mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) (12/03/90)
In article <61265@bbn.BBN.COM> cosell@bbn.com (Bernie Cosell) writes: > >But... I hate to give aid and comfort to the 'enemy', but unfortunately >the situtation is true, as a matter of fact, and that's irrelevant to >whether it is used by some as an excuse for no-knock searches. Fact >is, that it is just not very hard to make a computer system be "booby >trapped" so that the "offending bits" vanish in a VERY big hurry. The >speed with which computers could make incriminating evidence just >"vanish" makes flushing amphetamines down the toilet seem crude by >comparison. You have exhibited the same conflation of two issues here that is present in the writings by prosecutors on this subject. No one disputes that it is *possible* to boobytrap one's data. But that's not the issue. The issue is whether law-enforcement officers are actually *likely* to encounter such boobytraps--a likelihood that would necessitate a no-knock search. In all the data available to me, I have not found any reference to the Secret Service's actually coming across booby-trapped computers in their searches of teenage hackers. Yet the writings on the subject suggest that this is a commonplace occurrence. And the prosecutors who read the writings ask for authorization of no-knock searches. >Turning this around, what would you suggest? Presuming that the LEOs >continue to pursue various sorts of computer-based crimes [the question >of the searches is orthogonal to the question of whether they're >performed in the pursuit of brain-dead legislation, right?], will we be >better or worse served if they better understand the realities of the >craft? How about a showing to the magistrate of probable cause to believe that the target of the search is likely to have boobytrapped his computer? That seems like a reasonable prerequisite for a no-knock search. --Mike -- Mike Godwin, (617) 864-0665 |"If the doors of perception were cleansed mnemonic@eff.org | every thing would appear to man as it is, Electronic Frontier | infinite." Foundation | --Blake
jgd@Dixie.Com (John G. DeArmond) (12/03/90)
mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes: >You have exhibited the same conflation of two issues here that is >present in the writings by prosecutors on this subject. No one disputes >that it is *possible* to boobytrap one's data. But that's not the issue. >The issue is whether law-enforcement officers are actually *likely* >to encounter such boobytraps--a likelihood that would necessitate a >no-knock search. The issue is even more basic than that. The issue is "Should cops ever need or be allowed to use violent entry techniques when non-violent crimes are alleged?" I say NO. To use the Operation Sundevil as an example: There was no reason, other than the residual desire to be a cowboy marshal, why immediate physical possesion of the computer equipment was nessary. Conventional police techniques such as wire taps (data taps?), undercover ops and surveillance techniques, techniques that have worked for years for much more serious crimes, would have done just fine. They could have tapped the phone lines of the BBS systems and recorded all sessions. They could have planted agents as "memebers" of the group and they could have observed who did what when. Instead they took their brains out, replaced them with their dicks and demonstrated to the world how many hormones they could summon. After all, it takes BIG MEN to crash the door of a hacker and grab his computer. The proper technique would have been to have built a case using the techniques listed above and then ordered that the evidence be turned over to the grand jury. If the defendents destroyed evidence, then they could be pursued for tampering, fraud and perjury - crimes that would likely have gotten them more time than hacking. (Don't interpret this as a defense of computer cracking. I hope they screw the guilty parties to the wall. I am protesting the methods of convenience and machismo being used today by our government, methods that are unconstitutional and just plain wrong.) John -- John De Armond, WD4OQC | "Purveyors of speed to the Trade" (tm) Rapid Deployment System, Inc. | Home of the Nidgets (tm) Marietta, Ga | {emory,uunet}!rsiatl!jgd | "Vote early, Vote often"
gsh7w@astsun.astro.Virginia.EDU (Greg Hennessy) (12/03/90)
In article <5201@rsiatl.Dixie.Com> jgd@Dixie.Com (John G. DeArmond) writes:
#(Don't interpret this as a defense of computer cracking. I hope they
#screw the guilty parties to the wall.
One of the problems with Operation Sun Devil is that it is highly
likely that a large number of innocent parties will also be screwed to
the wall.
--
-Greg Hennessy, University of Virginia
USPS Mail: Astronomy Department, Charlottesville, VA 22903-2475 USA
Internet: gsh7w@virginia.edu
UUCP: ...!uunet!virginia!gsh7wlear@turbo.bio.net (Eliot) (12/04/90)
This discussion reminds me of the movie, _Brazil_ (Gilliam). If you haven't seen it, see it - it's a psychotically humerous Utopia that will leave you in a cold sweat. -- Eliot Lear [lear@turbo.bio.net]
pam1@ra.MsState.Edu (Phillip A. McReynolds) (12/04/90)
In article <Dec.3.10.42.53.1990.23893@turbo.bio.net> lear@turbo.bio.net (Eliot) writes: >This discussion reminds me of the movie, _Brazil_ (Gilliam). If you >haven't seen it, see it - it's a psychotically humerous Utopia that ^^^^^^ >will leave you in a cold sweat. > >-- >Eliot Lear >[lear@turbo.bio.net] I think that the word you're searching for is "Dystopia." However, one man's "U" is another man's "Dys". This is >>not<< a spelling or grammar flame, by the way. I just thought that this was a worthwhile word to know. Phillip McReynolds You'll find me on mars. Mars.EE.MsState.Edu (130.18.64.3); login as 'bbs'
peter@ficc.ferranti.com (Peter da Silva) (12/05/90)
In article <884@ra.MsState.Edu> pam1@ra.MsState.Edu (Phillip A. McReynolds) writes: > I think that the word you're searching for is "Dystopia." However, one man's > "U" is another man's "Dys". Um, "dystopia" is the result of a misinterpretation of "utopia" (no place) as "eutopia" (good place). Technically, a "utopia" is merely an ideal that can't exist (unfortunately, the society on Brazil fails this test too). -- Peter da Silva. `-_-' +1 713 274 5180. 'U` peter@ferranti.com
learn@igloo.scum.com (Bill HMRP Vajk) (12/15/90)
In article <2575@cod.NOSC.MIL> Joe Lalor writes: > If you maliciously try to conceal data (regardless of the how clever > your means are) to hinder an ongoing law-enforcement investigation, > you're breaking the law. > Encrypting data with a secret password (done all the time in military > labs) is okay as long as you are not doing it to obstruct justice. > Taking the fifth, IMHO, in the above scenario could leas to contempt. You're all welcome to as much speculation as you wish, it is mere speculation. It is a judge, perhaps a jury, who will actually decide. And then there are possible appeals, by the prosecution or the defense. Seems that there isn't always the desired satisfaction at the first level. The reality includes both good and evil intentions of a whole slew of people, starting with the lowest levels of enforcement and progressing through an entire system such as clerical help to prosecutors. Essentially all one has to do is capture the imagination of one of these people in a negative way and you're bound to be charged with something "illegal." After all, that is thir job, to prosecute. Some do it better than others, some do it more often than others. Did you ever notice that none of them ever seems to have a "dry spell ?" Consider just how difficult it is to avoid breaking a law these days. We've had a couple of hundred years of making laws, and repealing or replacing darned few. Have you ever taken over the counter cough medication and driven ? Not to suggest that you are impaired, but should you make any errors in driving, and the officer making the traffic stop sees a jar in your posession, it is highly likely that you'll be charged with DUI and taken for a chemical screening at a nearby hospital. In Illinois, at least, you'll probably need to come up with a 300 dollar bond, wait 4 hours before getting your car back from the pound, and pay the pound's towing fee ( $60 on up. ) Next, you'll need to acquire an attorney, as most judges today will not permit you to handle your own affairs. If you take a count of the public defender pleas, you'll notice that for the most part, the high incidence of guilty pleas at the first stage in court, the arraignment. So flaunt the fact that you drank a bit of cough medicine, drive, and you'll shell out several hundred dollars to purchase justice. Craig Niedorf's defense, for traansmitting suspicious seeming though almost freely available information, interstate, with a trial of less than 4 days, is reputed to have cost him over $100,000. In spite of this outcome, the Atlanta Three who plead guilty to computer charges which also happened to involve the E-911 file established as easily available by legitimate means, were further damaged by the prosecutor (in his sentencing memorandum to the judge) by a impugned value associated with that document. This is a serious newsgroup. We are discussing and dealing with some pretty serious issues here. I, for one, am getting tired of seeing these childish responses. Instead of worrying about concealing data from law enforcement, it might be better to deal in a sober manner with model laws defining what illegal data is, what proprietary means, what protections are offered by copyrights, and how value is established. I am also concerned that one's private thoughts, if in a diary or on computer media, are also evidence against one when the pretext in common law is that an individual shall not be convicted from his own mouth. I have a hunch that the best possible use of this newsgroup is to consider these and other issues in an orderly fashion, and offer to the EFF the best ideas we have in such regards. We've seemingly placed a lot of eggs in that basket called EFF, and there are some of you handling that basket pretty roughly at the moment. Thanks in advance. Bill Vajk