karish@pangea.Stanford.EDU (Chuck Karish) (11/11/90)
In article <NgVes1w163w@dogface> Bob Izenberg writes: >A computer that you have responsibility for had a file on it >that contained fraudulently obtained information, perhaps credit card >numbers of celebrities or public officials. The file has been removed, >but you know that it's on regular backups that were made of that computer, >going as far back as six months. These backups represent protection against >disaster for you and the computer's users. Do you save the backups, knowing >that the illegal file is on them? Or do you erase or destroy the backups, >and possibly leave yourself in the lurch if they are needed? I'm following up on this subject rather than responding to the straw poll because I thiunk there are are interesting and relevant issues here that can't be summed up into 'YES' or 'NO'. My initial response to this question is that my responsibility is to see that the information in question isn't disseminated, not necessarily to remove all evidence that it was once available on line. Following this logic, I'd keep the backups secure, and keep a note with them to remind me that certain steps must be taken after a full restore (deletion of the offending data). It would be irresponsible for me to destroy the backups and risk significant harm to my business in the event of a data-loss disaster. In addition, I might be required by contract and, in some cases, by law to maintain certain records; in fact, I am working on two projects right now that have such requirements. To destroy backup tapes would reduce my assurance that the required records could be retrieved at any time. Nontheless, it might be the case in this situation and in the related situation where improperly-obtained copyrighted information is on tape that my approach would not stand up to a strict legal interpretation. I could wind up in a standoff with the rightful owner of the data in which neither of us would trust the other to safeguard his data, and the only solutions would be to destroy the tapes or to restore, sanitize, and re-archive the data. -- Chuck Karish karish@mindcraft.com
landon@Apple.COM (Landon Dyer) (11/11/90)
In article <NgVes1w163w@dogface>, writes: > A computer that you have responsibility for had a file on it > that contained fraudulently obtained information, perhaps credit card > numbers of celebrities or public officials. The file has been removed, > but you know that it's on regular backups that were made of that computer, > going as far back as six months. These backups represent protection against > disaster for you and the computer's users. As an additional prescription against disaster, encrypt the backups. This gives you: o Plausible deniability. "Gosh, sir, it looks like *all* of my backups are bad like this. Holy cow!" o The ability to stonewall. The interesting question is, are you required to reveal the key if your backups are siezed? Ah, but human memory can be _so_ frail.... -- Landon Dyer (landon@apple.com) ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: making the merry-go-round SPIN FASTER Apple Computer, Inc. :: so that everyone has to HOLD ON TIGHTER NOT THE VIEWS OF APPLE COMPUTER :: just to keep from being THROWN TO THE WOLVES
jgd@rsiatl.UUCP (John G. DeArmond) (11/11/90)
landon@Apple.COM (Landon Dyer) writes: >As an additional prescription against disaster, encrypt the backups. >This gives you: > o Plausible deniability. "Gosh, sir, it looks like *all* of my > backups are bad like this. Holy cow!" > o The ability to stonewall. The interesting question is, are > you required to reveal the key if your backups are siezed? > Ah, but human memory can be _so_ frail.... I don't know why we spend so much time thinking up trite methods to skirt the law. The fact is that if reading a tape backup became an issue in court, and you had the data encrypted, the judge WOULD order you to reveal the password (I know from experience.), perhaps under seal. If you "forgot" the password, the judge would most likely allow you to reconsider your memory loss while sitting in jail on contempt. If you lie about it, you'll probably spend a LOT of time in jail thinking about perjury. When that issue came up in a case I was involved in, my attorney warned me that the WORST thing I could do would be to have a memory loss. We did keep the tapes secret but it was because we convinced the judge that we'd suffer irreprable harm if the contents were released to the other side and NOT because we tried to fool the court with juvenile tricks. BTW, I DID have to give the judge ALL involved passwords and they WERE kept from the other side. Since the law almost always looks at intent, the mere fact that a proprietary file is on a backup tape that is generally inaccessable to users is not incriminating. Inaccess coupled with the fact that you have made no illegal use of the data is adequate defense. Of course, if you have a handle like "Lord of Data Death" and enjoy cracking others' computers, you maybe should be paranoid and degauss the tapes BEFORE it becomes an issue. John -- John De Armond, WD4OQC | "Purveyors of Performance Products Rapid Deployment System, Inc. | to the Trade " (tm) Marietta, Ga | {emory,uunet}!rsiatl!jgd | "Vote early, Vote often"
larry@belch.Berkeley.EDU (Larry Foard) (11/12/90)
> >I don't know why we spend so much time thinking up trite methods to skirt >the law. The fact is that if reading a tape backup became an issue in The issue isn't skirting the law, it is protecting yourself against witch hunts. >court, and you had the data encrypted, the judge WOULD order you to >reveal the password (I know from experience.), perhaps under seal. If you [stuff deleted] What happened to the fifth admendment? Being forced to provide information that can be used against you certainly would appear to violate your fifth admendment rights. After all if your arrested you are told you have the right to remain silent. True story: A person had stolen equipment from a computer store, and even admited the theft to the owner. When the police went to the person apartment, the person had already consulted with a lawyer who told them to take the fifth. At this point the police claimed they couldn't even get a search warrant on the evidence they had and the whole thing was dropped. This was a real crime and the person got away with it because they kept quite. Either the government cares alots more about stolen $13 telephone documents, than grand larceny, or people investigated in witch hunts make the mistake of thinking innocence will protect thm. and don't excercise there 5th admendment rights. (probably both of the above are true)
learn@igloo.scum.com (Bill HMRP Vajk) (11/12/90)
In article <NgVes1w163w@dogface>, bei@dogface writes: > I'd like to take an informal straw poll, based upon this hypothetical > situation. A computer that you have responsibility for had a file on it > that contained fraudulently obtained information, perhaps credit card > numbers of celebrities or public officials. The file has been removed, > but you know that it's on regular backups that were made of that computer, > going as far back as six months. These backups represent protection against > disaster for you and the computer's users. Do you save the backups, knowing > that the illegal file is on them? Or do you erase or destroy the backups, > and possibly leave yourself in the lurch if they are needed? This is apparently a subject in need of an open discussion and is probably nore in keeping with the charter of this newsgroup then some of the other nonsense we've been seeing of late. If one reviews the strategies employed by government agencies of late in cracking down on this evil called 'computer crime' one can easily develop a well based paranoia against ever being in posession of anything which might be construed as being illegal. This, of course, might be the intention of the enforcement agencies, but the entire business of surpression of possibly normal activities because of overzealous government activities is an important issue. From several publically available reports on the subject of the jolnet confiscation, originally the system administrator was co-operative in submitting to authorities some information which came through his system. At some later time, when the case file moved from the bottom of someone's to-do pile to the top, they claimed they could not locate the particulars, and did the sysadmin have another copy ? The answer was "yes" and he provided it, at which point the question apparently arose why did he retain a copy, what was his interest, and he himself became a subject of investigation, equipment confiscation, the whole 9 yards. In fact, representatives of one of the agencies appeared to interview him at his job one day. Not nice at all to someone who had been trying to help. This story is now many months old. As yet, no charges have been brought against the system administrator of jolnet. And there has been no word on the disposition of his equipment. One needs to recognize that in the outgrowth of the jolnet investigation there are only two cases which have apparently achieved at least the earliest stages of realistic resolution. Craig went to trial and the case was droped by the government in the first week. The Steve Jackson Games confiscation also has been partially resolved, some of the equipment has been returned damaged. Both these people, who should have had nothing to fear from the law enforcement agencies of this democracy, fell victims to the overzealous nature of the employees, OUR employees, of the government. In Craig's case, his cost went into 6 figures. In the case of Steve Jackson Games, the best one can hope to determine is the cost to repair/replace equipment damaged while in the posession of our servants, those who have sworn an oath to serve and protect us. It is not likely that the real damages to SJG can be ascertained. What segment of the potential marketplace, fearing future intercession by a federal agency, will elect to forego purchasing any games associated with a firm whose business records potentially might bring goverment agents to their doorstep ? The included article mentions saving old backups "to prevent disaster." Unfortunately, the way things have been going, it has become a case of the less one has, they safer they are. In order to add a little historical relevance to this discussion, I trot out my copy of _The Age of Atilla_, University of Michigan Press, ISBN 0-472- 06111-9. "Among the Synthians, said he, men are accustomed to live at easy after a war, each enjoying what he has, causing little or no trouble and not being troubled. Among the Romans, however, men are easily destroyed in war, in the first place because they put their hopes of safety in others, since on account of their tyrants all men are not allowed to use arms. For those who do use them the cowardice of their generals, who cannot support the conduct of war, is more perilous. In peace, moreover, experiences are more grevious than the evils or wars, on account of the very heavy taxes and the wrongs suffered at the hands of wicked men, since the laws are not imposed on all. If the transgressor happens to be of the monied class, it is not likely that he pays the penalty for his wrongdoing; if he is poor and ignorant of how to handle the business, he endures the penalty according to the law - if he does not depart life before his trial. For the course of these cases is long protracted, and a great deal of money is is expended on them. Probably the most grevious suffering of all is to obtain the rights of law for pay. No one will even grant a court to a wronged man unless he lays aside some money for the judge and his attendants." "My interlocutor wept and said that the laws were excellent and the constitution of the Romans fair, but the rulers were ruining it by not taking the thought for it like their predecessors." Bill Vajk gargoyle!igloo!learn
peter@ficc.ferranti.com (Peter da Silva) (11/12/90)
I would suggest reading the tapes into a spare disk or partition, removing the offending file, and writing them out again onto a new tape. After this has completed and been verified, erase the original tapes. It's interesting to note that USENIX sent out a tape that had inadvertantly contained copyrighted materials. They sent out a note later on requesting that this operation be done. It's not so exotic, unless you're disk poor and have a backwards backup system (like some MS-DOS ones) that don't allow easy creation of backup format tapes. -- Peter da Silva. `-_-' +1 713 274 5180. 'U` peter@ferranti.com
new@ee.udel.edu (Darren New) (11/15/90)
In article <NgVes1w163w@dogface> writes: >The file has been removed, >but you know that it's on regular backups that were made of that computer, >going as far back as six months. These backups represent protection against >disaster for you and the computer's users. Do you save the backups, knowing >that the illegal file is on them? Or do you erase or destroy the backups, >and possibly leave yourself in the lurch if they are needed? I've always wondered why intelligent people who run illegal (or possibly-illegal) BBSs and such don't have a provision for wiping them on a moment's notice. For example, why not have all local backups stored in range of a degausser that would turn on if the door to the room was opened before a particular switch was turned off elsewhere. I can't imagine this being illegal in any sense. What about storing the backups in a safe that would take damage to the backups inside to open? Such safes are available pretty cheaply. -- Darren -- --- Darren New --- Grad Student --- CIS --- Univ. of Delaware --- ----- Network Protocols, Graphics, Programming Languages, Formal Description Techniques (esp. Estelle), Coffee -----
fwp1@CC.MsState.Edu (Frank Peters) (11/15/90)
In article <36353@nigel.ee.udel.edu> new@ee.udel.edu (Darren New) writes:
I've always wondered why intelligent people who run illegal (or
possibly-illegal) BBSs and such don't have a provision for wiping them
on a moment's notice. For example, why not have all local backups
stored in range of a degausser that would turn on if the door to the
room was opened before a particular switch was turned off elsewhere. I
can't imagine this being illegal in any sense. What about storing the
backups in a safe that would take damage to the backups inside to
open? Such safes are available pretty cheaply.
If the cops show up with a search warrent for the premises you are
required to unlock doors, open safes and so on. I'm sure disabling
booby traps would also be required.
Now if they searched while you weren't present and failed to disable
the trap...hmmm, that would be a tough call. I'd see a lwayer before
I tried it though.
and whatever you do be sure your trap can't injure someone. I recall
a story on 60 minutes a while back about a shop owner convicted of
manslaughter after a thief died in his home-made electric trap.
FWP
--
--
Frank Peters Internet: fwp1@CC.MsState.Edu Bitnet: FWP1@MsState
Phone: (601)325-2942 FAX: (601)325-8921new@ee.udel.edu (Darren New) (11/15/90)
In article <FWP1.90Nov14135135@tzu.CC.MsState.Edu> fwp1@CC.MsState.Edu (Frank Peters) writes: >If the cops show up with a search warrent for the premises you are >required to unlock doors, open safes and so on. I'm sure disabling >booby traps would also be required. Ah, but that would imply that the police know it is boobytrapped. If by the time the police got to the backups they were just blank tapes, I doubt there is much that they could prove. Remember, I'm presupposing that you are intentionally running an illegal "hackers BBS" or credit-card-number publishing BBS or whatever. >Now if they searched while you weren't present and failed to disable >the trap...hmmm, that would be a tough call. I'd see a lwayer before >I tried it though. Oh, Mr Lawyer, I'm breaking the law. Would you help? :-) >and whatever you do be sure your trap can't injure someone. I've never heard of a bulk-tape eraser hurting anybody. -- Darren -- --- Darren New --- Grad Student --- CIS --- Univ. of Delaware --- ----- Network Protocols, Graphics, Programming Languages, Formal Description Techniques (esp. Estelle), Coffee -----
larry@belch.Berkeley.EDU (Larry Foard) (11/15/90)
In article <36353@nigel.ee.udel.edu> new@ee.udel.edu (Darren New) writes: [stuff deleted] > >I've always wondered why intelligent people who run illegal (or >possibly-illegal) BBSs and such don't have a provision for wiping them >on a moment's notice. For example, why not have all local backups >stored in range of a degausser that would turn on if the door to the >room was opened before a particular switch was turned off elsewhere. I >can't imagine this being illegal in any sense. What about storing the >backups in a safe that would take damage to the backups inside to >open? Such safes are available pretty cheaply. > -- Darren I imagine they do, that is probably why the feds love to harrass innocent bystanders, the real criminals are harder to prosecute. When was the last time you heard of a mob boss being prosecuted? Real criminals can afford enough lawyers to find the loopholes.
karl_kleinpaste@cis.ohio-state.edu (11/16/90)
new@ee.udel.edu writes: >and whatever you do be sure your trap can't injure someone. I've never heard of a bulk-tape eraser hurting anybody. Oh, I dunno: Ejected toward the door with a suitable catapult, it could cause a concussion...
edguer@charlie.CES.CWRU.Edu (Aydin Edguer) (11/17/90)
In article <KARL.90Nov16092717@giza.cis.ohio-state.edu> karl_kleinpaste@cis.ohio-state.edu writes: >new@ee.udel.edu writes: > >and whatever you do be sure your trap can't injure someone. > > I've never heard of a bulk-tape eraser hurting anybody. > >Oh, I dunno: Ejected toward the door with a suitable catapult, it >could cause a concussion... Karl, while you are quite right (I have never seen a "light" bulk eraser :-), I *think* that a suitably strong electromagnetic field (as is generated by a bulk eraser) *might* cause trouble for people using pacemakers. So, you might want to put a danger sign on the door to your computer room, warning such individuals. I do not know if you would have any further responsibility. -- Aydin Edguer
merlyn@digibd.com (Brian Westley (Merlyn LeRoy)) (11/20/90)
You're all missing the most obvious solution: Old Adage: Never write anything down. New Adage: Keep everything in RAM. Cops usually remove what they are searching for, and I doubt they would give a second thought about turning the computer off & unplugging it. --- Merlyn LeRoy "Eeelectricity is penny cheap from N..S..P..to..yooooooooou!"
price@uclapp.physics.ucla.edu (John Price) (11/22/90)
In article <36353@nigel.ee.udel.edu>, new@ee.udel.edu (Darren New) writes: >In article <NgVes1w163w@dogface> writes: >>[what do you do if you have 'illegal' files on a backup tape?] > >I've always wondered why intelligent people who run illegal (or >possibly-illegal) BBSs and such don't have a provision for wiping them >on a moment's notice. For example, why not have all local backups >stored in range of a degausser that would turn on if the door to the >room was opened before a particular switch was turned off elsewhere. I >can't imagine this being illegal in any sense. This is the wrong attitude. First, I would suspect that it is indeed illegal - something about tampering with evidence (Mike, help me on this - is it evidence before the police have it?). Second, I don't think that was the intent of the original question. These "illegal" files were due to a user on the system, not the sysop. A person running a BBS is another story. Third, do we really want to use this group to discuss methods of implementing the 11th commandment ("don't get caught") ? My understanding was that this group is for the discussion of the rights of computer professionals (where that term may be loosely defined, I suppose). Have I missed the point? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- John Price | Internet: price@uclapp.physics.ucla.edu 5-145 Knudsen Hall | BITNET: price@uclaph UCLA Dept. of Physics | SPAN: uclapp::price Los Angeles, CA 90024-1547 | YellNet: 213-825-2259 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Where there is no solution, there is no problem.
mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) (11/22/90)
In article <1990Nov20.041806.29066@digibd.com> merlyn@digibd.com (Brian Westley (Merlyn LeRoy)) writes: >You're all missing the most obvious solution: > >Old Adage: Never write anything down. > >New Adage: Keep everything in RAM. > >Cops usually remove what they are searching for, and I doubt they >would give a second thought about turning the computer off & unplugging it. Actually, this is false. Articles written by dedicated-computer-crime-unit "experts" like Catherine Conly and John McEwan advise law-enforcement agents to bust down the doors of computer criminals rather than knocking and announcing their identity on entry--precisely because of the possibility that data might be lost of the alleged criminals have a chance to shut their systems off. Good thing they have you to confirm the need for their no-knock-entry prescriptions. --Mike -- Mike Godwin, (617) 864-0665 |"If the doors of perception were cleansed mnemonic@eff.org | every thing would appear to man as it is, Electronic Frontier | infinite." Foundation | --Blake
merlyn@digibd.com (Brian Westley (Merlyn LeRoy)) (11/30/90)
mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes: >>Old Adage: Never write anything down. >>New Adage: Keep everything in RAM. >>Cops usually remove what they are searching for, and I doubt they >>would give a second thought about turning the computer off & unplugging it. >Actually, this is false. Articles written by dedicated-computer-crime-unit >"experts" like Catherine Conly and John McEwan advise law-enforcement >agents to bust down the doors of computer criminals rather than >knocking and announcing their identity on entry--precisely because of >the possibility that data might be lost of the alleged criminals have >a chance to shut their systems off. This seems to be a difference over theory vs. practice. All the anecdotes about actual confiscation talk about the police impounding & hauling away computers. No-knock break-ins would just push things one level further (dead-man power switches, or something). Besides, it would be trivial (for a Mac, at least) to have a power-down key always active on the keyboard. And there's always the power strip rocker switch. >Good thing they have you to confirm the need for their >no-knock-entry prescriptions. And if I advocated "keep everything in your memory" I'd be confirming brainwashing techniques? Get real. >--Mike --- Merlyn LeRoy
mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) (11/30/90)
In article <1990Nov29.164728.504@digibd.com> merlyn@digibd.com (Brian Westley (Merlyn LeRoy)) writes: > >This seems to be a difference over theory vs. practice. >All the anecdotes about actual confiscation talk about the police >impounding & hauling away computers. No-knock break-ins would just >push things one level further (dead-man power switches, or something). >Besides, it would be trivial (for a Mac, at least) to have a power-down >key always active on the keyboard. And there's always the power strip >rocker switch. Apparently you are unaware that a substantial percentage of the seizures were based on no-knock execution of warrants, Merlyn. With all due respect to you, my job requires me to be up on the details of these seizures. One of the reasons for no-knock searches and seizures seems to be that the National Institute of Justice publications favor them, precisely because prosecutors have been told by "security experts" that hackers routinely set up degausser boobytraps and keep all their evidence of illegal activity in RAM. I hasten to add that anyone who believes his computer or data is about to be seized, and who arranges for it to be automatically destroyed upon such seizure, may well be indicted on obstruction- of-justice charges. >And if I advocated "keep everything in your memory" I'd be >confirming brainwashing techniques? No, I never said this. Keeping information in your own memory, rather than in your computer's memory, implicates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. >Get real. With all due respect to you, Merlyn, I'm pretty realistic when it comes the searches and seizures of Operation Sun Devil and other computer-crime operations. After all, I do have a law degree, and my job requires me to be knowledgeable about the facts surrounding the current searches and seizures. I don't know how to be more "real" than I already am. --Mike -- Mike Godwin, (617) 864-0665 |"If the doors of perception were cleansed mnemonic@eff.org | every thing would appear to man as it is, Electronic Frontier | infinite." Foundation | --Blake
cosell@bbn.com (Bernie Cosell) (12/02/90)
mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes: }In article <1990Nov20.041806.29066@digibd.com> merlyn@digibd.com (Brian Westley (Merlyn LeRoy)) writes: }>You're all missing the most obvious solution: }> }>Old Adage: Never write anything down. }> }>New Adage: Keep everything in RAM. }> }>Cops usually remove what they are searching for, and I doubt they }>would give a second thought about turning the computer off & unplugging it. }Actually, this is false. Articles written by dedicated-computer-crime-unit }"experts" like Catherine Conly and John McEwan advise law-enforcement }agents to bust down the doors of computer criminals rather than }knocking and announcing their identity on entry--precisely because of }the possibility that data might be lost of the alleged criminals have }a chance to shut their systems off. }Good thing they have you to confirm the need for their }no-knock-entry prescriptions. But... I hate to give aid and comfort to the 'enemy', but unfortunately the situtation is true, as a matter of fact, and that's irrelevant to whether it is used by some as an excuse for no-knock searches. Fact is, that it is just not very hard to make a computer system be "booby trapped" so that the "offending bits" vanish in a VERY big hurry. The speed with which computers could make incriminating evidence just "vanish" makes flushing amphetamines down the toilet seem crude by comparison. Turning this around, what would you suggest? Presuming that the LEOs continue to pursue various sorts of computer-based crimes [the question of the searches is orthogonal to the question of whether they're performed in the pursuit of brain-dead legislation, right?], will we be better or worse served if they better understand the realities of the craft? /Bernie\
wayner@fulla.cs.cornell.edu (Peter Wayner) (12/03/90)
>But... I hate to give aid and comfort to the 'enemy', but unfortunately >the situtation is true, as a matter of fact, and that's irrelevant to >whether it is used by some as an excuse for no-knock searches. Fact >is, that it is just not very hard to make a computer system be "booby >trapped" so that the "offending bits" vanish in a VERY big hurry. The >speed with which computers could make incriminating evidence just >"vanish" makes flushing amphetamines down the toilet seem crude by >comparison. In Poland and the Eastern Bloc, floppy disks were the favored method of illegal information storage. They would just bend them in half and bye, bye evidence. Peter Wayner Department of Computer Science Cornell Univ. Ithaca, NY 14850 EMail:wayner@cs.cornell.edu Office: 607-255-9202 or 255-1008 Home: 116 Oak Ave, Ithaca, NY 14850 Phone: 607-277-6678
peter@ficc.ferranti.com (Peter da Silva) (12/03/90)
In article <49185@cornell.UUCP> wayner@fulla.cs.cornell.edu (Peter Wayner) writes: > In Poland and the Eastern Bloc, floppy disks were the favored method > of illegal information storage. They would just bend them in half and > bye, bye evidence. I've heard this too. I think it's pretty naive. I lent a friend some software on floppies once, and as he was coming back with them it started pouring down rain. He dropped the box while crossing the parking lot. Floppies all over the place, some of them stepped on and I would be surprised if some weren't run over as well. They were wet of course. I cut the jackets open and dried out the disks... and was able to read most of them after putting them in a new sleeve. Floppies can be tougher than people think. (on the other hand, I've worked in environments with dust in the air where an average floppy had a MTTF less than a week) -- Peter da Silva. `-_-' +1 713 274 5180. 'U` peter@ferranti.com
zane@ddsw1.MCS.COM (Sameer Parekh) (12/03/90)
You say that they don't knock so therefore, stuff kept in RAM
wouldn't be lost when they took it. Yet I haven't heard of any
raids where the raiders did a memory dump before they took the computers.
(Having to unplug it along the way.)
--
zane@ddsw1.MCS.COM
cirby@vaxb.acs.unt.edu ((C. Irby)) (12/03/90)
In article <1990Dec03.034248.21073@ddsw1.MCS.COM>, zane@ddsw1.MCS.COM (Sameer Parekh) writes: > > You say that they don't knock so therefore, stuff kept in RAM > wouldn't be lost when they took it. Yet I haven't heard of any > raids where the raiders did a memory dump before they took the computers. > (Having to unplug it along the way.) ..you have to remember that the Feds aren't very sophisticated on this. Heck, they couldn't even figure out how to use a set of keys to open the filing cabinets encountered during Sun Devil. Instead of opening them in a normal fashion (with an offered set of keys), they used crowbars... Really enhances my faith in their ability to find stuff in RAM. Or ROM. Or on disk (I have this image of some guy in a cheap suit sitting there holding floppies up to the light: "Nope. Nothing on this one... or this one... or this one either! They must have erased these things- I can't find any printing on *any* of them...") -- C Irby || "Go that way... *really* fast. Internet: cirby@vaxa.acs.unt.edu || If something gets in your way, Bitnet: cirby@untvax || turn!" Compuserve: 71541,770 || ---_Better Off Dead_---
merlyn@digibd.com (Brian Westley (Merlyn LeRoy)) (12/09/90)
In article <1990Nov30.133254.3737@eff.org> mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes: >>This seems to be a difference over theory vs. practice. ... >Apparently you are unaware that a substantial percentage of the >seizures were based on no-knock execution of warrants, Merlyn. >With all due respect to you, my job requires me to be up on the >details of these seizures. Yes, but my point was that, so far, impounded machines are routinely turned off when seized; I haven't heard of any cases where the machines (PCs, at least) were deliberately left in place, with power, to prevent this. ... >>And if I advocated "keep everything in your memory" I'd be >>confirming brainwashing techniques? > >No, I never said this. Keeping information in your own memory, >rather than in your computer's memory, implicates the Fifth >Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. And I never approved no-knock searches by ignorant, incompetent authorities, but I'm willing to provide suggestions on how to beat them at their own sorry game. You seem to think my suggestion (keeping everything in RAM) was legitimizing their fascist tactics; I think it combats their tactics by staying ahead of them, and makes their police state mindset more obvious and open to criticism. To each his own, I guess. --- Merlyn LeRoy
mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) (12/09/90)
In article <1990Dec08.171628.10447@digibd.com> merlyn@digibd.com (Brian Westley (Merlyn LeRoy)) writes: > >And I never approved no-knock searches by ignorant, incompetent >authorities, but I'm willing to provide suggestions on how to >beat them at their own sorry game. You seem to think my suggestion >(keeping everything in RAM) was legitimizing their fascist tactics; >I think it combats their tactics by staying ahead of them, and makes >their police state mindset more obvious and open to criticism. Not only will law-enforcement officers regard your suggestions (not yours in particular, but similar suggestions by others) as legitimizing no-knock searches, but this already has been the case. See, e.g., McEwan and Conly's articles on computer crime. Moreover, anyone who arranges for the destruction of data in the belief that his equipment is likely to be seized is laying himself open for an obstruction-of-justice prosecution. If data are destroyed as part of the normal course of operations, that's one thing. But if you deliberately destroy data because you think your system may be seized, that's quite another. Ditto if you arrange for it to be destroyed upon seizure. --Mike -- Mike Godwin, (617) 864-0665 |"If the doors of perception were cleansed mnemonic@eff.org | every thing would appear to man as it is, Electronic Frontier | infinite." Foundation | --Blake
tom@ssd.csd.harris.com (Tom Horsley) (12/10/90)
>>>>> Regarding Re: "Bad" backups; mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) adds: mnemonic> Moreover, anyone who arranges for the destruction of data in the mnemonic> belief that his equipment is likely to be seized is laying himself mnemonic> open for an obstruction-of-justice prosecution. mnemonic> If data are destroyed as part of the normal course of operations, mnemonic> that's one thing. But if you deliberately destroy data because you mnemonic> think your system may be seized, that's quite another. Ditto if mnemonic> you arrange for it to be destroyed upon seizure. Actually this whole argument is moot. A much more effective way to hide critical data is the "purloined letter" technique. Just install TeX on you system and stick critical files in one of the PK font directories with names like CMXBR1000.PK - no one will ever find it! In a few days, you won't be able to find it yourself :-). No data destruction is involved, if they can't find the data, that's their problem... -- ====================================================================== domain: tahorsley@csd.harris.com USMail: Tom Horsley uucp: ...!uunet!hcx1!tahorsley 511 Kingbird Circle Delray Beach, FL 33444 +==== Censorship is the only form of Obscenity ======================+ | (Wait, I forgot government tobacco subsidies...) | +====================================================================+
merlyn@digibd.com (Brian Westley (Merlyn LeRoy)) (12/12/90)
In article <1990Dec9.155404.4847@eff.org> mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes: >Not only will law-enforcement officers regard your suggestions >(not yours in particular, but similar suggestions by others) [ keep everything in RAM -ed] >as legitimizing no-knock searches, but this already has been the >case. See, e.g., McEwan and Conly's articles on computer crime. I'd say you should be protesting THEM, then. Do you also feel that people who only let cops into their homes with a search warrant "legitimize", say, helicopter searches? I think (1) people OUGHT to insist on warrants, and (2) cops ought NOT use helicopters to spy on people without a warrant (even though it's legal, sigh). However, I refuse to accept that (1) "legitimizes" (2), OR keeping data in RAM "legitimizes" no-knock searches, OR private citizens shooting armed people breaking into their homes "legitimizes" raking homes with machine-gun fire before executing a no-knock search. If you think keeping data in RAM should be illegal, fine. Pass a law. Right now it's legal. If you are scared of people performing LEGAL ACTS because the state might not like it, or I shouldn't be advocating same, too bad. >Moreover, anyone who arranges for the destruction of data in >the belief that his equipment is likely to be seized is laying himself >open for an obstruction-of-justice prosecution. I did not advocate that anyone break the law, just keep their sensitive data "fragile". Am I prohibited from laying shag rugs since the cops may pick up a static charge and zap my computer as they walk over to seize it? Do I have to have "watch your head" signs so the cops don't hurt themselves as they trash^H^H^H^H^Hsearch my house? >--Mike ----- Merlyn LeRoy (backed-up) Don't write anything down. Keep everything in RAM. Question Authority. Obfuscate C.
mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) (12/13/90)
In article <1990Dec11.164524.1860@digibd.com> merlyn@digibd.com (Brian Westley : >In article <1990Dec9.155404.4847@eff.org> mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) write: >>Not only will law-enforcement officers regard your suggestions >>(not yours in particular, but similar suggestions by others) > [ keep everything in RAM -ed] >>as legitimizing no-knock searches, but this already has been the >>case. See, e.g., McEwan and Conly's articles on computer crime. > >I'd say you should be protesting THEM, then. Well, actually, I am working to see that their recommendations are not followed. But it undercuts my efforts every time some clever person advocates boobytrapping his data to prevent searches. >Do you also feel that people who only let cops into their homes with a >search warrant "legitimize", say, helicopter searches? *I* haven't said that anything legitimizes anything. Please read more carefully. >However, I refuse to accept that (1) "legitimizes" (2), OR keeping >data in RAM "legitimizes" no-knock searches, OR private citizens >shooting armed people breaking into their homes "legitimizes" raking >homes with machine-gun fire before executing a no-knock search. I refuse to accept it too. But you seem to have confused my views with those of the law-enforcement computer-crime 'experts' I have referred to in previous postings. >If you think keeping data in RAM should be illegal, fine. Huh? I have never said I thought this should be illegal. But if you make it a habit to keep data in RAM in order to thwart searches, and then proudly announce your intention to do so, you are inviting no-knock searches. >Right now it's legal. If you are scared of people performing LEGAL ACTS >because the state might not like it, or I shouldn't be advocating same, >too bad. Sigh. Comments like this make me despair. I never said any such thing, and you should apologize for implying that I did. It does not take great subtlety on your part to distinguish between my statements about how the law operates and my statements about how the law *should* operate, does it? You consistently confuse the two sets of statements in your postings. It is not legal to obstruct justice. See, e.g., 18 USC 1505. Otherwise legal activity becomes illegal when you're doing it in order to thwart an investigation that is part of a "pending proceeding." >I did not advocate that anyone break the law, just keep their sensitive >data "fragile". If you think you are about to be searched, and you do this in order to impede the search, you may be charged with obstructing justice. >Am I prohibited from laying shag rugs since the cops may >pick up a static charge and zap my computer as they walk over to seize it? No. Unless you thought you were about to be searched and did this in order to impede the search. >Do I have to have "watch your head" signs so the cops don't hurt themselves >as they trash^H^H^H^H^Hsearch my house? No. >Merlyn LeRoy (backed-up) >Don't write anything down. >Keep everything in RAM. >Question Authority. >Obfuscate C. Learn the law before you start advising people about it. --Mike -- Mike Godwin, (617) 864-0665 |"If the doors of perception were cleansed mnemonic@eff.org | every thing would appear to man as it is, Electronic Frontier | infinite." Foundation | --Blake
schultz@motcid.UUCP (Rob Schultz) (12/13/90)
Brian Westley (Merlyn LeRoy) writes: >I did not advocate that anyone break the law, just keep their sensitive >data "fragile". A (perhaps) interesting side point. If I have sensitive data (not necessarily illegal or immoral, but definitely private) on my computer, then I should have the right to protect that data, yes? That protection should be from ANY sort of intrusion, be it from the police, from a physical intruder, from an electronic intruder, etc. Good sense dictates that I pasword-protect my entire system. Sensitive data should at least be encrypted. Perhaps my most sensitive data should be protected via booby-traps. Thus any uninvited search of the most sensitive data would cause that data to be destroyed, so as to prevent it from falling into the wrong hands. I suppose the most sensitive data around would be in military computers (sigh). Batle plans, simulations, troop and equipment strengths, etc would fall into this category. So the military has the responsibility to protect this data in any way it can, even to the extent of destroying it to prevent it from falling into enemy hands (computers?). It may be better to lose the information completely than to allow it out of their hands. A similar analogy might be applied to corporate, and even personal data. Proprietary corporate information, including new technologies being invented and financial information might be this sensitive. Personal information such as financial information and ideas might be this private. Is booby-trapping this data ok? just rambling . . . -- Thanks - Rob Schultz, Motorola General Systems Sector rms 3209 N Wilke Rd, Arlington Heights, IL 60004 +1 708 632 2875 motcid!schultz@chg.mcd.mot.com !uunet!motcid!schultz Happy Holidays in whatever language or religion or lack thereof you like!!
mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) (12/13/90)
In article <5758@catfish10.UUCP> schultz@motcid.UUCP (Rob Schultz) writes: > >Is booby-trapping this data ok? Booby-trapping your data is perfectly legal, unless you're doing it to thwart a specific, ongoing law-enforcement investigation, in which case it probably isn't. --Mike -- Mike Godwin, (617) 864-0665 |"If the doors of perception were cleansed mnemonic@eff.org | every thing would appear to man as it is, Electronic Frontier | infinite." Foundation | --Blake
hnewstro@x102c.harris-atd.com (Harvey Newstrom) (12/13/90)
In article <1990Dec13.045324.2811@eff.org> mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes: >In article <5758@catfish10.UUCP> schultz@motcid.UUCP (Rob Schultz) writes: >> >>Is booby-trapping this data ok? > >Booby-trapping your data is perfectly legal, unless you're >doing it to thwart a specific, ongoing law-enforcement investigation, >in which case it probably isn't. What about keeping data encrypted with a secret password? It seems like one could ``take the fifth'' and refuse to divulge the password on the grounds that it might incriminate. _______________ Harvey Newstrom (hnewstro@x102c.ess.harris.com)
mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) (12/13/90)
In article <5081@trantor.harris-atd.com> hnewstro@x102c.ess.harris.com (Harvey Newstrom) writes: > >What about keeping data encrypted with a secret password? It seems like >one could ``take the fifth'' and refuse to divulge the password on the >grounds that it might incriminate. If you normally encrypt your data, no problem. If you encrypt it in order to obstruct an investigation, well, that is a problem. The nature of current Fifth Amendment law is such that you probably would be compelled to turn over the password *unless* the very act of turning it over tended to incriminate you. This is a particularly tricky area of the law right now, thanks to the Rehnquist Court. --Mike -- Mike Godwin, (617) 864-0665 |"If the doors of perception were cleansed mnemonic@eff.org | every thing would appear to man as it is, Electronic Frontier | infinite." Foundation | --Blake
lalor@cod.NOSC.MIL (Joe Lalor) (12/14/90)
>>Booby-trapping your data is perfectly legal, unless you're >>doing it to thwart a specific, ongoing law-enforcement investigation, >>in which case it probably isn't. > > What about keeping data encrypted with a secret password? It seems like > one could ``take the fifth'' and refuse to divulge the password on the > grounds that it might incriminate. > _______________ Mike's tried a couple of times to explain the law and his answer has been the same each time, but the same questions that are just a different color keep coming up. Since his answers don't seem to to be getting the point across, I'll try with a simple one sentence analysis: If you maliciously try to conceal data (regardless of the how clever your means are) to hinder an ongoing law-enforcement investigation, you're breaking the law. Encrypting data with a secret password (done all the time in military labs) is okay as long as you are not doing it to obstruct justice. Taking the fifth, IMHO, in the above scenario could leas to contempt. JOE LALOR -apologies to Mike for any area above where I may have gone astray from what he was trying to say- Lalor@nosc.mil A La
mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) (12/14/90)
In article <2575@cod.NOSC.MIL> lalor@cod.NOSC.MIL (Joe Lalor) writes: > >If you maliciously try to conceal data (regardless of the how clever >your means are) to hinder an ongoing law-enforcement investigation, >you're breaking the law. > >Encrypting data with a secret password (done all the time in military >labs) is okay as long as you are not doing it to obstruct justice. >Taking the fifth, IMHO, in the above scenario could leas to contempt. > >JOE LALOR >-apologies to Mike for any area above where I may have gone astray >from what he was trying to say- You did fine. Maybe you're going to be more successful than I am in getting the point across. --Mike -- Mike Godwin, (617) 864-0665 |"If the doors of perception were cleansed mnemonic@eff.org | every thing would appear to man as it is, Electronic Frontier | infinite." Foundation | --Blake
elisem@nuchat.sccsi.com (elise mahaffey) (12/15/90)
From elisem Fri Dec 14 14:32:40 1990 To: /users/elisem/.article Subject: Law/Ongoing Investigation.. What if you did NOT know that you where being investigated and had the "boobytraps" installed anyways?? And then where either caught or "investigated" then?? Would you still be held responsible? I'm no expert on law, but I have never read anyone saying"BTW we are investigating you, better be warned" If I was told that, I would then make sure I was squeaky clean, seems to me that when your being investigated that you are NOT TOLD that in order to build a case against you. B/c if you where told that you where being investigated you might just go out and do a malicious act.
merlyn@digibd.com (Brian Westley (Merlyn LeRoy)) (12/18/90)
In article <1990Dec12.162746.1411@eff.org> mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes:
[ the same argument we've been having for 3x2 articles or so ]
Short summary:
I sez "Keep everything in RAM"
Mike sez "That will possibly increase no-knock searches"
Most of this seems to boil down to how each of us deals with
[real or potential] abuses of authority. I prefer a more
confrontational/defiant response compared to Mike (at least
in this instance).
A few disasterous no-knock searches _might_ end the stupidity faster,
and do less overall damage, than a larger number of knock-knock
searches (like Steve Jackson Games).
--
Merlyn LeRoymerlyn@digibd.com (Brian Westley (Merlyn LeRoy)) (12/18/90)
In article <1990Dec13.045324.2811@eff.org> mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes: >In article <5758@catfish10.UUCP> schultz@motcid.UUCP (Rob Schultz) writes: >>Is booby-trapping this data ok? >Booby-trapping your data is perfectly legal, unless you're >doing it to thwart a specific, ongoing law-enforcement investigation, >in which case it probably isn't. What a minute! What if the first inkling you have of such an investigation is a no-knock search? What if they don't KNOW what the data was (because it is now gone), but they prosecute you because they THOUGHT it was the naughty data they wanted? This is the kind of thing I was referring to. --- Merlyn LeRoy
mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) (12/18/90)
In article <1990Dec17.171753.24860@digibd.com> merlyn@digibd.com (Brian Westley (Merlyn LeRoy)) writes: >In article <1990Dec12.162746.1411@eff.org> mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes: >[ the same argument we've been having for 3x2 articles or so ] > >Short summary: >I sez "Keep everything in RAM" >Mike sez "That will possibly increase no-knock searches" I said no such thing. What I said was, if you set out to obstruct justice, and you announce your intention to do so, you will increase the likelihood of no-knock searches. >Most of this seems to boil down to how each of us deals with >[real or potential] abuses of authority. I prefer a more >confrontational/defiant response compared to Mike (at least >in this instance). I prefer to deal with the abuses of authority by depriving law enforcement of any rational basis for gratuitous no-knock searches. Of course, my work becomes much harder whenever someone announces his intention to obstruct justice by boobytrapping his data. >A few disasterous no-knock searches _might_ end the stupidity faster, >and do less overall damage, than a larger number of knock-knock >searches (like Steve Jackson Games). Right. In the same way that disastrous no-knock searches in the War on Drugs have increased the power of the Fourth Amendment (that is to say, not at all). --Mike -- Mike Godwin, (617) 864-0665 |"If the doors of perception were cleansed mnemonic@eff.org | every thing would appear to man as it is, Electronic Frontier | infinite." Foundation | --Blake
mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) (12/18/90)
In article <1990Dec17.172423.24992@digibd.com> merlyn@digibd.com (Brian Westley (Merlyn LeRoy)) writes: > >What a minute! What if the first inkling you have of such an investigation >is a no-knock search? Then you won't be guilty of obstructing justice. I've already explained this three or four times. >What if they don't KNOW what the data was (because it is now gone), but >they prosecute you because they THOUGHT it was the naughty data they wanted? If you boobytrapped the data because *you* thought they were about to search you as part of an ongoing investigation, then you're guilty of obstructing justice. It doesn't matter if they never find out what the data was. --Mike -- Mike Godwin, (617) 864-0665 |"If the doors of perception were cleansed mnemonic@eff.org | every thing would appear to man as it is, Electronic Frontier | infinite." Foundation | --Blake
mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) (12/18/90)
In article <1990Dec18.020803.2058@eff.org> mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes: > >What I said was, if you set out to obstruct justice, and you >announce your intention to do so, you will increase the likelihood >of no-knock searches. I should have added that if it becomes the norm for users to keep everything in RAM in order to obstruct even potential investigations, that too will increase the likelihood of no-knock searches. --Mike -- Mike Godwin, (617) 864-0665 |"If the doors of perception were cleansed mnemonic@eff.org | every thing would appear to man as it is, Electronic Frontier | infinite." Foundation | --Blake
cirby@vaxb.acs.unt.edu ((C. Irby)) (12/19/90)
In article <1990Dec18.021419.2214@eff.org>, mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes: > In article <1990Dec18.020803.2058@eff.org> mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes: >> >>What I said was, if you set out to obstruct justice, and you >>announce your intention to do so, you will increase the likelihood >>of no-knock searches. > > I should have added that if it becomes the norm for users to keep > everything in RAM in order to obstruct even potential investigations, > that too will increase the likelihood of no-knock searches. I have a minor question- Why should they have to enter the house to "search" the computer? I can sit down with a couple of hundred dollars worth of equipment and an antenna and read everything scrolling down your terminal from *across the street*... why bother with entering the house? Electronic security is a joke for most of the computers in the U.S.- if the government wants to find out what you're doing, they can just videotape your actions in real time. This way, they wouldn't have to do much more than sit across the street from your place and drink coffee for a few nights. Getting ready for a "no-knock" search is a big waste of time... -- C Irby Internet: cirby@vaxa.acs.unt.edu Bitnet: cirby@untvax ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| || WARNING! This .signature has been found to be hazardous to your || || health. If you accidentally read this .sig, report to your local || || health authorities for decontamination and disposal. ||
mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) (12/20/90)
In article <1990Dec19.121253.43876@vaxb.acs.unt.edu> cirby@vaxb.acs.unt.edu ((C. Irby)) writes: > >I have a minor question- > >Why should they have to enter the house to "search" the computer? > >I can sit down with a couple of hundred dollars worth of equipment >and an antenna and read everything scrolling down your terminal from >*across the street*... why bother with entering the house? What makes you certain that the data the government wants will be "scrolling down" the terminal? What if the data they want is on a hard disk and is accessed irregularly? --Mike -- Mike Godwin, (617) 864-0665 |"If the doors of perception were cleansed mnemonic@eff.org | every thing would appear to man as it is, Electronic Frontier | infinite." Foundation | --Blake
cirby@vaxb.acs.unt.edu ((C. Irby)) (12/20/90)
In article <1990Dec19.232250.12875@eff.org>, mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes: > In article <1990Dec19.121253.43876@vaxb.acs.unt.edu> cirby@vaxb.acs.unt.edu ((C. Irby)) writes: >>I can sit down with a couple of hundred dollars worth of equipment >>and an antenna and read everything scrolling down your terminal from >>*across the street*... why bother with entering the house? > > What makes you certain that the data the government wants will be > "scrolling down" the terminal? What if the data they want is on > a hard disk and is accessed irregularly? In that case, they wouldn't see it- but if they are after some Evil Hacker Person, that person would probably look in on their ill-gotten data from time to time, and just getting a suspicious filename up on the screen would be enough in the current atmosphere... "Well, Your Honor, I observed the defendant in the process of his work, and the file in question- foobar.lst- was listed in a directory on the screen. Acting promptly, I entered the house and confiscated the file and the equipment in question." Incidentally- isn't the current rule for radiated electronic signals pretty loose? Can the police (and Feds) listen in on computer signals freely, just like a portable phone? Or do they have to get a court order? -- C Irby Internet: cirby@vaxa.acs.unt.edu Bitnet: cirby@untvax ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| || WARNING! This .signature has been found to be hazardous to your || || health. If you accidentally read this .sig, report to your local || || health authorities for decontamination and disposal. ||
pjs269@tijc02.uucp (Paul Schmidt) (12/20/90)
From article <1990Dec3.074612.42317@vaxb.acs.unt.edu>, by cirby@vaxb.acs.unt.edu ((C. Irby)): > In article <1990Dec03.034248.21073@ddsw1.MCS.COM>, zane@ddsw1.MCS.COM (Sameer Parekh) writes: >> >> You say that they don't knock so therefore, stuff kept in RAM >> wouldn't be lost when they took it. Yet I haven't heard of any >> raids where the raiders did a memory dump before they took the computers. >> (Having to unplug it along the way.) > > ..you have to remember that the Feds aren't very sophisticated on this. > > Heck, they couldn't even figure out how to use a set of keys to open > the filing cabinets encountered during Sun Devil. Instead of opening > them in a normal fashion (with an offered set of keys), they used > crowbars... > > Really enhances my faith in their ability to find stuff in RAM. > > Or ROM. > > Or on disk (I have this image of some guy in a cheap suit sitting there > holding floppies up to the light: "Nope. Nothing on this one... or this > one... or this one either! They must have erased these things- I can't > find any printing on *any* of them...") > I remember that Len Rose wrote that he had to pack up the computers for the Feds. They were ready to throw them into the back of a moving van and take off with them. Just imagine the unparked winchester disk head banging into the disk all the way to the police station. When the disk didn't work, they probably blame it on a boobytrap, and honestly believe their own story! -------------- Paul Schmidt - pauls@kk4fs.uucp
merlyn@digibd.com (Brian Westley (Merlyn LeRoy)) (12/27/90)
mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes:
<>[ the same argument we've been having for 3x2 articles or so ]
<>
<>Short summary:
<>I sez "Keep everything in RAM"
<>Mike sez "That will possibly increase no-knock searches"
<I said no such thing.
<What I said was, if you set out to obstruct justice, and you
<announce your intention to do so, you will increase the likelihood
<of no-knock searches.
And *I* said no such thing.
<>Most of this seems to boil down to how each of us deals with
<>[real or potential] abuses of authority. I prefer a more
<>confrontational/defiant response compared to Mike (at least
<>in this instance).
<I prefer to deal with the abuses of authority by depriving law
<enforcement of any rational basis for gratuitous no-knock searches.
<Of course, my work becomes much harder whenever someone announces
<his intention to obstruct justice by boobytrapping his data.
Again, *I* said no such thing.
<--Mike
----
Merlyn LeRoyzane@ddsw1.MCS.COM (Sameer Parekh) (12/31/90)
I don't get this no-knock keep everything in RAM business. . . I know the feds are dumb and may not realize this, if you keep everything in RAM, it won't make a difference if they knock or not. . . They WILL NOT attach a battery to the thing or do a RAM dump. -- zane@ddsw1.MCS.COM