some of the hotter BBSes these days, your are talking hundreds of megabytes of data and soon gigabytes of data, and if some users have found some unseen/unused nook or cranny to conspire or otherwise make trouble, I don't think the sysop should be hassled. Likewise as I mentioned earlier, the sysop of a big system *cannot possibly know* the contents of every message that's coming through from the Usenet feed. To hassle the sysop in a case like this would be the equivalent of hassling Kroger's because some kids had been using an empty woodpecker hole in a tree behind one of their stores as a mail drop. (I submit the opinion that any law requiring sysops to read all messages received at their machine would be unconstitutional as it limits free speech. Many have said that free speech doesn't apply because the systems are all owned by someone, etc, and as owners their control of their systems is absolute, but it is not clear to me that at least some aspects of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech would not apply to bulletin boards and networks, as they do serve as a transmission medium for information and the opinions amongst their users, and in previous comp.org.eff.talk articles Mike Godwin quoted some court opinions along the lines of that any means of transmitting an idea was protected.) Now once the sysop has discovered or, say, been notified by a user that illegal activities are going on, is the sysop obligated to notify the authorities or take other action? I think so, if the activity is in a non-private manner, i.e. a newsgroup or equivalent. (Email, I think, should be private to the degree possible, and people should start routinely encrypting mail to each other to help insure that privacy, but that's another matter.) So if for example I was notified by a user that some child molesters (Is it really true about a child molestation BBS in Portland? I kind of assumed it was an urban legend.) were secretly using comp.protocols.tcpip.eniac with a distribution of "local" as a means of conspiring to abuse children, I would call the cops. Hopefully the sysop would be allowed some discretion such that, for example, a user who was chronically abusive to other users could, after repeated warnings, be kicked off the system -- not the net, just the system. Another opinion, even though Houston Chronicle reporter Joe Abernathy seems to hate the idea that the Usenet is so anarchic, its implementation in the United States is such that it is harder to control centrally or censor than most other networks. I submit that cooperative networks with distributed ownership of the nodes and communication paths are inherently safer from central control than the single-owner variety. Plus they fragment better, that is, in the face of a massive failure or the intentional shutdown of some big backbone sites, the broken-off subnets thus formed still work among themselves, and it takes only one site willing to spend a little extra time and/or money in each of a pair subnets to reconnect those two subnets back together into a larger net. Thus Usenet has continued to function over time as various big sites (seismo et al) came and went. Thus have the other public nets (Fido) become gatewayed to Usenet. Thus Usenet is fault-tolerant, at least in a kind of queasy, quivering way. (i.e. the scramble to replace a lost feed, occasionally unreliable email delivery, the article-with-a-space-in-the-ID bug, sites running too-old software, etc) It's great stuff, and I find the continuing advancement of the capabilities of the net to be quite exciting. I hope we can manage to keep the government from taking it all away from us. I guess that's what the EFF is all about... -- -- uunet!sugar!karl -- Usenet access: (713) 438-5018
brnstnd@kramden.acf.nyu.edu (Dan Bernstein) (10/08/90)
Wtf is wrong with USENET being a common carrier? It looks like it will eventually become a common carrier, legally. That status makes sense and ensures the privacy that people want. Mail fraud and wire fraud laws are quite effective without a central censor. > So if for example I was notified by a user that some child molesters (Is > it really true about a child molestation BBS in Portland? I kind of assumed > it was an urban legend.) were secretly using comp.protocols.tcpip.eniac > with a distribution of "local" as a means of conspiring to abuse children, > I would call the cops. Sure. And if I were nosy and discovered that the National Enquirer is really a front for drug dealers, I'd call the cops. The same if I heard crosstalk on phone lines of people planning a murder. But it's the crime here that I'd be worried about, not the communications medium per se. > It's great stuff, and I find the continuing advancement of the capabilities > of the net to be quite exciting. I hope we can manage to keep the government > from taking it all away from us. I guess that's what the EFF is all about... I was under the impression that the EFF was a computerized version of that other defense organization... ---Dan
md3b+@andrew.cmu.edu (Matthew Donald Drown) (10/10/90)
I haven't looked foward a couple days yet, but following this thread... jimp@sequent.UUCP (James Pilcher) wrote: >While I agree with you that holding sysop responsible for everything would >be a disaster, you should note that a phone line is SUPPOSED to be private, >whereas a net is assumed to be public. Bulletin boards have been misused in >all kinds of ways; should a sysop who runs a board for child molesters >be free of all responsibility? This has happened, here in Portland, by >the way. In your definition then, if I were to start an alt.child-molester on the net, then it would be perfectly legal. Damn, I could talk to child molesters all over the world with no problem, instead of just in the Portland area. I think there is a lot more to this question then phone lines being private. I am using a phone line to connect to my schools computer to post a message to this board, is this private? -Matt
joe@zitt (Joe Zitt) (10/14/90)
md3b+@andrew.cmu.edu (Matthew Donald Drown) writes: > jimp@sequent.UUCP (James Pilcher) > wrote: > >While I agree with you that holding sysop responsible for everything would > >be a disaster, you should note that a phone line is SUPPOSED to be private, > >whereas a net is assumed to be public. Bulletin boards have been misused in > >all kinds of ways; should a sysop who runs a board for child molesters > >be free of all responsibility? This has happened, here in Portland, by > >the way. > > In your definition then, if I were to start an alt.child-molester on the > net, then it would be perfectly legal. Damn, I could talk to child > molesters all over the world with no problem, instead of just in the > Portland area. On a raised-hackles note, it seems that the official straw boogie man of conversation about rights (and damned near everything else) nowadays is the "child molester". The term seems to be used in very much the same way that "communist" and "homosexual" and "witch" were used in the not too distant past. While no one doubts that >some< pedophiles exist, the media frenzy about it, and the way that people's rights are getting stepped on (see the recent Harper's article about the bogus preschool accusations and trials, for example) make Operation Sun Devil seem like a round of touch football. Come to think of it, a thoroughly anonymous, possibly moderated alt.child-abuser or similar mailing list might be a good idea; there appear to be relatively few self-help groups for these people, and a properly handled electronic discussion group might be a good idea. -- Joe Zitt ...cs.utexas.edu!kvue!zitt!joe (512)450-1916